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DESCRIPTION OF THESIS 
`PRIME MINISTERS & CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 1960-74' 
JON DAVIS 
This thesis anatomises the high watermark of belief in administrative and 
institutional remedies to the deeply-felt relative economic and absolute military decline of 
Britain in the years after the Second. World War. It analyses the second half of the 
Macmillan years, the administration of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the first two 
premierships of Harold Wilson (but not the period from 1974-76 which saw little 
reformist activity) and the three-and-a-half years that Edward Heath occupied No. 10 
Downing Street. The approach has been to look at the prime ministers' plans, examine 
how these were embraced by the Civil Service and analyse the results. 
The period 1960-74 saw a great many major reforms to the machinery of 
government, all of which are analysed. Significant new findings include the struggle over 
the demarcation `concordat' between the Treasury and the Department of Economic 
Affairs in 1964; the way that the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary acted 
against the senior civil servant handling the reception of the Fulton Report; the fact that 
Harold Wilson developed a keen interest in the `hiving off' of parts of the public sector in 
1969; how, after the Heath Government was elected in 1970, the Civil Service took the 
massive political planning undertaken prior to government and effectively cherry-picked 
what it wanted, turning the dynamism for reform to its own advantage; the remarkable 
lack of interest in Programme Analysis and Review; and the way that the Central Policy 
Review Staff was sidelined in Heath's last weeks. 
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Introduction 
The study of prime ministers and the reform of British central government in any 
era is fascinating. The interaction between the temporary, often inexperienced but largely 
elected ministers - especially those in the top job, and the always highly-educated and 
usually experienced yet theoretically subservient senior civil servants who comprise the 
permanent side of government, would provide great interest on its own. The analysis of 
personalities is intrinsically attractive. But if you add in rivalry between and inside the 
`governing tribes', ' and the rise of a class of `special advisers' somewhere in between, 
you have the makings of an absorbing analysis. Set this against a backdrop of a 
powerfully-felt relative economic decline which lasted several decades, years which also 
'saw an absolute reduction in the UK's global clout alongside a fast-changing social 
scene, and the story becomes compelling for anyone interested in the workings of British 
governance. During the years 1960-74, all these elements mingled and engendered 
numerous myths and legends - as well as real lessons - which are remembered in British 
government to this day. 
Several treatments of the period 1960-74 have appeared before. There is the 
cumulative, daily `first rough draft of history' in the press. ' Then there are countless 
1 Peter Hennessy, `Britain's Governing Tribes', The Tablet, 4 October 2003. 
2 Philip Graham used the phrase when he bought Newsweek, the international news magazine in 1961, 
quoted from Michael Cockerell, Peter Hennessy and David Walker, Sources Close to the Prime Minister: 
1 
articles and books which concentrate on one or more of the specific elements. Finally, we 
have the books which attempt to gather all the issues and synthesise them Perhaps the 
best known of these is Peter Hennessy's Whitehall. ' Another which dealt with the themes 
in a much more concise way was Kevin Theakston's The Civil Service Since 1945.4 
Gavin Drewry and Tony Butcher's text book, The Civil Service Today (published in 1988 
and updated in 1991), offered a highly valuable introduction to the world of Whitehall 
and `how things came to be' by the late 1980s. 5 Manipulating the Machine, Christopher 
Pollitt's excellent inquiry into the reform of the government's central machinery, 
published in 1984, offered an admirable analysis of the changes which took place through 
many interviews with many of the most relevant figures throughout the years 1960-83.6 
Pollitt's study was completed without access to the official documents of the time. 
Geoffrey Fry's highly detailed work on the Fulton Report, Reforming the Civil Service, 
published in 1993, did, however, have the distinction of being based on the relevant 
documents some time before the thirty-year rule released them to the general public. ' The 
declassification of Fulton-related records for the period after 1968 which is covered in 
chapter three of this thesis, adds intriguingly to Fry's work. 
The overall narrative in all these books is mostly similar. For the history of British 
administration is largely, at the highest level, uncontentious. It is not a story of competing 
policies - that would be political history, or even the history of ideas. Administrative 
Inside the Hidden World of the News Manipulators, (Macmillan, 1984), p. 89. All books were published in 
London unless otherwise stated. 
3 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (Secker and Warburg, 1989). 
4 Kevin Theakston, The Civil Service Since 1945 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995). 
s Gavin Drewry and Tony Butcher, The Civil Service Today (Blackwell, Oxford, 1991). 
6 Christopher Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine (George Allen and Unwin, 1984). 
7 Geoffrey Fry, Reforming the Civil Service (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1993). 
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history is concerned with a political party's plans and, more specifically, how those plans 
are put into practice, or at least attempted. 
This thesis retraces ground previously trodden, but for the first time with virtually 
all of the central government archive open. What emerges diverges little from Hennessy 
and Theakston's work at the top end. There are, however, many new leads, angles and 
fragments of documentary evidence which provide fresh light on familiar events. 
Declassified documents often loosen the tongues of heretofore notoriously discreet retired 
senior officials. The archive plus the oral testimonies of these aged `desk warriors' gives 
what Churchill might have described as `beginning of the end' of the story. For though 
this study attempts to be as comprehensive as possible, it covers many years of activity, 
and so some areas might well benefit from much closer scrutiny in the future. It is in a 
sense a hybrid of specialisation and generalism, something of which officialdom itself 
(especially after the Fulton Report) should heartily approve. It has proved challenging to 
keep exactly to the topic in question - the why, how and evaluation of administrative 
reform - when so many other aspects affect it, for example, economic performance and 
the ebb and flow of political support. The context is important but has been kept brief. 
The hybrid nature is most keenly seen in the manner in which the study has been 
conducted. The methodology began with a comprehensive trawl through all of the 
secondary material available alongside biographies, autobiographies, memoirs and 
diaries. The period studied here has been particularly well covered, the Wilson 
governments of 1964-70 especially so. Just about every significant figure has given his or 
her account, sometimes in different formats, including the Cabinet diarists Richard 
Crossnman, Barbara Castle and Tony Benn. A good knowledge of all of these occasionally 
3 
misleading accounts (for example, the conflict of opinion between Harold Wilson and 
George Browns over the early days of the Department of Economic Affairs) is essential if 
one is attempting to find the gaps in the history, and seeking to bring new value to 
existing knowledge before developing a new synthesis. Once this was completed, 
immersion in the primary material followed. 
For any study of prime ministers and the reform of British central government there 
is only one place that can bring the necessary illumination to a story that requires an 
understanding of the political and bureaucratic interface, and that is the Public Record 
Office now under the umbrella of The National Archives. For this study, the Prime 
Minister's Office, or PREM, files are crucial as they hold virtually all of the papers and 
letters which the Prime Minister sees, writes and comments upon (though documents 
relating to intelligence matters are usually not included here). It is these files, created for 
Harold Macmillan, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Harold Wilson and Edward Heath which 
form the backbone of this work. But, being a hybrid, if a particular lead encourages 
investigation into departmental records this has then been pursued, leading to a thesis 
which has a strong central trunk with many off-shoots. If work has sometimes been 
suggested in archives other than those at Kew, these too have been investigated. 
The final element is oral testimony - vital because so much of the history of 
government is not written down. This can be for several reasons, not all sinister. There is, 
understandably, a reluctance on occasion to write down very sensitive matters which 
might then be leaked or used in future as evidence. But the modem problem of leaking, 
while undoubtedly a difficulty for Wilson in his governments of the 1960s (but scarcely 
one at all in the Heath Government that followed), was not on the scale of the 1980s, the 
4 
1990s and in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Another reason is that while a 
great many meetings in Whitehall are minuted, the sheer weight of consultation that 
occurs between colleagues, within and between departments, with Parliament, companies, 
overseas governments, international institutions and other outside interest groups means 
that much is necessarily lost. A further point is that personal observation, not written 
down at the time, can be compelling. This is naturally a danger given the passing of time 
and the blurring and selectivity of memory. One way of keeping interviewees `on the 
rails' of what actually happened, sometimes over thirty years ago (and in some cases, 
such as the interviews conducted with figures such as Sir Frank Cooper, former 
Permanent Under Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, about events over half-a-century 
ago), is to present them with documents unearthed at the Public Record Office and to 
conduct the interview around the papers. This brings great benefit in retaining the 
relevance but, more importantly, it jogs the memory as nothing else can. 
The investigation, though inevitably tracing some threads back before 1960, starts 
at that date because it essentially marks what Sir Samuel Brittan, economic commentator 
with the Financial Times since 1966, described as `the re-appraisal of the 1960s'. 8 Just as 
the Thatcherite reforms of the 1980s can reasonably be said to have begun (however 
slowly) with the Callaghan Government in the aftermath of the 1976 sterling crisis, an 
account of the reforms which Harold Wilson enthusiastically pursued after his election 
victory in 1964 would be incomplete without an explanation of Harold Macmillan's 
change of direction. This occurred after the Conservatives' landslide majority in the 1959 
election. The reasons for Macmillan's shift towards what he described as `a little 
Sir Samuel Brittan, `A backward glance: The reappraisal of the 1960s, ' lecture given to the Institute of 
Contemporary British History, April 1997. 
5 
dirigismei9 and which resulted in the reorganisation of the Treasury and the creation of 
the tripartite National Economic Development Council ('Neddy'), both in 1962 as part of 
his drive for economic growth, will be examined along with their effectiveness. 
The Labour years of 1964-70 which entrenched and deepened Macmillan's 
interventionist shift form chapters two and three. These were hectic years of enthusiasm, 
movement and disaster, all against a background of repeated and worsening exchange 
rate crises, deteriorating industrial relations and an economy seemingly falling ever faster 
behind its major competitors. The creation of the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) 
was meant to take on the work of `Neddy' and to ally this limited `dirigisme' to a much 
more statist and interventionist view of how to turn the country's economic fortunes 
around. The DEA was born of high hopes but was laid to rest just five years later after a 
battle royal with the Treasury over who controlled the direction of economic policy. An 
investigation into its creation and its perhaps inevitable demise forms much of chapter 
two. 
The other big department created in 1964 was the Ministry of Technology or 
Mintech. (There were three other newcomers: the Ministry of Overseas Development, the 
Ministry of Land and Natural Resources and the Welsh Office. ) Mintech's establishment 
was in response to a growing unease over Britain's perceived failure to convert its 
scientific prowess into economic advantage. The new department was supposed to be in 
the frontline of Wilson's battle to forge a new scientific socialism which would bring 
sustained and high levels of economic growth Yet Mintech started off slowly and only 
by the late 1960s - when it assumed some of the dying DEA's functions - was it 
9 Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day (Macmillan, 1973), p. 37. 
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beginning to look as if it might achieve the size and power that would enable it to be a 
major player in Whitehall. 
The importation of several high-level politically-appointed special advisers in 1964 
will also be covered. With Whitehall slow to recruit economists after 1945 and the belief 
on the left that the Civil Service was irredeemably centre-right, Labour decided to bring 
in such figures as Thomas Balogh to the Cabinet Office and Nicholas Kaldor and Robert 
Neild to the Treasury. Wilson's appointment of Marcia Williams as his Personal and 
Political Secretary in No. 10 was perhaps the most significant of all. How they fitted into 
the Whitehall ecosystem and the long-term significance of these developments will be 
considered throughout the thesis but mostly in chapter two. 
Eighteen months after coming to power, Wilson set up the Fulton Committee to 
look at the recruitment, training and management of civil servants, though steering it 
away from key areas such as minister-official relations and the machinery of government. 
The Fulton Report which emerged in 1968 became legendary for its difficult gestation, its 
immediate reception and the mini-civil war which developed within Whitehall over its 
partial implementation, as will be seen in chapter three. The aftermath of the Report, 
though effectively over by the early 1970s in terms of immediate impact and 
implementation, reverberated throughout that decade (and beyond, as many of its 
recommendations were enacted in a piecemeal fashion over three decades), with 
question-marks over the power of elected politicians to exert their will vis-ä-vis their 
permanent officials. The Fulton Report remains an undoubted landmark in the 
administrative history of Britain. 
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With Heath's unexpected election victory (unexpected to all but him, that is1°), the 
era of faith in the state's ability to effect a step-change in economic performance reached 
its zenith. Although elected on a platform with a vague commitment to reduce the role of 
government in the economy and society, " the reverse in fact took place. Two significant 
new additions to the institutions of Whitehall, the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS or 
`think tank') and Programme Analysis and Review (PAR), were established, with the 
hope not of reducing government machinery but of making what was already there work 
much better. Both had several parents, often a political and an official one, who wanted 
very different outcomes for their offspring. For example, PAR was originally planned by 
the Conservatives in opposition as a ruthless apparatus to concentrate minds on deciding 
whether a particular government activity was being done well, could be done better or 
should not be done by government at all. But by the time of its creation it had mutated 
into a highly bureaucratic scrutiny machine for long-term policy. Subtly different this 
may at first appear, but in practice a world apart as it now had no real cutting edge. with 
which to axe failing or unnecessary projects as was first envisioned. 
An even greater gap existed between the original planning of the `think tank' for 
the Prime Minister and what transpired. This began in the minds of Heath's advisers as a 
way of coldly analysing competing spending paths. Within Whitehall, meanwhile, there 
was a growing sense of a need for an analytical unit at the very heart of British 
government which could bring wisdom and clarity to intricate and frequently thorny 
problems, ones which often involved several departments. Again, the bureaucracy won 
the battle of ideas (perhaps more specifically the battle of practicality) and the CPRS was 
10 Douglas Hurd, An End to Promises (Collins, 1979), p. 25. 
8 
established in 1971 under the highly entertaining but idiosyncratic leadership of the third 
Lord Rothschild. The CPRS became an analytical unit effectively under the control of the 
Prime Minister as the political planners wanted, but without the purely financial focus 
they had deemed necessary in their pre-election analysis. The CPRS became the flagship 
for the Heath reforms, enjoying a first two years of great influence, before it gradually 
became just another analytical component at the Prime Minister's disposal. 
Heath's `quiet revolution"2 as he described his administrative changes, were 
heralded in The Reorganisation of Central Government of October 1970.13 The White 
Paper included other elements beyond PAR and the CPRS, the most significant of which 
was the move toward merging several departments into fewer larger ones. The creation of 
super-departments such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department of 
Health and Social Security (both in 1968), along with the gradually enlarging Mintech 
(throughout the later 1960s) which became the Department of Trade and Industry, and the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government which turned into the Department of the 
Environment (the latter two developments in 1970), was often for different specific 
reasons, but all fitted in with the prevailing management theory of `big is beautiful', due 
to the internal economies of scale that could be offered. This was taken to a new level in 
the early Heath years as it also coincided with his wish to have a smaller Cabinet. But 
events conspired to undo the attempt. The Heath Cabinet got bigger as the DTI was 
broken up under immense political pressure. The gestation of The Reorganisation of 
Central Government White Paper, its implementation and how the developments handled 
tl lain Dale (ed. ), `A Better Tomorrow', Conservative Party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997 
(Routledge, Oxford, 2000), p. 197. 
12 See Conservative Party conference 1970, Conservative Research Department archives, Conservative 
Party Archives, Bodleian Library, Oxford University. 
9 
the growing political, industrial and economic malaise of the 1970s is analysed in 
chapters four and five. 
The thesis ends with the resignation of Heath in March 1974. Wilson's return did 
not provide for a re-run of his earlier administrations' lust for institutional reform, save 
for the creation of the Downing Street Policy Unit, a formalisation of advice. from the 
special advisers whom he had incorporated into government in 1964. The fact that the 
PREM archive for 1976 will only become available at the National Archives in January 
2007 also means that the end of the Heath Government in 1974 provides a neat cut off 
point. 
Throughout the study, several themes will be examined. Firstly, the aforementioned 
relative economic decline. This proved to be a touchstone of those working in and writing 
about central government from the late 1950s to the 1990s. But by the early years of the 
twenty-first century, and with the UK having enjoyed unbroken and substantial economic 
growth between 1992 and 2006, the general view has consequently altered. 14 But though 
the post-war period of the UK's severe and rapid relative decline undeniably came to an 
end, it does not lessen the palpable feelings which living through the decline engendered 
in the minds of those who worked in Whitehall or wrote about government. It formed a 
backdrop which coloured analysis and stimulated many of the reforms to central 
government which will be covered. 
A theme which proved much more contentious among analysts was that of the post- 
war consensus. This notion saw a country essentially at ease with itself in the post-war 
era where a mixed economy (albeit with fierce arguments about the public/private 
13 The Reorganisation of Central Government (HMSO, 1970), Cmnd. 4506. 
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proportions of the mixes) and a comprehensive welfare state were accepted across the 
mainstream political spectrum and where opponents of these found their voices heard 
only with difficulty. An acceptance of a broad consensus did not mean, of course, that 
everything was agreed as there were always many specific items which were beyond 
consensus, aspects of public ownership especially. The dates of this consensus are 
generally thought to be the mid-1940s (the publication of the Beveridge Report of 194216 
and the Employment White Paper of 194417 are the cornerstones) through to the late 
1970s. But as this research shows, among those in the Conservative Party who conducted 
detailed planning in the run-up to the Heath Government were some keen to destroy the 
mixed economy aspect of the consensus equation. Many of the changes the Heath 
Administration enacted had at their heart an attempt to roll back the state. As we shall 
see, the bulk of these, if not all, were thwarted. This brings us to further themes which 
will be woven in. 
Firstly, the whole question of Civil Service power. Sir Warren Fisher, Head of the 
Civil Service 1919-39, tried hard in the inter-war period to make his Civil Service 
respected as one of the `four Crown Services', alongside the army, navy and air force. 18 
The power of the Civil Service was strongly underpinned by its sterling work, in 
organising the country during the Second World War, alongside gifted outsiders recruited 
for the duration. 19 It was further enhanced by the post-war move to draw much of the 
14 Philip Thornton, `Sleight of hand fails to hide gaping holes in public purse', The Independent, 17 March 
2005; See Gordon Brown's 2005 Budget statement (www. hmrc. gov. uk/budget2005). 
is See Paul Addison, The Road to 1945 (Cape, 1975); Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, Consensus 
Politics from Attlee to Major (Blackwell, Oxford, 1994); and Harriet Jones and Michael Kandiah (eds. ), 
The Myth of Consensus (Macmillan, 1996). 
16 Social Insurance and Allied Services, Cmnd. 6404 (HMSO, 1942). 
17 Employment Policy, Cmnd. 6527 (HMSO, 1944). 
18 Kevin Theakston, Leadership In Whitehall (Macmillan, 1999), p. 50. 
19 See Hennessy, Whitehall, pp. 88-119. 
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economy into the state and the creation of a comprehensive welfare system, largely 
administered by the central state, as 2,304,200 people moved from the private to the 
public sector between 1945 and 1951.20 As responsibilities and reach grew, so did the size 
and the might of the Civil Service as opposed to the wider public sector (in 1938 there 
existed a total of 581,000 civil servants; in 1960 996,00021). In the period dealt with here, 
there were many questions, from both left and right, over whether the senior Civil Service 
wielded too much power - and if the right kind of individuals were being recruited and 
promoted in the first place. 
Another, related theme was that of the widespread belief in the considerable use of 
state power as an instrument of modernisation during the first thirty years of the post-war 
era. In effect, this thesis looks at the why and the how of the attempts by both 
Conservative and Labour governments to use the state to bring about economic 
renaissance and social advance in Britain. Its main protagonists were Macmillan, Wilson 
and Heath The failures of some aspects of this ambitious approach, with the major 
economic indicators of inflation, unemployment, growth and the balance of payments all 
performing poorly and industrial strife destroying hopes of a tripartite solution, led quite 
clearly to the late 1970s rise of the New Right and the dawn of Thatcherism. Such ideas 
had been around for some time (even the word `privatisation' was coined before Heath 
entered Downing Street in June 197022) but it took the undeniable failure of the state and 
its civil servant operators from the late 1960s to allow these relatively extreme ideas 
20 Henry Pelling, The Labour Governments 1945-51 (Macmillan, 1984), p. 90. 
21 David Butler & Gareth Butler, Twentieth-Century British Political Facts, 1900-2000 (Macmillan, 2000), 
p. 309. 
22 David Howell, A New Style Of Government (Conservative Political Centre, 1970), p. 8. 
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(certainly compared to those dominant during the heyday of the post-war consensus) to 
come to the fore. 
Other, more specific, themes that will be addressed include an analysis of how the 
individual prime ministers viewed the Civil Service - as a whole and more particularly 
the centre - and what they planned for it, both in government and when in opposition. 
There will also be an on-going look at the relative importance of Civil Service, party- 
political and other pressures upon the prime ministers and how all these varying 
influences, combined with their personal views, affected their ability to effect change. A 
link will also be made to other analyses of the dynamics of administrative reform 
Finally, an assessment of the impact the prime ministers had on Whitehall will provided. 
How British prime ministers attempted reform of British central government during 
the years 1960-74 is, therefore, a substantial story. It deals with both long and short-term 
institutional, social, economic and political issues. It encompasses all areas of central 
government, from the `hardware' of state (its structures and institutions) to the `software' 
(the people who formulate policy, take decisions and shape it every day). 23 It looks at the 
many changes which took place in fourteen years which in retrospect appears the high- 
watermark of faith in government-framed and administrative solutions to economic 
problems. This thesis analyses why this was so, what was done as a result of this belief 
and evaluates each reform and examines why so much activity was followed by so little 
as the appetite for administrative reform waned for twenty years after the fall of the Heath 
Government. 
23 Lord Bancroft, speaking at the Gresham College seminar, `In the Steps of Walter Bagehot: A 
Constitutional Health-Check', 13 March 1995. 
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Chapter 1- Cracks 
Pressure for reform of the British Civil Service 
1853-1964 
The High Watermark 
The Civil Service was under great pressure in 1964. It was accused in the years 
running up to Harold Wilson's first electoral victory of everything from under-skilled 
impotency to wielding too much undemocratic, elitist power. A seemingly failing 
economy, a speedy retreat from empire and a country adrift of the integrating nations 
of western Europe meant that British confidence was at a low ebb. Disaffection was 
given form by a rash of publications which attempted' to demonstrate how a once 
proud country was in swift decline. Books such as Andrew Shonfield's British 
Economic Policy Since the War (1958), ' Michael Shanks's The Stagnant Society: A 
Warning (1961)2 and Anthony Sampson's Anatomy of Britain (1962)3 differed in their 
analysis of decline but all included the British State amongst their reasons for the 
UK's failure. 4 Though not as initially famous, an article from a left-wing Hungarian- 
born economist in 1959 was to prove more significant for the Civil Service of the 
1 Andrew Shonfield, British Economic Policy Since The War (Penguin, 1958). 
2 Michael Shanks, The Stagnant Society: A Warning (Penguin, 1961). 
3 Anthony Sampson, Anatomy of Britain (Hodder and Stoughton, 1962). 
° Shanks's work was one of the `Penguin Specials', many of which were concerned directly with the 
mid-century `decline' question. See Matthew Grant, `Historians, the Penguin Specials and the 'State- 
of-the-Nation' Literature, 1958-64, ' Contemporary British History, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), 
pp. 29-54. 
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1960s. `The Apotheosis of the Dilettante' by Thomas Balogh (who was to become 
Economic Adviser to the Cabinet in 1964) had as its sole target the senior civil 
servants themselves, castigating them for their amateurism, self-righteousness and 
self-protection. 5 Just before the election in 1964, Balogh was part of a Fabian group 
which developed the themes he had previously expounded, in a more measured way, 
in The Administrators. 6 This pamphlet sought to avoid simply pointing out 
shortcomings and offered practical roads to reform All of these writings, amid an 
atmosphere of general dissatisfaction, led Professor WJM Mackenzie to note in 1963: 
`Administrative reform is a phrase that has hardly been heard since the eighteen-fifties 
until recently. '? This was a great contrast to the mood just a decade-and-a-half before. 
For, in the afterglow of victory in the Second World War, the British Civil Service 
was widely held to have been the most effective bureaucracy of the warring nations. 8 
In order to chart this extraordinary turnaround, we must begin in that `adventure 
playground for all the talents'9 - wartime Whitehall. 
When Britain declared war on Germany in September 1939, a complex planning 
operation that had been gearing up for several years sprang into action. Learning the 
lessons of the opening months of the First World War when many of the young and 
best-educated men of the British Isles had been killed on the Western Front1° and 
when it took several years to get the structure and people right, a substantial list had 
been compiled of those whom the State felt it could profitably use in the wartime 
$ Thomas Balogh, `The Apotheosis of the Dilettante', in Hugh Thomas (ed. ), The Establishment (A. 
Blond, 1959). 
6 Fabian Society, The Administrators (Fabian Tract 355,1964). 
7 W. J. M. Mackenzie, `Does Our Administration Need Reform? ' (The Listener, 21 February 1963). 
'Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (Secker and Warburg, 1989), p. 118. 
9 Ibid., p. 54. 
10 Lord Penney quoted in ibid., p. 88. 
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bureaucracy and how they would be used. " Individuals from all walks of professional 
life, academics and industrialists, young and old alike, were to be absorbed as the 
State mushroomed. As existing ministries expanded and new ones grew 
exponentially, the `irregulars' 12 merged into the machine and some truly excelled. 
Oliver Franks, philosophy don on the outbreak of war, was the best example. He 
unprecedentedly rose from principal to permanent secretary in just six years. 13 
Although the star performer, he was not alone in his success, with `Many of the 
established civil servants who were originally most opposed to the new recruits 
[coming] to regard them as a stimulating influence. ' 4 
Civil servants had their moments, too, as the suffocating inter-war grade 
cementation was temporarily swept aside. 15 The role of experts was also crucial as 
Winston Churchill, Prime Minister from May 1940, came to depend on analysis from 
newly created groupings such as the Statistical Section (created in 1939 when 
Churchill returned to the Admiralty and which followed him across Horse Guards 
Parade when he became Prime Minister). The wartime Civil Service, with its blend of 
established and temporary, expert and generalist officials, raised its game 
impressively during the war to make Britain probably the most fully mobilised society 
on either side. 16 The Whitehall fort had been overrun and was unquestionably the 
better for it. 
11 Hennessy, Whitehall, pp. 94-102. 
12 George Brown probably coined the phrase according to Samuel Brittan, Steering the Economy 
(Pelican, 1971), pp. 55-6. 
13 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 94. 
14 Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 56. 
is Hennessy, Whitehall, pp. 106-7. 
16 Ibid., pp. 114,118. 
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The State also set in motion during the war the study of future responsibilities 
which were to change the political landscape of the United Kingdom out of all 
recognition. The Beveridge Report of 194217 drew up plans for a comprehensive 
welfare state while the wartime coalition's 1944 Employment Policy White Paper" 
looked at ways in which government could sustain high and stable employment (but 
significantly not total-employment). 19 Moreover, there were also the substantial 
nationalisations which Whitehall had not planned during 1940-45 (the National 
Health Service apart) but which Labour enacted after its 1945 victory. The acceptance 
of these new responsibilities was to bring difficulties to a Civil Service keen on 
largely unbending continuity with pre-war practices, as would gradually become 
apparent. 
The Civil Service, therefore, entered the post-war world rejuvenated and 
supremely confident. Yet, in its moment of triumph, the seeds of future under- 
performance were sown. For, as soon as hostilities ended, the very high quality 
irregulars left virtually en masse, 20 not attracted by the pay or. the atmosphere of 
Whitehall once the wartime emergency was over. 21 Those irregulars with previously 
established careers went back to their universities and firms, while many of the 
younger ones sought pastures new. This severely depleted the Civil Service of exactly 
the kind of enthusiasm and skill that the bureaucracy needed as, over the space of only 
six years, it substituted administering total war for making real the ambitious wartime 
plans for welfare and economic management. This was to be explicitly recognised by 
17 Social Insurance and Allied Services, Cmnd. 6404, HMSO, 1942. 
is Employment Policy, Cmnd. 6527, HMSO, 1944. 
19 B. W. E. Alford, British Economic Performance 1945-1975 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1995), p. 14. 
20 Kevin Theakston, The Civil Service Since 1945 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995), p. 68. 
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the Head of the Civil Service, Sir Edward Bridges. 22 Bridges did not, however, allow 
his regret to get in the way of the newly emboldened Civil Service's `institutional 
conservatism'. 23He simply felt that the irregulars had proved wonderfully effective 
and now that most of them had gone, the Service must go back to doing things as they 
had done prior to the War and with the same people. 
In fact, by the early 1950s there were very few of the wartime temporaries left. 
Some, like Richard `Otto' (a pseudonym from his pre-war financial journalism days24 
which apparently referred to his trademark spectacles25) Clarke, became permanent 
but those who did not were gradually removed. Sir Frank Cooper, who joined the Air 
Ministry in 1948 after wartime service in the Royal Air Force, explained that `people 
well up the ladder wanted to get back out into the private sector and earn some money 
again' and that those not in senior positions `could be held to have got in through the 
back door by some kind of favouritism'. `The Civil Service in those days, ' Sir Frank 
explained, `was very prudish and rules were not meant to be broken. '26 The staleness 
which many began to note in the 1950s was partly due to the return to `normality' as 
the war years receded. 27 Reviews of the Civil Service did take place during this 
period, but they were invariably internalised affairs (in practice if not in theory) and 
ultimately unambitious. 28 
21 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 124. 
22 Ibid., p. 122. 
23 Kevin Theakston, Leadership in Whitehall (Macmillan, 1999), p. 82. 
2' Leo Pliatzky, Getting and Spending (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982), p. 34. 
25 Comment by Professor Peter Burnham, Warwick University, 27 January 2005. 
26 Interview with Sir Frank Cooper, 13 June 2001. 
27 Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 35. 
28 See the Anderson Committee (which trickled into the public domain in the 1946 Oxford Romanes 
Lecture) in National Archives (NA) T 273/9 `Civil Service organisation: setting up of ministerial and 
official committees and papers concerning draft White Paper on Future of Civil Service'; Whitehall, 
pp. 129-131; the Royal Commission on the Civil Service (the Priestley Commission), Cmnd. 9613, 
HMSO, 1955 -a 'narrow inquiry into pay and conditions of service', Theakston, The Civil Service 
is 
This generally blase attitude contrasted sharply with the approach of a Labour 
backbencher and businessman, Geoffrey Cooper, who wrote to Clement Attlee on 12 
February 1946, urging the Prime Minister to conduct a reform of the Civil Service. 
Cooper pointed directly to the massive new responsibilities the State had taken on 
which negated any possibility of business as usual. 29 But his points were effectively 
ignored. For Attlee and his senior ministers had served in the wartime coalition and 
had found it highly effective . 
30 Furthermore, the left's fears in the 1930s that the Civil 
Service was anti-socialist were assuaged as one nationalisation bill after another 
rolled off the production line. 31 
Attlee, as well as many others (including Professor Harold Laski of the London 
School of Economics), 32 observed that the Civil Service had proved itself democratic 
and effective. Pressure for reform was for Attlee, according to Richard Crossman, 
`left-wing clap-trap', 33 though he had had some interesting, and quite radical, thoughts 
of his own on machinery of government reform, after his early governmental 
experience in the second Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald and his senior 
role in the War Cabinet during the Second World War, thoughts which he did not 
implement once in Downing Street. These included a forerunner of Churchill's 1951- 
Since 1945, pp. 74-5; there was also the ongoing 'application to public administration of scientific 
techniques of management and routine''28 the so-called '0 & M' (Organisation and Methods) 
branches located in the Treasury, Henry Roseveare, The Treasury (Allen Lane, 1969), pp. 246,304. 
29 Hennessy, Whitehall, pp. 121-2. 
30 Ibid., p. 127. 
31 Kevin Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall (Routledge, Oxford, 1992), pp. 141-4. 
32 His most famous works include Authority in the Modern State (Yale University Press, Connecticut, 
USA, 1919), Parliamentary Government in Britain (Allen and Unwin, 1938) and A Grammar of 
Politics (Allen and Unwin, 1948). Laski had been the most vociferous critic of British administration 
but later remarked, according to AJP Taylor, that the 1945-51 Governments which were `put in 
power by popular vote and did what the people wanted, [were] nearer the Marxist idea than any of 
the governments thrown up by revolution, French, Russian or other', A. J. P. Taylor's introduction to 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Penguin, 1967), p. 15. 
"Richard Crossman quoted in Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall, p. 74. 
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53 peacetime co-ordinating `overlords' experiment and significantly strengthening the 
Prime Minister's Office. 34 
That the Civil Service survived the return of Sir Winston Churchill as 
Conservative Prime Minister in 1951 unscathed, especially after the example of 1945, 
demonstrated its political neutrality. This was despite Churchill's private remark soon 
after re-entering Downing Street that the Civil Service had been politicised and was 
`drenched with socialism'. 35 This throwaway aside fitted well with the traditional 
Tory suspicion of bureaucracy (bar defence - the Armed Forces were always seen as 
something different from civil servants in the Service ministries). But it was to be 
short-lived as Churchill settled into the other traditional Conservative approach to the 
Civil Service -a high level of intellectual dependence. 36 
The Civil Service was, therefore, highly self-confident during the immediate 
post-war period, something graphically illustrated by Bridges's amazingly self- 
congratulatory 1950 lecture `Portrait of a Profession', which was rightly described by 
Samuel Brittan as `an inexhaustible quarry of quotations for radical critics'. 37 Bridges 
did understand, though, that the Civil Service had a poor public reputation when he 
observed that `I confidently expect that we shall continue to be grouped with mothers- 
in-law and Wigan Pier as one of the recognized objects of ridicule'. 38 How the Civil 
. Service went 
from supreme self-confidence, able to brush aside all criticism, to one in 
which it even began to question its own abilities, in such a small space of time, is 
truly intriguing. The cause, primarily, was economic. 
34 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister (Penguin, 2000), pp. 155-6. 
's John Colville, The Churchillians (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), p. 64. 
36 Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 187. 
37 Ibid., p. 37. 
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Economics casts a shadow 
With the successful conclusion to the war, Britain was generally on something 
of an understandable high. The exemplary sacrifice of so much to prosecuting the war 
meant many Britons looked forward to a relaxation of effort once it was won. Before 
this could happen, however, the British had to undergo one final push. Britain had to 
be made to pay for itself again, since it had been since 1941 financially reliant on 
America39 (in the form of Lend-Lease initially, and when that was abruptly halted the 
American Loan and then Marshall Aid4). A tremendous export drive was launched as 
it was widely felt that the United Kingdom was in a favourable position to take 
advantage of mainland Europe's devastation to make large strides in post-war world 
markets. 41 The feeling was that the British could now look forward to a rosy 
economic future. 
As the 1950s opened, the Korean War erupted. Widely feared to be the opening 
skirmish in World War Three, 42 the British rearmed substantially, directing resources 
away from the consumer to the military industries through a quadrupling of the 
defence estimates thereby halting the great upswing in exports. 43 Mercifully, a third 
world war failed to materialise but so, unfortunately, did a successfully renewed 
export drive even though the Korean emergency's pressure on resources proved short- 
38 Sir Edward Bridges, 'Portrait of a Profession', Rede Lecture, University of Cambridge, 1950, printed 
by CUP, 1950, p. 33. 
39 Correlli Barnett interviewed in Richard English and Michael Kenny (eds. ), Rethinking British 
Decline (Macmillan, 2000), p. 43. 
ao Richard Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective (Columbia University Press, 
New York, USA, 1980), pp. 165-253. 
41 Geoffrey Owen, From Empire to Europe (HarperCollins, 1999), p. 30. 
42 Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy (John Murray, 2002), p. 92. 
43 Peter Hennessy and Caroline Anstey, `Moneybags and Brains', Strathclyde Analysis Paper (1990), p. 
5. 
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lived. Lord Croham, generally agreed to be `one of the most economically literate 
civil service permanent secretaries' as Permanent Secretary to the Treasury (1968- 
74), 44 felt that the Labour Chancellor, Hugh Gaitskell, was politicking and panicking 
when he diverted the country's resources in such an extreme way and that `we could 
have had a German-style recovery here' but for him. 45 Persistent balance of payments 
crises and the drag of administering the world's second reserve currency alongside a 
business cycle politically, though not very effectively, manipulated from 1955 to 
produce economic booms to coincide with general elections, meant that instead the 
decade was one of fitful growtha6 
Although growth in the early to mid 1950s was not given the primacy it later 
attracted (unemployment was still the main preoccupation 47) the feeling began to 
develop that the British economy was under-performing. The Treasury's 1954 
Economic Survey was perhaps the first publication to draw attention to the UK's 
dwindling share of world trade, 48 though there had been private unease in Whitehall 
since before the end of the War. 49 This was increasingly underlined by the 
comparative statistics that institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development were beginning to publish, which continuously pointed to 
so lagging British performance. 
44 Kevin Theakston, `Allen, Douglas Albert Vivian' entry in John Ramsden (ed. ), The Oxford 
Companion to Twentieth-Century British Politics, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), p. 13. 
45 Lord Croham briefing the `Hidden Wiring' MA option course, 9 February 2005. 
46 Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo, 'Postwar Growth: An Overview', in Economic Growth in 
Europe Since 1945 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), p. 132. 
47 Interview with Sir Donald MacDougall, 21 May 2001. 
48 Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 193. 
49 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 3. 
so Sir Samuel Brittan, `A backward glance: The reappraisal of the 1960s, ' lecture given to the Institute 
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The decline debate which fascinated a generation of historians demonstrates a 
powerful warning about the use of statistics. Depending on the start and end points, 
almost anything can be `proved'. As Hamish McRae of The Independent has 
indicated, Britain began the twentieth century enjoying the world's largest economy 
and finished it in fourth spot behind the United States, Japan and Germany - hardly a 
crash. 51 (An even starker statistic is that Britain also had the fourth largest economy 
way back in 1820, behind China, India and France respectively. 52) With this in mind, 
the post-war acceptance of significant and sustained British decline was clearly 
misplaced. This is not to suggest that Britain did not lose ground economically during 
the 1950s, 1960s and also the 1970s, as it most certainly did. But, while one duty of 
the historian is to dissect the past, another is to try to understand why individual 
protagonists thought and acted as they did. It is entirely understandable why decline 
felt so palpable to contemporary observers, as we shall see. 
Some historians, most notably Correlli Barnett, have unequivocally blamed 
British decline in the fifties, sixties and seventies on the creation of a comprehensive 
welfare state during the final months of the Coalition Government and Attlee 
Administrations; 53 he has also argued that the creation of a generalist career Civil 
Service in the nineteenth century was another great failing. 54 The considerable burden 
which the welfare provision imposed, so the theory went, meant scarce resources were 
directed to unproductive consumption as a way of the UK patting itself on the back 
sl Hamish McRae, 'Lucky Britain's great escape', The Independent, 4 August 2002. 
52 Hamish McRae, `Renaissance of China and India is the renewal of an old relationship', The 
Independent, 26 January 2006. 
53 See Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (Sutton, 1972), The Audit of War (Macmillan, 
1986) and The Lost Victory (Macmillan, 1995). 
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for a (war) job well done. This superficially persuasive theory is not borne out by 
closer scrutiny. As Jose Harris has demonstrated, by 1950 the UK's spending on 
social services as a percentage of gross domestic product was less than West 
Germany, Austria and Belgium; in 1952 it was passed by France and Denmark; in 
1954 by Italy; in 1955 by Sweden; in 1957 by the Netherlands; in 1970 by Norway 
and Finland. For health care the position is even clearer. Studies during the 1950s and 
early 1960s show that `the aggregate volume of per capita health expenditure through 
central, local and private agencies was lower in Britain than anywhere else in Europe 
except Italy and Ireland'. 55 
Higher European spending on social progranunes did not mean poorly 
performing economies, either. Poor growth in Britain contrasted eye-catchingly with 
that of continental Western Europe. Despite the same world financial crises that faced 
Britain in this period (but always remembering that no other country had the 
combined burdens of a reserve currency, an empire and a big defence budget) 
Germany's growth averaged 7.8 per cent per annum over the period 1950-8, Italy 
achieved 5.8 per cent, and France 4.6 per cent. Britain could only muster 2.6 per 
cent56 - interestingly, not dissimilar to America's. 
57 This was respectable by historical 
standards but clearly very poor by contemporary comparison. 58 (The trend continued: 
Me Home Civil Service... encouraged the steady, safe, orthodox man of academic approach, rather 
than the man of, in the words of one senior civil servant, 'intense energy, great driving force and 
devouring zeal' ', The Collapse of British Power, p. 64 
ss Jose Harris, `Enterprise and Welfare States: A Comparative Perspective', Transactions of the Royal 
historical Society, No. 40,1990, p. 180. 
56 Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot (Macmillan, 1998), p. 106. 
57 Brittan, `A backward glance: The reappraisal of the 1960s. ' 
58 Ibid. 
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between 1950 and 1973, Germany averaged 6 per cent in GDP per hour worked, 
France and Italy 5.1 per cent and the UK 2.9 per cent. 59) 
Looked at in world economic terms, the quarter-century after the War are 
regarded as the `Golden Age 60 - `Everywhere growth was faster than before. 
61 It 
subsequently dawned on many in the British circles of influence that the jump in 
continental growth that reconstruction from a low base inevitably brought was 
continuing for a suspiciously long time. 62 This recognition turned into something of a 
`national neurosisi63 (though this was not the first outbreak of declinist gloom - that 
began in the 1870s64 and was followed by another in Edwardian times) fuelled by 
unsubstantiated scare-mongering that the UK was heading for `technical inferiority 
and spiritual weakness in the face of the Soviet challenge'. 65 Even Prince Philip 
joined in when he said in 1962 that `we are suffering a national defeat comparable to 
any lost military campaign, and, what is more, self-inflicted'. 66 The burgeoning 
declinism reached a crescendo with publications such as the best-selling The Anatomy 
of Britain which pictured the UK as `becoming to the twenty-first century what Spain 
was to the eighteenth'. 67 
s' Stephen King, 'Yes, the Sixties were groovy - but it's time for Europe to embrace the modem 
world', The Independent, 31 May 2005. 
60 Interview with Sir Samuel Brittan, 30 May 2001. 
61 Alec Caimcross, 'The Post-war Years 1945-77', in Roderick Floud and Donald McCloskey (eds. ), 
The Economic History of Britain Since 1870, Volume 2 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1981), p. 375. 
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Criticism becomes focused 
Powerfully underpinning the burgeoning economic self-doubt was the foreign 
policy debacle of the Suez Crisis, whereby a hostile USA flexed its financial muscle 
to such effect - in the face of sterling's fragility68 - that it spelt the end for British 
pretensions to independent world-powerdom. As the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony 
Eden, privately put it in `a kind of political last will and testament'69 penned less than 
a fortnight before stepping down from the top job, `we must review our world. 
position and our domestic capacity more searchingly in the light of the Suez 
experience, which has not so much changed our fortunes as revealed realities'. 70 The 
combination of economic and foreign policy failure festered and led to palpable 
national self-recrimination, which in turn led the search for scapegoats. 71 
The re-evaluation was to encompass all aspects of British life in a far-reaching 
re-evaluation of where the country was, how it had got there and where it should go. 
Anthony Sampson, in the early 1960s, felt that the seemingly inexorable decline in the 
country's power and prestige - and the non-reaction from the Civil Service - was 
`producing a crisis almost comparable to the war'. 72 That the government of the war 
years and those since had accepted state economic management as a primary 
responsibility largely through the 1944 Employment White Paper, yet things appeared 
to be going wrong economically, meant that governments and therefore their civil 
servants were very much in the firing line. 
68 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p. 235. 
69 Ibid., p. 246. 
70 National Archives (NA), Public Record Office (PRO), PREM 11/1138, `Lessons after Suez: thoughts 
of Prime Minister', Sir Anthony Eden, "'Thoughts" on the general situation after Suez'. 
71 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 170. 
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Much of the detailed criticism came from left-leaning thinkers who discounted 
the Attlee line that there was nothing wrong with the Civil Service's democratic 
credentials or its ability. For example, Thomas Balogh felt that a future radical Labour 
administration would require root-and-branch reform of the ' system of public 
administration as an `essential pre-condition'73 to extensive social and economic 
change. Moreover, the Fabian team which produced The Administrators included not 
only noticeable left-wing political figures such as Balogh himself, Shirley Williams 
and Anthony Crosland, but also serving civil servants in a private capacity (the Fabian 
Society allows for non-party members), two of whom went on to be Permanent 
Secretaries74 (although these dropped out, claiming the Fabian work was poor3s). 
There were two main elements of criticism which the senior Civil Service faced: 
that they possessed a distinct lack of expertise and a hopelessly elitist attitude, two 
mutually reinforcing drawbacks. Ever since 1853-54 and the founding of the modem 
Civil Service with the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and, much more specifically, 
during the inter-war tenure of Warren Fisher as Head of the Civil Service (1919- 
1939), there had been a definite bias towards what was known as the `generalist'. 76 
The idea was that the expert should be the first one consulted yet the last to take the 
decisions - `on tap but never on top' as the phrase went. 
77 The expert, Fisher believed, 
had too narrow a viewpoint, wanting to solve a problem by the shortest route. This 
was a recipe for tunnel vision. Having been moved between disparate tasks and fields 
72 Sampson, Anatomy of Britain, p. 229. 
73 Balogh, `The Apotheosis of the Dilettante', p. 126. 
74 Hennessy, Whitehall, pp. 172-3; private information. 
75 Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall, p. 116. 
76 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 75. 
77 The exact source of this widely-quoted phrase remains elusive. It is often attributed to Winston 
Churchill during the Second World War. 
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of expertise over many years (what Fisher described as `musical chairs 78), the 
generalist had been schooled continuously in the on-the-job ar? 9 of official-political 
decision-making reality, the generalist believing that the expert was irredeemably 
impractical. This produced, to Anthony Sampson's mind, a `cold war' between 
experts and generalists. 80 Balogh contemptuously dismissed `the absence of training 
[which] does not make for an absence of `theory'. It usually results in a bias towards a 
policy of `do-nothing' in the fond - and jejune - hope that a negative absolves them 
from any responsibility'. 8' 
Although the amateur ethos was not completely reversed, the post-war Treasury 
recognised that Fisher's views were becoming outdated. It took the major step of 
establishing in 1963 the Centre for Administrative Studies, 82 `which inaugurated 
formal courses for Assistant Principals in economics and related subjects' and which 
led to a growing professionalism throughout the 1960s. 83 The traditional lack of 
expertise in the Treasury - Sir Donald MacDougall was appalled at the general 
economic illiteracy when he became Economic Director of the National Economic 
Development Council in 196284 - had a further repercussion. It left the Treasury very 
dependent upon the Bank of England for advice in monetary matters. 85 (As BWE 
Alford has pointed out, `the nationalisation of the Bank of England was regarded as a 
78 Sir Warren Fisher quoted in Kevin Theakston and Geoffrey K. Fry, `Britain's Administrative Elite', 
Public Administration, Vol. 67, Summer 1989, p. 138. 
79 Sampson, Anatomy of Britain, p. 224. 
80 Ibid., p. 227. 
81 Balogh, "The Apotheosis of the Dilettante', p. 103. 
82 Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 33. 
83 Ibid., p. 84. 
" Interview with Sir Donald MacDougall, 21 May 2001. 
85 Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 54. 
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crucial first step in gaining [political] control of banking and finance ... the reverse 
would be nearer the truth'. 86) 
Leaving aside the anomalous wartime emergency experiences, the supreme 
merit of the generalist was underpinned by the iron commitment to sustaining a 
recruitment processes whereby high-fliers were admitted straight from university and 
expected to stay for life, a practice which had developed since Northcote-Trevelyan. 
Earlier in the twentieth-century more mature appointments were sometimes made, 
occasionally all the way up to Permanent Secretary. 87 This was gradually phased-out 
and the almost total reliance on recruitment straight, or very soon after, university 
became standard practice. 88 Not only was this fact criticised, but also that during the 
years 1957-63, eighty-five per cent of those recruited by the Civil Service Selection 
Board (CSSB) to the (top-ranking) Administrative Class were from the Oxbridge 
colleges. 89 As such a high proportion of Oxbridge students came from the public 
schools - between 1948 and 1956 thirty per cent came from boarding schools alone90 
- the charge of elitism had much foundation. 
Public schools came under attack at this time from many quarters. There were 
those who felt that they fostered the antiquated ethos of the Victorian gentleman, 
personified by the archaic figure of the imperial administrator, qualities unsuited to 
the new era of highly specialised, innovatory international capitalism let alone 
running huge public businesses. 91 Apart from the honesty of the average civil servant, 
86 Alford, British Economic Performance 1945-1975, p. 17. 
87 'Britain's Administrative Elite', p. 135. 
88 Ibid., pp. 137,141. 
89 Roseveare, The Treasury, p. 305. 
90 Sampson, Anatomy of Britain, p. 225. 
91 Martin Wiener quoted in English and Kenny (eds. ), Rethinking British Decline, p. 30. 
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Thomas Balogh could see little virtue at all in this recruitment system. 92 Others 
claimed that it was a socially divisive practice93 perpetuating snobbery, and just as 
powerfully-held, inverse-snobbery (in its wake fuelling the destructive industrial 
relations94 which, for many historians, accounted for much of Britain's apparent 
economic anti-miracle 95) 
The Civil Service ignored these specific criticisms by pointing to the unbending 
merit inherent in their recruitment systems - `the first great meritocracy'. 
96 Michael 
Young, in his remarkable study of the past and future of British society, The Rise of 
the Meritocracy, written largely in the early 1950s and eventually published in 1958, 
explained how the perpetuation of privilege at this time was inevitable: 
the rest of society, and in particular education, was not yet run on the civil- 
service principle. Education was very far from proportioned to merit. Some 
children of an ability which should have qualified them as assistant secretaries 
were forced to leave school at fifteen and become postmen ... 
Other children 
with poor ability but rich connexions, pressed through Eton and Balliol, 
eventually found themselves in mature years as high officers in the Foreign 
Office ... The limits were the 
deficiencies of the general education system. Only 
when the school did its job were the Civil Service Commissioners able to do 
theirs? 7 
92 Balogh, Planning for Progress, p. 31. 
93 Sampson, Anatomy of Britain, p. 174. 
94 Conversation with Dr Gary Magee, 17 April 2001. 
95 Sidney Pollard, The Wasting of the British Economy, (Croom Helm, 1984), p. 6. 
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Meritocracy was, therefore, only applied from the age of twenty-one. The elitism this 
practice created collided heavily with the accelerated social change which Britain 
experienced in the post-war period. The civil servants themselves were seen by many 
as antiquated symbols of a discredited past. 
The creation of essentially `night-watchmeni98 civil servants, with a `mentality 
of maintenance', 99 was the inevitable culmination of Civil Service recruitment and 
training. This produced a mismatch, as the Civil Service was in effect now running 
huge enterprises. `Though the Keynesian state was to have highly sensitive new 
responsibilities', wrote Professor David Marquand in The Unprincipled Society, 
he [Keynes] had no theory of state and appears to have seen no need for one. He 
assumed that, demand management apart, the Keynesian state would behave as 
the pre-Keynesian state had behaved. The possibility that it could not discharge 
these new responsibilities successfully without a change in its character - that 
they would generate new expectations and demands, which could be 
accommodated and reconciled only by a new kind of state, engaging the public 
in a process of consultation, negotiation and mutual-education - does not seem to 
have occurred to him. 100 
The resultant lack of what Marquand called a `developmental state' therefore meant 
that there was no accommodation between formal parliamentary sovereignty and 
ministerial accountability on the one hand and the `great powers of the real economy' 
9' The phrase is Ferdinand Lassalle's and is quoted in Balogh, The Apotheosis of the Dilettante', p. 83. 
99 Martin Wiener quoted in English and Kenny (eds. ), Rethinking British Decline, p. 30. 
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on the other. '°' Defence is a major area in which that thesis was not wholly true. 
David Edgerton has explained how the defence arm of Whitehall was consistently 
successfully interventionist, offering encouragement and co-operation, all with 
informed and high quality technocratic civil servants. 102 Agriculture was another 
example of Whitehall-influenced technical prowess, certainly up to the British 
accession to the European Economic Community in 1973, but these were very much 
exceptions to the rule. 
Reform begins 
The Treasury was at the forefront of criticism. That `most political of all the 
Departments', 103 as Bridges called it, faced attack from all sides. What was most 
interesting, and most significant for its workings, was that much disquiet came from 
inside (especially after Keynes's death in 1946 left it without a respected external 
stimulus104) so beginning the Treasury's rolling internal reappraisal of the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. '°5 Some officials were coming to see the Treasury's aims and 
methods as anachronistic. They thought the Departments were too decentralised 106 
and that the Treasury had too few people to properly scrutinise other departments' 
programmes, yet too much power when it came to imposing simplistic, wholesale 
pol Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 722. 
102 David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane (Macmillan, 1991) and 'Liberal Militarism and the 
British State', New Left Review, no. 185, pp. 118-169. 
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economies which could prove counterproductive. They also felt, along with the rest of 
the Treasury, that the piecemeal scrutiny of programmes and the way the Chancellor 
was being ambushed in Cabinet by spending Ministers was undermining the 
Treasury's role in expenditure control (in the words of one Treasury official, `trying 
to avoid this system of being nibbled to death'). 107 
All-encompassing machinery needed to' be constructed on the model of the 
fledgling defence and social security forward surveys, 108 begun in the mid-1950s, 
which were an attempt to add serious analysis to the politics of spending. 109 An 
opportunity for Treasury officials to enact big change arose in late 1957 with an 
investigation by the all-party House of Commons' Select Committee on Estimates. 
Reporting in July 1958, the committee was broadly favourable to the Treasury, but 
felt that a more expert investigation into the public expenditure machinery was 
required (after suitable briefing and encouragement by the Treasury reformers). "° A 
year later, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Derick Heathcoat Amory, announced an 
inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord (Edwin) Plowden, Chief Planning Officer in 
the late 1940s-early 1950s Central Economic Planning Staff and latterly Chairman of 
the Atomic Energy Authority. 
The investigation took place privately under the auspices of the Chancellor. The 
membership of the Committee was interesting in that it included three businessmen, 
all with some experience of Whitehall. 11' Five anonymous senior civil servants also 
106 Clarke, Public Expenditure, Management and Control, p. 3. 
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sat on it as `assessors' (Burke Trend, Otto Clarke and Evelyn Sharp were among 
them). 112 The Report was to prove a landmark in the post-war history of the Treasury. 
For not only was it the first investigation to take Keynesianism as its point of 
departure, i13 but it had the same effect in government circles as the legendary wartime 
Beveridge Report in that it signalled a true change of heart at the centre of 
government - `It was in effect a statement of Government policy. ' 114 According to 
Otto Clarke, the senior internal Treasury critic and wartime temporary who stayed on, 
this was because of three elements: it asked practical questions; it had a chairman of 
great standing and government experience; and the Civil Service was bound in from 
the start. ' is 
Sir Samuel Goldman, a successor of Clarke's in Treasury public expenditure 
control, was later to write that `It is an open secret that the principal ideas and analysis 
which made the Plowden Report so seminal a document came from the mind of Sir 
Richard Clarke'. '16 The outcome of the Report was, therefore, totally in accordance 
with the wishes of many in the Treasury and was, according to Sir Leo Pliatzky, 
another successor of Clarke's, `a great conceptual achievement. To secure its 
acceptance by Whitehall was a feat of will and organisation. I say this as someone 
who - to understate the point somewhat - owed nothing to patronage from that 
quarter [i. e. Clarke's]. "17 
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There were several elements to Plowden. It led to the then world-beating 
sophistication"8 (later much criticised for being a motor of inflation) of the Public 
Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) - but not to a permanent Cabinet committee 
solely devoted to public expenditure which Plowden also recommended privately. 119 
Only ad hoc ones were created120 until some three ' decades later when the Major 
Administration created a system, long after PESC had been abolished, in which 
projected government revenues were matched against all public spending over the 
forthcoming five years, all within the standing EDX Cabinet committee. 121 `With 
PESC', said one Treasury official, `power is shifted to the centre, that is, to the 
Treasury, ' all in an attempt to make sure the Treasury would not be defeated in 
future. 122 PESC also reflected the growing realisation that emergency across-the- 
board cutbacks in public spending were irrational and often counter-productive. ' 
The Report led to the most extensive Treasury peacetime reform since 1919.124 
In October 1962 the Treasury was internally divided into two, the `Pay and 
Management Side' and the `Finance and Economic 125 according to an Otto 
Clarke-William Armstrong blueprint (Armstrong had been made Permanent Secretary 
to the Treasury earlier in 1962). 126 The split happened because (setting aside the 
institutional reform represented by PESC) the true crux of the Plowden Report was to 
change the nature of the Treasury or, in Otto Clarke's words: `Instead of being a back- 
seat driver, the Treasury's job is to ensure that every Department has the best possible 
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cars and drivers and is properly equipped with maps. ' 127 In effect, there was to be a 
new ethos for a new era of intervention in the economy. 128 (In Henry Roseveare's 
view, the split was also due to the Treasury having to raise its game in rivalry to the 
creation of the National Economic Development Council, of which, more later. 121) 
The 1962 reorganisation made management the modem successor of negative 
control130 (the age-old criticism being that the Treasury was more interested in 
counting 'candle-ends' 131 which counterproductively produced irresponsibility on the 
part of the departments132). Thus `management' firmly entered the Civil Service 
lexicon, in this instance as a way of delivering more sophisticated public expenditure 
oversight. The drive for better management was to prove a recurrent theme133 as 
complexity and cost of programmes increased. 134 
At the same time as the visible failure in domestic economic matters and 
humiliation along an overseas canal, a more intangible shift was happening with the 
increasing breakdown of social deference. This was powered by such factors as the 
spread of affluence, the rise in the number of students attending a form of higher 
education (from 69,000 in 1938-39 to 216,000 in 1962-63, an increase of over 
300%135), the steady decline in church-going136 and the ending of national service, 
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each of which would separately bring change but combined to produce a social 
revolution. The rise of satire, exemplified by the stage show Beyond The Fringe 
(1960), the television programme That Was The Week That Was (1962) and the 
magazine Private Eye (1962), ushered in a new era of nearly no-holds-barred public 
discourse. Britain was changing fast and the results included continuing attacks on the 
allegedly old-fashioned, class-ridden totem poles of British public life and the `the 
whole matrix of official and social relations within which power is exercised', as 
Henry Fairlie put it in 1955. Fairlie went on to revive the catch-all phrase `The 
Establishment' to succinctly describe Britain's governing tribe. 137 The Civil Service 
was clearly a prime candidate for assault as it could be described - even parodied - as 
holding to procedures and traditions a century old, with a middle-class, male- 
dominated, old school (and university) tie-ruled upper echelon which had presided 
over undeniable failure. 138 That its political masters in Harold Macmillan's Cabinets 
were at this time increasingly from an identifiably privileged social stratum 
intensified criticism 139 
Macmillan's intellectual life prior to becoming Prime Minister proved him to be 
quite the progressive, calling in his 1938 book for `The Middle Way' to be found 
between total state planning and unbridled laissez-faire. 140 `By far the most radical 
man I've known in politics ... He was a real left-wing radical in his social, human and 
economic thinking', Clement Attlee recalled privately in 1951.141 In fact, Macmillan 
had even gone as far as having a pre-war conversation with Aneurin Bevan about his 
137 Henry Fairlie, `The Establishment at work', The Spectator, 23 September 1955. 
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potential defection, who advised caution. 142 In any event, this was highly significant 
for the Civil Service as there was now a Conservative Prime Minister who did not 
find state power per se distasteful (as many, if not most, Conservatives did143), but 
one who had actively called for its thoughtful and extensive application. 
Macmillan formed his government with his party at a low ebb after Suez. But he 
managed to turn around the Conservative Party's fortunes to produce a landslide 
victory in the October 1959 general election. '44 The post-election honeymoon was not 
to last long, however, and the Tories found it increasingly difficult to prolong the 
good times. 145 Macmillan had to lean heavily on his own economic thinking and 
writing in trying to escape this tight spot. 
Palpable relative economic decline in the 1960s really began with the sterling 
crisis of 1961. `July Measures' from the Chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd, imposed `rather 
savage deflationary measures' 146 on the British economy, which included a curb on 
government spending and bank advances and a raise in the Bank Rate to 7 per cent. 147 
One of the most controversial factors in British economic decline in the 1950s and 
early 1960s was the policy derided as `stop-go', largely by economists such as 
Christopher Dow who ridiculed attempts at fine-tuning, "' scapegoated as a prime 
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accelerator of relative economic decline (though Geoffrey Owen has argued 
persuasively that `stop-go' was the result of poor growth 149). 
Fundamental to Keynes's philosophy of demand-management (published by 
Macmillan in 1936 as The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money)'so 
was the idea that it was for the government to encourage economic activity in times of 
slump and to discourage it when overheating threatened. Overheating happened 
rapidly in Britain at this time. Because of the commitment to as full employment as 
the government could create, demand for labour was constantly high This obviously 
led to consistent upward pressure on wages, and hence to inflation. More money in 
the economy therefore ate into the quantity of goods and services which ideally 
should have been exported. It also led to increasing imports as demand remained 
high. 15 1 There were several problems with this as a paucity of supply and little by way 
of productivity gains meant, for a fixed exchange rate economy like Britain's, great 
pressure on the balance of payments during times of growth. 
With growth widely accepted as the new goal, and becoming a driver of British 
political competition, Macmillan's old thinking came into its own. Macmillan was 
consumed by the commitment to higher growth. His experiences as a young 
Conservative hopeful in depression-ravaged Stockton-upon-Tees during the 1930s 
had seared into his psyche the perils of the free market when it went wrong (officials 
kept a secret tally of the number of times Macmillan's old stomping ground cropped 
up in conversation152). He subsequently urged expansionary measures at all points 
during his tenure, something consistently urged on him by the economist Roy 
149 Owen, From Empire to Europe, p. 450. 
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Harrod, 153 thinking that `writing cheques', as Peter Thorneycroft sardonically put it, 
was the best way to solve the problems of places such as Stockton. '54 
Thomeycroft was made Macmillan's first Chancellor in 1957 but resigned a 
year later when the Cabinet only offered £100 million of cuts to planned spending 
when he had somewhat precipitately demanded £150 million. His belief that inflation 
was stoked by excessive government borrowing led to him becoming a totemic figure 
in the monetarist movement of 1970s and 1980s. '55 But there was no room for this 
kind of thinking during the Macmillan years. Thorneycroft's successor Derick 
Heathcoat Amory, Chancellor from 1958 to 1960, proved more flexible in allowing 
Macmillan, `almost a wild inflationist at that time"56 (in Amory's words), to 
pressurise him into producing the boom for the 1959 general election. But even 
Amory let it be known that if he had not been granted his request to retire in 1960, 
there would have been a parting of the ways in any case over the need for a `stop' to 
the booming, but fragile, economy. '57 
A powerful reason for Macmillan's pressure for expansion on his Chancellors 
was because of his hatred of the Treasury's traditional methods of dealing with he 
economy which went back to the desperate days of the 1930s and even into the 1920s, 
August 1931 in particular, when the National Government was formed and 
deflationary measures imposed on an already depressed economy, all in the perennial 
effort to save the pound. This was to instil in Labour politicians and, as we have seen, 
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Macmillan too (due to his somewhat ambiguous philosophical sympathies), a deep 
distrust of `Treasury orthodoxy'. 158 He subsequently felt that deflation was `more 
dangerous, really, than inflation', 159 though his celebrated `never had it so good' July 
1957 Bedford speech, 160 and his lecture to the Conservative Political Centre (which 
formed the introduction to the 1958 reissue of The Middle Way), each clearly 
demonstrated an understanding of the dangers of excessive inflation. 161 
The 1961 `stop' was delivered by the new Chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd. The 
Treasury had calculated that if the outflow of reserves continued at a constant pace 
there would be none left by Christmas. 162 Macmillan felt powerless to avoid the 
deflationary measures. 163 But the expansion-minded Prime Minister was determined 
not to be trapped again and so began the search for a solution to the problem of `stop- 
go'. The `July Measures' were botched in the eyes of the business community who 
lost confidence in the Treasury after it singled out consumer goods and car 
production, two of the biggest growth markets. 164 This produced a gulf in outlook 
between business and the government exacerbated by the Treasury's assertion that 
deflation was not boosting exports as it should, and that this was down to the poor 
way industry was run by employers on the one hand and the behaviour of trade unions 
on the other. 165 
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Continental tilt 
Sir Frank Lee, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, was convinced that 
Britain needed a strong dose of competition (an analysis that was by no means 
unanimous in the Treasury) alongside continuous deflationary pressure, in order to 
counter the rigidity of the labour market. 166 The application in 1961 to join the six- 
nation European Economic Community (EEC) was clearly a way of intensifying 
competition and therefore efficiency, but Lee was convinced that the British economy 
needed a cold shower, whether or not the application was successful. 167 The EEC was 
increasingly seen by Macmillan as a major threat to British economic success due to 
the tariff wall erected around what were fast becoming the UK's most important high- 
value trading partners, 168 in direct contrast to earlier analysis that too much European 
involvement would damage what eventually became seen as low-value 
Commonwealth trade. 169 This was largely ignored in the Foreign Office but the 
economic need to turn to Europe was understood in the Treasury, ever the hard- 
headed part of government. 170 Lee was supported by a growing band of younger 
Foreign Office officials who fervently believed that Britain's future was European. 171 
Thus began a technocratic takeover of UK-EEC policy which in effect lasted until the 
accession in 1973 and involved a somewhat unconstitutional push for eventual UK 
165 Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 231. 
166 Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 232. 
167 Ibid., p. 237. 
168 Dell, The Chancellors, p. 285. 
169 Cairncross, The British Economy Since 1945, pp. 11,19. 
170 Young, This Blessed Plot, p. 105. 
171 Ibid., p. 107. 
42 
entry by many senior officials even when government policy was against it (during 
Harold Wilson's first years as Premier). 172 
The 1961 application to join the EEC, with a negotiating team comprising the 
cream of Whitehall and headed by Edward Heath (Lord Privy Seal, 1960-63), 173 was 
knocked back unilaterally by the French President, Charles de Gaulle, in January 
1963. To Macmillan, de Gaulle's precipitate action meant that `all our policies at 
home and abroad are in ruins'. 174 The subsequent British exclusion from the rapid, 
stable growth in intra-European trade from the EEC's inception in January 1958 
through to the early 1970s175 was, for Geoffrey Owen, along with the aforementioned 
lack of competitiveness, the true determinant of Britain's relative economic decline. 176 
A different path to the cold-shower effect of greater competition was taken 
when the divergence of view between the Treasury and the organised employers' 
groups provided the springboard for one of the elements which formed part of 
Macmillan's `post-Suez rethinksi177 for across-the-board modernisation and 
expansion. In 1961 the Federation of British Industry (FBI) conference called for 
planning to be adopted in Britain. 178 This was because the French system was seen as 
dynamically capitalist but underpinned by a government which fostered a benign 
environment for business. 179 The FBI move was, therefore, an attempt to wrestle some 
aspects of economic management away from the Treasury18° (which was already 
happening separately with independent investigations such as the Beeching Report on 
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the railways, the Buchanan Report on traffic in towns and the Robbins Report on 
higher education, 18 1 and with Lord Hailsham's appointment as Minister for the 
regeneration of North-East England'82). 
The concept of `planning' was an enigma in itself. While few people regarded a 
step backwards to the wartime days of physical controls to be practical or indeed 
desirable outside the hard-left of the Labour Party and left-wing extremists, the tide of 
intellectual opinion was at this time moving towards the advocacy of some form of 
state-involved planning, and that pointed to just across the English Channel. 183 The 
French wanted the UK to adopt their own `indicative planning' - or `planning by 
influence' as Edmund Dell called it184 - so that it would tip the balance towards the 
Germans adopting greater dirigisme if ever Britain joined the EEC. 185 To that end, 
they entertained several unpublicised group visits to France in 1960186 and attended a 
conference in London on 20-22 April 1961.187 Sir Donald MacDougall was one of 
those present and described the British thinking: 
We noticed that French growth had been rapid, that they had had a succession of 
four year `plans', and thought there might be some connection between the two. I 
had been to France, on a visit ... 
in a team of civil servants, businessmen, trade 
unionists, politicians and academics, and we were told by the chief planner, 
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Monsieur Mass6, that French planning - on a tripartite basis - had indeed 
increased their rate of growth. 188 
It is highly debatable whether Masse's claim was true. 189 For Alec Cairncross, 
(professor of applied economics at Glasgow in 1960, and subsequently Head of the 
Government Economic Service, 1964-9) the whole idea of politicians claiming credit 
for rapid economic growth was fanciful. 190 But it was certainly attractive for those 
who visited France who were, it seems to modem eyes, clutching at straws, trying to 
discover just what the Continentals were doing which Britain was not. 191 The Cabinet, 
however, was wary of being too closely linked to the French model. During the 
Cabinet meeting of 21 September 1961, Macmillan told colleagues that `It would be 
wrong to suppose that any form of organisation would resolve the fundamental 
difficulties of economic planning in a free society, but progress might be made in 
practical respects, if the co-operation of industrialists and trade unions could be 
secured in the studies and investigations which the council would promote. '192 The 
Government eventually decided on the planning route, albeit a British version. 193 
As it was supported by so many people, right across the political spectrum, it is 
clear that there was no one definition at the time of `planning', but broadly it seemed 
to be a synonym for forward thinking. 194 (Eastern European planners, used to almost 
total control of the economy, who visited Sir Donald MacDougall were very confused 
as to how planning UK-style could work: "`You've got your plan, now how do you 
188 MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p. 137. 
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make people invest and do what you want them to do? " ... They weren't at all 
convinced and they were probably right. ' 195) Specifically, the British form entailed 
the attempt to rationalise spending, avoid unnecessary waste and forge a mutually- 
understanding socially-cohesive bond between government, employers and the 
unions196 in order to minimise the industrial conflict which was beginning to blight 
the British economy and agree on a growth target. (Those favouring an injection of 
competition were suspicious of this move towards what they regarded as 
cartelisation197 but, crucially, Sir Frank Lee backed NEDC as an independent 
institution. 198) 
The creation of the National Economic Development Council, funded by the 
taxpayer and thus as an instrument of public policy, was announced by Selwyn Lloyd 
during his statement on the July 1961 Measures to counter the negativity of their 
content. 199 Although the idea of NEDC was widely credited to the Chancellor, as 
Macmillan did himself in his memoirs, 200 there is more than a hint of NBDC in The 
Middle Way. In it, Macmillan called for a `National Economic Council' which `with 
all the facts before it, would survey the whole field of economic activity, and, in 
consultation with the responsible representatives of the Government, formulate a 
comprehensive plan for general guidance' -a very similar brief to Neddy. 201 
Furthermore, Neddy demonstrated a determination by the Macmillan Government to 
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absorb and act on the pro-planning criticism thereby re-directing the anti- 
establishment impulse in a technocratic fashion. 
The NEDC's birth was opposed by several in a Cabinet bounced into 
acceptance. In Cabinet, they complained that its creation would cause confusion and 
duplication, and that its strong association with government would give it too much 
credence. 202 The most notable dissenter was Reginald Maudling, President of the 
Board of Trade, who also disliked the idea of a powerful agency beyond democratic 
control. 203 (Maudling replaced Lloyd as Chancellor in July 1962 and, therefore, took 
the chair of the NEDC. His initial opposition was reversed, especially after the EEC 
veto left the Government's economic policy in ruins204). Macmillan saw the Cabinet 
opposition as `corresponding to whether they had old Whig, Liberal, laissez-faire 
traditions, or Tory opinions, paternalists and not afraid of a little dirigisme'. 205 
Neddy was established as a non-statutory, purely advisory, tripartite economic 
forum with a few independent members. 206 Tripartism had a long history in Britain 
and reached its height in the wartime emergency. Deemed a great wartime success, it 
was to be dusted down once again when new difficulties challenged. 207 The Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) eventually agreed to join Neddy on 24 January, 1962208 
(overcoming their distaste of 1961-62's public sector `Pay Pause'). 209 The NEDC was 
buttressed by a series of Economic Development Committees (EDCs or `Little 
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Neddies') a micro-economic attempt to help the economy which scrutinised 
individual industries and pointed out improvements (a supply-side measure which 
signified a departure from the solely demand-minded philosophy of Keynesianism 
proper). It was backed by a staff, the National Economic Development Office 
(NEDO). 
The first head of the NEDC was Sir Robert Shone, a former Chairman of the 
Iron and Steel Board (chosen because of his familiarity with the French plan21). The 
inaugural Economic Director of the NEDC, Sir Donald MacDougall, somewhat 
touchingly described the hope of its first meeting: `The lift was not working, so 
members had quite a climb to the room where we met. This was regarded as symbolic 
of the run down state of the economy. Neddy would change all that. By 1966 all the 
lifts would be working all the time everywhere. '211 The feeling that Neddy 
represented the future of British economic management, and therefore the place to be, 
was reinforced by That Was The Week That Was which contrasted the dull, orthodox, 
antiquated Treasury with the thrusting, iconoclastic, new NEDC. 212 
Staffing Neddy also proved to be significant. The Civil Service as a whole had 
worryingly few professional economists at this time, in actual fact only twenty-five in 
1964.213 The Civil Service acknowledged the astonishment this provoked214 but 
claimed it was very difficult to attract them215 MacDougall pointed out that this did 
210 Middlemas, Industry, Unions and Government, p. 15. 
211 MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p. 138. 
212 Ibid., p. 144. 
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not stop this period becoming known as the `Golden Years'. 216 But the lack of 
economic professionalism was worrying to all during a time of massive investment in 
publicly-funded infrastructure projects - the roads programme, the rail modernisation 
plan and civil nuclear power - many of which were planned without the help of an 
economist. 217 
Shone and MacDougall went about making NEDO as expert as they could. 
They proved so effective, and recruited nearly as many economists as there were in 
the Treasury, 218 that Neddy came to be regarded as an intellectual rival to the 
Treasury and therefore a threat to the economic hegemony carefully-built and 
jealously-guarded over many years. 219 As it was so expert, Samuel Brittan surmised 
that it may also have exerted valuable behind-the-scenes pressure on the Treasury. 22° 
There were two major studies which the NEDC completed in its first years. The 
`Green Book' predicted an annual rate of growth of four per cent for the years 1961- 
66 and the `Orange Book' dealt with obstacles and efficiency. 221 The Treasury vetoed 
a section of the Orange Book written by a former student of Sir Donald 
MacDougall's, Maurice Scott, which looked at the possibility of a floating rate for 
sterling; `most people refused to talk about it, it was quite extraordinary'. 222 This 
matter alone demonstrated a determination by the Treasury to avoid being usurped by 
the NEDC as the central shaper of economic policy and showed its fear `that NEDC 
should embark on such a question in semi-public circumstances [which] seemed to 
216 Interview with Sir Donald MacDougall, 21 May 2001. 
21 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 177. 
218 MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p. 138. 
219 Donald MacDougall, `The Machinery of Economic Government: Some Personal Reflections, ' in 
David Butler and A. H. Halsey (eds. ), Policy and Politics (Macmillan, 1978), p. 176. 
220 Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 15. 
221 Middlemas, Industry, Unions and Government, p. 22. 
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confirm fears that it would turn out to be a Frankenstein Monster'. 223 The Treasury 
was otherwise very impressed by the analysis of the Orange Book. 224 
The four per cent `target' for growth essentially became an estimate for growth 
This was because the Government could hardly refute the predictions of a panel it had 
set up and which had the Chancellor as chairman. 225 Nevertheless, the Treasury 
remained very sceptical about four per cent growth226 Yet it was factored into the 
public expenditure estimates, against the Treasury's own forecast, which proved more 
accurate at just over three per cent. The overriding principle which Otto Clarke and 
the other Treasury reformers had tried to instil into future public expenditure plans, 
that government spending growth (as detailed in the PESC machinery) must not 
outpace that of growth in the economy, was fundamentally undermined. 227 This 
period was described by Otto Clarke as 'anti-PESC'. 228 
Civil Service self-confidence shaken 
The Treasury's 1961 miscalculation regarding the immediate future for the 
balance of payments was so significant that it not only damaged the Chancellor but 
undermined the Treasury's confidence in itself. 229 Unsurprisingly, the Cabinet became 
222 Interview with Sir Donald MacDougall, 21 May 2001. 
223 Middlemas, Industry, Unions and Government, p. 26. 
224 Ibid., p. 27. 
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226 Ibid., p. 278. 
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highly wary of the Treasury's forecasting skill. 230 Macmillan was chief among the 
ministerial critics but his scepticism went deeper - and had lasted longer - than most. 
In fact, giving the Budget speech as Chancellor himself in 1956, he had warned 
against economic forecasting and statistics: 
Some people feel that what passes for such is more like astrology than astronomy 
... I do not share this extreme view. Nevertheless, I think that we should all 
agree that if there is such a science, it is not an exact one. There are too many 
unknowns and to[o] many variables. Then I am told that some of our statistics 
are too late to be as useful as they ought to be. We are always, as it were, looking 
up a train in last year's Bradshaw. 23' 
Macmillan was a bitter opponent of stop-go (it being `like those young ladies who 
oscillate daily between the stimulant and the tranquillizers' 232), wanting just `go', and 
he cast around desperately searching for a remedy. His major decision was to ditch 
what he came to see as his ineffective Chancellor, Lloyd. His replacement was 
Reginald Maudling, the most economically literate and experienced Conservative 
Chancellor for many years (having been Economic Secretary to the Treasury 1952-55, 
Paymaster-General 1957-59 and President of the Board of Trade 1959-61). 233 July 
1962 also saw a new Permanent Secretary for the Treasury. Sir William Armstrong, 
probably the first Permanent Head to have a contemporary approach to economic 
230 Britian, Steering the Economy, pp. 265-6. 
231 House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 551,17 April 1956, col. 867. 
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management, was promoted from Third Secretary over the heads of his superiors in a 
clear sign that Macmillan was displeased with the official side of the Treasury. 234 
The Treasury appeared at this time to be in a somewhat chastened mood. The 
critical assault it suffered over the forecasting mistake of 1961, as we have seen, lost 
it the confidence of ministers and many of the captains of industry. According to 
Samuel Brittan, this made `very senior Treasury administrators' anxious `to persuade 
sceptical industrialists that stop-go had at last been abandoned in favour of steady 
growth'. 235 The Treasury was therefore committed to the Prime Minister and 
Chancellor's expansionist plans which lasted until Labour's narrow victory in 1964. 
What became known as the `dash for growth' was ended when the incoming Labour 
ministers took fright amid fears for the fixed exchange rate. As Brittan later lamented: 
A period of steadily rising demand, at slightly above trend levels, might in the 
early and middle 1960s, before the inflationary explosion of the end of the 
decade, have speeded up the underlying growth rate via its effects on 
expectations and business investment. Because of the devotion to an arbitrary 
exchange rate the experiment never had a chance, and we shall never know 
whether it could have worked. 236 
Apart from the economic apparatus, there were several other machinery of 
government reforms in the last years of Macmillan's reign before his sudden 
234 Brittan, Steering the Economy, pp. 271-2. 
235 Ibid., p. 283. 
236 Ibid., p. 15. 
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retirement forced by ill-health in the Autumn of 1963. Macmillan's successor, Sir 
Alec Douglas-Home, had little time to refashion the State himself during his short- 
lived Premiership from October 1963 through to the Labour election victory in 
October 1964. He was certainly interested in technocratic questions, though, as he 
explained in his memoirs: 
I confess that I would like to have been given a bit longer at No. 10 so as to get 
more grip on the machinery of government. 
The keys to this are: short and precise paper-work; a chain of government 
committees each charged to take decisions, resulting in a Cabinet agenda which 
is cleared of all but the absolute essentials; Ministers who can be relied upon to 
insist on these rules ... and 
lastly a programme of legislation for Parliament 
which is not overloaded. 238 
Douglas-Home was privately working on plans for a radical reform to reduce the 
workload on the Cabinet and Civil Service if the electorate returned him to Downing 
Street, to be overseen by Enoch Powell (who knew nothing of this at the time29 and 
237 The Treasury was given a second Cabinet Minister in 1961, with the revival of the old office of 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the final unification of the Ministry of Defence came in April 1964; 
the same month saw Sir Edward Boyle relinquish much of his Education portfolio to become Minister 
of State for the universities and Quintin Hogg (the former Lord Hailsham) landing the rump Education 
Department; the Department of Technical Co-operation was created in 1961 to co-ordinate technical 
aid previously split between the Foreign, Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices and the 
Ministry of Labour; the Central African Office was created in 1961 and was in turn quietly merged into 
the Commonwealth Relations Office in April 1964. 
23s Lord Home, The Way The Wind Blows (Collins, 1976), p. 202. 
239 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 174. 
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who held very minimalist views regarding bureaucratic arrangements as he made 
clear in his evidence to the Fulton Committee240) 
There was a minor innovation with another experiment in `overlordship' from 
December 1963. The wartime practice that had been discredited with its peacetime 
resurrection in Churchill's 1951 Government was again tried, this time with Edward 
Heath becoming Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development. As 
a co-ordinating Minister, Heath was supposed to hold the Prime Minister's authority 
in deciding issues from the Board of Trade or from the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government, Transport, Power or Public Buildings and Works. There was little extra 
support given to Heath, however, and he had no statutory power to direct other 
Ministers. The Head of the Civil Service, Sir Laurence Helsby, felt that this 
experiment had again failed but Douglas-Home did not believe that it had had long 
enough to prove itself by the time the Conservatives lost the October 1964 election. 241 
Home's rational mind also led to the creation of the Douglas-Home Rules which to 
this day ensure authorised access for the Opposition to discuss the machinery of 
government changes to be enacted in the event of election victory, as we shall see in 
chapter two. 242 
In 1945, the Civil Service could feel rightly proud of itself. But it undoubtedly 
made a strategic error in thinking that things would quickly reassume the pattern of 
the pre-war years. For the 1942 Beveridge Report and the 1944 Employment White 
Paper had signalled a fundamental shift in the ambition and reach of the public 
sphere. To quote Oliver Franks, the State `had changed from being purely regulative 
240 Enoch Powell quoted in Geoffrey Fry, Reforming the Civil Service (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 1993), p. 215. 
241 Helsby and Home quoted in Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine, pp. 42-3. 
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and had become more and more [that] of management'. 243 This `missed 
opportunity' coupled with the despondency created by accelerated relative economic 
decline in the 1950s and 1960s, which proved such a millstone around the neck of the 
Civil Service due to the responsibilities imposed by the 1944 Employment White 
Paper, meant the Service understandably came in for tremendous criticism once 
problems became apparent. 
How did the Civil Service face this barrage of cynicism? Some buccaneering 
souls such as Otto Clarke tried to shift the culture of an increasingly demoralised 
Treasury almost single-handedly. But much remained the same, and this is 
unsurprising. For in a culture as hidebound as the then Civil Service, conditioned by 
generations of cautious practice, `men of push and go' (as Lloyd George liked to 
say)244 rarely prospered. It was therefore left for the politicians to step into the breach, 
Macmillan being the first, and much changed during his Premierships, with his stab at 
tripartism and clear disapproval of Treasury orthodoxy. Macmillan fell before he 
could really begin to see the results of his policy shifts and within a year of his 
retirement it was left to Harold Wilson's reinvigorated Labour Party to run with the 
torch of modernisation. 
242 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p. 284. 
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Chapter 2- Hardware 
Harold Wilson & the reforging of Whitehall 
1964-68 
Birth of the DEA 
The Labour Party's electoral victory in 1964 after thirteen years in the 
wilderness provided an injection of enthusiasm to the `little dirigisme' that Harold 
Macmillan had embarked upon (though with no credit given to Macmillan's ideas or 
actions). The Conservative Party had been slightly uneasy about its unorthodox and 
Whiggish leader. The Labour Party, by contrast, was fully behind the manifesto's 
declaration that `the machinery of government must be modernised' 1- and intended 
to embrace economic planning at a gallop. This is not to suggest that all Labour 
members were in accord over what or how to plan. But, at least in the Autumn of 
1964, hopes were high within Labour that intensifying the planning already begun 
would lead to improved and more equitable economic growth - and a shift in the 
country's political balance leftwards. 
Aneurin Bevan, the godfather of Britain's post-war left-wing tradition, in his 
last speech to the House of Commons, a response to the Queen's Speech, on 3 
November, 1959, said: 
1 Let's Go with Labour for the New Britain, reprinted in F. W. S. Craig (ed. ), British General Election 
Manifestos, 1959-1987 (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1990), p. 60. 
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There is one important problem facing representative Parliamentary Government 
in the whole of the world where it exists. It is being asked to solve a problem 
which it has so far failed to solve: that is, how to reconcile Parliamentary 
popularity with sound economic planning. So far, nobody on either side of this 
House has succeeded, and it is a problem which has to be solved if we are to 
meet the challenge that comes to us from other parts of the world and if we are to 
grout and to buttress the institutions of Parliamentary Government in the 
affections of the population. 2 
Interestingly, Bevan's words formed the epigraph of Harold Wilson's The Labour 
Government 1964-1970 (and was repeated in his Final Term: The Labour 
Government, 1974-1976) 3 In this chapter, we shall look at Labour's attempts during 
the 1960s to enhance the British state's ability to manage its ever more complex 
economy. As we saw in Chapter One, much of the criticism of the British Civil 
Service in the run-up to Labour's 1964 victory was aimed at the Treasury and its 
handling of economic policy. It is therefore unsurprising that the bulk of Labour's 
initial reforms to the Civil Service centred on the splitting of the Treasury and the 
subsequent creation of several rival outposts of economic power. This, along with 
many other reforms, represented the `hardware', as opposed to the 'software 4 
changes on which Harold Wilson set great store by in his re-jigging of Whitehall. 
Economic planning - in short, the attempt to mitigate the vagaries and waste 
of an unadulterated price-mechanism as a distributor of resources - had been the 
Labour Party's touchstone since the interwar years5 (partly because the Great War had 
2 House of Commons, Official Report, 3 November 1959, Col. 862. 
3 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p. xix and 
Final Term: The Labour Government, 1974-1976 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p. ix. 
° Lord Bancroft, speaking at the Gresham College seminar, `In the Steps of Walter Bagehot: A 
Constitutional Health-Check', 13 March 1995. 
5 Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (HarperCollins, 1993), p. 430. 
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shown just what a government could do when it put its mind to it6). Attlee's 1945-51 
governments had delivered mightily on nationalisation. But it was deemed by most 
commentators to have been unsuccessful when it somewhat half-heartedly attempted 
to `plan' the resulting semi-controlled economy with units such as the Central 
Economic Planning Staff, the Economic Planning Board and a myriad of Cabinet 
committees. 7 This sense of relative failure resonated throughout the 1950s in Labour 
circles. 
The shrinkage in support for the Conservatives during the years 1960-62 
(Gallup calculated Macmillan's personal rating to fall from 79% satisfaction in May 
1960 down to 52% dissatisfied in July 19628) meant the Labour Party was 
increasingly buoyant and began confidently to plan for the day it would return to 
government. These preparations, due to the Macmillan Government's increasing 
embrace of planning, were, however, comparable to shooting at a moving target. 9 
When the Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell, died suddenly in 1963, the winner of 
the subsequent bloody leadership election was Harold Wilson. 10 Wilson was, remains 
and probably always will be, an enigma, both personally and politically. Beginning 
working life as an Oxford don (from a lower middle class, North of England 
background), he was appointed to the War Cabinet Secretariat as a temporary civil 
servant during the Second World War, joined the Cabinet in 1947 as its youngest 
member since Pitt and resigned from it in 1951 with Bevan over defence estimates 
and cuts in social spending, apparently on principle. " During the long years of 
6 Martin Wolf, `Why Globalisation Works', speaking at the `Globalisation Lectures', Queen Mary, 
University of London, 12 January 2005. 
Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister (Penguin, 2000), p. 303; Keir Thorpe, "°Ihe Missing Pillar": 
Economic Planning and the Machinery of Government during the Labour Administrations of 1945- 
51', unpublished PhD thesis (Queen Mary and Westfield, University of London, 1999). 
Alistair Home, Macmillan, 1957-1986 (Macmillan, 1989), p. 350. 
9 Kevin Theakston, The Civil Service Since 1945 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995), p. 87. 
10 Pimlott, Ilarold Wilson, pp. 252-265 
11 Ibid., pp. 154-172 
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opposition from 1951-64 he was initially a leading Bevanite (albeit a mistrusted one, 
both by ultra- and anti-Bevanites'2), Shadow Chancellor and Chairman of the 
powerful House of Commons Public Accounts Committee. All in all, a man of great 
ability and even greater experience, yet one dogged by accusations of shiftiness which 
led to a poor subsequent reputation. 13 
The battle to succeed Gaitskell scarred Labour for several years. 14 The leading 
right-winger, George Brown, felt that the crown rightfully belonged to him, but his 
unpredictable nature split the vote and allowed Jim Callaghan to steal valuable 
support. Harold Wilson won comfortably. 15 But, unlike 1992 when Bryan Gould 
completely left British politics soon after losing the contest to John Smith, Callaghan 
and Brown (especially) were still hugely ambitious. This left Wilson with a problem. 
For Callaghan was highly placed in the Shadow Chancellorship (though he found his 
brief difficult to master and personal seminars in economics at Nuffield College, 
Oxford, were provided to help1), while another leading right-winger, Patrick Gordon 
Walker, was firmly positioned as Shadow Foreign Secretary. Where to place George 
Brown? 
With Macmillan ailing and soon gone, the economy overheating and 
Macmillan's successor, Douglas-Home, largely unimpressive, Wilson was right to see 
No. 10's door beckoning. He began to plan for the day when he would move into the 
famous terraced house he had been photographed outside as a child. Right from the 
beginning of Wilson's leadership, it was clear that Neddy and the Treasury's reforms 
12 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, pp. 265-281. 
13 Though some who knew him believed him to be breathtakingly clever (conversation with Andrew 
Graham, 19 May 2003) and personally very kind (conversation with Dr Peter Rose, 2 December 
2004). 
'4 Eric Roll, Crowded Hours (Faber, 1985), p. 157. 
is The first ballot was held on 7 February 1963, when Wilson received 115 votes, from the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, Brown 88 and Callaghan 41. In the head-to-head exactly a week later, 
Wilson polled 144 votes to Brown's 103. 
16 Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan: A life (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997), pp. 173-6. 
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in 1962 had been dismissed as inadequate by the Labour high command and that 
major reforms were being considered. Intelligence began to filter through in July 1963 
to the Head of the Home Civil Service, Sir Lawrence Helsby, from Macmillan's 
Principal Private Secretary, Tim Bligh, that `It has come to my ears that if he becomes 
Prime Minister Mr Wilson has one or two ideas floating about in the machinery of 
government field. ' 7 Bligh was referring to widely-conducted consultations that some 
high-ranking Labour politicians were undertaking on variety of economic planning 
mechanisms and approaches. 18 Here was a chance to square the Brown circle. 
Lord Roll of Ipsden, who, as Sir Eric Roll, was to be Brown's right-hand man 
as Permanent Secretary of the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), was clear how 
limited was Brown's initial interest in the economic sphere: `George's principal desire 
was the Foreign Office, he really wanted to be Foreign Secretary basically [shades of 
Ernest Bevin, the formidable father-figure of Brown's union, the Transport and 
General Workers, and Foreign Secretary 1945-51]. But it was quite clear at this stage 
that he couldn't be as it was already spoken for in a way, so that's why he turned 
himself more to economics. ' 19 With this switch, Brown attacked his new target with 
gusto. 
Brown began to carve out for himself a role that he believed befitted his true 
position in the Party. What he wanted to be was economic overlord, a kind of supreme 
co-ordinator of everything with an economic and industrial aspect - and one 
buttressed by a dynamic new department. This overlordship was not to be of the 
vague, discredited 1951-53 Churchillian breed'20 but one with statutory powers 
" National Archives (NA), Public Record Office (PRO), PREM 11/4834 `HM Opposition proposals 
for changes in machinery of government', Bligh to Helsby, 18 July 1963. 
1 George Brown, In My Way (Gollancz, 1971), p. 96. 
19 Interview with Lord Roll of Ipsden, 17 September 2002. 
20 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, pp. 186-95. 
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underlining who was boss. 21 This would have turned the Treasury, the Board of Trade 
and the Ministry of Labour, in effect, into specialised executive agencies, all carrying 
out the will of the overlord. 22 As Brown later wrote, the new department `(as I always 
saw it) would be superior to the Treasury in determining the country's economic 
priorities. Looking back, it seems that my own thinking may have gone further ahead 
than that of the Prime Minister and some of my other colleagues, and it is possible 
that I made assumptions in my mind which the others did not, in fact, share. 23 It 
seems clear that Brown picked up the ball and ran with it, for Wilson himself was 
later to write that `George Brown had interpreted the DEA mandate liberally ... DEA 
had developed more than I had originally intended'. 24 Samuel Brittan, the unrivalled 
Whitehall-watcher and very temporary DEA temporary from 1964-65, thought that 
Wilson's wish was to have `rival views on economic strategy, instead of being argued 
out in the depths of the official machine ... represented by different ministers, which 
would bring the Prime Minister into the picture in a way that had not happened under 
the Conservatives'. 25 
Tim Bligh's intelligence feed, this time directly to the Prime Minister, Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home, continued into 1964 when he reported on Brown's `private 
conversation away from Whitehall with Sir William Armstrong', Permanent Secretary 
to the Treasury: 
Apparently, Mr Brown claimed to be speaking on behalf of Mr Wilson but this 
seems unlikely on two counts. Mr Wilson plays his cards very close to his chest 
and leaves no room for the space of a fly, let alone George Brown; secondly, Mr 
21 Peter Paterson, Tired and Emotional (Chatto and Windus, 1993), p. 172. 
22 Samuel Brittan, Steering the Economy (Pelican, 197 1), p. 311. 
23 Brown, In My Way, p. 96. 
24 Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970, pp. 63,221. 
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Brown claimed that Labour Party policy was to have a Minister for Production 
who would be an overlord in the economic field (and this would be him), helped 
by a whipper-snapper Chancellor of the Exchequer (who would be Mr 
Callaghan). 26 
How had it happened that Brown had strayed so far from Wilson's thinking? Lord 
Roll of Ipsden believed he knew why: `It was to some extent stimulated by people like 
Tommy [Balogh] ... Tommy was the inspirer, Tommy used to say `I'm a visperer. ' 
[sic]. '27 Balogh was central to the pre-election planning. The man who had vented his 
spleen at the `Establishment' and the Civil Service in particular with his celebrated 
late-1950s essay the Apotheosis of the Dilettante, 28 was now given what he saw as a 
free-hand (Wilson was very self-confident in economic matters) to help shape the 
future Labour administration as a true intimate of Wilson, having known him since 
the early days of the war in Oxford. 29 Balogh began to draw up plans for a `Ministry 
of Expansion or Production'. 30 
Sir Donald MacDougall, Economic Director of the NEDC 1962-64 and 
Director-General of the DEA 1964-68, observed that `Balogh didn't trust the Treasury 
or the Bank of England one little bit and wanted a department to keep an eye on the 
wicked things the Treasury wanted to do. '31 This was a deeply held belief across a 
wide swathe of the Labour Party, not just its left wing. `Take economic planning away 
from the Treasury ... they know nothing about 
it' said Bevan in his already quoted 
25 Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 311. 
26 NA, PRO, PREM 11/4834, Bligh to Douglas-Home, 22 April 1964. 
27 Interview with Lord Roll of Ipsden, 17 September 2002. 
28 See chapter 1. 
29 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p. 116. 
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unsorted and therefore not open for consultation' according to the Curator at Balliol College, e-mail 
12 October 2005, whereas Tony Benn wrote that his `archives are being moved and I cannot trace it 
for the moment', letter 12 November 2005. 
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1959 Commons response to the Queen's Speech32 It was also widely shared 
throughout intellectual circles sympathetic to Labour33 and Wilson himself disliked 
the Treasury all his life although he had been offered a job there after his stint in the 
wartime Civil Service; working round it became his leitmotif. 34 Balogh was 
convinced that sustained British economic success could never be achieved without 
the humbling of the myopic Treasury and the installation of a more pro-growth bias at 
the heart of government. Through losing the leadership battle and having no big 
shadow seat to slip into, George Brown was ripe for Balogh's `vispering'. 
Some of the unofficial consultations between Brown and senior civil servants 
began to reach the ears of Bligh. These conversations were quite different to the 
`Douglas-Home Rules' meetings which facilitated official contact between Her 
Majesty's Opposition and senior members of the mandarinate, but were recorded for 
posterity by Lord Roll. Roll was involved in many of the discussions in the early 
summer of 1963 and had been invited to: 
a large and very agreeable luncheon party by Roy Jenkins at which I was placed 
(deliberately, as I later discovered) next to George Brown ... I admitted the 
theoretical case against having the whole of economic policy run by a 
department with the `candle-ends-saving' tradition of the Treasury ... But I 
remember very clearly ... stressing three things: 
first, that it was far from easy 
for government in practice to take account of all the economic factors that were 
significant and that finance in the broadest sense could often be the most useful 
focus of diagnosis and therapy; that the Treasury was so powerful by statute and 
tradition that any new department would have an almost impossible task in trying 
31 Interview with Sir Donald MacDougall, 25 September 2002. 
32 House of Commons, Official Report, 3 November 1959, Col. 862. 
33 Roll, Crowded Hours, p. 149. 
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to assert itself, and, above all, traditionally in British government departmental 
machinery was rarely as important as the relative power of Ministers. A Minister 
who was powerful by status and personality would soon make his department 
powerful, too 35 
A year later, Roll was privately sent the most up-to-date thinking on Labour's desired 
reform of economic administration. While thinking the planning was `workable', he 
again warned, extremely presciently and specifically, that 
There is a danger, I think, which it is well to recognise at the beginning, that if 
there is a tug-of-war between relatively short-term considerations that must 
influence immediate decisions on fiscal or monetary policy, on balance of 
payments etc. the longer-term considerations that are to be the special concern of 
the new department will take a back seat. If this is so, then the danger is that the 
new department will become essentially a `backroom boy' outfit with relatively 
little impact on current affairs. 
Fascinatingly, Roll was offered the job of Permanent Secretary in the new department 
despite - or, more likely, because of - his words on just how difficult it would be to 
supplant the Treasury (and also his considerable reputation as a planner during the 
War and the late 1940s, not least the UK end of Marshall Aid). 37 Brown was later to 
lament his choice of Roll, surmising that the resultant battle with the Treasury would 
have gone better had Sir William Armstrong been at the DEA helm. As we will see, 38 
'4 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (Secker and Warburg, 1989), pp. 180-1. 
35 Roll, Crowded hours, p. 149. 
36 Lord George-Brown papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS. Eng. c. 5000, Roll to Brown, 3 April 1964. 
37 Alec Caimcross, `Obituary: Lord Roll of Ipsden', The Guardian, 2 April 2005. 
38 Brown, In My Way, p. 97. 
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the quality of the staff in the DEA was never in question, though the rationale of its 
creation most certainly was. 
The opposition to a `Ministry of Expansion or Production'39 was as fervent as 
its supporters' advocacy. The legendary Lord Bridges, erstwhile Cabinet Secretary 
and Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and, therefore, a former gamekeeper of 
machinery of government issues, was a vocal critic, believing that management and 
finance should never be divorced from one another. 40 Another most vociferous 
opponent was Douglas Jay who had been Attlee's economic adviser in No. 10 from 
1945-46, Economic Secretary to the Treasury 1947-51 and was to be Wilson's first 
President of the Board of Trade. Jay tried hard to persuade Wilson that splitting 
Treasury control was madness, basing his criticism on the experience of 1945-47. 
These two years saw the Lord President of the Council, Herbert Morrison, attempt to 
co-ordinate economic policy with Hugh Dalton in the Treasury handling domestic and 
international finance and public spending. Sir Stafford Cripps was appointed Minister 
for Economic Affairs in 1947 in charge of planning, while Dalton remained 
Chancellor in charge of fiscal policy. 41 Dalton resigned just six weeks later, ostensibly 
over his Budget indiscretion but physical and mental exhaustion played their parts, 42 
with Cripps assuming both tasks. The `discredited muddle A3 which could only have 
intensified if the arrangement had continued44 was, therefore, brought to an end, but 
Wilson appeared to be determined to recreate it in another form (Paradoxically, 
George Brown's biographer, Peter Paterson, hands the credit for inspiring the DEA to 
Jay, citing a May 1963 paper he wrote for the Labour Party's Finance and Economic 
39 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, p. 25. Diary entry for 25 May 1963. 
40 Lord Bridges in Norman Hunt, Whitehall and Beyond (BBC, 1964), p. 71. 
41 Alec Caimcross, Managing the British Economy in the 1960s: A Treasury Perspective (Macmillan, 
1996), p. 96. 
42 Peter Hennessy, NeverAgain (Jonathan Cape, 1992), p. 338. 
43 Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune (Hutchison, 1980), p. 295. 
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Committee which suggested that a Minister of Economic Affairs be appointed, but, 
crucially, one that should report to the Chancellor in an enlarged Treasury. 45) 
Jay was sufficiently worried by developments in Wilson's mind to arrange for 
Lord Normanbrook (who as Sir Norman Brook was Cabinet Secretary between 1947- 
62) and Lord Plowden (the public-private sector amphibian who had directed the 
Central Economic Planning Staff during 1947-53), and who, between them, `knew 
more about the higher government machinery for managing the economy under 
several governments than anybody else', 46 to give their unsupportive views to Wilson 
in the months running up to the 1964 Election. Jay invited Wilson and Lord 
Nonnanbrook to lunch in the Commons: 
Brook was forthright as ever; Wilson listened politely. But it became pretty clear 
to me that he had promised George Brown to put him at the head of the DEA. 
This was a prime example of creating bad organization in order to appease 
personalities -a classic recipe for trouble. Wilson, I am sure, knew the scheme 
was ill-judged, but for some reason put personal appeasement first. 47 
Wilson did not `know' the scheme to be ill-judged'48 as his support of it through its 
gradual demise to its eventual death in October 1969 was to prove. He was truly 
wedded to his `specifically socialist measures'49 of technological and scientific 
progress coupled with a firm agreement on prices and incomes policy to bolster the 
44 Dell, The Chancellors, p. 307. 
45 Paterson, Tired and Emotional, p. 171; Patterson quotes Jay's paper from the Lord George-Brown 
papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University. 
46 Jay, Change and Fortune, p. 295. 
a' Ibid., p. 295. 
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49 Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970, p. xvii. 
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balance of payments. S° As Wilson outlined in his `white heat' Party Conference 
speech at Scarborough in the autumn of 1963, `unless we can harness science to our 
economic planning, we are not going to get the expansion that we need'. 51 
Wilson did, however, place `personal appeasement' higher. Creating a new, 
high-level department partly solved the Brown-conundrum (Brown's temperament 
would make him a problem for the Prime Minister wherever he was located in 
Whitehall). Brown himself was very pleased to be given such a role. With all of the 
warnings that Wilson had been given, he knew that the DEA was not going to have a 
smooth ride, so placing Brown there helped ease another problem This was 
succinctly described by Marcia Williams, Wilson's Personal and Political Secretary, 
who later thought that `George Brown seemed to feel that he was not so much a 
Deputy Prime minister as the alternative Prime Minister'. 52 Giving Brown a just such 
a role meant the prince would have more on his mind than the leadership question. 
This was a key Wilson tactic, to avert potential threats by creating balances of power. 
One of the justified criticisms of Harold Wilson was that he had a great belief that 
improving the higher State machinery was an essential preliminary to better 
governance generally and healthier economic performance specifically, yet a `political 
penchant for playing things by ear'. 53 This contradiction was to be replayed again and 
again. 
1964 marked the inauguration of the so-called `Douglas-Home Rules' which 
were needed due to the many years that had elapsed since Labour was last in office 
and the burgeoning aspirations of Wilson and his entourage. Bligh wrote to Douglas- 
Home conveying his concern: 
so NA, PRO, PREM 13/1546, `Reorganisation of government after 1966 Election', Balogh to Wilson, 
'Government Machinery, ' 4 April 1966. 
51 Harold Wilson, Purpose in Politics: Selected Speeches (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), pp. 14-28. 
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I wonder if I might add a personal thought on all this. The Civil Service are 
servants of the Queen and serve the government of the day. They cannot also 
serve the Opposition. But there is a real problem here ... because a newly-elected 
Prime Minister has, in practice, very little time to form an administration. 
Certainly there is not enough time for an in-coming Prime Minister to have long 
discussions with officials about machinery of government problems ... There 
is 
every possibility of a hasty ill-thought out decision being taken which might ... 
do real harm to the country. If, however, discussions between the Opposition and 
the Civil Service were to be regarded as tolerable I would have thought that the 
particular case of machinery of government on economic affairs was such a 
case. 54 
While neither a man lacking ambition nor oblivious to securing party advantage, 
Douglas-Home was rightly concerned with the welfare of his country and saw the 
benefits of this development, so long, as Douglas-Home intriguingly told Helsby, the 
Prime Minister `must know nothing whatsoever about this' (i. e. what transpired at the 
sessions). 55 
53 Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 295. 
S4 NA, PRO, PREM 11/4834, Bligh to Douglas-Home, 22 April 1964. 
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Planning (in)action 
The consultations resulted in Labour's Civil Service-prepared brief being 
considerably larger than that written for the Conservatives, 56 which is unsurprising as 
a re-elected government is, to a considerable degree, a matter of continuity. Contained 
within the brief was a Treasury-designed provisional blueprint for the creation of the 
DEA. 57 The Civil Service was unenthusiastic about the DEA. Sir Lawrence Helsby 
had responded to Bligh's 1963 information that Labour was considering altering the 
economic machinery by deeming it `troublesome, but I think there may be ways in 
which we can contain it'. 58 Whereas Lord Croham was convinced that Sir William 
Armstrong `would not have approved the Treasury split - he had, after all, just taken 
over the Treasury'. 59 
The Treasury's plan was to give the fledgling Department of Economic Affairs 
enough responsibilities to make it important rather than dominant, but no more. To 
this end, the Treasury blueprint for the DEA envisaged the new department having a 
unit for creating an all-embracing economic plan, a section devoted to prices and 
incomes policy, and capability to take responsibility for industrial policy and regional 
economic development60 (in effect taking on board most, but not all, of the NEDC's 
work and secretariat 61) 
s6 Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland (Cape, 1982), p. 122. 
57 Interview with Lord Roll of Ipsden, 17 September 2002; See NA, PRO, T 325/98, 'Economic Plan 
and Concordat co-operation between Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) and the Treasury', T 
330/88 'Machinery of Government: division of functions between the Treasury and the Department 
of Economic Affairs (Concordat)'. 
58 NA, PRO, PREM 11/4834, letter from Helsby to Bligh, 19 July 1963. 
59 Interview with Lord Croham, 29 October 2002. 
60 Roll, Crowded Hours, pp. 148-189; Dell, The Chancellors, pp. 306-309; Hennessy, Whitehall, pp. 
182-186. 
61 It was MacDougall who persuaded Brown not to absorb all of the NEDC and NEDO. Interview with 
Sir Donald MacDougall, 25 September 2002. 
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In view of George Brown's pre-election discussions, Sir Donald MacDougall's 
observation that Brown `didn't understand it [the battle over the DEA's functions]. He 
hadn't done any preparatory work at all, really'62 appears to be erroneous, but 
evidence at the Public Record Office supports Sir Donald. For the `Concordat' ('the 
Treasury presumably cast in the role of the Pope and the DEA in that of a secular 
power, although George Brown on occasion liked to refer to himself as "the Pope"'63) 
was agreed on 27 October, 1964.64 Tom Caulcott, Brown's long-to-suffer Private 
Secretary who had been sacked and reinstated three times within the first month, 65 
wrote to William McIndoe, Sir Burke Trend's Private Secretary in the Cabinet Office, 
that the Concordat `is agreed between the First Secretary and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer', less than a fortnight after polling day, Thursday, 15`h October. 66 Wilson 
himself was later to claim of the Concordat that it `did not take more than a few 
minutes to dictate its terms'. 67 
Yet two days later, Peter Jay, Private Secretary to Sir William Armstrong, 
wrote to Ian Bancroft (Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor) and Otto Clarke 
(Second Secretary in charge of public expenditure): `Apparently the Concordat is now 
back in the melting pot. i68 This followed Balogh, now Economic Adviser to the 
Cabinet, and Anthony Crosland, the Labour MP and author of The Future of 
Socialism, given the No. 2 job to Brown in the DEA (though ostensibly employed by 
the Treasury as Economic Secretary due to too many ministers being appointed), 
bz Interview with Sir Donald MacDougall, 25 September 2002. 
63 Roll, Crowded hours, p. 152. 
64 NA, PRO, PREM 13/2126, `Division of functions between HM Treasury and Department of 
Economic Affairs', Tom Caulcott to WI McIndoe, 27 October 1964. 
65 Alec Caimcross, The Wilson Years: A Treasury Diary, 1964-1969 (The Historian's Press, 1997), p. 
15. Diary entry for 16 November 1964. 
66 NA, PRO, PRO Pp 'EM 13/2126, Caulcott to McIndoe, 27 October 1964. 
67 Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970, p. 5. 
68 NA, PRO, T 325/98, Peter Jay to Ian Bancroft and Richard Clarke, `Concordat - Note for the 
Record, ' 29 October 1964. 
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reacting with horror to the Treasury's view of the Concordat - and also to Brown's 
ready acceptance of it. 
Only a relatively small number of `irregulars' were brought in by Labour in 
1964, amongst them several economists. The most important amongst them were 
Balogh (stationed in the Cabinet Office), Nicholas Kaldor and Robert Neild (both to 
advise Jim Callaghan at the Treasury) along with John Allen and Michael Stewart. 
While this small number could not cause great alarm to the mandarins, the fact that 
Balogh, Kaldor and Neild were `at a high level, at the centre of the administration' 
certainly did. 69 As Peter Hennessy described it: 
For some Whitehall regulars, this appeared, still does, to be the thin end of a 
wedge of politicisation which has advanced ever since. One seasoned Treasury 
man, for example, traces to October 1964 a growing tendency among some 
career officials to trim their advice to ministerial preferences. Certainly there was 
a degree of mutual wariness in Whitehall between the old and the new blood ... 
70 
This was one innovation of Wilson's which was going to last, and indeed deepen and 
grow so much so that by 2000 there were 77 special advisers in Government, 26 of 
them answering directly to the Prime Minister. 71 
Balogh and Crosland were upset that, as a note from the Treasury's 
Organisation Committee put it, the DEA `will not have executive functions in the 
ordinary sense of the form Its organisation therefore will be more like that of a strong 
secretariat, with a comparatively small supporting staff. '72 This was not what the two 
69 Andrew Blick, People Who Live in the Dark (Politico's, 2004), p. 88. 
70 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 189. 
71 Blick, People Who Live in the Dark, pp. 321-3. 
72 NA, PRO, T 325/98, AJ Collier and J Anson, `Her Majesty's Treasury - Treasury Organisation 
Committee: Department of Economic Affairs: Note by the Secretaries, ' 30 September 1964. 
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economists believed the DEA was created for, since they wanted the DEA to be 
superior to the Treasury: the Treasury plan was clearly to maintain the status quo vis- 
d-vis ultimate policy-making power. 
When Brown, bolstered by Crosland and Balogh, attempted to renegotiate the 
formarly-agreed Concordat by demanding the transfer of some or all of the Treasury's 
public expenditure responsibilities, the Treasury Knights began to man the ramparts. 
Otto Clarke, undisputed general of public expenditure and `a very clever man at 
arguing, very clever', 73 led the defence. Clarke wrote to Ian Bancroft pointing out 
that, 
It is impossible for us to carry out our work of control of current expenditure 
unless we control the whole of public expenditure (this is literally the case); and 
it would be utterly impracticable to have the departments negotiating one part of 
their Vote and other expenditure authorisations with the Treasury and another 
with the DEA. I emphasise that we are here in the field of literal administrative 
impossibility [emphasis added). '74 
Clarke went on in the same letter to express his wish to see the DEA thrive -a 
comment which provokes deep scepticism. The next day Clarke reported to his boss, 
William Armstrong, that MacDougall had had a long chat with him at Roll's 
suggestion. According to MacDougall, Roll was very concerned to foster good 
relations with the Treasury, in direct contrast to Brown who often viewed it as the 
`enemy '75 - another sign of the difference in outlook between the permanent and the 
temporary government. MacDougall `explained the First Secretary's preoccupations 
73 Interview with Lord Roll of Ipsden, 17 September 2002. 
74 NA, PRO, T 325/98, Clarke to Bancroft, `Concordat', 29 October 1964. 
75 Interview with Sir Donald MacDougall, 25 September 2002. 
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on familiar lines, including the consideration that Labour Party opinion had expected 
that public investment would be controlled by the new department'. 76 This was a real 
battle over the very heart of Whitehall and one that was remembered for many years. 77 
With the Chancellor keeping quiet and Brown digging in his heels, it was left 
to the officials to look for a solution - or a fudge. At a meeting on 2 November, 
Helsby, Armstrong, Clarke and Jay of the Treasury met the DEA's Roll and 
MacDougall to thrash it out. MacDougall produced a theory and supporting wording 
that all could agree with Sir Donald 
suggested that, while it might not be practical to divide the subject matter of 
public expenditure between the two departments, it might be possible to 
distinguish the points of view from which each department approached it. The 
Treasury's prime interest was in the `vertical' division of the public sector outlay 
between the various public services etc. (i. e. the functional blocks). By contrast, 
the D. E. A. 's predominant interest was in the `horizontal' division of this 
expenditure between the various categories of resources and particular 
industries. 78 
The notion of `horizontal' integration is intriguing as Lord Croham thought that many 
of the Wilsonian machinery of central government reforms had the aim of providing 
greater cohesion of government. 79 This was a fascinating pre-echo of the early Blair 
Government's obsession with `joined-up government', to provide more efficient 
76 NA, PRO, T 325/98, Clarke to Sir William Armstrong, 'Concordat', 30 October 1964. 
77 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 182. 
78 NA, PRO, T 325/98, note from the meeting of Helsby, Armstrong, Clarke, Roll, MacDougall and 
Jay, 'Machinery of Government (Economic): Concordat', 2 November 1964. 
79 Interview with Lord Croham, 29 October 2002. 
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delivery of policies and to counter the `wicked issues' which slipped between 
departmental silos. 80 
MacDougall's diplomacy did not put an end to the conflict. For on the 11 
November, Roll wrote to Helsby stating that Brown and Crosland were still unhappy 
and that Crosland, in particular, was uncompromisingly confident that the DEA would 
assume responsibility for public investment and that he was personally redrafting the 
Concordat. 81 Moreover, Clarke had not let his defences down. He now attacked 
MacDougall's accommodation, writing to Armstrong on the 17 November that `The 
distinction between short-term and long-term, useful in considering economic policy, 
is not meaningful in public sector expenditure. ' 82 
But suddenly on 4 December, Brown wrote to Helsby and appeared to 
completely capitulate. He told Helsby that due to the good working relationship 
between himself and the Chancellor, the direction of higher economic policy needed 
no further reform. 83 In light of the battle royal which had raged for over a month, at a 
time when the Labour Government suffered its first exchange rate crisis and, 
subsequently, introduced an emergency Budget, it seems incredible that the First 
Secretary would quietly back off on the key issue of public investment. (Though the 
big initial problems the new Labour ministers encountered may have meant that there 
was little appetite for a protracted fight. ) The answer, according to Lord Roll, was 
maybe that the Prime Minister finally intervened: 
8o `This phrase was invented by Sir Michael Bichard when Permanent Secretary of Education and 
Employment. He used it at a private conference attended by Labour figures before the 1997 General 
election and it impressed them. ' Comment by Peter Hennessy, 5 July 2003. 
81 NA, PRO, T 325/98, Roll to Helsby, `Concordat', 11 November 1964. 
82 NA, PRO, T 325/98, Clarke to Armstrong, `The Control of Public Expenditure and a Plan for 
National Economic Development', 17 November 1964. 
83 NA, PRO, T 325/98, Brown to Helsby, 4 December 1964. 
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I suspect that what happened was that Wilson must have had a chat with George 
... and more or less warned him off by saying `Don't fight the Treasury on this 
sort of ground' but in addition he must also have said `As you are Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs and First Secretary of State you will in fact have as 
much power to counter Jim as you can reasonably expect to have in our system 
of things. ' 84 
This was understood by Brown, especially as the First Secretaryship led Wilson to 
give him the chairmanship of both the Cabinet's main economic committee, 
Economic Development Committee, ED, 85 and that of the NEDC, so that Callaghan 
did have to consider the DEA in Treasury decision-making86 - in the final analysis, a 
powerful position. 87 The DEA was also allowed a small team to shadow the 
Treasury's public expenditure work and to offer suggestions when they impacted on 
growth88 
Wilson's probable intervention is illuminating for he accorded the DEA a less 
than dominating role, something that clearly ran contrary to Crosland and Balogh's 
beliefs and wishes. This was powerfully underlined on 28 October, soon after the 
conflict began, when Wilson scribbled on a letter from Balogh regarding the need for 
public investment to be assigned to the DEA. In a note to the Cabinet Secretary, Sir 
Burke Trend, Wilson wrote `We discussed this. NFA [no further action] on this. '89 It 
is easy to understand why the Chancellor kept quiet and allowed Brown, Crosland and 
Balogh `to swing slowly in the wind' (to borrow a phrase Callaghan himself used ten 
S4 Interview with Lord Roll of Ipsden, 17 September 2002. 
as NA, PRO, CAB 161/16, 'Committee Organisation Book, December 1964'. 
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years later over Edward Heath's desperate attempts to retain the Premiership). 90 
Wilson, therefore, allowed the battle to play itself out for over a month - during an 
economic storm - until he finally weighed in to demand Brown's acquiescence. It was 
a foretaste of his Cabinet management style to come. 91 
The Concordat eventually approved by Wilson on 14 December 196492 was 
based on the short term long term division, with the Treasury retaining power over the 
Budget, public expenditure, the balance of payments, exchange rate policy and 
overseas financial relations, and the DEA taking responsibility for physical resources, 
incomes policy, economic growth, regional and industrial policy. 93 This division 
frustrated the Treasury because it could not look at the long-term, and the DEA due to 
the ban on the short-term. 94 The Chancellor was later to write that 
the Concordat represented a verbal truce rather than a true meeting of minds with 
a genuine and rational division of responsibility. The principal officials in the 
Treasury and DEA tried to make the agreement work, but there were what the 
Americans call frequent `turf fights'. It was sometimes said that No. 10 believed 
in something called `creative tension' and that the friction between the 
Departments would produce the desired pearls. This was not my experience. 95 
Officials from both sides of the divide were unconvinced by the Concordat as well, 
and it was never used to sort out any difficulty. 96 Clarke backed Callaghan's appraisal, 
believing that `It was never possible to establish a meaningful division of functions 
James Callaghan quoted in Peter Hennessy, Muddling Through (Gollancz, 1996), p. 36. 
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between the two departments' while Croham felt that much `was not politically or 
organisationally viable'. 97 He did, however, think that it `had worked better than he 
had thought possible at the outset'. 98 
Wilson's actions also demonstrated a private U-turn on economic policy- 
making. For one of the key ways the enforced schism in economic policy was 
originally to be managed was through a co-ordinating committee chaired by the Prime 
Minister (something `strongly' supported by Sir William Armstrong"), overseeing the 
Treasury, the DEA and the newly bolstered Cabinet Office containing Balogh, all of 
them vying for influence. 100 But the Prime Minister shied away from this, apparently. 
under pressure from Callaghan, 101 leading to Wilson being in charge of economic 
policy only at critical moments102 -a fact, naturally, pleasing to the Chancellor. In 
any case, Wilson was always keen to avoid internal disputes, 103 especially if they 
concerned the `brilliant but uncontrolled personality' 104 of Brown. 
The way in which Brown approached the creation of the DEA was grandiose 
and totally unrealistic. He blamed the subsequent difficulties the DEA encountered on 
the lack of a detailed, Labour Party-prepared blueprint for the Concordat'°5 (missing 
largely because of the difficulty in drafting it106) but also felt that the economic crisis 
Labour inherited `meant that we simply couldn't give as much attention as we should 
have given to establishing the relationship between the department and the Treasury 
97 Clarke and Croham quoted in Christopher Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine (George Allen & 
Unwin, 1984), p. 55. 
98 Croham quoted in Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine, p. 55. 
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in formal minutes'. 107 He also claimed that the Concordat `never got itself formally 
accepted between Jim Callaghan, the Prime Minister and myself . 108 Yet, he had 
readily agreed the Treasury-designed split within a fortnight of the Election, and the 
subsequent Balogh-Crosland-inspired row lasted for over a month due to the 
impossibility of reconciling'09 `diametrically opposed policies', with the Treasury 
wishing to retain the exchange rate parity at all costs and the DEA determined to raise 
Britain's growth rate. ' 10 Brown himself wrote to Helsby `I do not think it necessary to 
spell out all the details, especially in a document which we intend to circulate to other 
departments. "11 
It is a pity that Wilson and Brown did not live to see the lifting of the thirty- 
year rule from their 1964 files and so escaped the cross-questioning demanded by the 
contradiction between their accounts (both published in 1971) and the declassified 
documents. Politicians in struggles with officials, intra-Civil Service strife and a turf 
war over the most important department in government provided one of the most 
strange and fascinating stories in the reform of post-war central government. But the 
conflict was not the only thing to linger over the years as the actual reason for 
splitting the Treasury was in Jim Callaghan's thoughts when he considered creating a 
Ministry of Finance and an Office of Management and Budget if he had won the 1979 
general election (a different and admittedly more rational split). 112 Newspaper reports 
suggesting a modem cleavage in the Treasury appeared again in January 2005.113 
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How different the Treasury might have been if the major reorganisation two 
years before Labour returned had been given time to settle is impossible to know. 
Callaghan, who claimed he had originally `supported fully' the concept of the 
DEA, 114 later explained how 
William Armstrong had convinced me that as a result of a reorganisation at the 
Treasury department in 1962 there was a change in atmosphere - that the 
Treasury would no longer operate perhaps as it had done in the 1950s, to a large 
extent. Putting a dampening hand on something was always going to be realistic, 
but the Treasury did ... fall for the fallacy of trying to get a 
higher growth rate, 
being able to achieve these things, and saying `Yes, we are going to do our part 
in order to do this'. And this is one reason why I think if the department [the 
DEA] had not been set up we might have had perhaps a slightly different 
result. '15 
It is difficult to envisage the reforms of 1962 delivering the grandiose aims of the 
Labour, and Labour-supporting, planners who dreamt of sustained economic 
expansion. Planning through the DEA represented the `big idea' of the incoming 
Wilson Government. It demonstrated dynamism and modernisation, in direct contrast 
to the seemingly ineffective Conservative approach `Critics of the civil service, ' 
wrote Sir Leo Pliatzky, 
as unreceptive to new ideas cannot have witnessed the missionary spirit, 
sometimes spiralling over into an uncritical enthusiasm for practically any fresh 
114 Callaghan, Time And Chance, p. 153. 
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initiative, which the new Department generated among its recruits. There was 
also a certain amount of promotion going there, which is generally good for 
morale. 116 
The DEA was created with hope and not a little expediency. But it was not thought 
through and was dominated from the beginning by the wishes of Wilson, Callaghan 
and, initially, Brown to maintain the parity of $2.80 to the pound"" - and, therefore, 
by the Treasury. A lot of effort went into creating the DEA and to bedding it down 
into the Whitehall matrix, all for so little return. 
The Civil Service and Labour 
If the DEA was created to provide growth-through-economic planning, then 
another department created in 1964, the Ministry of Technology, was to provide 
growth through the planning and application of high technology. 118 `The other major 
new department', as Wilson described it, had been foreshadowed at Labour's 1963 
Scarborough Conference, ' 19 when Wilson claimed that `In all our plans for the future, 
we are re-defining and we are re-stating our Socialism in terms of the scientific 
revolution'. 120 The 1964 manifesto also heralded its arrival `to guide and stimulate a 
116 Plitatzky, Getting and Spending, p. 63. 
117 Though the first two meetings of MISC1 on Saturday 17`h and Sunday 18`h October 1964 did not 
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... Dell, The Chancellors, p. 307. 
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major national effort to bring advanced technology and new processes into 
industry'. 121 Wilson later described exactly why he created it: 
I had long felt that we needed a ministry to discharge two functions which 
existing departments were inadequate to perform. It was to be a `Ministry of 
Industry', starting with a relatively small number of industries, but taking on a 
wider and wider sponsorship, with a very direct responsibility for increasing 
productivity and efficiency, particularly within those industries in urgent need of 
restructuring or modernisation ... 
The second task of the Ministry of Technology would be to speed the application 
of new scientific methods to industrial production ... Britain had always been 
good in the scientific laboratory, but all too often the results of fundamental 
research done here had been clothed with the necessary know-how only by 
foreign industrialists ... The process had continued apace after the war and I 
decided something must be done about it. 122 
But although the concept of Mintech had long been in gestation, Wilson had not 
settled on a clear scheme prior to assuming office and the new Ministry, designed 
very much `off-the-cuff' according to its Economic 123 suffered a rough first 
year. 124 This was also due to the Prime Minister's choice of Frank Cousins as its first 
ministerial head. Cousins had been General Secretary of the Transport and General 
Workers' Union and there are suggestions that one reason for Mintech's creation was 
that as Wilson wanted a major trade unionist in his Cabinet. 125 If true, the totally 
121 Craig (ed. ), British General Election Manifestos, 1959-1987, p. 48. 
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inexperienced new Minister would fit the new Ministry nicely. 126 Although Cousins 
was liked - Barbara Castle thought it an inspired choice from an industrial point-of- 
view'27 and Callaghan thought him `dynamic, forceful and self-confident' 128 _ the 
Minister was initially very uncomfortable in the House of C011mons, 129 naive about 
the workings of Whitehall 130 and administratively weak. 131 An inauspicious beginning 
for the other new institutional pillar upon which Wilson was to base his growth 
strategy. 
The Prime Minister did not leave his immediate machinery of government 
reforms there. The Department of Technical Co-operation was transformed into the 
Ministry of Overseas Development, with a seat in the Cabinet for Barbara Castle. Its 
duties were enlarged so that it could now foster real development particularly in the 
Commonwealth 132 1964 also saw the creation of the Welsh Office, a manifesto 
promise. This was given responsibility for functions such as local government, 
housing, roads and forestry. 133 
The final newcomer was the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources which 
was set up in order, Marcia Williams wrote, to combat `the more vicious sides of the 
housing'. 134 The MLNR was quickly abolished, lasting just eighteen months, before 
its functions were reabsorbed back into the Ministry for Housing and Local 
126 Sir Lawrence Helsby quoted in Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine, p. 57. 
127 Barbara Castle, Fighting All the Way (Macmillan, 1993), p. 353. 
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Government. 135 It was not in the manifesto and was simply invented at the last 
minute, causing difficulties with the MHLG. 136 
Wilson wrote to Helsby on 21 October 1964 to offer his thanks for the Civil 
Service's reforming efforts: `I am not unaware that the changes that have been 
announced involved fundamental changes in the government machinery such as we 
have not seen in peacetime in the last generation ... much as I love you all, I do not 
want to see you on Sunday and I hope that Saturday will, as far as is possible, be a 
free day for all those who have borne the heat and burden of the past few days'. 137 
Wilson genuinely liked the company of civil servants and respected their abilities 
hugely to the dismay of some of his more politically motivated intimates. Marcia 
Williams, his Political Secretary, felt this was a major problem 
Some of us who were very close to him were worried it would be the civil 
servant who would dominate him, and I think it is fair to say that our fears were 
in fact justified to some great extent through the years of the two Labour 
Governments. 
It is the fact that he does have such an admiration for and such a working 
knowledge of `the System' that he tends to lean over backwards in his 
relationship towards it. He gives it the benefit of the doubt. He doesn't really 
want to argue with it. He admires the way it is organized and its methods of 
working. He admires its efficiency and he is often myopic about its failings and 
its short-comings and its inefficiencies, and this is a great drawback 138 
135 Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine, p. 65. 
136 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol. 1, Minister of housing, 1964-66 (Cape, 
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Williams is a true boon to the historian. Her memoir of the 1964-70 governments is 
embittered, vitriolic and Thatcheresque in its sense of struggle. It is also lengthy and 
an unadulterated case for the prosecution. 
Williams was Wilson's Private and Political Secretary throughout his 
Premierships (paid for by the Labour Party) and by his side from 1956-83, a 
confidante of the utmost centrality. How she achieved this longevity has been the 
cause of intense speculation since the very early days of their relationship. Some, such 
as Peter Hennessy, believe Williams `suffered as strong-minded women in politics 
often do from being deemed shrewish and shrill in a way that does not afflict 
comparably insistent men'. 139 Further claims were provided by Joe Haines, Wilson's 
Press Secretary from 1969-76, who wrote in 2003 that documentary evidence held by 
Williams of a pre-1964 affair between herself and Wilson is probably the best 
explanation of how she could act in a bizarre way for so long. 140 Haines details so 
many examples of Wilson, and almost everyone else around him, being humiliated by 
Williams, events `so unreal the average fiction writer would have rejected' them141 - 
even in an era used to the embarrassment George Brown could cause - that it is 
interesting, to say the very least, how she retained her role. Perhaps only if rumours 
prove correct of a manuscript written by Williams, lodged with a London publisher 
and embargoed until Mary Wilson's (Harold's widow) death, will the full story of her 
and Wilson's unprecedented relationship be known. 142 
Whatever the truth behind the Wilson-Williams relationship, there was 
undeniably a close meeting of minds which, according to Ben Pimlott, rendered 
139 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p. 295. 
140 Joe Haines, Glimmers of Twilight (Politico's, 2003), p. 135. 
141 Ibid., p. 64. 
142 Ibid., p. 134. 
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rumours `a technicality'. 143 When Labour returned to office, there was never any 
doubt that Williams would follow Wilson into Downing Street. There were questions, 
however, over the role she would play. `Some considerable time before the 1964 
election, ' Williams explained, 
I had been taken to dinner and lunch several times by the late Sir Timothy Bligh, 
who was Principal Private Secretary to Sir Alec Douglas-Home ... Tim Bligh 
made it clear during these meetings that there was no place for me, or my office 
colleagues, at No. 10. I reported these views back faithfully to Harold, and there 
was a joint decision to disagree with Sir Timothy ... They 
knew I had been 
running Harold's Private Office in opposition, and if he succeeded in capturing 
power in 1964, they wanted to make certain that they captured him. 144 
Williams's pre-election difficulties with the Civil Service were imported exorbitantly 
into Downing Street. The chief battle was between her and Derek Mitchell, Bligh's 
successor as the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary. The problem was that 
Williams's Political Office, which she situated in the waiting room next to the Cabinet 
Room, handled many of the functions which had previously fallen to the Principal 
Private Secretary and his staff. When asked if there was any administrative point to 
Williams's role, beyond personal and spiritual support to the Prime Minister, Sir 
Derek replied: 
I think if you put it like that, the answer's "no". She had the skills of a good 
constituency secretary ... she could see the politics of any situation and 
understand it. If a situation required statesmanship instead of simple political 
143 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p. 204. 
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nous, she was lost, it was beyond her .. But not a great brain, not a[n Alistair] 
Campbell or a [Peter] Mandelson, nowhere near it, but it was coupled with the 
deep suspicion [detailed in her book]. She felt more strongly than anyone else 
who worked near him that there was this great conspiracy, that all of Whitehall 
was against him, the press were against him and it was up to the likes of her, all 
too few of them, to save him and somehow bring him through this. Dreadful 
situation. A bit weird. '45 
She even called for a complete purge of, what she considered to be, the Tory- 
supporting No. 10 staff, something which was utterly impracticable. 146 Her `volcanic 
and neurotic' nature (Williams's reported description of herself) 147 alongside her bond 
with Wilson meant that `Civil servants, almost without exception, hated her' wrote 
Joe Haines. 148 The resulting turf war. between Williams and Mitchell -became 
Whitehall legend. 149 
To be taken more seriously were Williams's claims that the Civil Service 
obstructed her and the entire Labour Government and its programme. Williams's 
distrust of the Civil Service machine was great: `I hold the view very strongly that 
Ministers, and particularly Prime Ministers, should automatically suspect many of the 
activities of the Civil Service. ' 50 Why was this? First, thirteen years of Opposition 
had made Labour very suspicious of the Civil Service. 151 In reality, the Civil Service 
was keen for the changeover and the new ideas that went with it. 152 Next, Williams 
personally equated the senior civil servants with the `Establishment', ergo, all civil 
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servants simply must be closet Tories (the Conservatives `controlled the Civil Service, 
more or less' 153) This was paranoia on a high level, if she felt the Civil Service as a 
whole was trying hard to scupper the Labour manifesto due to Tory sympathies. It 
was true that many of the senior civil servants did belong to the clubland of St 
James's as did many Conservative politicians. But the two different breeds rarely 
mixed there as civil servants were typically members of the Reform or the Travellers 
not the Carlton or White's. Moreover, many senior civil servants found soul-mates 
among high-ranking Labour figures like Jenkins, Crosland and Healey who shared 
their schooling (grammar as well as public schools), university formation, outlook and 
interests. Furthermore, as Douglas Hurd has written, the Civil Service `works in 
practice to the advantage of Labour Governments because allied to it is a firm belief 
in the merits of action by the state' (especially if a Conservative wish is to reduce the 
reach of the state '54) What Williams really meant was that the senior Civil Service 
did not conform to her tastes and her view of what Wilson's tastes should be. 
But did the Civil Service obstruct? There was clearly no love lost between 
Williams and Mitchell. The latter adhered scrupulously to the dividing line between 
Civil Service lifers and temporary political appointees; due to the inevitability of 
another election in the near future, thought Williams, `We were treated as ships 
lss passing in the night'. The impartiality of the Civil Service was unquestionably 
observed during these years. 
Bearing this in mind, was the Civil Service's heart in the Labour programme? 
This is much more vexatious. When asked to judge how he, Armstrong and Trend 
152 pimlott, Ilarold Wilson, p. 323. 
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rated, on a scale between blind enthusiasm for the Government and Yes, Minister- 
style cynicism, Lord Roll admitted 
More the latter. Not entirely. But there was never real reforming drive, it was 
modest. It was `Well there it is, these ideas are here, and these things come and 
go' ... To some extent William 
[Armstrong] was a bit of an old-style civil 
servant, shrugging his shoulders and saying `There we are, here we go again; 
something will stick but not an awful lot. ' Anyway, there's always the feeling: 
how long is this minister going to be here - he could be gone tomorrow so let's 
not take it too seriously. '56 
Perhaps Williams had a point after all. But perhaps not. For, upon closer inspection, 
Roll's honesty betrays a keenness to provide a fine service, just based upon 
experience and a lack of faith in what Peter Hennessy christened the `Tommy Cooper 
Trap' whereby everything changes just because somebody says it will - `just like 
that'. Government had become too big to change overnight, or even in a few years. As 
Mitchell commented, `It must be extremely frustrating to see the sheer inertia of 
government activity' 157 - especially for someone of Williams's temperament. There is 
also the fact that just as Williams herself bemoaned the fact that No. 10 was never 
transformed from the monastery into the powerhouse of Wilson's pre-election 
rhetoric, 15' the monks were likely to be nervous of outsiders (a problem that afflicts 
much of the Service, then as now). `It is possible that she misrepresented people 
because she didn't understand them, ' lamented Sir Derek. 159 
156 Interview with Lord Roll of Ipsden, 17 September 2002. 
157 Interview with Sir Derek Mitchell, 19 September 2002. 
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Marcia Williams and her office did prove difficult to bolt onto Downing 
Street's machine, 'something that was eventually put to rest when Michael Halls 
somewhat inappropriately succeeded Mitchell as Principal Private Secretary in 1966 
against the wishes of the Civil Service hierarchy, when Sir Derek moved on (see 
Chapter 3). Wilson knew that he - and doubtlessly Williams - would find Halls a 
more accommodating colleague, as the Prime Minister and he had worked together at 
the Board of Trade in the late 1940s. '60 This proved true, but Halls was deemed to 
have failed on several professional fronts and worked himself into an early death just 
before Labour left office in 1970.161 
What became known as the `kitchen cabinet' was another Wilsonian 
development which provided succour directly to the Prime Minister, especially during 
the period 1964-66. In essence it was a group of left-leaning Wilson acolytes, though 
ones often prepared to confront him like Barbara Castle, Richard Crossman and 
Thomas Balogh. These political obsessives met in Downing Street and chewed the 
political fat and drank the prime ministerial brandy into the early hours, though they 
were often frustrated afterwards at the lack of influence they could bring to bear on 
the chameleon-like Wilson. 162 
Planning runs mound ound 
As we have seen, a majority of the first significant peacetime wave of what we 
now call special advisers were economists. The unelected yet often centrally- 
positioned temporary civil servants appointed by a Prime Minister or Minister to offer 
160 Dell, The Chancellors, p. 304. 
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specialist skills that the Civil Service cannot provide or political activity it will not, 
found themselves in the thick of the action from the very first days. For the attempts 
of Reginald Maudling to break out of the `stop-go' cycle had led to Armstrong 
presenting the new Chancellor with a dire prediction of a balance of payments deficit 
for 1964 of `about £750 million', quite beyond the realms of credibility at that time. 163 
The Labour ministers, all `expansionists at heart', 164 were crestfallen. The 
ruling triumvirate, Wilson, Brown and Callaghan, agreed to meet in secret (the cover 
story was that the future of Crosland and Robert Neild were to be discussed) on 
Saturday, 17 October, without any advisers or civil servants. 165 The troika decided 
that the new Government's `specifically socialist measures' 166 of planning and 
technology would swiftly right the imbalance, 167 and so they plumped for reductions 
in the increase of public expenditure instead of devaluing the pound. Crosland was 
infuriated by the decision and the manner of its taking. All the special advisers on the 
economic side were aghast, barring Balogh who backed the ruling threesome only to 
renege three weeks later. 168 Yet all the civil servants - again, barring one, Sir Donald 
MacDougall, not a career civil servant169 - supported the decision not to devalue. This 
was because, as Sir Samuel Brittan, an economic adviser in the DEA from 1964-65, 
saw it, the decision was not whether to devalue or deflate, but to devalue and deflate 
or to deflate much deeper. 170 The civil servants were unconvinced (rightly) as to 
whether a devaluation would have been coupled with the necessary deflationary 
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measures. 171 This was also the view of the Governor of the Bank of England, Lord 
Cromer. 172 
The decision not to devalue in October 1964 cast a shadow over the first three 
years of the Government173 as the currency remained overvalued. 174 It certainly meant 
that the Labour Government's pride and joy, the centrepiece of the 1964 manifesto 
and of their economic policy, the National Plan, was put under pressure before it had 
even begun to be written. The spectre of an overvalued pound had caused the 
Government great concern in the last months of 1964 as the currency markets turned 
against the new Labour Administration. This abated but the markets returned to the 
attack in July and August 1965.179 
Sir Alec Cairncross was the first head of the newly-established Government 
Economic Service, created in order to maintain an apolitical head of economic advice 
upon the appointment of the special adviser Robert Neild (in actual fact Cairncross 
and Neild sometimes shared direction of the GES). 176 Cairncross was very concerned 
that `Ministers seemed oblivious to the situation that was building up and were busy 
discussing the National Plan' 177 once again placing theory over reality. But the 
pressure intensified and the Government was forced into a hasty series of public 
investment cuts, 178 virtually indistinguishable from the hated Tories' stop-go 
policies. 179 By this time, Brown had come to understand that inevitable balance of 
payments crises, coupled with an overriding commitment to the existing parity of 
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$2.80, meant deflation - and less, if any, emphasis on expansion, the raison d'etre of 
his DEA. From this point on, Brown became an increasingly vocal internal advocate 
of devaluation (but not deflationlso) 
The Chancellor's and, more importantly, the Prime Minister's staunch support 
of the existing parity was due to the fear of being forever condemned as the party of 
devaluation after the two previous Labour Prime Ministers had devalued in 1931 and 
1949 (Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, was not actually leader of the Labour 
Party at the time of devaluation, but the point holds). Added to this was the belief that 
devaluation would damage the standard of living181(of the working classes mostly182), 
that sterling balances held by many of the world's poorest countries would have their 
reserves devalued, too, and that it was simply immoral; the 1964 manifesto criticised 
the Conservatives for allowing the pound to shrink in value. 183 Wilson had also 
promised the New York Federal Reserve Bank while still in opposition that there 
would be no devaluation (provided financial help was forthcoming, naturally). '84 
However, promising no devaluation and delivering it were two very different 
things. Super-secret contingency planning in case the parity could not be maintained 
went on in an official committee humourously entitled the `FU [Forever 
Unmentionable] Conunittee'. Set up by Armstrong probably early in 1965, possibly 
due to Neild's warning that `devaluation is going to happen one day and I trust the 
Treasury has a contingency plan for it', its membership was interesting. 18' Senior 
Treasury officials were, of course, represented along with the Bank of England and 
the Chancellor but, at least initially, the Prime Minister was not notified of its 
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existence. 186 Meanwhile, as the contingency planning proceeded, ministers continued 
publicly and privately to stress the impossibility of devaluation - Samuel Brittan 
encountered George Brown in the DEA corridor one day in 1965, asking `What shall 
we do about the Unmentionable? T 'Don't mention it' was Brown's reply. 187 Whatever 
the reasons, though these soon became secondary to not losing face, the decision to 
place the balance of payments above all else meant that the National Plan was under a 
cloud from the beginning. 
What George Brown described as `our main object' was `the first attempt at 
economic planning on such a scale that has ever been made in Britain'. 188 In essence, 
the National Plan was a development of early 1960s NEDC work. It tried to form a 
big plan from all the little plans of individual industries and to foster a meaningful 
prices and incomes policy (which George Brown, through his own idiosyncratic skills, 
did achieve, much to universal praise'89) all with the intention of achieving an annual 
rate of four per cent growth and thus avoiding the necessity of a devaluation. 190 
According to Pliatzky, `Much of this document struck me at the time of its preparation 
as a sort of What's On In Whitehall. That is to say, various Departments tabled 
statements of what they were doing and would in any case have been doing in their 
respective fields, which became the National Plan. "91 
The National Plan would succeed where the Tories' version had failed, 
thought Brown, because this time all of government would be behind it. 192 By August 
1965 the Plan was almost complete. On 4 August, Brown got wind of preparations, 
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the night before the crucial NEDC meeting to agree the Plan, for the industrialists' 
comer of the tripartite triangle to pull out of the agreement. Using his staffs detective 
capabilities to their limit, the industrialists' meeting was tracked down to Sunningdale 
in Berkshire. Although Brown was told the meeting was over, he raced down there 
with MacDougall (in effect the author of the Plan) bearing the only copy. By two 
o'clock in the morning, Brown had persuaded the group to back the Plan, a 
superhuman effort. This was not the end of the story, however, as Brown then left the 
document in the Mini of a motorist who had deigned to pick him up - after the Civil 
Service-provided car had broken down - and drop him at the DEA's headquarters at 
the back of the Treasury. The man duly returned it the next day - the blueprint for 
future British economic success being rescued by a startling symbol of contemporary 
British design. 193 
The Plan was confidently introduced to the House of Commons by Brown on 
3 November 1965, an attempt to map out the economy for the next six years. '94 It was 
interesting to hear, in contrast to Roll's admission of collective scepticism, 
MacDougall, had truly believed in it at the time. 195 He soon appreciated his misplaced 
faith. The National Plan was born of a moment when the belief of the middle ground 
in Britain was firmly placed in the benefits of `indicative planning' - and this 
represented the high point. 
The Plan was comprehensive, stretching to nearly 500 pages, and covered 
macro-economics (efficiency, productivity, the balance of payments, etc. ) and micro- 
economics (the state of individual industries) with copious appendices and annexes in 
a kind of mid-1960s economic Domesday Book. Nobody could say that its production 
193 Brown, In My Way, pp. 104-6. 
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was half-baked. What critics could say was that it was based upon an over-ambitious 
and weak understanding as to how an economy grows, especially when there were 
little or no physical controls at the Government's disposal. Even this could have been 
ignored for years if the general economic climate had been propitious. 
The Plan had some life between September 1965 and July 1966 but slipped 
into desuetude and was not replaced. 196 The dynamic history of the DEA died with 
it197 (although a more detailed Concordat was considered around the time of the 
March 1966 General Election, 198 but was swiftly abandoned'99). For, although the 
Plan formed the centrepiece of Labour's highly successful appeal to the country in the 
1966,200 a third currency crisis - this time a much deeper one - hit the country again 
in a July. This time Brown fought hard for devaluation, the timing of which 
subsequent commentators supported, 201 with more than an eye on toppling Wilson. 
But once Callaghan had fallen into line beside Wilson, after initial sympathy for 
Brown's economic analysis, 202 and further deflationary measures were announced, 
Brown's move was thwarted. In a Cabinet meeting only recorded in a `Confidential 
Annex', Wilson managed to hold his anti-devaluation line but only by agreeing that 
`All measures, including devaluation, would be open to examination'. 203 
Wilson wasted little time in moving Brown, this time to fulfil his heart's 
desire, the Foreign Office. 204 Roll left soon after to become chairman of Warburgs, as 
, the fun had gone out of it in a way ... seeing George 
fighting all the time was great 
196 Pott, Harold Wilson, p. 425. 
197 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 187. 
198 NA, PRO, PREM 13/2126, Mitchell to Helsby, 5 April 1966. 
199 NA, PRO, PREM 13/2126, Michael Halls, `Note for the Record', 25 April 1966. 
200 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 186. 
201 Brittan, Steering the Economy, p. 338. 
202 NA, PRO, CAB 21/5889, 'UK general economic situation', `Record of a meeting on Economic 
Strategy on July 1,1966' & 'Economic Policy. Note for the Record', 11 July 1966. 
203 NA, PRO, CAB 128/46/1, `CC(67)46th conclusions, minute 1(part) confidential annex', `CC(66) 
37', 19 July 1966. 
204 Interview with Lord Roll of Ipsden, 17 September 2002. 
95 
fun', 205 illustrating the paradox of Brown -a sexual harasser by modem standards, a 
poor drinker by any measure and a man of irrational exuberance, yet one of power and 
passion. But Brown's assertion that `The story of the D. E. A. ... is the record of a 
social revolution that failedi206 is almost ludicrous. For, as Roy Jenkins was later to 
write in a slightly different economic context, but one that bears direct comparison to 
the DEA and its National Plan: `This was nonsense, and rather dangerous nonsense. It 
implied that you could control the allocation of resources in an economy with the 
precision of air-traffic controllers allowing planes on to a glide path. i207 With little or 
no physical controls, certainly nothing like those which existed in wartime Britain or 
early post-war France, upon which so much of the economic planning thinking was 
based, the only ways to influence an economy was by exhortation (which would be 
`an exercise in make-believe'208) or managing the fiscal and monetary elements. The 
last two were problematic due to the overriding commitment by the Prime Minister, 
the Chancellor, the vast majority of the senior Civil Service and the Bank of England 
to maintain the parity of the pound at virtually all costs. 
A positive balance of payments despite all the various travails since 1964, 
declared Wilson in his 1971 memoir, demonstrated economic success under a Labour 
government, and thereby made a good export record synonymous with successful 
socialism according to Edmund Dell. 209 Interest rates and exchange rate policy were 
completely geared to that end. The belated realisation of this spelt the end for the 
dream of `purposive' (a favourite Wilson word in those days) expansive economic 
planning. 210 The destruction of the left's 1964 and 1966 election economic raison 
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210 Ibid., p. 376. 
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d'etre, which killed Labour's short-lived reputation for efficiency and modernity, 211 
foreshadowed a decades-long decline in Labour fortunes. This was one factor which 
would eventually lead to the neo-liberal Conservative dominance of the 1980s. 
The DEA might have succeeded. Most saw a positive role for the NEDC 
(indeed it survived until 1992) and if the DEA had been a bolstered Neddy then good 
results might have flowed. 212 This was in essence the view of Douglas Jay in 1963-64 
which failed to prevail with Harold Wilson. Perhaps, as Callaghan later lamented, the 
Treasury's 1962 reorganisation, aimed at encouraging sustainable growth, should 
have been allowed to settle. 
Few, however, have supported with the benefit of hindsight the decision to 
make the DEA a major department of state in direct competition to the Treasury. This 
truly was folly, as retired Civil Service luminaries such as Lord Bridges and 
experienced economic ministers such as Jay had foreseen. `Creative tension' 
inevitably took shape as energetic conflict. Moreover, the reputed Wilson ploy of 
balancing (and therefore thwarting) pretenders to his crown did little to enhance his 
reputation for statesmanship. 213 
The DEA was reduced, in Harold Lever's words, to `a very agreeable form of 
adult education' (Lever was Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the DEA 
in 1967). 214 With the instruments of fiscal and monetary power staying firmly in the 
hands of the Treasury throughout, the DEA was doomed from the beginning, as Roll 
had tried to make Brown understand in 1963. Not only was the DEA less volatile after 
Brown's transfer but it was also palpably less important. Brown swapped jobs with 
the Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, the proverbial safe pair of hands, donnish and 
Z" Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p. 364. 
212 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 185. 
213 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p. 490. 
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quiet, 215 and under him the DEA inevitably withered. It was, however, more under 
Wilson's control than it had ever been. 216 The Department toyed with the idea of 
producing an updated National Plan in March 1967,217 as had originally been 
envisaged. But what with recurrent economic crises and a totally understandable lack 
of enthusiasm, bearing in mind what had happened to the first National Plan, the 
atmosphere was never going to be as conducive again. However, a Green Paper, `the 
new version of the former National Plan', 218 was published as an `Economic 
Assessment' on 26 February, 1969.219 (In September 1969, when the DEA's days 
were finally numbered, there was official talk of a second National Plan, this time it 
was to be authored by the Treasury. 220 It never materialised. ) 
Wilson moved a frustrated Stewart (he had been sold the DEA as the dynamic 
department of Wilson's imagination221) in August 1967, complaining that getting 
anything out of Stewart was akin to `throwing darts at cotton wool'. 222 He replaced 
him with Peter Shore, a Wilson protege. Shore was given the title of Secretary of State 
for Economic Affairs (but not the First Secretaryship which Brown and Stewart held 
which later went to Barbara Castle at the Department of Employment and 
Productivity). Shore was given responsibility for the day-to-day running of the 
Department. But the big news of this change was the fact that Wilson himself 
assumed over-arching control of the DEA, now his DEA. Wilson ambitiously 
explained to Shore that `Defence in wartime was the best precedent for a Prime 
`5 Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life, p. 173. 
216 Ibid., p. 259. 
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219 House of Commons, Official Report, 26 February 1969, Cols. 1727-34. 
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Armstrong, 23 September 1969. 
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98 
Minister assuming strategic control of a department, assisted by a Secretary of 
State'. 223 He told Dick Crossman that `If I can't run the economy well through the 
DEA, I'm no good. I was trained for this job'. 224 The Prime Minister believed 
planning could save the day right up to devaluation in the Autumn of 1967.225 This, in 
the view of a very senior economic official, was Wilson demonstrating his all too 
frequent - and highly damaging - penchant for dreaming. 226 
The Chancellors, whether Callaghan or his successor Roy Jenkins, would 
never have allowed their power to be usurped in such a way. But we have also seen 
how the DEA had been effectively eniasculated by the absolute adherence to the 
sterling-dollar parity, and this point is key. For the economy, which had been looking 
`deceptively favourable' in the Spring of 1967 with some rebuilding of the reserves 
and better news on the balance of payments front, took a turn for the worse in the 
Summer and Autumn and this time the effects were decisive. 227 In November 1967 
the Prime Minister and the Chancellor finally conceded that the pound was 
overvalued compared to the dollar, that the parity was unsustainable, and an 
ignominious devaluation from $2.80 to $2.40 followed after so much defiant rhetoric, 
dubbed `Operation Patriarch'. 228 The Chancellor, Jim Callaghan, resigned but was 
persuaded to move to the Home Office, swapping jobs with Jenkins. The Prime 
Minister was a man who, according to Edmund Dell, `had been devalued along with 
sterling'. 229 The last vestiges of the `specifically socialist measures'230 were swept 
223 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1538, 'Prime Minister assumed responsibility for Department Economic 
Affairs', note of telephone conversation between Wilson and Shore, 30 August 1967. 
Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol. 2, Lord President of the Council and 
Leader of the House of Commons, 1966-68 (Cape, 1976), pp. 462-3. Diary entry for 5 September 
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away as all attention turned to deflation and getting the balance of payments to 
balance (though the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, an institution announced 
in the Queen's Speech of 1966 to merge smaller concerns into larger companies and 
to invest in already burgeoning ones, lived on until the Heath Government abolished 
it23'). 
Peter Shore's tenure at the DEA was not a successful one. Being the newboy 
in the Cabinet and one widely regarded as there purely on the Prime Minister's 
patronage, Shore found it difficult to effect co-ordination. 232 Lord Croham, Permanent 
Secretary at the DEA during this period, observed that his minister was roundly 
ignored by the big beasts in the Cabinet. 233 Shore's position was not helped by a poor, 
performance when steering the 1968 Prices and Incomes Bill through the 
Commons. 234 This failure led Wilson to ponder moving the up-and-coming Barbara 
Castle to the DEA, something she began to agitate for, 235 with a brief to prepare a 
major reform of industrial relations (what was to become the infamous In Place of 
Strife White Paper and proposed legislation in 1969). But the new Chancellor, Roy 
Jenkins, had no intention of allowing a rival to the Treasury to spring up once again 
and he left the Prime Minister in little doubt that he would not tolerate Castle's 
appointment (Jenkins was, in many respects, an ally of Castle's and personally 
explained his veto to her as a compliment to her strength). 6 Wilson decided not to 
provoke Jenkins head-on. Instead, he promoted Castle into something approximating 
the role he had originally envisaged by moving her to the Ministry of Labour and re- 
230 Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970, p. xvii. 
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jigging it to form the new Department of Employment and Productivity and giving her 
the title of First Secretary, in the process taking away the prices and incomes function 
of the DEA. 237 Wilson also relinquished control of the DEA at this time when, in a 
Parliamentary statement just eight months after his do-or-die conversation with 
Crossman, he explained to the House of Commons that 
I took over that responsibility last August because I was not satisfied with the co- 
ordination among the industrial departments ... With the new changes ... of 
course I retain my present and previous responsibility for the co-ordination, not 
only of industrial matters, but of economic matters in general ... But I am all the 
time trying to take steps to ensure that the industrial departments are able to do 
even more than they have done so far for industrial productivity and 
efficiency. 238 
The DEA was left to study the long-term239 The end was nigh. 
October 1969 saw the Department's final demise, something that Jenkins had 
long lobbied for240 (as had Callaghan unsuccessfully in 1966241). Although Wilson 
had earlier in the year written to its Permanent Secretary, William Neild, talking of 
future plans, 242 the DEA was now an irrelevance. Defeated over its original founding 
brief, shorn of senior ministerial authority243 and having functions carved-off, there 
was little left to abolish at its end. 244 Some of its responsibilities went to the Board of 
7 Dell, The Chancellors, p. 360. 
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Trade and the Treasury. But the major gainer was the Ministry of Technology and 
Tony Benn as its Secretary of State. 245 
Mintech had been steadily accumulating functions since its inception - with 
aircraft manufacture and shipbuilding. Now it was turned into the `counter-balance' it 
had originally been created to be. 246 Marcia Williams stepped into the debate when 
she wrote that `It would only have been possible to challenge the Treasury if a 
department had behind it a vast backing like the Board of Trade and the DEA 
amalgamated together. '247 Although Mintech did have some statutory powers, 
especially for industrial sponsorship, this was Wilson and Williams the dreamers once 
more. 248 For, as we have seen on several occasions, no Chancellor would have 
allowed a rerun of the 1964-66 DEA-Treasury conflict. Due to devaluation (and his 
own deft handling of the aftermath), Jenkins was just too powerful throughout his 
Chancellorship for Wilson seriously to cross. Anthony Crosland landed another new 
super-ministry, the Department of Local Government and Regional Planning, which 
subsumed the DEA's regional functions at the same time (and which was to evolve 
into the Department of the Environment after the Conservative triumph in 1970). 249 
Wilson tinkered with the machinery of government throughout his first two 
administrations, mostly in the pursuit of `joined-up government' (the DEA excepted). 
Not only were there the big changes we have been examining, but also myriad minor 
ones, too. Such changes can be a permanent temptation for some premiers as, being a 
prime ministerial prerogative, unless offices exist on a statutory basis (as does the 
Ministry of Defence) changes can be made using orders in council -a clear symbol of 
15 Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine, p. 60. 
16 Tony Benn, Office Without Power: Diaries 1968-72 (Hutchinson, 1988), pp. 203-4, diary entry for 4 
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authority. 25° Some changes were beneficial in the late 1960s, as when the continuing 
logical rationalisation in the UK's overseas representation culminated with first the 
merger of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office in 1966 to 
' form the Commonwealth Office, and with the Foreign Office to form the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office in 1968. 
Another major creation was the Department of Health and Social Security in 
1968 (Social Security itself had been formed in 1966 with the merger of the ministries 
of Pensions and National Insurance). This was roundly denounced subsequently as a 
poor decision the two departments and was described by Peter Hennessy as 
`organisational nonsense'. u' The two departments had little or no common functions. 
It was another example of Wilson displaying the curious tendency to create baronies 
to suit particular personalities, in this case Richard Crossman's, regardless of the 
administrative mess this caused (a pattern repeated around the person of John Prescott 
in the Labour Governments, 1997-2005). Wilson later viewed the DHSS 
amalgamation as a mistake, telling the House of Commons' Expenditure Committee 
in 1977 that `I think that that was probably the wrong step. In fact, soon afterwards -I 
take full responsibility for it - they were saying to me that they were not sure they 
ought not to have advised me to merge social services with the Home Office'. 252 
The Cabinet system itself was also partly reformed. Perhaps the greatest bout 
of Cabinet committee-making ever saw a wealth of MISC committees created in what 
Robert Armstrong called `proMISCuity'. 253 There were also two half-hearted attempts 
to foster a formal strategic inner cabinet, the Parliamentary Committee set-up at the 
249 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p. 545. 
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same time as Castle's Department of Employment and Productivity in 1968 and 
which evolved into the Management Committee in 1969 until the afternoon of June 
1970's election defeat 254 Both of these attempted to bring some cohesion to the 
government's strategy but ultimately foundered on Wilson's fundamental disdain for 
forward-thinking, the raison d'etre of an inner cabinet. 255 They both degenerated into 
short term political tools, similar to the `kitchen cabinet'. The most important 
committees were the belated attempt to bring cohesion to economic matters with the 
Steering Committee on Economic Policy (SEP), who announced its creation to the 
Cabinet on 10 August, 1966,256 and MISC 205 the `most secret and powerful of the 
Cabinet groups'257 which was created to deal with the `gold-dollar-sterling crisis of 
March 1968'. 258 The Joint- Intelligence Committee (JIC), located in the Cabinet 
Office, was also reformed, which saw a `sharpened, bespoke, all-source analytical 
capacity in the form of the Cabinet Office Assessments Staff' which proved highly 
successful and endures to this day. 9 
The `hardware' reforms of the 1964-70 Wilson governments were plentiful. 
These varied from short-term political fixes, such as the repeated creation of 
departments to suit personalities, to far-reaching and effective reforms, such as the re- 
jigging of the JIC and the first large-scale peacetime importation of political 
appointees to government. They demonstrated Wilson's inexhaustible belief in the 
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power of administrative reform to effect change not only in the running of Whitehall 
but also that of the wider society and especially of the economy. But the story of the 
Department of Economic Affairs became a mighty weight upon the shoulders of 
future advocates of administrative reform. Though there was a case for an agency 
tasked with the pursuit of sustainable growth, its birth, infancy and subsequent 
reincarnations were mired in fantasy and political expediency. While the commitment 
to detailed economic planning by government was effectively ended here, the belief in 
the efficacy of dramatically reforming Whitehall's ecology and, through this, its 
performance, also began to be undermined. 
Intriguingly, the Leader of the Opposition, Edward Heath, was privately and 
enthusiastically engaged at exactly the same time in preparing his own transformation 
of the hardware of state. For all their undoubted mutual personal antagonism, Wilson 
and Heath demonstrated a very similar commitment to the State and its potential to 
improve the country and thus the lives of their countrymen. That they both saw reform 
of central government as a first-order question essential to a wider picture of national 
renewal was partly due to their both having worked in its higher echelons both as 
officials and ministers prior to becoming Premier. Though, as we shall see in 
subsequent chapters, this shared view did not mean an identical approach 
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Chapter 3- Software 
The Fulton Report & its partial implementation 
1966-70 
Genesis of the Committee 
The `software' of the state, `the people involved', in Lord (Ian) Bancroft's vivid 
metaphor, came under substantial, at that stage unprecedented, scrutiny during 
Wilson's 1964-70 governments. ' The result was the Fulton Report of 1968. The last of 
the great investigations into the workings of the Civil Service achieved legendary 
status within the Service for the simple reason it happened at all, the reforms which 
were enacted, those that were not, and the way in which it attracted controversy at the 
time and subsequently. 
As we saw in chapter one, the years leading up to 1964 witnessed growing 
criticism levelled at the Civil Service and at the calibre and attitude of the senior civil 
servants themselves. The beginning of the post-war `decline' debate, and the linked 
idea that the United Kingdom had swapped the positive, `can-do' spirit of its 
industrial and imperial apogee for a bureaucratic caution, was the subtext for an 
argument which centred on the Civil Service's supposed lack of professionalism 
(more specifically, its traditional peacetime disdain for specialists). This was 
especially, apparent when compared with the allegedly dazzling and technocratic 
1 Lord Bancroft, speaking at the Gresham College seminar, `In the Steps of Walter Bagehot: A 
Constitutional Health-Check', 13 March 1995. 
106 
French. The `what's wrong with Britain' debate2 was, moreover, incomplete without a 
sizeable dash of class-based criticism which contrasted the elitist British bureaucracy 
with that of probably imaginary meritocratic societies which allegedly existed in 
competitor countries. 
With part of the Labour Party's electoral success in 1964 based upon the 
promise of across-the-board modernisation, and doubts over the efficiency of nearly 
all state or state-related institutions, the stage was set for far-reaching changes to the 
machinery of government. The Labour manifesto stated `we shall need to make 
government itself more efficient'. ' Yet the impetus for change did not manifest itself 
immediately. Indeed, compared to the highly visible (and audible in George Brown's 
case) reforms to the departments of. Whitehall undertaken within the new 
government's first few weeks, the initial steps towards an investigation of the role of 
civil servants in the machine took over a year, with the Fulton Committee only being 
announced some sixteen months after the 1964 General Election on 8 February (just 
before the March 1966 election campaign began). 4 
Throughout the history of British administrative reform it is noticeable just how 
much the Prime Minister of the day alone is required to get things moving and for 
sustaining the momentum. The machinery of government, both hardware and 
software, is his traditional bailiwick. Yet the establishment of the Fulton Committee 
owed much to Jim Callaghan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, certainly more than to 
Harold Wilson (although Callaghan in 1988 described Wilson as the `moving spirit in 
2 See Matthew Grant, 'Historians, the Penguin Specials and the `State-of-the-Nation' Literature, 1958- 
64, ' Contemporary British History, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 29-54. 
3 Let's Go With Labour reprinted in lain Dale (ed. ), Labour Party General Election Manifestos, 1900- 
1997 (Politico's, 2000), p. 124. 
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getting the Fulton Committee established"). Callaghan wrote to Wilson on 1 
November, 1965, pointing out that 
I think that the case for a wide ranging inquiry has been made out. There has 
been a good deal of criticism of the Service, and it is many years since the last 
comprehensive inquiry. There are also specific problems that are becoming 
urgent, for example those of recruitment ... The Committee should be given 
wide terms of reference to review the structure, recruitment and management of 
the Service. It is important that their field of work should not seem to be 
restricted ... 
6 
Callaghan's letter is important in many ways. As Chancellor, Callaghan was the 
minister responsible for the Civil Service as Establishments had traditionally been 
part of the Treasury, and, since the 1962 reorganisation, it had become one of the two 
sections into which the Treasury had been split (the other being finance and 
economics). Given that the issues were not of the highest political controversy, and 
that it was typed, the letter was most likely prepared by officials as they nearly always 
are, at least in the first draft. Trying to unearth who exactly was behind the letter is 
more difficult. Professor Robert Neild, special adviser to Callaghan and co-author of 
the Fabians' The Administrators, replied when asked: 
The short answer is that I cannot remember this message from Jim Callaghan to 
Harold Wilson, but I may have been somewhere behind it ... I certainly talked to 
William Armstrong [Permanent Secretary to the Treasury] about it at many 
S Letter from James Callaghan to Geoffrey Fry quoted in Fry, Reforming the Civil Service (Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh, 1993), p. 8. 
6 National Archives (NA), Public Record Office (PRO), PREM 13/1357, 'Size of Civil Service: 
management; training; setting up of committee of enquiry under chairmanship of Lord Fulton Mar 
1965-Apr 1966', Callaghan to Wilson, 1 November 1965. 
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stages and found him sympathetic to my views ... I think 
it is most likely that it 
was put forward by Armstrong-Helsby [Head of the Civil Service], while I 
stayed in the background. It should not be read to mean that the initiative for 
Fulton came altogether spontaneously from the Treasury. Tommy Balogh at No 
10 was a passionate critic of the Civil Service and told me, I remember, that he 
was pressing Harold Wilson to establish an enquiry. The Treasury will have 
known this; and they also knew that there was a tide of public criticism of the 
Civil Service; there was some recognition of the need for an enquiry and 
modernisation. Hence I guess Jim was responding to a suggestion from Harold 
Wilson, spoken or written, that there should be an enquiry, and doing so guided 
by the machine! 
Although a civil servant must theoretically do whatever the minister bids him or her 
do, from the language it appears that officialdom was broadly supportive of the 
letter's content, for it pointed out three reasons why an -enquiry was required. First, 
the outside criticism. Second, the argument that it had been `many years since the last 
comprehensive inquiry' was powerfully supported by the retired, but still hugely 
influential, Lord Bridges, ex-Cabinet Secretary and Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury. In The Times, ten days after the announcement of the Fulton Committee by 
Wilson in the House of Commons on 18 February, 1966, Bridges wrote that the 
investigation `follows the long standing practice whereby, at intervals of about twenty 
years, there has been a major inquiry into Civil Service organisations. 
" (Peter Kellner, 
writing fourteen years later, was unimpressed - `an inquiry every three-and-a-half 
decades scarcely suggests the watchfulness of a hawk'. ) 
7 E-mail from Professor Robert Neild, 20 October 2004. 
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The third reason Callaghan stated was that of recruitment. Pressure from the 
Treasury was pivotal in the creation of the investigation into the Civil Service, due to 
a continuing recruitment shortfall, a nagging doubt that this was due to the Service 
becoming less attractive to the burgeoning graduate population (the numbers of 
university students had gone up 44 per cent in the years 1955-1963, from 82,000 to 
118,0001) and a growing belief that the traditional method of recruiting a small 
number of high quality entrants alongside many school-leavers with A levels `no 
longer represented the output of the educational system'. " In June 1965, Sir Laurence 
Helsby wrote to the Prime Minister expressing concern that `The present shortage of 
Principals is about 100, or some 10% of the total cadre. Such a shortage at this level is 
a serious impediment to good administration, and it is in my view beginning to have 
harmful effects on morale and on the organisation of departmental work. 912 
This practical reason for the investigation was underlined at a `Fulton: 20 Years 
On' symposium when Richard Wilding, secretary of the Fulton Committee, later the 
co-ordinator and planner of the Report's implementation and secretary to all the 
committees set up during 1968-70 to carry out Fulton, " said that the Committee's 
establishment was due to `the considerable increase in the number of graduates 
produced by the educational system, and the feeling that the civil service 
arrangements for recruiting them were not actually up to date and well devised ... A 
person who attended the early meetings of the committee could have been forgiven 
for supposing that it had actually been set up to settle that problem alone! t14 In another 
letter to Wilson, in September 1965, Helsby underlined the concern when he informed 
'o A. H. Halsey, `Higher Education', in A. H. Halsey, British Social Trends Since 1900 (Macmillan, 
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the Prime Minister that `In recent years competition to enter the Service has not been 
strong enough to exclude any acceptable candidate simply because a better was 
available. ''' 
Once again, internal Treasury nervousness over an issue proved to be the key 
reason why a major enquiry was set up, as with the Plowden Committee. It is also the 
case that, in Lord Allen of Abbeydale's words (as Sir Philip Allen he was Second 
Secretary in the Treasury when the Committee was announced and was appointed 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office soon after), although the 
Committee was set up with deeper, declinist, anti-elitist, anti-generalist feelings 
`floating about in the atmosphere, I don't think they were quite as specific in 
motivating Callaghan himself, at any rate, towards taking action'. 16 
The main reason why the Chancellor pushed for the enquiry at this time came 
from within the Civil Service itself and it was due to practicality, a source of Treasury 
pride throughout its history (compared to the rest of Whitehall, including No. 10). 
Even the Committee's terms of reference as announced were almost identical to 
Callaghan's original memo: for `review the structure, recruitment and management of 
the Service' substitute `examine the structure, recruitment and management, including 
training, of the Home Civil Service'. " While the Fulton exercise may have owed 
much to outside pressure, its direct creation was essentially a Treasury affair. 
There was another direct factor, however. That came early in 1964 when the 
House of Commons' Estimates Committee, chaired by the former ICI industrialist, Dr 
Jeremy Bray, recommended the establishment of a hybrid committee of insiders and 
outsiders, on the model of the successful Plowden Committee into public expenditure 
is NA, PRO, PREM 13/1357, Helsby to Mitchell, 13 September 1965. 
16 Lord Allen of Abbeydale quoted in `Fulton: 20 Years On', p. 44. 
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control appointed in 1959.18 During the debate in which he announced the Fulton 
Committee, Wilson, addressing Bray, gave fulsome praise to `an extremely valuable 
contribution to the study of this subject. The factual examination was done in greater 
depth than almost any other inquiry for a very long time. "9 The Plowden Committee's 
creation was due to Treasury pressure - most from notably Otto Clarke - channelled 
discreetly through the Estimates Committee20 Thus two of the- most significant 
scrutinies of the Civil Service were heavily influenced by the Commons. Parliament 
can be a very useful ally for a Whitehall reformer. 
Fulton's terms of reference caused controversy over the subsequent years due to 
what was not in it. Machinery of government issues, and potential tinkering to the 
minister-permanent secretary partnership, were ruled out from the very beginning: 
`the Government's willingness to consider changes in the Civil Service does not 
imply any intention on their part to alter the basic relationship between Ministers and 
civil servants [who] remain the confidential advisers of Ministers, who alone are 
answerable to Parliament for policy; and we do not envisage any change in this 
fundamental feature of our parliamentary system of democracy ... [though] within the 
terms of reference and competence to inquire into all aspects of the functioning of and 
recruitment for the Civil Service'. 2' This later caused Lord Crowther-Hunt angrily to 
denounce this move as `a nice illustration of the way the Civil Service helped to 
narrow the Committee's terms of reference - and later was able to argue that this 
restriction invalidated much of what the Committee said! '22 Norman Hunt, as he was 
when a member of the Fulton Committee's inquiry, was a tutor in politics (but no 
1S House of Commons, Sixth Report from the Estimates Committee, 1964-65, HMSO, 1965, p. xxxv; 
Jeremy Bray (Elizabeth Bray, ed. ), Standing On The Shoulders Of Giants (Elizabeth Bray, 2004), p. 
64. 
" House of Commons, Official Report, 8 February 1966, Col. 211. 
20 See Chapter I. 
21 House of Commons, Official Report, 8 February 1966, Col. 210. 
22 Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants, p. 28. 
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authority on the contemporary British Civil Service23) at Oxford, who had struck up a 
friendship with Wilson during the run-up to the 1964 election when Hunt interviewed 
him for the BBC Radio series Whitehall and Beyond. ` He proved to be the leading 
radical on the Committee, and became the bete noire of many in the senior Civil 
Service. 
Peter Hennessy was very clear that the terms of reference represented a huge 
missed opportunity. Fulton, he thought, . 
was steered away from the start from fundamental, fascinating and important 
questions which, to my mind, needed to be settled before the second-order 
questions such as recruitment, training and management were addressed. The 
specifications of the machine and the ground-rules for its operation surely should 
have been considered before the choice and man-management of its minders 
were pondered ... Its enforced removal from machinery-of-government 
questions and minister/civil servant relationships made Fulton a one-dimensional 
inquiry rather than the three-dimensional investigation that was needed. " 
These are strong words, indicative of the frustration the Fulton Report caused. At the 
time of its publication, Sir William Armstrong himself thought that the- lack of 
machinery of government questions may well lead to `pressure for a "new Haldane""' 
(the 1918 report which looked at British central government as a system in the round 
from a theoretical, yet practical, viewpoint). 27 
23 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 18. 
24 Norman Hunt, Whitehall and Beyond (BBC, 1964). 
u Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (Seeker and Warburg, 1989), pp. 190-191. 
26 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1971, `Appointment of committee, under chairmanship of Lord Fulton, to 
examine structure, recruitment, management and training of Civil Service: comments on report; part 
3', Armstrong to Halls, `The Fulton Report', 21 June 1968. 
27 Ministry of Reconstruction, Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, Ctnnd. 9230, 
(HMSO, 1918). 
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So much was excluded from the start of what was billed a comprehensive 
exercise. Lord Allen provided an answer for this: `Machinery of government was not 
included because it was too big a subject, like criminal justice. "' There simply was 
not the scope to deliver tangible recommendations for reform and practical changes to 
the machinery of government, all within a timeframe of two years. Moreover, a Prime 
Minister very rarely allows machinery of government responsibility to slip from his or 
her grasp. It is far too powerful a tool. Allen went further: 
It is difficult to see any modem Government allowing an outside body to review 
machinery and what Ministers do. Even if such a review body was thought to be 
suitable, it would have to have been a different and much weightier body than 
the Fulton Conunittee could ever hope to have been. The Haldane Committee 
had been such a body but it didn't achieve very much. 29 
Lord Fulton and Norman Hunt 
A complex investigation requires deft chairmanship, the selection of which was 
by no means easy. Lord (John) Fulton was not the first choice. On the 3 November, 
1965, Wilson suggested to Callaghan that Lord Simey, the Charles Booth Professor of 
Social Science at Liverpool University (his wife, Margaret, a veteran Labour activist, " 
was based in the city" - near to which Wilson had his constituency) should be shown 
`serious consideration'. 32 Richard Wilding was blunt about this suggestion: `That 
wouldn't have done. Simey was a very nice man and had a lot of common sense but 
28 Interview with Lord Allen of Abbeydale, 7 May 2003. 
29 Lord Allen of Abbeydale quoted in Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 28. 
30 Carol Davis, `Honour without accolades', The Guardian, 23 July 2003. 
31 Interview with Lord Allen of Abbeydale, 7 May 2003. 
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he was really on the downhill with health and age and so on. He wouldn't have been 
able to manage. 933 If Simey had been appointed, the `Simey Report' would have had a 
very different flavour to that of Fulton, as Simey attached to it a minority report 
defending the conduct and achievements of the existing Civil Service, as we shall see. 
The Chancellor, on the 25 November 1965, recommended the Cambridge scientist Sir 
Eric Ashby for the chair. This was accepted by the Prime Minister on 29 November. 
No evidence has been uncovered to suggest if he was ever approached and, if so, why 
he was not appointed. 
The reason why Fulton was fmally chosen is unclear from the archival evidence. 
His name was first mentioned by Wilson's Principal Private Secretary, Derek 
Mitchell, in a letter to Callaghan's Principal Private Secretary, Ian Bancroft, on 28 
January 1966. Fulton had been a friend of Wilson, from before the war at Oxford, "' 
and later, when they were temporary wartime civil servants in the Mines Department 
of the Board of Trade sharing fire-watching duties 35 After teaching philosophy and 
politics as a fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, Fulton became Vice-Chancellor of 
Sussex University. 36 Crowther-Hunt and Kellner observed in hindsight that `he was 
doing so many jobs when he was made Chairman ... that it must have seemed to 
anyone who took the trouble to think about it that he simply would not have the time 
to spearhead any serious probe into the operations of the Whitehall machine'. " These 
preliminary fears were underlined when Lord Allen much later observed that `Fulton 
was not first choice, nor the happiest choice. 
"' Allen was alluding to the, by all 
accounts, appalling chairmanship demonstrated by Lord Fulton. 
32 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1357, Ian Bancroft, `Note for the Record', 3 November 1965. 
33 Interview with Richard Wilding, 15 August 2003. 
34 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 15. 
35 Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants, p. 27. 
36 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 15. 
37 Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants, p. 27. 
38 Lord Allen of Abbeydale quoted in `Fulton: 20 Years On', p. 45. 
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Robert Neild, economic adviser to the Chancellor, and a member of the Fulton 
Committee, thought Fulton among the worst chairmen he had ever encountered, 39 
while Richard Wilding saw Fulton as `A very incompetent chap. A nice man of 
excellent qualities, liberal thoughts and that sort of thing. But he could not manage a 
committee. '40 As the Committee drew to a close in the Spring of 1968, Wilson's 
Principal Private Secretary, Michael Halls, had dinner with Fulton and afterwards sent 
the Prime Minister an account of the meeting along with a general appraisal of the 
inquiry. Halls wrote that `there is a certain amount of unease in his Committee about 
the way in which he is handling the Report ... It is said he jumps about like a 
grasshopper and re-opens issues which the Committee have already decided, not 
necessarily with new views but often with irrelevant comments. '41 
Lord Shackleton, the first political head of the future Civil Service Department, 
recalled that, in the years after the Report, `it became very apparent when you talked 
to Fulton himself, that he didn't really know what he was proposing'. 42 This was the 
view of most members of the Committee, yet Geoffrey Fry, author of the authoritative 
history of the Fulton inquiry, felt that, on paper at least, Lord Fulton was a good 
choice for Chairman owing to his record as a university administrator and wartime 
temporary civil servant, and his background knowledge of the Civil Service as a 
whole. 43 
At the `Fulton: 20 Years On' seminar, the chair, Peter Hennessy, described it 
provocatively as `a classic "good and the great enterprise"'. " He suggested this by 
looking down the list of people on the Committee. This was roundly rejected by Allen 
39 Interview with Professor Robert Neild, 6 May 2003. 
40 interview with Richard Wilding, 15 August 2003. 
41 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1970, `Appointment of committee, under chairmanship of Lord Fulton, to 
examine structure, recruitment, management and training of Civil Service: consideration of 
conclusions; publication of and publicity for report; parts 1 and 2', Halls to Wilson, `The Fulton 
Report', 9 March 1968. 
42 Lord Shackleton quoted in 'Fulton: 20 Years On', p. 48. 
43 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, pp. 21-22. 
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who pointed out `There had never been a committee like this; Callaghan said it was an 
experiment of mixed insiders and outsiders. On reflection, he thought there ought to 
be more outsiders than insiders but I'm not conscious of any precedent for it -I don't 
think anyone was at the time. '45 
The nearest example was the (at least for Whitehall afficionados) Plowden 
Committee on public expenditure which blended insider Civil Service lifers with 
outsider amphibians like Edwin Plowden himself who had experience of both 
Whitehall and industry. But that was a private committee, conducted under the aegis 
of the Treasury and delivered initially only a series of reports to the Chancellor of the 
day personally and confidentially46 (though an edited summary was subsequently 
published47). Why was something as important as this not conducted as a Royal 
Commission but as a Committee of Inquiry? After all, Wilson was not averse to this 
form of inquiry, having established seven such investigations between 1964 and 
1970.48 Again, the answer lies with Callaghan, who thought that `A body of this kind 
... should work more quickly and 
flexibly than a Royal Commission'. 49 `To some this 
seemed to be a downgrading of the inquiry even before it got underway; and the 
suspicious at once smelled a Civil Service plot, ' wrote the leading critics of the Fulton 
exercise: 
This is partly indicated by the fact that its chairman does not receive the 
traditional silver ink-stand which marks the conclusion of the work of a Royal 
Commission. More important, though, a Committee of Inquiry is not given the 
power that a Royal Commission has `to send for persons and papers'. But if this 
44 Peter Hennessy quoted in `Fulton: 20 Years On', p. 45. 
45 Allen quoted in 'Hilton: 20 Years On', p. 45. 
46 Henry Roseveare, The Treasury (Allen Lane, 1969), p. 297. 
47 Control of Public Expenditure, Cmnd. 1432 (HMSO, 1961). 
48 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 26. 
49 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1357, Callaghan to Wilson, 1 November 1965. 
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was a Civil Service plot, it made no difference. The Committee never had any 
difficulty in getting anything it wanted. 5° 
The first meeting of the Committee was held on 10 March 1966 with the last 
taking place on 19 June 1968. The Committee only slightly exceeded its estimated life 
- the Government urged Fulton to deliver in eighteen months-to-two years. 
3' 
Normally convening on Tuesdays, there were 32 meetings in 1966,35 in 1967 and 
eighteen in 1968. The task undertaken was huge, and herein lay one of the key 
dilemmas for the enquirers. What kind of investigation and report were required? 
Opinions differed, with some wanting a no-nonsense document as pithy, judgemental 
and high-minded as the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854. `I was a strong advocate 
of a brief, forceful Report, ' explained Neild, `I circulated copies of the Trevelyan- 
Northcote Report and the Macaulay Report [the precursor to Northcote-Trevelyan 
which dealt with the Indian Civil Service]. It seemed to me that our Victorian 
ancestors had set us a fine example of being outspoken, brief and robust. 'S2 
The Northcote-Trevelyan Report offered little in the way of specific reform but 
was still being cited nearly a century-and-a-half later as the core ethic of public 
service which informs the spirit of reform. 
53 As Allen observed in a letter to Halls 
The Chairman is aiming at providing a new `Northcote-Trevelyan' Report -a 
broad and philosophic state paper rather than a minute analysis of every problem 
of grading and structure. This is probably inevitable if the Committee is to report 
in reasonable time, since the field is so vast ... This broad approach however has 
some dangers: - 
50 Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants, p. 26. 
51 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 26. 
52 Robert Neild quoted in ibid., p. 231; the Macaulay Report and the Northcote-Trevelyan Report are 
found in Appendix B of the Fulton Report. 
53 For example, The Civil Service: Continuity and Change, Cmnd. 2627 (HMSO, 1994). 
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Exceeding the terms of reference: some members (including the chairman) 
and some witnesses are inclined to go pretty wide' 
The machinery of government was looked at by the Fulton Committee but only in 
areas such as the `hiving-off' of executive functions from the day-to-day control of 
ministers, and the creation of the Civil Service Department, " of which more later. 
John Rosselli, an historian at Sussex University, employed more clarity and 
eloquence than heretofore when he wrote to Fulton saying: `You cannot really have a 
latter-day Macaulay or Trevelyan-Northcote statement; the issues and the 
organization your Committee has to deal with are much more complex than anything 
the investigations of the 1850s looked into; nor are people today as sure of having 
found the key as those men were'. 56 The result was a report which was neither 
succinct nor sufficiently sophisticated. 
The Fulton Committee certainly mixed insiders and outsiders. There were the 
three serving civil servants, Sir Philip Allen of the Home Office; Sir, James `Ned' 
Dunnett, Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Labour upon appointment to the 
Committee and later Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence; and Sir William 
Cook, `a superb organizer, and a decisive project manager, with a powerful grasp of 
detail', " who was Deputy Chief Scientific Officer in the Ministry of Defence (though 
he `didn't say very much' according to Richard Wilding5'). 
The outsiders were numerous: along with the aforementioned Norman Hunt sat 
Sir Norman Kipping, Vice-Chairman to Fulton and former Director General of the 
Federation of British Industries; Walter Anderson, a solicitor and General Secretary of 
54 NA, PRO, PREM 13/764, 'Fulton Committee: discussions on giving of evidence by ministers and 
former ministers', Allen to Halls, 18 August 1966. 
ss Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, pp. 28,99. 
56 John Rosselli quoted in ibid., p. 235. 
S' Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-bomb (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000), p. 78. 
58 Interview with Richard Wilding, 15 August 2003. 
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the National Association of Local Government Officers; Sir Edward Boyle, 
Conservative MP for Birmingham HandsworthS9; Robert Neild ('thus ensuring that the 
Committee's agenda would take full account of his Fabian pamphlet [The 
Administrators]'60; John Wall, Deputy Chairman of the Post Office (and former 
member of the Plowden Committee); Robert Sheldon, Labour MP, replaced Shirley 
Williams after its first meeting as she had been made a junior minister. The initial 
Secretary of the Committee was Mary Loughnane, a Principal in the Treasury. She 
stepped down on grounds of health in May 1966 and was replaced by Richard 
Wilding, also a Treasury Principal (Loughnane's `headaches rapidly turned into a 
continuous migraine ... I very soon came to feel a lively sympathy with her distress' 
the sardonic Wilding later commented6). An assistant secretary, Michael Simons, an 
Assistant Principal from the Ministry of Labour, was appointed in April 1966. 
Fulton's was `an unhappy committee' according to Allen. 62 While Wilding 
recalled (laughing to himself, it has to be said) that 
They were a nasty lot of people and they didn't like each other. There was lots of 
ill temper. Being secretary of that body was not a pleasant experience ... We 
used occasionally to have some dinners on Monday nights before the Tuesday 
meetings. Norman Kipping used to lay rather excellent little dinners for an inner 
group to which I used to go. Robert Neild and Norman Hunt and Ned Dunnett 
and Fulton. Philip Allen used to go but because he lived [outside London] he 
used to leave early which was a pity because as people had more and more to 
59 Formerly Economic Secretary to the Treasury 1955-56, Financial Secretary to the Treasury 1959-62 
and Minister of Education 1962-64 
60 Richard Wilding, Civil Servant (The Memoir Club, Stanhope, 2006), p. 44. 
61 Wilding, `The Fulton Report in retrospect', p. 398. 
62 Allen and Wilding quoted in Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 20. 
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drink, the atmosphere used to get nastier and Philip Allen wasn't there with his 
mollifying influence. 63 
This sentiment was not shared by all. Robert Sheldon, for one, was very satisfied by 
the way the Committee operated. T But there was an undercurrent of dissatisfaction at 
best, distrust at worst. There was no outright warfare - Neild was clear that politeness 
prevailed, `it wasn't a rumbustious committeej65 - that is not to say that cold, very 
`English' antipathy did not take place. But the haphazard manner of Fulton's 
chairmanship, alongside Committee members either preoccupied with very heavy 
workloads (for example, Allen, who returned to the Home Office on promotion as 
Permanent Secretary after a stint in the Treasury, was not replaced because Wilson 
did not want another change after Williams's departure) or those lacking in 
confidence, background, energy or plain interest, meant there was a power and energy 
vacuum at the heart of the Committee. The stage was set for Norman Hunt. 
Hunt became fascinated by the role of the Civil Service and obsessed with the 
eventual implementation of Fulton. He became the leading champion of the pre-1964 
Civil Service critics, advocating dramatic reform to rid the bureaucracy of the 
inefficiencies which elitism and generalism allegedly wrought. Hunt threw himself 
into the investigation. Once it was complete, he wrote to the Prime Minister to express 
his thanks for being appointed in the first place - maybe to toady a little - but also to 
inform Wilson that `The last 2 1/2 years have been the most stimulating I've ever 
had. '67 
63 Interview with Richard Wilding, 15 August 2003. 
" Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 20. 
65 Interview with Professor Robert Neild, 6 May 2003. 
66 Lord Allen of Abbeydale quoted in Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 16. 
67 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1971, Hunt to Wilson, 31 July 1968. 
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Hunt took full advantage of the generous, year-long sabbatical leave from 
Exeter College (it was said that his College was only too pleased to give him leave68) 
to drive the Committee forward and to lead one of the spin-off investigations the 
Committee sanctioned to run in parallel and to inform the members along the way. 
The one Hunt oversaw was the Management Consultancy Group (MCG), with John 
Garrett, future Labour MP and Whitehall-watcher as deputy. The other three were the 
sociological survey, undertaken by Professor AH ('Chelly') Halsey of Nuffield 
College, Oxford; Richard Wilding's study of those entering the Administrative Class 
in 1956; and the comparison by John Pickering of Durham University of how those 
who had joined the Service in 1951, those that had been accepted through the 
recruitment process but turned down the offer, and those who had been rejected, did 
in the subsequent years of their careers. 69 None were thought to have much influenced 
the Committee7° and Neild later spoke of the irrelevance of it all - `There was a core 
of us and we were just anxious about the main stuff, which didn't rest on that kind of 
research material'". 
The MCG was set up, according to Hunt, `to carry out its own investigation of 
what civil servants were actually doing'. 
72 More specifically, it was to look at the 
newly expanding field of management theory and its application in the private sector 
(though 49% state-owned at this time, BP was the model") and whether there were 
lessons the Civil Service could learn from this. It was also the fount of new thinking 
whereas too much of Fulton was concerned with entrenched, clearly distinctive `us 
68 Private information. 
69 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, pp. 42-3. 
70 Ibid., p. 55. 
71 Neild quoted in `Fulton: 20 Years On', p. 45. 
72 Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants, p. 30. 
73 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 67. BP was clearly as influential then as it has been in the recent 
past, with its former Chairman, Lord Simon, assuming an unofficial role as adviser to Tony Blair on 
public sector reform, Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister (Penguin, 2000), p. 516. 
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and them' positions. 74 Hunt and Garrett drove the MCG with the idea that it must 
produce the finest analysis, regardless of the cost or time taken. It was finally 
delivered to the Fulton Committee on 29 December, 1967, and so was in plenty of 
time to inform the Report, unlike Halsey's findings. 75 
The first draft of Halsey's Social Survey was delivered in July 1967 but was 
only cleared for publication after myriad objections by those on the Committee and 
departments in September 1969.76 It painted a highly socially-exclusive picture of the 
Senior Civil Service which many, not least in the Civil Service Commission and the 
Treasury which had given Halsey most of his statistics, felt presented an incomplete 
picture. " A supporter of the Halsey survey, Sheldon, offered perhaps the best epitaph 
when he claimed that it was `interesting' but `we had already made up our minds' by 
the time it became available. 78 The fact that Hunt led the MCG and was perhaps the 
leading member of the Fulton Committee proper meant that cross-fertilisation had to 
take place. 79 Members of the Committee were divided over just how powerful the 
MCG's report was, but it is clear that it did influence the drive towards 
recommending single unified grading and accountable management. 8° 
Hunt produced the first draft of the Fulton Report late in 1967.81 If any 
chairman, especially a Prime Minister, controls a meeting by dictating the agenda, 
then he who writes the drafts often steers a committee. Hunt's drive and, most 
importantly his free-time, meant that he became by far the most significant member 
on the Committee, indispensable almost. This was resented by several other members, 
Simey the most keenly, who felt they were being railroaded by Hunt's determination. 
74 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 125. 
75 Richard Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The Dynamics of Administrative Reform (Croom Helm, 
1980), p. 139. 
76 Ibid., pp. 51-5. 
71 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, pp. 52-3. 
7$ Ibid., p. 56. 
79 Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants, p. 33. 
80 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, pp. 67,70. 
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As indeed they were. Simey wrote to the Chairman in October 1967 stating that `I 
don't propose to come to London for the next meeting, as I cannot think that anything 
useful will be served by ploughing through drafts produced by Norman Hunt'82 (Hunt 
repeatedly accused Wilding of `circulating minutes designed to sabotage the 
Committee's conclusions' S3). After a dinner with Fulton on 8 March, 1968, Halls told 
Wilson that `While he [Fulton] paid tribute to the enormous work which Norman 
Hunt had done and his enthusiasm he gave the impression that Hunt's enthusiasm was 
beginning to irk some members of the Committee (probably including himself) and he 
told me quite bluntly that Simey just could not stand Hunt. '" 
Another member of the Committee, more sympathetic to Hunt's ideas, thought 
that his enthusiasm and determination were inappropriate, concerning what were, after 
all, relatively dry questions of administration over which there was little dispute about 
the main recommendations (tone was a different matter): `He was a rabbit. Eager 
rabbit ... 
One didn't waste time on him. jBS 
The civil servants on the Conunittee had other causes for concern. In the first 
place, how could they independently advise their respective ministers when the 
Report came to Cabinet? 86 Furthermore, if they appeared to obstruct any 
recommendation for reform, however innocently and on the basis of experience, and 
this leaked to the press, `Mandarins obstruct equal opportunity! ' would have been the 
inevitable headline. Allen felt that `we were in a terribly embarrassing position, Ned 
[Dunnett] and I. j87 Sir William Armstrong, at this time still Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury but now about to succeed Helsby on the establishments side and therefore 
take the lead on the Civil Service's appraisal of Fulton, told Sir Laurence that there 
sl Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 234. 
82 Lord Simey quoted in ibid., pp. 234-5. 
83 Wilding, `The Fulton Report in retrospect', p. 401. 
S4 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1970, Halls to Wilson, `The Fulton Report', 9 March 1968. 
85 private information. 
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is the possibility of a highly embarrassing disclosure that there was a rear-guard 
action on the Committee on the part of the permanent secretaries to modify any 
of the conclusions other members of the Committee might want to see; or even a 
suggestion that they tried to tone down the wording in the analytical part of the 
Report which sets out the reasons for any recommended changes 88 
They therefore felt in some ways gagged. 89 More troubling for them was that word 
began to filter into the Whitehall grapevine that Fulton and Hunt were suspiciously 
close to Wilson. It was felt, as Allen enunciated during the `Fulton: 20 Years On' 
seminar, that the Chairman and leading protagonist `used to go and see Harold Wilson 
and together they would get their instructions ... Not usually No. 10, but somewhere 
else to get the line. We weren't party to these instructions. '90 These are unambiguous 
words from a usually cautious retired senior civil servant and point to a resentment of 
outside interference, especially from the man who would, in effect, accept or reject 
the Report's findings. 
Harold Wilson and Michael Halls 
For Fulton and Hunt to be seen to have prime ministerial backing for their 
involvement meant that it was doubly hard for others - especially serving civil 
servants - to object to their wishes. But Allen, while correct in saying there was 
contact, does not give the full picture. There was no lobbying with a coherent end- 
86 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1970, Armstrong to Helsby, 25 March 1968. 
87 Interview with Lord Allen of Abbeydale, 7 May 2003. 
88 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1970, Armstrong to Helsby, 25 March 1968. 
89 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 238. 
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game in mind. For example, Hunt requested a private meeting with Wilson `without 
Fulton' towards the end of February 1968.9' We can only speculate what Hunt wanted, 
but it seems likely that he wished to cut the - for Hunt, at least - inadequately focused 
Fulton out of the prime ministerial loop as the Report came to be published and 
thoughts turned to implementation. As for getting `the line', Neild, firmly on the more 
radical side of the Committee, believed that `Harold Wilson was a great lover of busy- 
body meetings, at which nothing whatever would happen ... it was busy-bodying, 
seeking reassurance, keeping the PM in the picture, getting his blessings, whatever 
you care to call it. I cannot remember anything emerging from those meetings that in 
any degree influenced me. '92 But the real unfolding story during the Fulton Committee 
and after was of the relationship between Hunt and Halls, something which only truly 
became apparent with the declassification of the PREM files for 1968-70. 
Halls was solidly behind the Fulton Report. He and Hunt became firm allies, 
they and their wives going out for dinner together, 93 but there was also a true meeting 
of minds between the two. Halls had been promoted to Principal Private Secretary to 
the Prime Minister after special intervention by Wilson who had worked with him 
when President of the Board of Trade in 1947-51.94 The usual Civil Service 
procedures did not deem him worthy of the position (a negative appraisal powerfully 
underlined by Roy Jenkins°5). Heisby recommended that Wilson see five other 
candidates, which Wilson did, but stuck to Halls. Helsby suggested that this could be 
construed as patronage. In an uncharacteristic display of opposition to Civil Service 
procedures, Wilson stood up to Helsby, writing: 
90 Lord Allen of Abbeydale quoted in 'Fulton: 20 Years On', p. 45. 
91 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1970, Halls to Wilson, `Fulton', 25 February 1968. 
92 Robert Neild quoted in 'Fulton: 20 Years On', pp. 46-47. 
93 NA, PRO, PREM 13/197 1, Hunt to Halls, 31 July 1968. 
94 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 204. 
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If I am told that this is a question of patronage and challenged to choose between 
Prime Ministerial patronage and patronage exercised by a small, self- 
perpetuating oligarchy of Permanent Secretaries, I have no alternative but to say 
that patronage, if patronage it be, must be exercised by me. 
I certainly cannot accept the implied suggestion that such an appointment 
would imply a deterioration of standards since the arrival of the present 
administration ... My suggested appointment has no political implications, I 
have not the slightest idea of the political views, if any, of the five I saw. 
But I do not regard the appointment as patronage, reward for past services, 
or as a promise for the future ... I regard 
it as the means of ensuring that my 
office will work ... as efficiently, smoothly and agreeably as possible. What I 
want is a Private Secretary, actual or in embryo. No. 10 is an office, not a 
Government Department; it is also a small and necessarily intimate community - 
it is also a home. 96 
Given the force of that letter, it was unsurprising that Wilson got his man. But the 
episode must have fostered in Halls some animosity against his seniors. Coupled with 
the fact that the Prime Minister could not pay anywhere near as much attention to the 
Fulton Committee as he would undoubtedly have wished (with the needs of the post- 
devaluation economy, trade union reform and rebellion in Rhodesia taking up much 
of his time), and the Chairman's lackadaisical approach, meant that the Halls-Hunt 
axis provided the strongest support for the Fulton Report's findings. 
Evidence-gathering was long and laborious. The secretaries, Wilding and 
Simons, were very critical of this, especially of evidence taken orally by the 
Committee, Wilding describing it as `fairly chaotic' and something which `wasted a 
95 Interview with Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, 5 May 1999. 
96 Wilson Papers, box 76, Wilson to Helsby, 14 February 1966, quoted in Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The 
Authorised Life (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), pp. 213-4. 
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lot of time'. "' This was only remedied once Hunt had produced his first draft during 
the summer of 1967.98 The bureaucracies in France, the United States, Holland, 
Sweden, West Germany and Canada were examined99 (but, according to Michael 
Simons, `did not result in serious studies of other Civil Services1)°) and consultation 
was invited from all interested parties. One of the most eye-catching testimonies was 
that of Richard Crossman, then Lord President of the Council and Leader of the 
House of Commons, who told the Committee that his time in Government had not 
diminished his sympathy for Tommy Balogh's Apotheosis of the Dilettante but had 
rather strengthened it. '°' Another was that of a serving Treasury official, William 
Ryrie, who produced what Peter Hennessy described as a `mini-Haldane' in which he 
juxtaposed what he saw as the reducing responsibility officials exercised with the 
staggering and often banal workload expected of civil servants. 102 This stepped over 
the boundary imposed by terms of reference which specifically warned the Committee 
off machinery of government issues. Throughout the inquiry, Wilding later suggested, 
`certain opinions were held so widely that they were almost taken for granted'. They 
were that 
(a) The Treasury had failed, both in its task of giving economic advice to 
Ministers and in its management of the civil service ... 
(b) The civil service was failing in its duty to do long-term policy planning and 
to provide ministers with a coherent basis for long-term decisions. 
(c) It was also intolerably amateurish in its approach to complex technical and 
investment matters ... 
97 Richard Wilding quoted in 'Fulton: 20 Years On', p. 47. 
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101 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. Two, Lord President of the Council and 
Leader of the Mouse of Commons 1966-68 (Hamish Hamilton and Cape, 1976), p. 200, diary entry 
for 17 January 1967. 
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(d), The administrators sat on the specialists and allowed them neither their full- 
share in decision-making and management nor proper career opportunities to 
become administrators. 
(e) Administrators moved around far too often, thus developing a kind of 
butterfly mentality which reinforced their amateur status. 
(f) Too few civil servants saw themselves as managers and developed the 
appropriate skills. 
(g) The service was too much a closed world, drawn from too narrow a social 
and educational base. "' 
In late February 1968, the fundamentals of the Report began to take shape - and 
the lobbying began. This was when Halls began to operate very significantly behind 
the scenes. To a considerable extent, the history of the Fulton Report can now be seen 
as a story of two civil servants, Halls and William Armstrong - certainly in terms of 
the fight for Wilson's ear. Fulton sent the Prime Minister a copy of the penultimate 
draft, Halls wrote a lengthy memorandum to accompany the draft, giving his 
assessment of it. Urging the Prime Minister to bear in mind `what Hunt calls "the 
ethos of professionalism"", Halls observed: 
Of course, there are many practical problems in implementation, but the Fulton 
Report is not looking to the Service in the next five years, it is seeking to 
establish a Service with opportunities for all (eliminating the defects of what is in 
fact, at present, `class snobbery') and a new found professionalism which would 
determine its role over the next generation or so. As you will see, my own 
personal view [Wilson scribbled next to this `And mine'] is that it is just the kind 
'°2 Hennessy, Whitehall, pp. 191-4. 
103 Wilding, `The Fulton Report in retrospect', pp. 399-400. 
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of radical reform that is essential, indeed without it, the Fulton Report would 
finish up by producing merely one step forward. 1" 
Wilson, Hunt and Halls therefore shared a common vision. 
Halls went on to `remind' Wilson of the five main elements of the Report as it 
took shape. They were: 
(i) The Classless Uniformly Graded Service. 
(ii) The structure of the Civil Service in three broad groups, (a) Economic 
and Financial, (b) Social in its widest sense, (c) Scientific and Technical. 
(iii) The establishment of a Civil Service Training College. 
(iv) A new department for the Civil Service. 
(v) Recruitment. 'os 
We will take these points in reverse order, beginning with recruitment. This was a 
tough and inherently controversial issue for the Committee to consider. Pre-Fulton 
recruitment to the Civil Service had come into question from both socio-theoretical 
and practical stances - from Balogh (amongst others) over elitism and non-specialism, 
and the Treasury which simply wanted to get educated brains in. 
Statistics demonstrating that between 1957 and 1963 eighty-five per cent of 
those recruited to the Administrative Class came from Oxbridge were hard to 
defend. 106 Wilson was a critic, even though he had been a high-flying Oxford don 
himself. In September 1965, Helsby wrote to the Prime Minister, stating `My own 
view is that the Civil Service dilemma reflects a basic unbalance in our educational 
system which arises from the capacity of Oxford and Cambridge to attract a 
104 NA, PRO, PREM 1311970, Halls to Wilson, `Fulton', 25 February 1968. 
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106 Roseveare, The Treasury, p. 305. 
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disproportionate share of the ablest undergraduates. ' Wilson responded sharply: 
`Membership [of the Administrative Class] seems to me to be heavily weighted 
against L. E. A. [Local Education Authority] types - and even if these things are not 
taken into account like tends to perpetuate like"" (it is worth pointing out that most 
grammar school students at Oxbridge were `L. E. A. types'). Both men were merely 
reprising the longstanding wish for a Civil Service that reflected the society it served 
along with the need to preserve merit in its appointments. The late Michael Young, 
writing in the mid-1950s, observed that whatever the case for recruitment to a civil 
service on the basis that appointees should represent the community they serve, the 
need for efficiency always emerged victorious. 108 
The Fulton Committee's consideration of the recruitment problem did not get 
very far. It resulted in a largely semantic argument between those who favoured a 
written examination (Method I) and those who advocated a blend of that plus tests, 
exercises and an interview (Method II) as the chief means of recruitment to the higher 
grades. The organisation with most clout in this area, the Civil Service Commission, 
had made clear its wish to discontinue recruitment based on Method I and this took 
place in 1969.109 The (Jack) Davies Committee into Whitehall recruitment (Davies 
was a personnel expert in the Bank of England), reporting in 1969 after being set up 
by Wilson on 24 October 1968, backed this move alongside strong support for 
Method H. 1° (Thomas Balogh was a very keen supporter of Method I as a way of 
measuring merit without heeding the accent of the candidate. "') 
logy NA, PRO, PREM 13/1357, Helsby to Mitchell, 13 September 1965. 
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A new department for the Civil Service seemed a big change (although it had 
been first mooted by Harold Laski many years before"'). Responsibility for the Civil 
Service, as previously noted, was part of the Treasury's remit. Splitting the Treasury 
once again (after the DEA experiment), in effect making explicit the implicit division 
of 1962, became important for more reform-minded members of the Committee, such 
as Hunt, Neild and Sheldon (an interesting omission from this list was Sir Edward 
Boyle whose `heart was not in the Fulton business' "'). It was felt that greater 
concentration could be given to personnel matters if the Service was taken out of the 
Treasury's grasp. It was also believed that the Treasury's domination in Whitehall 
would be fundamentally undermined by this action. This was not just a practical move 
for, as Helsby reported to the Prime Minister in May 1967, `Some members appear to 
think that the image of the Treasury is a serious disadvantage ... some members of his 
[Fulton's] Committee seem to think that a move away from the Treasury would help 
to create a brave new world'. 114 The Treasury's bad PR, which had led to distrust in 
the wider Civil Service, was counting against it once again. 
The creation of a Civil Service-specific college was a largely uncontroversial 
recommendation. Clement Attlee had urged Sir John Anderson's wartime machinery 
of government committee to support one in 1942, 
"s as did the Committee on the 
Training of Civil Servants chaired by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Ralph 
Assheton, in 1943.16 Both came to naught despite the need for training appearing 
obvious. The establishment of the Centre for Administrative Studies in 1963, an 
attempt to bring greater economic expertise to the Treasury and Whitehall generally, 
112 Harold Laski, `Introduction', in J. P. W. Mallalieu, Passed To You Please (Gollancz, 1942), p. 11. 
113 Letter from Richard Wilding, 18 December 2005. 
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116 See NA, PRO, T162/752; T162/805; T1621806; T162/806 `Committee on training of civil servants'; 
Chapman and Greenaway, The Dynamics of Administrative Reform, pp. 146-7. 
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provided a successful blueprint. "' A `Staff College for the Civil Service"8 became 
something of a pet subject for Wilson in the Summer of 1965, but the Prime Minister 
was far from being the first to advocate it. Since the First World War there had been 
thoughts regarding how to improve the skills-set of higher officials, "' and the Civil 
Service was itself becoming uncomfortable. As Balogh wrote to Wilson in July 1965: 
Sir Philip Allen's Management Committee has been considering how to ... train 
up people and I am sure your idea of enlarging the Staff College into a fully- 
fledged university-level institute ... 
is by far the most likely to yield results. As 
you said yourself, the Mendes-France reforms have made all the difference to the 
knowledge and morale of the French Civil Service and enabled them to dominate 
the scene in the Common Market and beyond. 'zo 
Pierre Mendes France was French Premier, 1954-55, and `represented just the kind of 
left-of-centre technocratic attitudes which Balogh was trying to inculcate into the 
Wilson Government ... All the enthusiasm 
for planning and the Ecole Nationale 
d'Administration' which was created in October 1945.121 Wilson and his intimates 
were, therefore, concerned about not only the British but more importantly the French 
bureaucracies. This is not to say that Wilson was consumed by the need for Civil 
Service reform, or encouraged it in members of his `kitchen cabinet'. For, as another 
letter shows, from Derek Mitchell to Helsby, the Prime Minister was keen to escape 
being the focus of attention in this area (perhaps with good reason): 
117 Samuel Brittan, Steering the Economy (Pelican, 1971), p. 33. 
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The Prime Minister suggested that it would be appropriate for a Treasury 
minister - presumably the Financial Secretary - to take a closer interest in all 
this with a view to reporting his impressions to the Prime Minister in due course. 
One point he has in mind is that the nomination of a minister for this purpose 
would enable him to provide Mr. Balogh with an audience other than the Prime 
Minister himself for his many ideas on Civil Service training. `' 
Wilson much appreciated Balogh's input, thinking of him as a one-man think tank 
able to counter conventional machine advice. But he could clearly prove too much at 
times. 
123 
The first two points on Halls's list are essentially one. The `single, unified 
grading structure' was, according to Halls, `the major issue'. 124 Robert Sheldon agreed 
completely. "' The myriad classes - there were literally thousands of them126 - within 
the Service were essentially seen by critics as a barrier to the efficient use of 
personnel and a tool of the classics-educated Oxbridge elite within the Administrative 
Class to aid its self-perpetuation. The wish of reformers was to abolish the barriers 
which would allow bright young things from the Executive Class a free run through to 
the very top. 127 This troubled many, especially those with responsibility for 
recruitment like the Civil Service Commission, as they feared that the traditional high 
calibre. applicants for the Administrative Class would be discouraged if they were not 
given special treatment. 
' 
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There was also a secondary aspect, and this concerned the lamentable lot of 
specialists in the Civil Service. The dominance of the generalist in the Civil Service 
came under critical pressure during the 1960s. The wish of reformers - and Wilson 
himself was of course a trained statistician who had been a wartime temporary civil 
servant - was to take the shackles off gifted specialists and allow them to progress to 
the very top. That meant access to the administrative tree, a diminution of job- 
classification obstacles and possibly a `preference for relevance' regarding the subject 
that a civil servant had studied at university. 
The widely accepted incompetence of the generalist compared to the specialist 
argument must not be allowed to pass without question, however. Lord Allen, like 
many others in the senior ranks (including Dunnett at the relatively technocratic 
MoD12) recognised the need for greater specialisation especially in accountancy. 
Allen was somewhat rueful when later explaining that `the problem was when you 
brought them [specialists] into the limelight, ministers couldn't understand what they 
were saying! ' This translation explanation was `a very difficult point for me and Ned 
[Dunnett] to argue in the presence of Kipping and Cook'. 1° Not wanting to embarrass 
themselves or others meant that they did not curb the hyperbole surrounding the 
merits of specialists and the failure of all-rounders. 
Moreover, generalists, according to the critics (see chapter one), were vastly 
more generalist than rational argument could sustain, a practice which prevented an 
official becoming an expert in his or her field. Thus the recommendation for 
Whitehall work to be split into three strands - economic, social and scientific. This 
was a compromise which provided for an official to be able to gain gradually greater 
relevant expertise yet still able to switch roles. The single, unified grading structure 
129 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 21. 
130 Interview with Lord Allen of Abbeydale, 7 May 2003. 
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was, therefore, both a vertical and an horizontal attack on the fortress of the 
Administrative Class. 
Further to this, recently-released documents at the National Archives offer a 
fascinating insight into the wishes of those demanding urgent reform along more 
professional lines. This was the simple question of the kind of civil servant who 
should occupy the Service's higher echelons in the future. In a letter to Wilson, Halls 
recalled from his conversation with Hunt how the reforms envisaged 
the creation of a powerful Civil Service. Hunt recognises this ... But it will not 
merely have the potential of power which he describes, it will be powerful. Will 
it be adaptable to ministerial change, or flexible enough to implement quickly 
fundamental changes of policy? Will it need the counter-balance of `kitchen 
Cabinets' [most likely Halls had in mind French-style ministerial cabinets] of a 
kind and scope with which you disagree? 
Hunt recognises that this new Civil Service will need strong democratic 
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control ... 
Hunt, as the chief reformer on the Committee, was not interested in diminishing the 
Service at all. He wanted to make it marvellous. He wanted to give senior civil 
servants much sharper teeth. But he did not think the current cohort could ever deliver 
his wishes. Root-and-branch reform was needed to achieve success. 
Once this improvement had been carried out, serious thought would have to be 
given to controlling the newly emboldened civil servants who might have even more 
power over politicians, the true amateurs of government. Hunt thought that this could 
be achieved in five ways (as Halls related it to Wilson). First, public scrutiny must be 
improved by lifting Whitehall's `veil of secrecy'. Next, the legislature must be 
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brought into greater balance with the executive by expanding the powers of the select 
committee system. The third proposal was for permanent secretaries to extend their 
new found public voice - hardly very loud at this time but apparent with more 
lectures, briefings and even television appearances, most notably by Sir William 
Armstrong1' (this proposal was rejected immediately by Halls and Wilson). Fourth, 
the idea for greater mixed ministerial-official committees was mooted as a way of 
controlling purely Civil Service might. The last point (though there was a vague plea 
for a streamlined machinery of government which was not elaborated upon133) was for 
a special committee, with a similarly eclectic membership, to review the progress of 
reform. Halls was disdainful of this but Wilson commented that it `might be useful'134 
(Armstrong was very antagonistic to this proposal, seeing it as `another example of 
the Committee's suspicion of bureaucratic inertia""). All in all, the Hunt-Halls line 
involved a detailed attempt to limit the power of a deliberately empowered 
mandarinate -a fascinating paradox. 
As with some of the hardware reforms detailed in Chapter 2, these ideas had 
more than a touch of fantasy surrounding them. Although several of the recommended 
checks were indeed acted upon - there was a half-hearted attempt at a reform of the 
Official Secrets Acts in 1969 (of which, more later) and Crossman oversaw changes 
to the select committee system (which invloved seven new ones set up between 1966- 
69)16 - there is little or no reason to believe they were due to Hunt's fears of over 
mighty officialdom. The overall `ethos of professionalism' and the accompanying 
checks and balances, therefore, turned out to be simply irrelevant, even if they help 
historians to understand the impetus behind such aspirations. 
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In May 1968 Sir William Armstrong moved from the economics and finance 
side of the Treasury, replacing Helsby as Head of the Home Civil Service, and was 
replaced in turn by Sir Douglas Allen. ('It astonished Whitehall that he gave up the 
Treasury' said Allen much later. 13') An important characteristic of Sir William's 
management style was his determination to create thinking-time to mull-over big 
issues. Prior to becoming Head of the Home Civil Service, he spent a fortnight at 
Nuffield College, Oxford, looking at the evidence presented to the Fulton 
Committee. "" After receiving a copy of the final draft of Fulton, Armstrong took it 
upon himself to represent what he felt to be the Civil Service angle. 
In a huge memorandum to the Prime Minister in early May of 1968, Armstrong 
began by assuring Wilson (and Halls) that he had kept his own counsel on the draft, 
showing it neither to his fellow permanent secretaries nor his minister, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins: `It was [agreed] that I would not bring the Chancellor 
in until we have an official text of the Report, when it is signed in a week or two's 
time. j139 Even though the Prime Minister is technically First Lord of the Treasury (a 
fact of which Margaret Thatcher occasionally reminded Treasury officials14), for the 
Joint-Permanent Secretary to the Treasury to keep the findings of the Fulton Report 
from his Chancellor, the minister responsible for the Civil Service at this time, is 
eyebrow-raising. Allen readily agreed when interviewed, believing that `The only 
time you can withhold something from your minister is over security. '141 (Yet Samuel 
Brittan saw nothing untoward in this. 142) More likely, Armstrong and Wilson were 
136 Priscilla Baines, 'History and Rationale of the 1979 Reforms', in Gavin Drewry (ed. ), The New 
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acting as if a separate Civil Service Department under the control of the Prime 
Minister had already been created. 
The level of outside interference in the Committee has long been an interesting 
issue. Earlier we saw how Allen was unhappy with Fulton's and especially Hunt's 
easy access to No. 10. With the opening of the National Archives' files relating to the 
Fulton Committee, we now have documentary evidence of Armstrong's influence 
over the Committee, if only in a minor way (`I've always been puzzled as to how far 
William was operating behind the scenes' mused Allen143 while Lord Croham 
observed that Armstrong `apparently had a lot of contact "round the back" as it 
were'44). For in reference to an earlier conversation regarding Wilson's wish to see a 
limit of two special advisers for each minister (a limit which survives to this day145), 
Armstrong responded `I aim to try to get the Committee's Report modified 
accordingly'. ' It must be noted, however, that Neild rejected the idea that the 
Committee was led from outside. While conscious of Wilson's, Halls's and 
Armstrong's interest in the Committee, he feels that the interference theory had been 
overdone. `Look at the Fabian and Fulton reports. Do you find much deviation? 1141 
Neild is correct. In fact, Richard Wilding describes the Report as `a kind of sandwich 
with a piece of Fabian rye bread on top and a piece of managerial white bread 
underneath'. 148 If the concept of meritocracy, according to its creator Michael Young, 
is computed by adding IQ and effort, then Fulton is The Administrators plus the 
Management Consultancy Group. 149 
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9 February 2005. 
145 Ministerial Code: A Code Of Conduct And Guidance On Procedures For Ministers, (Cabinet 
Office, July 2001), paragraph 50. 
146 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1970, Armstrong to Halls, `Fulton Report', 9 May 1968. 
147 Interview with Professor Robert Neild, 6 May 2003. 
'48 Richard Wilding quoted in `Fulton: 20 Years On', p. 45. 
149 Michael Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy, (Transaction, New Brunswick, USA, 1999), p. xiii. 
139 
Armstrong tried hard to appear upbeat in the memorandum. Arguably the most 
contentious issue was one of wording and especially that of paragraph one. Many felt 
that it was an own goal by the Committee. The Chairman had tried hard to foster 
agreement but, as Wilding observed, `[s]ome members made it clear that they would 
accept nothing less than a public execution with all drums rolling, and that they were 
not open to discussion on the point. ''so Halls, however, told his boss that Fulton felt 
the need to placate the civil servants on the Committee by avoiding `too much of a 
condemnation of the existing Civil Service'. "' Yet the final Report opened by boldly 
stating that 
The Home Civil Service today is still fundamentally the product of the 
nineteenth-century philosophy of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. The problems 
it faces are those of the second half of the twentieth century ... It is still too 
much based on the philosophy of the amateur (or `generalist' or all-rounder'). 
This is most evident in the Administrative Class, which holds the dominant 
position in the Service. 
Richard Wilding, writing nearly three decades later, declared that `[t]o this day, I still 
do not know whether the civil service members were right or wrong to go along with 
Chapter 1. I was glad as secretary not to have to make my own decision. ' 112 Several 
years after this assessment, he was to describe it as `a misconceived hand grenade'. "' 
Wilding was also highly critical of the `amateur' accusation finding it `unjust' and 
`vindictive': 
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although a sustained push from the Prime Minister is a necessary condition of 
keeping things moving along in this field, it is not a sufficient condition. You 
also have to persuade the people who are in the key jobs with responsibility for 
translating broad proposals into detailed plans, promulgating them and bringing 
them into effect that the changes are right, should be adopted and will in effect 
become their own property and their own achievement ... The result was that 
Fulton got a bad press in precisely those places where he needed a good one. 
Damage resulted. "4 
Even Hunt and Kellner were to deem the inclusion of the word `amateur' as `[t]he 
decisive tactical mistake'. 155 Sir William responded to this in a letter to Halls which 
contained wonderful mandarinese, a blend of understanding and contempt: 
In my own personal view much of the criticism is justified, though it would have 
been better from the point of view of getting across the positive 
recommendations accepted if the Committee had recognised more fully both the 
improvements that have been made in recent years, and the difficulties under 
which the Service has been labouring ... 
Armstrong went on to list the omissions, from his point of view, in the Fulton 
Report. He highlighted discipline, security, the political activities of civil servants, 
departmental welfare activities, financial control, the honours system ('The 
Committee appears to find nothing strange in the notion that a group of civil servants 
should in effect decide, subject to the approval of the Prime Minister, which of their 
number should be admitted to the various orders of knighthood'), and virtually 
nothing regarding the `psychology of office workers or the sociology of bureaucratic 
1S4 Wilding, The Fulton Report in retrospect', pp. 401-2. 
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communities' 156 In a letter to the Prime Minister, Halls countered Armstrong's 
reservations: 
In my view the Committee could have been much stronger in their criticism and 
indeed the chapter has been somewhat modified against the more critical views 
of Norman Hunt, Neild and Sheldon ... we are really turning our backs on 
Northcote-Trevellyn [sic - Wilson in his memoir referred to the 1854 Report as 
being authored by Harcourt-Trevelyan, 157 both hardly inspiring confidence that 
either had intimate knowledge of it] - let us turn our backs on the "Ministers 
without Portfolio and without Ministerial responsibility" - the Warren Fishers of 
the Civil Service. 
Halls went on to further criticise Armstrong because he had not confined himself 
purely to the acceptance of Fulton and the challenges involved in its 
implementation. "' 
Armstrong was also critical of the overall nature of the Report, which gave little 
in the way of definite recommendations and settled more for `rather general and even 
woolly"59 wishes, something which was to plague the Report's implementation (or 
lack of). This was to result in the process, described by Sir Donald MacDougall, who 
had become Head of the Government Economic Service in 1969, after which he was 
obliged to read, and sit through discussions of long papers by the CSD which I 
thought were sometimes like sermons. First there was the text -a paragraph 
from Fulton; then ten pages discussing what it might mean; then another ten 
iss Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants, p. 59. 
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considering what might be done about it; and a final section quite often saying 
why nothing was possible or, worse still, with no conclusion at all. 160 
Armstrong's negative tone spurred Halls into action. 
The 1960s and 1970s (especially after the first of Richard Crossman's diaries 
were published in 1975161) were decades of great mistrust of Civil Service attitudes. 
Conspiracy theories grew as to the obstructionist tendencies of the machine when 
confronted by radical policies and politicians. Yet there were serving civil servants 
who perhaps went too far the other way in trying to facilitate politicians' wishes. 
Halls sits in this category. He was very comfortable in the Prime Minister's `kitchen 
cabinet'. In a word, he had gone `native'. In response to Armstrong's long 
memorandum, Halls wrote to the Prime Minister, and his letter is quoting at length 
due to its lucidity and its criticism of the man who was the ostensible head of his 
profession: 
It is not only the young civil servants who will welcome the criticisms [contained 
in the Fulton Report]; there is a wide range of middle rank civil servants, of 
whom I am one, who have been making many of the criticisms which Fulton 
brings out ... Another point which 
is relevant to this and which William himself 
cannot, of course, make is the dominance of the Civil Service by Treasury 
personnel; Armstrong, Trend, 162 Johnson, '63 Morton, '" France, 161 Padmore, '66 
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Philip Allen, 167 Pitblado'68 and Otto Clarke, 169 all permanent secretaries who have 
served in a senior position in the Treasury and most of whom secure the breakout 
appointments under the influence of Bridges. Of course, many of these will feel 
that the criticism is unjustified because they in fact have been pillars of the 
system. 
(Sir Warren Fisher would have been mightily proud of this trend. ) Wilson minuted 
simply: `Agree with your comments. '10 But for all Halls's agitation and access to the 
Prime Minister, his influence was limited, as Wilding has observed: 
As far as I'm aware, Halls didn't have any very great impact inwards into the 
Service. He didn't seek allies there. ... He didn't himself carry the kind of 
weight with the rest of the Civil Service that people who had been Principal 
Private Secretary before him and after him carried. You could as I did occupy 
yourself with, as it were, what to do about Fulton without having any very strong 
impression that Halls was having an influence on the course of events. I was 
aware he was writing things and he was briefing Hunt. ... It was curiously 
detached. "' 
As the Fulton Committee neared its reporting stage, the time for Wilson to 
decide what he wanted to see enacted drew close. It appears that there was never a 
possibility that the report would be accepted in its entirety as the Cabinet was 
unconvinced. Indeed, there was a distinct chance of two reports, one majority and one 
minority, provoked by the aggressive tone of the final draft. In the event, only Lord 
167 Sir Philip Allen, Permanent Secretary, Home Office, 1966-72; Treasury Second Secretary, 1963-66. 
168 Sir David Pitblado, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Power, 1966-69; Treasury Third Secretary, 
1960. 
169 Sir Richard Clarke, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Technology, 1966-70; Treasury Second 
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Simey provided a `note of reservation"" because he felt that the Report's belligerence 
was `unfair to the Civil Service' 17' and because, so Wilding felt, `the two Permanent 
Secretaries were in a very difficult position. I think they went along with quite a 
lot. ""' According to Whitehall folklore this minority report was written by Sir 
William Armstrong himself - Simey told Allen and Dunnett (the latter no friend of 
the Treasury nor of Helsby15) that Armstrong and the Treasury were `helping him 
out'. 176 (The civil servants on the Committee, so gossip in Whitehall said, stayed only 
to act as a restraining influence - if they had not and the Report had taken a more 
radical turn and Labour had have won in 1970, the consequences for the Civil Service 
could have been much more far-reaching. "') 
The Prime Minister needed to decide exactly which of the many 
recommendations he was to endorse personally. But this was not a decision he could 
make in a political vacuum for the dispute between the future Head of the Home Civil 
Service and his own Principal Private Secretary was mirrored in the Cabinet. The 
spring of 1968 saw Wilson at one of the lowest points of his political life. 
Devaluation, and the mishandling of the aftermath, 178 left him in a very weak position. 
The economy was not coming right and industrial relations, were beginning to be a 
major headache. The strategy upon which Wilson and Halls based their approach was 
to immediately accept three points -a civil service college '179 a civil service 
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172 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 198. 
173 Cmnd. 3638, pp. 104. 
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department18° and single unified grading"' - and to leave the rest for later (there were 
twenty-two main recommendationst82 and 158 in total). 
Armstrong had previously feared that the civil servants on the Fulton 
Committee could be accused of fighting a rearguard action, but now he launched his 
own attempt to halt what he regarded as a truly problematic and counter-productive 
recommendation - that of single unified grading. The first evidence of Armstrong's 
attempted obstructionism came when he wrote a full appreciation of the Report which 
he hoped would form the basis of the paper to be circulated to the Cabinet. He 
suggested that Wilson accept only the Civil Service College and the Civil Service 
Department immediately, with the rest to be considered later. He then went on to 
highlight the cost of the reforms. 183 
Halls and Wilson were not impressed. Halls wrote to Armstrong stating that the 
Prime Minister `thought that the cost of the implementation of the Committee's 
Report in full might, as it was presented in your paper, cause some concern among 
Ministers who were at present preoccupied with the PESC [Public Expenditure 
Survey Committee] exercise. "" Halls was consistently suspicious of Armstrong's 
costings and by 1969 was, quietly, obtaining a second opinion from Colin Gilbraith, 
Armstrong's Private Secretary, such was the level of mistrust. "' 
On 13 June 1968 Armstrong accepted the principle of single unified grading. "" 
But a day later he provided an updated brief for Wilson's Cabinet discussion in which 
he again contested the Report and its recommendations when he gave the options as 
, to implement this report now and to accept in principle a substantial outlay of 
180 The Civil Service: Vol. 1-Report of the Committee 1966-68, Cmnd. 3638, pp. 81-8. 
181 Ibid., pp. 69-78. 
182 See Appendix. 
183 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1970, Armstrong to Halls, `Fulton Report', 12 June 1968. 
1&' Ibid., Halls to Armstrong, 13 June 1968. 
185 NA, PRO, PREM 13/2528, `Fulton Report: government's consideration of recommendations; 
enquiry into release of official information and Official Secrets Act; part 2', Halls to Gilbraith, CSD, 
22 April 1969. 
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manpower and money or to shelve the report until better times ... 
(I naturally hope 
that the decision will be in favour of implementation)' he added somewhat 
unconvincingly. '$' This was followed up four days later with even greater 
backtracking when he wrote to Halls, telling him about the conference of leading 
scientific and professional civil servants that he had attended: `I must tell you that 
what was said makes me more concerned about the dangers of becoming committed 
to the unified structure before examining it'. 188 Armstrong's repeated underlining of 
the problems, as he saw them, made a mockery of his professed support for the 
Report. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, earlier kept out of the Fulton loop by 
Armstrong, now made noises that `though he liked the report' there was a `need for 
delay while we [the Cabinet] considered it'. 189 Either Roy Jenkins was disingenuous at 
the time or changed his mind later for in his autobiography he described Fulton as `the 
midwife of a not very good 1968 report on the civil service'. 
190 Jenkins's real feeling 
was quite understandable, though, as Wilson did not consult him over the plan to 
create a new Civil Service Department from a slice of his Treasury, and in the 
sometimes juvenile world of politics this mattered greatly. A deal was struck between 
Jenkins and Crossman, Lord President of the Council (who wrote at the time in his 
diary that Fulton was `a second rate Report written in a very poor style by Norman 
Hunt'19)Crossman recorded Jenkins as saying, "`If I agree with you about 
postponing the decision on Social Service cuts for a week will you give me your full 
186 NA, PRO, PREM 13/1970, Armstrong to Halls, 13 June 1968. 
187 Ibid., 14 June 1968. 
iss Ibid., Armstrong to Halls, `Fulton Report', 18 June 1968. 
189 'Thomas Balogh quoted in Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70 (Weidenfeld, 1984), p. 464, 
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190 Roy Jenkins, A Life At The Centre (Macmillan, 1991), p. 41. 
191 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. III, Secretary of State for the Social 
Services 1968-70 (Hamilton, 1977), p. 107, diary entry for 25 June 1968. 
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support on Fulton? " "Yes", I said, "if you will support me on Lords' reform as well"' 
(that perennial quagmire of an issue). 192 
The Cabinet initially considered the Report on 20 June 1968. Wilson announced 
his intention of immediately accepting the Civil Service Department, the Civil Service 
College and single unified grading, while considering the rest of the proposals at a 
later date. But Cabinet Ministers were not to be bounced. They questioned the cost of 
Wilson's wishes at a time of economic crisis, especially as the Cabinet had previously 
agreed a freezing on Civil Service recruitment only to be informed that the Service 
would grow by 1,000 by April 1969.193 The Cabinet also expressed the feeling that 
`The criticisms in Chapter I of the report, which though not without foundation were 
over-simplified and lacking in balance, were likely to receive undue publicity'. A 
chastened Wilson agreed that `the Cabinet needed more time to consider the handling 
of the Fulton report'. 194 At Cabinet a week later, the Cabinet gave Wilson a much 
easier time, with `wide support for the view that when the report was published the 
Government should make a positive statement announcing their acceptance in 
principle of the three main recommendations'. 
"" In the Commons debate that 
followed, Edward Heath, the leader of the Opposition, welcomed the Report but saw 
it as only `one part of the changes which have to be brought about in the structure of 
government as a whole' (reforms he was already planning, as we shall see in chapter 
four). 196 The Prime Minister `readily agree[d]'. '9' 
192 Crossman was referring to his cross-party proposals for reform of the Lords - Crossman, The 
Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. III, pp. 96-103, diary entries for 17,18 & 19 June 1968. 
193 NA, PRO, CAB 128/43, Part 2, Cabinet meeting, 20 June 1968. 
14 Ibid. 
195 Ibid., Cabinet meeting, 25 June 1968. 
196 House of Commons, Official Report, 26 June 1968, Col. 459. 
19 Ibid. 
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The Battle for Fulton 
Now came the issue of implementation. Two of the agreed three 
recommendations were easy to deliver. The Civil Service College took two years to 
open with several sites canvassed, including the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. 
The former Civil Defence College in Sunningdale was the eventual location for the 
main premises and its opening in June 1970 became Edward Heath's first official 
engagement as Prime Minister. "' Lord Croham added a fascinating aside when he 
explained that Norman Hunt's determined behaviour throughout the period 1966-70 
was because he had his eyes fixed on becoming the CSC's first head, a post which 
went instead to Eugene Grebenik (Professor of Social Studies, University of Leeds, 
1954-69). 199 
The Civil Service Department began life on the 1 November 1968, the same day 
as the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office and the Department of Health and 
Social Security. The Prime Minister decide that the CSD should follow the ministerial 
model of the Department of Economic Affairs during 1967-68, whereby Wilson was 
in overall control but Shore in day-to-day charge - hardly a successful precedent. 200 
Wilson did assume control of the Civil Service as First Lord of the Treasury with 
Lord Shackleton donning the Shore role. Lord Croham, head of the Treasury in 1968 
and successor to Armstrong in the CSD, thinks that the CSD was another Wilsonian 
attempt at creative tension aimed at his Treasury, also observing that `the Treasury 
often won when there was a fight'. 
201 
198 Fry, Reforming the Civil Service, p. 267. 
199 Lord Croham briefing the `Hidden Wiring' MA option course, Queen Mary, University of London, 
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The third item was where the bad blood had been created and where further 
bloodshed was to come: single unified grading. This was also to become the leitmotif 
of whether one was pro- or anti-Fulton. In the two years after its acceptance in 
Cabinet, little in effect happened. The key moment in the story came when 
Armstrong, Head of the Home Civil Service and also, essentially, of the Civil Service 
Department (his political `boss', Lord Shackleton described their relationship as `he 
was the head and I was his political adviser' 202) began the abolition of all grades above 
Principal in the Administrative Class. The process was negotiated in the Whitley 
Counci1203 (Halls was convinced that `Whitleyism in the Service has probably been 
one of the main features contributing to our present rigidity'204). This led to Armstrong 
having a running battle with No. 10 - Halls at the forefront with, rather surprisingly, 
Norman Hunt, who was given a room in Downing Street at regular intervals so that he 
could review the current state of play and fire off sharp letters to Armstrong, all with 
the support of the Prime Minister. 205 
The Hunt-Halls-Armstrong trialogue became known as the `inner circle' - `a 
good description this', thought Hunt, `[w]e certainly went round in circles. And 
Michael Halls and myself were mostly taken for a ride 206 Even Peter Shore, who 
upon the DEA's abolition in October 1969 was made Minister Without Portfolio, but 
with special responsibility for the presentation of government policy, was also asked 
202 Quoted in Christopher Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine (Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 78. 
203 The machinery set up during the First World War to calm labour difficulties across the economy by 
bringing both sides, employers and trade unions together, which lasted in the Civil Service until Mrs 
Thatcher's tenure. It took its name from J. H. Whitley, the Deputy Speaker of the House of 
Commons who chaired the relevant sub-committee of the Cabinet's Reconstruction Committee. See 
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advance of introduction of unified grading system', Hunt to Halls, 31 December 1969; PREM 
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future"; part 2', Halls to Wilson, `Further Steps on Fulton', 13 February 1970. 
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to review Armstrong's activities. "' Among the choice comments that Hunt fired off to 
Armstrong, with the Prime Minister's blessing, was his observation that: `It is quite 
clear ... that the remit to the 
Civil Service Department is to devise a practicable 
scheme for the implementation of a unified grading system to replace all of the 
different Civil Service classes. The remit is NOT to see whether such a practicable 
scheme can be devised. '208 
Halls manned the defences of Fulton's single unified grading recommendation 
as he had fought all the feet-dragging by Armstrong (Wilding described the `chief 
villains' as Armstrong and `in the minor role of Third Murderer, myself 
20). He 
thought Armstrong's proposal fell `well short of the unified grading structure', "' and 
reminded Wilson that Armstrong `as you know, tried at literally the twelfth hour ... to 
prevent you from accepting the unified grading- structure as an objective of 
government policy'. 
"" `Working down', Halls had earlier written, `which put rather 
crudely was the original Treasury evidence which Fulton did not accept ... put 
another way, has not the time come to start at the bottom as well as at the top'. 
212 (The 
Treasury had submitted evidence to the Committee which spoke about the managerial 
need, to increase the efficient use of manpower, to abolish all grades above Principal 
but, crucially, nothing more213) Halls continued: `the proposal which will attract most 
interest, namely the merger of the Administrative, Executive, and Clerical classes, 
will not even be negotiated until next year [1970] and not come into effect until 
1971' 2'4 . 
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208 Ibid., Hunt to Armstrong, 12 February 1970. 
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These were the last months before Halls's fatal heart attack on 3 April 1970. 
Marjorie Halls was adamant about who was responsible for her husband's death. 
After some deliberation, she finally issued a writ in February 1973215 for £50,000 over 
Halls's non-transfer to an agreed position away from the very heavy workload of No. 
10 and Marcia Williams's bizarre behaviour. In fact, the job that Mrs Halls cited in 
her writ was that of `implementing the Fulton Report', something she said was agreed 
by both Wilson and Armstrong. 216 `That's completely news to me and, I would have 
said, deeply unlikely, ' says Wilding: `I would be surprised to hear that Armstrong 
would want to have Halls [in that role as] Armstrong actually thought he was 
implementing the best of Fulton'? " The Civil Service Department settled out of 
court. 21' His replacement, Sandy Isserlis, took over Halls's place in the `inner circle', 
but the 1970 election swiftly put paid to that. Hunt tried to interest David Howell in 
the battle after the Conservatives won but Howell, who was made Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Civil Service Department after his Opposition work for Edward 
Heath on Civil Service reform, was understandably more concerned with his own 
ideas. 21" As Hunt and Kellner somewhat melodramatically put it: `Armstrong and the 
CSD had seen off the one man capable of challenging their actions. '220 Certainly, the 
change of government in 1970 meant that even the modest support for single unified 
grading largely dried up, to the extent that Armstrong was able to `draw a line under 
Fulton' in 1972.221(`It was not until the 1980s, ' according to Wilding, `that the reform 
215 See NA, PRO, PREM 15/2024, `Claim against Civil Service Department by Marjorie Halls for 
premature death of her husband, Michael Halls (Principal Private Secretary to Harold Wilson), 
allegedly caused by stressful working conditions in 10 Downing Street'. 
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was carried through at those levels where it would make most difference: the middle 
management grades of assistant secretary and principal. '222) 
But Halls was getting agitated over what was, at the end of the day, an issue of 
bureaucratic management, something most people would find relatively insignificant. 
He clearly saw it differently, and wrote to Roger Dawes (a private secretary to the 
Prime Minister 1966-70) in July 1969, asking: `Are we being taken for a ride? Is this 
really a step towards a unified grading structure of the type envisaged by Fulton or is 
it a presentational step which achieves only a very limited contribution - if at all - to 
a unified grading structure? "" In one of his f vial submissions to Wilson regarding 
Fulton, Halls lamented that `Throughout the last year we have seen a slow but fairly 
determined withdrawal from a commitment to single unified grading. This is a great 
shame, particularly since it will delay the advantages for the junior staff. But I doubt 
whether you have the time at present to press further on this'. `I've every wish to 
return to it when I have more time'224 was the Prime Minister's response. Wilson 
elaborated on this in 1976, when he told the House of Commons' Expenditure 
Committee hearings on `The Civil Service' that by 1969 implementation of the Fulton 
Report `was tailing off a bit ... with so many urgent problems at that time, I was not 
able to give my mind to it sufficiently ... the sheer rush and pace of Government at 
the present time ... has prevented as much 
being done on this as I think should be'. 225 
An interesting sub-point was made by Wilding: 
When Armstrong backed the creation of the CSD, and agreed to become its first 
head as Head of the Home Civil Service, I think he believed that it would be a 
222 Richard Wilding, Civil Servant (The Memoir Club, Stanhope, 2006), pp. 53-4. 
223 NA, PRO, PREM 13/3099, Halls to Roger Dawes, 15 July 1969. 
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225 Eleventh Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1976-77, `The Civil . 
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major job, closer to the Prime Minister than it turned out to be. Part of the 
trouble in 1968-70 was that it began to become clear what later heads of the CSD 
certainly found ... 
it didn't make necessary the kind of daily or weekly meetings 
and dealings with the Prime Minister that would really shore up the importance 
of that position. I think that happened at the same time as I dare say Wilson felt 
that though he didn't have the time to do anything about it, things were falling 
behind on the Fulton front, that Armstrong was not doing all he hoped there ZZ6 
Wilding developed his point regarding the Head of the Home Civil Service's position, 
juxtaposing it with previous holders, beginning with Armstrong's immediate 
predecessor Helsby, who rarely saw the Prime Minister or the Chancellor: 
This was of course part of the reason why it was decided to have a CSD because 
the critics of the Treasury's management of the Civil Service felt that the 
management of the Civil Service always trailed home behind the rest of the field 
when it came to the Chancellor's attention. He had to cope with the balance of 
payments, the running of the economy, taxation and everything else, and there, 
way back in the distance, was the management of the Civil Service. That 
certainly was true that Helsby didn't see the Prime Minister and this was a 
slightly new problem because when Norman Brook had had the job he was 
Secretary to the Cabinet, and that, of course, meant that he was central and that 
when he wanted to bring to the attention of whoever was Prime Minister at the 
time some essential Civil Service matter, which would often usually be the 
appointment of a permanent secretary or some trouble that was going on between 
some permanent secretary and some Minister, that kind of thing, he had only to 
knock on the door and go in and talk because he was there talking about Cabinet 
Office business. I think Armstrong didn't foresee this. I'm sure that Fulton and 
226 interview with Richard Wilding, 15 August 2003. 
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0 
his Committee and Hunt didn't foresee this and it dawned on people during 
1968-70.227 
With Wilson settling on forcing through just three of the Fulton Report's 
recommendations, the majority were therefore ignored at the time. The Committee 
called for a continuous review of Civil Service functions and recruitment; 228 a greater 
emphasis on career management; 229 an expanded late entry into the Service; 230 the 
creation of accountable management units; 231 the establishment of departmental 
planning units, to be headed by a new Senior Policy Adviser; 232 and the right for all 
ministers to recruit temporary special advisers. Z" 
Perhaps the most eye-catching recommendation that was immediately rejected 
(and, in 2006, still unimplemented), the so-called `preference for relevance', "" an idea 
first recommended by Dr Benjamin Jowett of Balliol, the keen university reformer, at 
the time of Northcote-Trevelyan. 23' The Report stated that `a majority of us consider 
that the relevance to their future work of the subject-matter of their university or other 
pre-Service studies should be an important qualification for appointment'. 236 None of 
the civil service members of the Committee were among the majority. 237 It was 
another, this time lightly-veiled, attack on the classics graduates in the Administrative 
Class. 238 Douglas Allen (along with Helsby)239 was a firm believer in this 
recommendation, observing that as graduates with an eye on a private sector job 
227 Interview with Richard Wilding, 15 August 2003. 
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tailored their studies accordingly, the same could benefit the Civil Service. " 
Armstrong and Shackleton took the proposal seriously24' but it was dismissed `out of 
hand' by Wilson because it `would close to the Civil Service a very wide field of 
candidates who have started ... on their chosen university courses 
long before they 
had decided that they wanted to become civil servants'' 42 
The Fulton Report recommended that four further studies should be undertaken. 
The recommendation to reform the Whitley machinery was shelved. 2" The 
aforementioned Davies Committee on Civil Service recruitment was, in effect, one of 
the investigations. The third was the inquiry into official information, examining if 
the British bureaucratic obsession with secrecy actually needed to be relaxed at all as 
it could be hampering efficiency. This particular enquiry was a farce. Wilson had 
initially `doubted whether there would in fact be much of a demand for a review of 
the [Official Secrets] acts'. '" Indeed, the Prime Minister was apparently happy to see 
the issue `in limbo' (Halls's words). 245 The only reason he opened it was in response 
to Edward Heath who, whilst presenting the prizes at Granada's awards for journalism 
in January 1969, argued forcefully in favour of an inquiry when he said `politicians 
should make it possible for the media to improve the level of political discussion by 
reducing and eliminating the obstacles that stand in their way'. 
" In response, 
The Prime Minister said that when he had considered this matter both at the time 
of the debate and shortly afterwards, he had doubted whether there would in fact 
be much of a demand for a review of the Acts but he had been thinking further 
7`i0 Interview with Lord Croham, 29 October 2002. 
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about this. In particular, he had noted that Mr. Heath ... 
had called for a review 
of the Official Secrets Acts. The Prime Minister said that this might lead others 
to call for this ... 
2" 
The Government's review did produce a `truly feeble' White Paper, favouring ever- 
so-slightly more-open government, but nowhere near true freedom of information. 4B 
In fact, it only really pointed out that `departments are adopting a more liberal attitude 
towards the release of information than in the past'. 249 Wilson was powerfully 
supported in his lack of desire for greater openness by both Trend and Armstrong. 25° 
In such circumstances, there was no chance of anything of substance ensuing, which 
lent no credibility to Wilson's fast-disappearing reputation as a moderniser. 25' 
The final investigation recommended by Fulton dealt with the possibility of 
`hiving-off current central government responsibilities. This, like almost all of the 
Fulton proposals, was not a new idea. The late 1960s version was concerned with 
managerial efficiency. 252 As the Confederation of British Industry succinctly put it to 
the Fulton Committee, 
Accountable management is most effectively introduced when an activity is 
separately established outside any government department ... These boards or 
corporations would be wholly responsible in their own fields within the powers 
delegated to them. Although they would be outside the day-to-day control of 
7A6 Heath quoted in Peter Hennessy, `Open government, Whitehall and the press since 1945', in Hugh 
Stephenson (ed. ), Media Voices (Politico's, 2001), p. 320. 
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Ministers and the scrutiny of Parliament, Ministers would retain powers to give 
them direction where necessary. "' 
But there is no evidence (apart from the interest that Heath was taking in it and his 
question to this effect during the Fulton Report debate in the Commons in November 
1968254) as to why suddenly, in 1969, Wilson became fascinated by this, going as far 
as pointing out to his Principal Private Secretary that `I should like to feel that a very 
high priority is being given to the review'. "' 
The investigation was handled by the Civil Service Department and resulted in 
two large reports prior to Labour's Election defeat in June 1970. While it was felt that 
some bodies could be hived-off and others could not, yet all were ripe for reform, the 
actual results were thin on the ground. 256 (The most frivolous candidates for removal 
from the public sector were the state-owned breweries and pubs in Carlisle, Gretna 
and Cromarty, hangovers, literally, from the First World War. This was scotched as 
these were Labour-voting districts who would not take kindly to this form of 
efficiency drive. 25) Armstrong was nervous about even this turn of events. In a letter 
to his fellow permanent secretaries he alerted them to `a factor that should, I believe, 
weigh heavily with us is the possibility of implying a judgement that the Civil Service 
in the post-Fulton era, is disqualified from managing large executive operations of a 
commercial kind'. 259 Robert Neild recalls that this was almost precisely why he was so 
interested in hiving-off, as civil servants were taking responsibility for more and more 
253 Garrett, The Management of Government, p. 192; The Civil Service: Vol. 5, Cmnd. 3638, (No. 67). 
254 House of Commons, Official Report, 21 November 1968, Col. 1555. 
255 NA, PRO, PREM 13/3097, `Developments on Fulton Report: progress report; part 4', Wilson to 
Halls, 15 February 1969. 
256 NA, PRO, PREM 13/3242, Hiving-Off Steering Group, `Interim Report', around 15 August 1969. 
u' NA, PRO, PREM 13/3242, Hiving-Off Steering Group, 'Second Interim Report', 17 December 
1969. 
258 Ibid., Armstrong to all permanent secretaries, 'Hiving-Off, 15 August 1969. 
158 
roles. 259 While nothing resulted from this inquiry, it is significant as the first time that 
a government had looked at some of its activities, however small, and considered 
them for what was in effect privatisation - and under the auspices of a Labour 
Government. It is also interesting that the idea of devolving power by creating 
executive agencies came to be muddled with privatisation. 26° 
Conclusion 
The Fulton Report has gone down as one of the key moments in British 
administrative history. It is still talked about in Whitehall to this day. Does it deserve 
legendary status? Though it is undeniable that the Fulton Report is important in the 
history of the Civil Service and that it provides an intriguing story, its significance in 
explaining the development of British central government cannot be seen as pre- 
eminent. In no way was it as significant as Northcote-Trevelyan. The 
recommendations contained were not radical. Nothing in the Report's 
recommendations were new at the time. Richard Wilding was right to observe a 
quarter-of-a-century later that `an odd feature of the Fulton story was the 
disproportion between what the critics said about the civil service and the proposals 
that were put forward for improving it, between an apocalyptic diagnosis and a rather 
modest, even pedestrian, prescription for cure' . 
261 
Moreover, from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, compared to 
decades of continuous radical reform, from Margaret Thatcher's financial cuts and 
sustained disdain, through John Major's entrenchment of the Next Steps agency 
259 Interview with Professor Robert Neild, 6 May 2003. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Wilding, `The Fulton Report in retrospect', p. 394. 
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culture and first moves towards a codification of constitutional conventions, all the 
way to the Blair Governments' surrendering of interest rate setting, devolution to 
Scotland, Wales and (some of the time) Northern Ireland, the rising power and 
numbers of special advisers and the near-fusion of the Prime Minister's Office and the 
Cabinet Office, the Fulton Report is not nearly so significant as it once seemed. 
But legendary it remains. There was the head of steam which built up through 
theoretical criticism of the Balogh kind which the Civil Service appeared both 
bemused and troubled by, and the more practical critique by the Treasury in its 
concern over the quality of future recruitment. Then there was the inquiry itself which 
proved tortuous for the Committee's members and controversial due to the alleged 
influence of the Prime Minister and the Head of the Home Civil Service. Perhaps only 
Norman Hunt was subsequently proud of his involvement in the Committee's 
deliberations - certainly Lord Allen, Robert Neild and Richard Wilding all 
demonstrate varying degrees of dismissiveness. 
The unnecessary and controversial introductory assertion that mandarins were 
hopelessly amateur in an unprofessional sense rankled and demoralised the very 
people who were supposed to engineer Fulton's multiple recommendations and 
ensured that stories regarding dissatisfaction were abundant from one of the most 
private institutions in the realm. The Report's longevity was assured due to the 
Olympian stature of Sir William Armstrong locking horns with the energy and 
radicalism (in the sense of wishing to shift the status quo) of Norman Hunt, displaying 
all the zeal of somebody new to a topic and only having read the case for the 
prosecution. (The Civil Service has always undergone constant change, yet being 
accountable to Parliament and needing to care for ministers' reputations has also led 
to immense but understandable risk-averseness. ) Add to this the Prime Minister's 
Principal Private Secretary becoming ever more partisan in his opposition to the head 
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of his own profession, before his sudden death, and there is conflict, always helpful in 
deepening and perpetuating the memory of an event. From an administrative history 
point-of-view, few, if any, episodes have been more controversial. 
The Fulton Report proved to be the last of the big Civil Service investigations to 
date. Inquiries which followed were often internal and directed at a specific function 
of government. Though the machinery of government and its practitioners are central 
to understanding the state we live in, it is a curiously under-examined and often 
ignored subject. The daily press are progressively less interested as the years pass and 
few comprehensive publications appear; highly specific studies are written but often 
by experts for experts. One of the few books to capture the public imagination was 
Peter Hennessy's Whitehall. In this as in for others, the Fulton Report is treated as a 
hugely significant inquiry. Hennessy's views have, rightly, become the received 
wisdom. 
That most of the Report's recommendations were eventually implemented is 
another reason. to see it as a major event. From the Civil Service College and the Civil 
Service Department in 1968-70, to single unified grading and the late 1980s-1990s 
creation of 'hived-off' utonomous executive agencies as part of the Next Steps 
initiative, and even the eventual reform of the Official Secrets Acts, the 
implementation may have taken up to two decades, but it happened. Though none of 
the reforms were individually radical, taken together the package most certainly was 
compared to what had gone before. Fulton was never going to be the twentieth 
century's rival to Northcote-Trevelyan, but it was a landmark - and remains so. 
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Chapter 4- Strategy 
Heath's pre-election planning & 
The Reorganisation of Central Government 
1964-70 
Conservative planning in Opposition 
We have seen how the two Harolds, Macmillan and Wilson, made significant 
changes to the machinery of central government during each of their six-year stints as 
prime minister in the years 1957-63 and 1964-70 respectively. Yet the Government of 
Edward Heath which lasted just over three-and-ä-half years, from June 1970 to 
February 1974, introduced reforms which were more ambitious and strategically 
coherent than anything that had been attempted before or, indeed, since. The attempt 
to ally extensive forethought about the purposes and practices of government with 
robust determination in facing the country's challenges remains a highly 
commendable lesson to all who aspire to shape the fortunes of their country. This 
chapter will centre on the extensive research conducted by several groups which 
reported to Edward Heath in the run-up to the 1970 election and how the Civil Service 
reacted prior to the publication in October 1970 of The Reorganisation of Central 
Government White Paper which detailed the practical results of the plans. 
The Labour Party's narrow electoral victory in 1964 consigned the Conservative 
party to its first taste of opposition for thirteen years. The former Prime Minister, Sir 
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Alec Douglas-Home, intended to remain as leader for the general election expected to 
be in the near future, given Wilson's slender majority of five. Douglas-Home ordered 
soon after the defeat `the most extensive and businesslike policy review that the party 
[had] ever mounted'. ' It was headed by Edward Heath, the Party's new Shadow 
Chancellor. ' Heath had ended the 1964 Government as de facto `overlord' for 
industry, trade and regional development. He had also been the power behind the 
politically controversial but economically necessary abolition of resale price 
maintenance (Douglas-Home believed it cost them support on polling day3 though 
David Butler and Anthony King thought it `figured hardly at all'4). His promotion to 
Shadow Chancellor seemed a natural progression. 
Douglas-Home was not in a strong position. The nature of his `emergence' as 
leader had split the Party (some of the ablest younger Tories such as lain Macleod and 
Enoch Powell refused to join his Cabinet in protests) while the narrowness of the 
defeat was largely irrelevant to Conservative MPs used to repeated victory and the 
trappings of power. Discontent with his low-key leadership style began to grow and 
Douglas-Home, a truly honourable man and a hereditary landowner in the borders of 
England and Scotland to boot (and hence a man with much else in his life besides 
politics), announced his resignation on 22 July 1965 amid internal Conservative Party 
criticism. The subsequent leadership election, the first for the Tories, was essentially a 
two-horse affair between Heath and Reginald Maudling, the former Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. 
1 John Ramsden, An Appetite For Power (HarperCollins, 1998), p. 391. 
2 John Ramsden, The Winds of Change (Longman, 1996), p. 231. 
3 Lord Home in conversation with Peter Hennessy, The Quality of Cabinet Government: The 
Unknown premiership', broadcast on BBC Radio 3,25 July 1985. 
4 David Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1964 (Macmillan, 1964), p. 23. 
5 D. R. Thorpe, Alec Douglas-home (Sinclair-Stevenson, 1997), p. 322. 
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Maudling's record as partner to Macmillan and then Douglas-Home in the failed 
`dash for growth' during the years 1962-64, along with his languid style, did not 
endear him to the Party and it turned to Heath6 The contrast between the two could 
not have been greater. Heath had ended the Second World War as lieutenant-colonel 
in the artillery and was Chief Whip at the time of Suez, retaining his air of discipline 
and solidity throughout. Douglas Hurd, who ran Heath's office in opposition, later 
becoming his Political Secretary 1970-73, thought that Heath had been chosen 
`because of his reputation as a tough negotiator and his thoroughly professional 
approach to politics'. ' The Conservatives were desperate for a self-made man of 
direction and strength, as much to underline a break with the past as for a champion to 
take on Harold Wilson. Heath embodied great hope. 
Heath continued the wide-ranging policy review, but the chairmanship passed to 
Sir Edward Boyle. ' While Wilson governed as if `he had a hundred-seat majority', the 
reality was that a fast-disappearing majority meant that another election was 
imminent. ' Heath, therefore, oversaw a hasty conclusion to the policy review and all 
was complete by the time of the 1966 Election. It included some highly detailed 
analysis1° and a final report overseen by Boyle on the machinery of government; 
machinery issues were under consideration almost immediately under the initial 
chairmanship of Rab Butler until Boyle succeeded him in February 1965.11 The report 
61n the poll Heath gained 150 votes, Maudling 133 and Enoch Powell 15. 
7 Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (Little, Brown, 2003), p. 171. 
8 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (Secker and Warburg, 1989), p. 211. 
9 Patrick Gordon Walker, the Foreign Secretary, who lost his Smethwick seat in October 1964, did not 
manage to return to the Commons in the hastily arranged Leyton by-election in January 1965, thereby 
reducing Labour's majority to only three. See Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 
357-8. 
10 See Conservative Research Department (CRD) archives, Conservative Party Archives (CPA), 
Bodleian Library, Oxford University, 3/14/3. 
it CPA, CRD 3/14/2, Heath to Sir William Robson Brown, 26 February 1965; Kevin Theakston in 
Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds. ), The Meath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal (Longman, 
1996), p. 78. 
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advocated, among other things, only one central economics and finance department12 
- in direct contrast to Labour's Department of Economic Affairs - and was delivered 
to Heath in March 1966.13 The landslide Labour majority of 97 seats was not 
unexpected. As Heath had only been in the top job for eight months, his robust 
performance during the campaign meant that there was never any question of his 
being dumped as Douglas-Home had been. 14 He entered the 1966 Parliament 
determined to make sure he was not beaten again. 
Heath was remarkably consistent in his belief that he would be the winner 
second time around. Through double-digit opinion poll leads (in May 1968 the 
Conservatives were 28 per cent ahead of Labour") and Labour Party recoveries, 
Heath was convinced that he would get his chance due, as Douglas Hurd put it, to the 
logical result of the long years of preparation, and of the fact that the people of Britain 
.. were at 
bottom a sensible lot'. " This inner confidence meant that Heath spent less 
time worrying about if he was going to lead his country and more time planning for 
what he would do when he did so. 
The policy review which ended with the 1966 manifesto Action Not Words" 
was followed up by one after the election which did not question the fundamentals of 
the first but added flesh to them, 18 all in the spirit of a government-in-waiting and with 
the next election in mind. Most aspects of government were considered alongside 
12 Christopher Pollitt, Manipulating The Machine (Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 83. 
13 CPA, CRD 3/14/3, `Policy Group on Machinery of Government: Report on the Cabinet System', 
March 1966; National Archives (NA), Public Record Office (PRO), PREM 15/402, `Review of 
departmental responsibilities: reorganisation of central government', Douglas Hurd to Michael 
Wolff, `Reorganisation of Central Government', 14 October 1970. 
14 John Campbell, Edward Heath (Jonathan Cape, 1993), p. 212. 
is pimlott, Harold Wilson, p. 503. 
16 Douglas Hurd, An End to Promises (Collins, 1979), p. 25. 
17 lain Dale (ed. ), Conservative Party Manifestos 1900-1997 (Politico's, 2000), pp. 161-73; John 
Ramsden in The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 24. 
18 Campbell, Edward Heath, pp. 212-213. 
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machinery of government though, interestingly, the changes brought about by the 
Labour Governments after 1964 were ignored. " 
Heath had seen the way Whitehall worked from the inside, in a way akin to 
Wilson. For all their undoubted personal animosity and difference of style, Heath and 
Wilson offered similar histories and analyses of those experiences. Heath had been a 
Cabinet Minister for five years in 1959-64 (Wilson for four during 1947-51) and also 
saw government from the inside when he came joint-top in the post-war 
reconstruction Civil Service exams in 1946, spending a brief time in the Ministry of 
Civil Aviation as an assistant principal20 (Wilson spent the war inside the Cabinet 
Secretariat and the Board of Trade and thus both men tasted an invaluable flavour of 
how the Civil Service operated, though Wilson had naturally had a much more central 
experience). Heath later half-joked that if he had been given a Treasury posting he 
might well have stayed inside Whitehall21 - and would have been a permanent 
secretary during the years 1970-74.22 In fact, he left after two years upon being 
adopted as prospective parliamentary candidate for Bexley, disillusioned by the pace 
and atmosphere of his department. 
Heath came of age in the 1930s and 1940s. The mass unemployment (which did 
not leave his family untouched), 2' travelling through Germany just as it turned out the 
lights over much of Europe for the second time in a quarter of a century and his 
aforementioned successful army career in Germany at the end of the War gave him 
deeply-held principles. They also provided him with twin pillars for his future 
Premiership - to finally anchor the UK to an integrating Europe and to put Britain on 
19 Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine, p. 88. 
20 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 281. 
21 Ibid., p. 210. 
22 Peter Hennessy, Cabinet (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), p. 74. 
23 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life (Hodder and Stoughton, 1998), p. 120. 
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a much firmer and coherent economic path (the two were mutually reinforcing). This 
outlook was further cemented by his extensive exposure, at a relatively young age, to 
the two Conservative greats of the century (as Heath saw them), Winston Churchill 
and Harold Macmillan. Due to Heath's life-long bachelorhood and Kentish base he 
was always available for late nights and weekend socialising at Chartwell and Birch 
Grove, Churchill and Macmillan's respective country seats. Churchill's patronage of 
the young Heath meant that he witnessed the gravitas of the great man's leadership 
qualities (though very much on the wane compared to his war years). 26 But the real 
impression was made by Macmillan. 
In many late night whisky sessions, the Macmillan view of politics and the 
world, with its air of perspective and detachment, almost Whiggish in its robust 
centrism, was expounded to his Chief Whip and later Labour Minister. Heath found 
he shared Macmillan's `One Nation' beliefs' especially once he had moved away 
from the whips' office to the Ministry of Labour as Macmillan's interest in planning 
developed and grew. 28 But he believed that an injection of efficiency and dynamism 
into the country was necessary in order to sustain these values. 29 
What Heath wanted was a mixed economy with government doing all it could to 
provide economic success alongside social fairness - which he passionately believed 
to be absolutely right - vigorously pursued to a successful end. Heath's critique of the 
years 1951-64 was that insufficient energy and strength had been shown. `Harold 
Macmillan had taken things far too easily so he was wanting to be up and at them, ' as 
24 Ramsden, An Appetite For Power, p. 387; Hurd, An End to Promises, p. 86. 
u Hurd, An End to Promises, p. 84. 
26 Heath, The Course of My Life, pp. 100,188-9,197-8,641. 
27 Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 203. 
28 John Rarnsden in The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 41. 
29 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister (Penguin, 2000), pp. 334-5. 
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Douglas Hurd described Heath's view, `he was out for the slaying of dragons'. 30 
Heath was, in Martin Burch's words, `a classic exponent of the alternative 
governmental approach to opposition leadership'. 31 
To this end, and with his experience of the permanent and temporary sides of 
British government, he became deeply interested in the machinery of government. 
`This was a subject, ' Heath wrote in his memoirs, `that engrossed me to some 
people's surprise, because I was concerned that Ministers spent too much time on 
day-to-day matters, instead of on strategic thinking. '32 Heath's thinking ahead 
coincided with the Fulton Committee, an investigation the Conservative leader was 
careful not to endorse (although several ex-Ministers gave evidence and Heath 
himself had an informal meeting with Fulton in which he praised highly the overall 
calibre of civil servants, in particular his Brussels team during the first application to 
join the Common Market during 1961-63, but criticised some of the structures of 
government most especially the Cabinet system). 33 
Immediately following defeat in the 1966 election, Heath wrote to Ernest 
Marples, Conservative MP for Wallasey 1945-February 1974, a successful example of 
the businessman-in-politics" who was also crucial to Macmillan's early 1950s 
housing drive. 35 Heath wanted to know if Marples was interested in heading research 
into the machinery of government, specifically regarding enhanced efficiency through 
the reduction in the size and scope of the state. ' Marples readily replied agreeing to 
30 Douglas Hurd in conversation with Michael Cockerell and quoted in ibid., p. 338. 
31 M. Burch, `Approaches to Leadership in Opposition: Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher', in Z 
Layton-Henry (ed. ), Conservative Party Politics (Macmillan, 1980), p. 172. 
32 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 314. 
33 NA, PRO, BA 1/38, `Numbers 194-205', `Meeting with Mr. Edward Heath', C. C. S. (67)197,19 
June 1967; Kevin Theakston in The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 76. 
34 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 211. 
35 Alistair Home, Macmillan, 1894-1956 (Macmillan, 1988), pp. 336-7. 
36 Francis Boyd, `Mr Marples will not play by `Etonian' rules', The Guardian, 21 April 1966. 
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the task and set about recruiting a small number of high quality young Conservative 
would-be technocrats. 3' David Howell, MP for Guildford, who had worked in the 
Economic Section of the Treasury during 1959-60, Mark Schreiber, who was the 
Conservative Research Department Desk Officer for Science and Technology, and 
David Alexander, " along with a part-timer, Laurence Reed, 39 were brought on 
board. 40 The unit was announced on 22 April 1967.41 
Marples's political career had waned - he had been dropped from the Shadow 
Cabinet in 1966 - because of his profound contempt for the political world. 42 He was 
sceptical of Whitehall practices, too. He believed that figures such as Enoch Powell 
were right to lambast the extravagance and inherent inefficiency of the state but, as 
Howell put it, `their ideas and speeches were like paper arrows, crumpled and useless 
when fired against the great bureaucratic brick wall which lay across every path'. 43 
(Powell's strictures over bureaucratic profligacy and misjudgement did, undoubtedly, 
help push the Conservative leadership into a war on waste. He wrote in 1969 of `a 
hatred of bureaucracy, above all, lawless bureaucracy', and his rejection of `the 
modern assumption, which this country has been brainwashed into accepting, that the 
solution to every problem must be a government solution and that nothing can be well 
done, or perhaps done at all, unless the State has a finger in it' 44) Heath knew that 
Marples had brains but that his contempt, including that which he felt for his leader 
37 David Howell, The Edge Of Now (Macmillan, 2000), p. 307. 
38 This person's details have not proved to be traceable. 
39 MP for Bolton East, 1970-February 1974 who had studied and worked extensively in Europe. 
40 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 323. 
41 `Mr Marples spells out aims of new Research Unit', press release, Conservative Central Office, 22 
April 1967. 
42 Howell, The Edge Of Now, pp. 308-9. 
43 Ibid., p. 308. 
44 Enoch Powell's foreword to Andrew Elliot, The Guilty Madmen of Whitehall (Elliot Right Way 
Books, Kingswood, 1969), p. xii. 
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(Heath himself), was making him a liability. ' Howell said that `this was generalised 
contempt but focused on the current leader, he just felt that all the new generation of 
Conservatives were wafflers entrapped in the same web as Labour, and that he, 
Marples, was the only dynamic character who could break out of the box'. Though 
Marples remained an MP until February 1974, there was no chance of him taking 
office again as `[h]e was a pretty impossible team player! ' Corralling Marples and 
focusing his undoubted talents was wise man-management. 
The PSRU's blueprint 
Marples believed there was an answer to the seemingly intractable problem of 
inefficiency and waste and that it lay in American business methods. 47 With this in 
mind, he, Schreiber and Howell scoured the think tanks of North America (as well as 
Japan48 and Italy4), imbibing the newly developing management theories, and forged 
links with the Johnson Administration in Washington which was putting many of 
these new ideas to the test. S° Arguably, the most significant, certainly in terms of what 
was actually going on at this time within Whitehall under Labour, was the decision to 
split the US Treasury in two, creating a Bureau of the Budget and separating finance 
from management. s' This, of course, was a similar, but far from identical, approach to 
that pursued, haphazardly, with the creation of the Department of Economic Affairs, 
43 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 317. 
'' Email from Lord Howell of Guildford, 22 April 2004. 
47 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 308. 
48 CPA, CRD 3/14/7, Mark Schreiber, `Report on Japan', 6 May 1966. 
49 CPA, CRD 3/14/8, Mark Schreiber and Laurence Reed, 'Programme for visit to I. R. I. Italy', 16 
February 1968. 
50 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 327. 
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the key difference being that public spending allocation and control remained with the 
UK Treasury between 1964 and the DEA's demise in 1969. 
Splitting the Treasury, under a Conservative Government and along different 
lines, interested the Tory planners. They keenly believed that the machine over which 
ministers in successive governments presided had proved incapable of delivering the 
spending reductions which politicians kept promising. 2 According to the analysis of 
the Marples team, the Treasury was the only department with the capability for taking 
a strategic look at the whole of government, and as government grew ever bigger, 
against the professed wishes of Conservative and Labour governments alike, the 
Treasury was clearly not delivering. Heath claimed public spending rocketed from 44 
per cent of GDP in 1960 to 50 per cent in 1969.53 Planning for another cleavage was 
not the only way in which the Marples Unit, ' or Public Sector Research Unit (PSRU) 
as it became known, demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the Treasury. 55 A British- 
style bureau of the budget would mean that one department would draw up the plans 
for public expenditure, while another would find the means to fund it. But it would 
not solve the way in which the centre of British government was constantly defeated 
by the great departmental interests. The PSRU decided that the only way to stop this 
once and for all was to create a much stronger centre, something influenced by the 
sl Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 328. 
52 Ibid., p. 308. 
53 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 330. T. J. Hatton and K. Alec Chrystal claim that the precise 
figures are 39.1% taken up by government spending as a percentage of GDP in 1960 compared to 
47.5% in 1970, N. F. R. Crafts and N. W. C. Woodward (eds. ), The British Economy Since 1945 
(Clarendon, oxford, 1991), p. 56. The discrepancy clearly does not detract from Heath's overall 
point. 
54 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 323. 
55 1 am grateful to Lord Howell of Guildford for allowing me to look at his PSRU papers which are 
incomplete and unsorted. Lord Marlesford (Mark Schreiber) had the only other copies but disposed 
of them several years ago. 
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support provided for the German Chancellor at the timeS6 and also found in Canada, 
France and Italy. 57 
The British way of government traditionally relied upon a small centre, part of 
the theory that the Prime Minister is nothing more than primus inter pares. There was 
a growing belief among Marples's team that this was no longer realistic. Once a major 
project had got under way in government, especially if responsibility was shared 
between departments, it became almost impossible to halt or amend its progress, and 
there was an air of good money following bad into a bottomless pit. Many 
technological projects fell into this category, most notably those of a defence nature 
and those where the UK had overseas partners such as Concorde. 58 The PSRU came 
up with a plan for a new `analytical capability' which would look at such issues and 
offer clear guidance whether funding should be continued as before, amended or 
stopped altogether. In effect, it was an attempt to bring the American idea (or `fad' 
according to The Economist) of Planning, Progranuning and Budgeting (PPB) to 
Britain. 59 
Perhaps most significant, though far from new, was the idea to create a `central 
capability', too. (It must be understood that the `analytical capability' and the `central 
capability' went through many gestations, had several authors and were never clearly 
contained in one single blueprint. They, therefore, meant different things at different 
times. ) This had gone through several mutations amongst Heath's planners: a Public 
Sector Efficiency Unit, a Crown Consultancy Unit, a Cost-Effectiveness Department, 
56 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 344. 
57 Lewis Baston and Anthony Seldon in The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 73. 
58 David Henderson, `Two Costly British Errors', The Unimportance of Being Right, BBC Radio 3,24 
October 1977. 
59 `All do PAR', The Economist, 6 February 1971. 
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and an Office of Government Reorganisation and Efficiency. ' They felt this was 
needed in order to bolster the Prime Minister's control over government, and its 
strategy, through an injection of high-level information and guidance, traditionally 
lacking in the small centre. 
I Twice in the twentieth century there had been forms of `think tanks' answering 
directly to the Prime Minister. David Lloyd George's five-strong61 `Garden Suburb' 
led by the Oxford Professor W. G. S. Adams (so-called because it was housed in 
makeshift huts in the Downing Street garden) was the first, followed by Winston 
Churchill's `Statistical Section' of six academic economists under Professor 
Lindemann, both in wartime. 62 The PSRU made extensive studies of these. ' In its 
entirety, the plan to build a powerful Prime Minister's department was a bold 
statement of intent. There was not, however, a completely clear and unanimous 
decision even within the PSRU on what the `central capability' should do and 
engender, and this was to prove confusing after its creation. David Howell wanted a 
war on waste and inefficiency, while for Mark Schreiber the whole point was to 
sharpen the analytical side of government. 
" 
The planning did not end there. Alongside this reform of the centre were many 
ideas to refashion the wider machine. A smaller Cabinet was desired, able to take a 
much more strategic view of proceedings ('strategic' was the word of the moment, as 
`purposive' had been in 1964). This would be made possible by the creation of super- 
60 Kevin Theakston in The heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 79. 
61 It comprised five from its founding until May 1917 when a Cecil Harmsworth (Liberal MP and 
younger brother of Lord Northcliffe, proprietor of the Harmsworth newspapers) joined, went back to 
five in June 1917 when David Davies (Welsh coal-owner and philanthropist) left and fell to four 
when Waldorf Astor (Conservative MP and proprietor of The Observer) departed in July 1918. The 
other members were Philip Kerr (editor of the imperial unity journal The Round Table) and Joseph 
Davies (a Welsh commercial statistician); John Turner, Lloyd George's Secretariat (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1980), p. 2. 
67 Tessa Blackstone and William Plowden, Inside The Think Tank (Heinemann, 1988), pp. 2-4. 
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departments. This, essentially, was a far more rational and practical attempt to 
develop a more efficient and smaller Cabinet than Churchill's 1951-53 `overlords' 
experiment. 65 The move towards larger departments, it will be recalled, was already 
happening under Labour with the establishment of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, the Department of Health and Social Security, the continuing growth of 
Mintech and Crosland's late-1969 near-overlordship of what was to become the 
Department of the Environment (the planning being well advanced by the time 
Labour fell`'). 
Central to the PSRU's planning was the employment of a tough, but simple, 
managerial logic to the business of government. In a three-step approach, they asked 
what government was trying to achieve in all its myriad forms, could this be better 
done by the private sector, but if not, how could it be improved? 67 The idea of 'hiving- 
off, tate agencies was a key aspect in the PSRU's blueprint - as it had been in 
Whitehall during 1969-70 after being mentioned as a subject requiring a follow-up 
enquiry in the Fulton Report. Indeed, Heath later wrote that he was keen on hived-off 
executive agencies `following the advice of the Fulton Report'. 68 (Though it is 
interesting to note that in 1967 Heath had told Fulton at his informal discussion during 
the Fulton investigation that `[t]he Conservative Party had come to the conclusion that 
hiving-off could work where the organisation was commercial in character, but was 
doubtful elsewhere. W) As Howell wrote in 1970, Fulton `failed to take the next 
logical step and discuss the idea of taking functions right out of the public sector. But 
63 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 350. 
64 Conversation with Mark Schreiber (now Lord Marlesford), 15 November 2003. 
65 See Hennessy, The Prime Minister, pp. 189-95. 
66 Kevin Theakston in The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 90. 
67 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 313. 
68 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 315. 
69 NA, PRO, BA 1/38 -`Meeting with Mr. Edward Heath', C. C. S. (67)197,19 June 1967. 
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since they were already outside their terms of reference in dealing with machinery 
questions at all, this is perhaps understandable. '7° 
If much government activity could be farmed out to the private sector (or at the 
very least placed in autonomous agencies), the over-arching aim of less - but better - 
government could be achieved. To attain this, the PSRU wanted a team of top 
businessmen to be seconded for two years or more to launch a war on waste and inject 
business ideas and energy throughout Whitehall71 - not a new idea, of course - 
alongside a much greater use of management consultants, something relatively rare at 
the time. 72 (Heath had always been keen on consultants since he employed a group to 
audit the accounts of the Oxford Union when he had been its President in 1938-9.73) 
All this would, the PSRU felt, also demand a fundamental reform of Parliament to 
improve its scrutiny function, 74 something very similar to Norman Hunt's views of the 
Parliamentary implications of developing super-civil servants during the Fulton 
Committee's deliberations. All in all, the PSRU enterprise was human and structural 
planning on a grand scale - planning for a `quiet revolution'. 75 
The Conservative Party and its institutions were uneasy with the degree of 
Heath's interest in the technocratic side of government, especially as not everyone 
shared his belief in inevitable victory. It was widely felt that as the onus was on 
thinking like a `government-in-waiting' some of the tactical opportunities of 
opposition were being ignored, for example not being able to find a House of 
Commons bruiser like John Boyd-Carpenter a front bench job. 76 It was also felt that 
70 David Howell, A New Style Of Government (Conservative Political Centre, 1970), p. 13. 
71 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 324. 
77, Ibid., p. 324. 
73 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 62. 
74 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 331. 
75 Hurd, An End to Promises, p. 142. 
76 Ramsden, The Winds of Change, p. 251. 
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concentration on the `how' was ignoring the necessity of the `why' as regards the 
detailed policies being produced. As the Director of the Conservative Research 
Department, Brendon Sewill, privately wrote to a predecessor, David Clarke, `the 
public want to know where he [Heath] wants to go just as much as how he means to 
get there'. ' Enoch Powell thought it also due to Heath's inability to talk grand 
theory. 78 As Powell told Phillip Whitehead, Heath `believes there is an answer to all 
problems which can be worked out by proper bureaucratic means - I'm not using that 
word abusively for once - by the proper approach If all the relevant facts are 
assembled and put together by competent people, and logical analysis is made, then 
that will provide the answer. i79 Heath's critics were concerned that all this, as they 
saw it, technocratic nonsense was getting in the way of telling people what a 
Conservative government would be for. That, as Angus Maude, Shadow spokesman 
for the colonies, wrote in his controversial `Winter of Tory Discontent' in The 
Spectator in January 1966, `for the Tories simply to talk like technocrats will get them 
nowhere'. 8° Heath sacked Maude for this. The apprehension in the Conservative Party 
that this engendered, and especially inside the Conservative Research Department, 
meant that Heath created and kept the PSRU outside the usual Conservative Party 
structure. (Howell was also dissatisfied by Conservative Central Office as he 
explained in another Spectator article. 
81) 
The Conservative Research Department's consistent resistance to radicalism 
partly explained this: `So pervasive was this negative attitude that those who wanted 
77 Brendon Sewill to David Clarke and quoted in Ramsden, An Appetite For Power, p. 394. 
78 Ramsden, An Appetite For Power, p. 389. 
79 Enoch Powell quoted in Phillip Whitehead, The Writing On The Wall (Michael Joseph, 1985), p. 52. 
80 Angus Maude, `Winter of Tory Discontent', The Spectator, 14 January 1966. 
81 David Howell, `What's Wrong with Central Office', The Spectator, 13 January 1967. 
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to break out from it had to conduct a kind of covert operation'. 82 This subterfuge was 
necessary, thought David Howell, as `The reality was that we were digging very deep 
indeed into philosophical issues. We were questioning the very nature of the state 
apparatus and we were proposing to carry forward that question in a more systematic, 
ordered and analytical way than ever attempted. '83 He believed that the opposition to 
the PSRU was rooted in the belief that `the idea that the collectivist state could be 
unravelled was seen as just as unrealistic as the idea that the Soviet Empire could be 
dissolved. Neither was ever going to happen'. " The PSRU's true aims were shrouded 
under the cloak of a dry-as-dust machinery of government rejig. BS 
Discontent with the apparent failure of the economy and inefficiency within the 
state, something felt palpably across the political spectrum, 
86 was fostering the 
beginnings of an organised backlash against the previously, at least for the previous 
quarter-century's mostly unquestioned tenets of large statism. Howell claims the first 
published use of the word `privatisation' was in the A New Style of Government 
pamphlet in 1970.5' This was why the road these Conservative planners were 
beginning to travel was hidden from the more politically and electorally conscious in 
the Conservative Party, although some Tories were beginning to reject the small-scale 
corporatism (especially compared to that on the Continent) and interventionism 
88 
Enoch Powell and, to a lesser extent, Keith Joseph (shadow Trade spokesman), 
among others especially in the constituencies, felt that these issues would cost the 
82 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 315. 
83 Ibid., p. 315. 
84 Ibid., p. 310. 
85 Ibid., p. 315. 
Ibid., p. 322. 
87 Howell wrote: `Peter Drucker uses the unusually ugly word `privatisation' for this process ... 
it is 
... 
hideously clumsy. Something better must be invented', Howell, A New Style Of Government, p. 8; 
see also Patricia Sullivan, `Management Visionary Peter 
Drucker Dies', Washington Post, 12 
November 2005. 
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Party votes, both through antagonism and indifference. 89 The whole edifice of the 
`post-war consensus', discussed in chapter one, was beginning to be questioned. 
A conference was arranged in which the PSRU, most of the future 
businessmen's team, industrialists and academics joined the Shadow Cabinet and 
selected backbenchers, at Sundridge Park in Kent 9° Sessions took place between 15 
and 26 September 1969 and were a blend of presentations by the planners and guests 
on the theory of the proposed changes and talks by the future Ministers on how it was 
to be done in practice. " Charles Schultz, former Director of the Bureau of the Budget 
and later at the Brookings Institute, gave two lectures on 'Planning and Programming 
the Budget in a Political Setting'. 92 The participants' reactions were mixed with some 
shadow Ministers very sceptical93 (It also has to be said that for all of the talk and 
writing about Planning, Programming and Budgeting and a possible Bureau of the 
Budget, there is no actual evidence of a blueprint for this in the PSRU papers, at the 
Conservative Research Department's archive, nor in The National Archive, unlike the 
impressive detail of the `future legislation exercise' undertaken during the Winter of 
1969-70 and delivered to Heath on 10 March 1970. ') 
The conference was followed by a dinner for the Shadow Cabinet in November 
1969 in which `the whole approach [to machinery of government changes] was 
thrashed out'. 95 Lord Carrington, the chairman of the Shadow Cabinet sub-committee 
concerned, which included Robert Carr (spokesman on industrial relations) and Keith 
88 Ramsden, An Appetite For Power, p. 395. 
89 Rasmden, The Winds of Change, pp. 276-86. 
90 NA, PRO, PREM 15/402, Hurd to Wolff, `Reorganisation of Central Government', 14 October 1970. 
91 Public Sector Research Unit papers, `Preparation for Government: Seminar Programme', September 
1969. 
92 CpA, CRD 3/14/10, `Conservative Party "Preparation for Government" Seminar', September 1969. 
93 Kevin Theakston in The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 80. 
94 Reprinted in John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy (Longman, 1980), pp. 279-83. 
95 NA, PRO, PREM 15/402, Hurd to Wolff, `Reorganisation of Central Government', 14 October 1970. 
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Joseph as members, regarded machinery issues as `very important' 96 Carrington 
supervised action groups set up after the Sundridge conference to go into specific 
aspects of `the new style' and reported just before the 1970 Election. 97 
No-one could say the plans were half-baked. One could say, however, that the 
planning was only half-supported, if that. Reginald Maudling, Conservative 
spokesman for home affairs and deputy leader, was somewhat bemused by it all when 
attending a meeting on 2 December 1969 dealing with the same machinery issues: 
`What's all this balls we're having dinner about at the Carlton tonight ... I can't say I 
understand what it's all about'. 98 David Howell's contemporary note of the meeting 
demonstrated that Maudling was not alone in his cynicism: `the wretched Sewill piped 
up saying he didn't see what the point of it all was while in opposition - that the C. S. 
[Civil Service] was doing it all anyway etc. ' Howell was positively glowing in his 
praise for Heath's response to Sewill, `I can only say I don't agree', noting that 
Heath's address to the dinner was `Flat as usual but authoritative - obviously well 
ahead of most of his audience - an evidence of leadership over his dissident 
colleagues, I thought - very refreshing. '99 All of these ideas were contained in various 
pamphlets and letters, which Howell wrote in order to `send out some smoke signals' 
to the Civil Service, and culminated in the `Black Book' which was published just 
prior to the 1970 General Election. 10° The `Black Book' was made up of `a relatively 
unimpressive `impressionistic' "Urgent Action Dossier" °' and what also formed a 
draft PSRU submission to Heath. The latter boldly stated that `the next Conservative 
96 Public Sector Research Unit papers, `Note on Dinner with the Shadow Cabinet', 2 December 1969. 
97 NA, PRO, PREM 15/402, Hurd to Wolff, `Reorganisation of Central Government', 14 October 1970. 
98 David Howell, `Note on Dinner with the Shadow Cabinet', Public Sector Research Unit papers, 2 
December 1969. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Interview with Lord Howell of Guildford, 8 October 2003. 
` o' E-mail from Professor Rodney Lowe, 4 April 2007. 
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government must have a much better decision-making capability, which must include 
the means of implementing decisions, than any government of Britain has had 
before'. 102 
There were other teams, comprised of retired senior civil servants, working on 
machinery of government issues, which reported directly to Heath and, though aware 
of each other's existence, were kept separate from each other. 103 Heath received 
advice from Lord Plowden (former head of the Central Economic Planning Staff and 
Chairman of the committee which recommended the five-year plans of the public 
expenditure survey) and Lord Roberthall (the former Chief Economic Adviser to the 
Treasury)104 who told him that businessmen floating around Whitehall unattached to a 
specific department could only be a bad thing. " A team was chaired by the former 
Cabinet Secretary, Lord Normanbrook (who had initially turned down membership of 
Rab Butler's 1965 machinery of government committee and who died in 1967), 106 and 
another chaired by Dame Evelyn Sharp, formerly Permanent Secretary at the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government, which covered ground similar to Boyle's 1965 
review. 107 (Sharp was not the first choice, with many others considered earlier 
including Anthony Barber, Conservative Party Chairman 1967-70, and Lord Eccles, 
one of Macmillan's victims during the `Night of the Long Knives' in July 1962.108) 
102 NA, PRO, BA 17/232, 'Machinery of government review. organisation of the Prime Minister's 
Office: paper no 3'; Public Sector Research Unit papers, `Second Draft of Submission to Mr. Heath 
by Action Group I', 20 May 1970. 
103 Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine, p. 85. 
104 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, p. 8. 
105 Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 222. 
106 CPA, CRD 3/14/2, Lord Normanbrook to Heath, 8 January 1965; Kevin Theakston in The Heath 
Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 77. 
107 NA, PRO, PREM 15/402, Hurd to Wolff, 'Reorganisation of Central Government', 14 October 
1970. 
108 CPA, CRD 3/14/4, 'Machinery of Government', Michael Fraser to James Douglas. 
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Sharp told William Plowden, who had been Heath's Private Secretary at the 
Board of Trade in 1963-4 and was secretary to the Sharp Committee, that the `whole 
project originated with some remarks of hers to H. [Heath] about the need for any 
future government to handle questions of government structure better than had the 
current Labour administration'. 109 (Sharp's first contact with Heath's advisers was 
actually Mark Schreiber. ") Sharp's group contained Sir Henry Hardman, Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Defence, 1964-6; Sir Freddie Bishop, Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, 1964-5; Sir Eric Roll, Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Economic Affairs, 1964-6; and James Robertson, a former senior 
official in the MoD who had also been private secretary to the Cabinet Secretary. '' 
This powerful group eventually recommended an ambitious blueprint. The 
Prime Minister was to have his own department which would subsume the Prime 
Minister's Office, the Cabinet Office and the recently-created Civil Service 
Department in a `Prime Minister's Department'. "' There was also to be a central 
planning staff to help maintain priorities"' and a more rational demarcation of 
departments. 114 Sharp's views were influenced by Harold Macmillan's analysis of his 
years as Premier (she had got to know him well when Macmillan was at Housing in 
1951-54). 115 These groups often presented their findings, and were asked their opinion 
of other groups' work, at Heath's flat in Albany. 
1' It added up to the most significant 
109 Dr William Plowden's diary. Entry for 21 March 1971. I am grateful to Dr Plowden for providing 
me with a copy of his diary which is not available in any archive. 
Ito See CPA, CRD 3/14/4. 
111 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, p. 7. 
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113 Kevin Theakstcn in The heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 80; Blackstone and 
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114 Kevin Theakstcn, Leadership In Whitehall (Macmillan, 1999), p. 144. 
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attempt to re-fashion the central machinery of Whitehall since Lloyd George's 
administrative revolution of 1916-17.117 The detail of the plans would also make it 
more difficult for the Civil Service to obstruct or reject. "' The idea of a think tank or 
some form of central capability was also under consideration within Whitehall. Lord 
Trend later talked of `a quite remarkable coincidence of diagnosis"9 (although one 
must always be aware that Civil Service words often hide myriad meanings, as we 
shall see later). 
The concept of a central capability unit was agreed on all sides. This was made 
apparent during the `Douglas-Home Rules' discussions between the Civil Service and 
the Opposition in the last days before the General Election of June 1970.120 No 
previous record of these discussions, nor indeed of those in 1964 and 1966, have ever 
been unearthed at The National Archives. Documents relating to the 1970 discussions 
have, however, been found. These show that Schreiber had three meetings with Sir 
William Armstrong; one session with Messrs Douglas Henley (Third Secretary, 
Treasury), Peter Baldwin (Treasury Under Secretary 1968-72) and Tom Caulcott 
(Under Secretary, Machinery of Government Group, CSD, 1970-73); a meeting with 
Otto Clarke; and a meeting with Sir Burke Trend and Armstrong. 121 David Howell 
remembers attending one of the meetings, 
" while Derek Rayner of Marks and 
Spencer and Richard Meyjes of Shell, both from Heath's team of businessmen, also 
went to see Armstrong. 
123 The reason Schreiber conducted these most important 
11'7 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p. 337. 
118 James Radcliffe, The Reorganisation of British Central Government (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1991), 
p. 68. 
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conversations was that all the other major figures were politicians nursing 
constituencies in what was a snap election. 1'4 
For it appears that while the two redoubtable knights, Armstrong and Trend, 
were in favour of reforms to the centre of government, they had their own idea of 
what they should be and what they thought possible. At a conference of officials 
which took place at Sunningdale concerned with machinery of government matters, it 
was understood that `Sir W Armstrong will want to follow up [the Conservative] 
proposals with Mr Schreiber and seek to guide him gently along the lines of thinking 
which emerged at Sunningdale. Briefly, this envisaged building up a series of staffs 
inside the Cabinet Office designed to service official and Ministerial 
interdepartmental groups ... These staffs would assist Ministers to reach decisions on 
priorities as between Departments, acting on material collected during the PESC 
process and in close consultation with Departments ... In effect, these staffs would be 
providing Ministers with a central analytical capability to enable them to discharge 
the constructive task of planning priorities in the medium term - year 4 and after. ' lu 
It would also be fascinating to find out exactly what the future Conservative 
ministers had in mind. For, as we have seen, the plans of the PSRU were not 
universally embraced. Iain Macleod for one, as shadow chancellor, was naturally 
irresolute on the need to split his potential future fiefdom, as James Callaghan had 
been in 1964, though Macleod did ask Howell to brief him on his ideas for 
government just before his untimely death on 20 July, 1970, a month after the 
election. 126 
121 Interview with Lord Marlesford, 8 October 2003. 
125 NA, PRO, BA 17/208, Ian Bancroft to Gilbraith, 28 May 1970. 
126 Interview with Lord Howell of Guildford, 8 October 2003. 
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Breaking up the Treasury was not explicitly broached by anyone during the 
`Douglas-Home Rules' conversations, nor during the run-up to the publication of The 
Reorganisation of Central Government White Paper. Lord Howell has explained that 
as regards splitting the Treasury, `Our ideas, which were very fully developed in some 
areas, were not fully developed here, ' 127 due to the earlier-than-expected election. 
However, Richard East of Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds, one of the businessmen 
expected to be recruited should the Conservatives form the next government, did 
circulate less than a month before the June 1970 election amongst the Conservative 
reformers a quite detailed plan for a Programmes Department and a new Minister of 
Programmes, heavily based on the US's Bureau of the Budget experience. "' Howell 
himself, in his 1970 A New Style of Government pamphlet, did not advocate an 
immediate cleavage but something far more organic by way of bolstering the 
`expenditure "half" of the Treasury with `a better capability than exists today for 
effective budgetary analysis'. This could possibly develop into a `full-blown 
department of the Budget'. '29 When Schreiber went to see Henley, Baldwin and 
Caulcott on 1 June, 1970, the Conservative planner hinted at the idea of splitting the 
Treasury. 130 
Lord Croham, then Sir Douglas Allen and Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, 
had no knowledge at this time of the Tory planners' keenness to separate the spending 
and finance functions of his department. 
131 Armstrong and Trend still sported bruises 
from trying to make the Department of Economic Affairs experiment work and had 
no interest in seeing history repeat itself. Already the plans of the PSRU were 
127 interview with Lord Howell of Guildford, 8 October 2003. 
129 public Sector Research Unit papers, `Priority Actions to Implement Recommendations', 28 May 
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129 Howell, A New Style Of Government, p. 24. 
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beginning to founder on the rock of Civil Service pessimistic scepticism (Joe Haines, 
Wilson's Press Secretary 1969-70 and 1974-76, thought that `Their impatience and 
frustration is understandable ... They labour to create a policy and then they labour to 
dismantle it, only to be told to start building again. ' 132) 
The Civil Service are handed the plans 
After some of the worst years a peacetime administration had suffered in recent 
times, the Labour Government's morale and poll-ratings quickly recovered by the 
early months of 1970. After being 28 per cent adrift in May 1968, Labour posted its 
first lead at the end of April 1970 and five polls then gave it an average three per cent 
advantage on 14 This was largely due to Roy Jenkins's determined 
stewardship of the balance of payments after the devaluation, and Wilson called a 
general election for 18 June (he could have held on until the Spring of 1971). This 
caught Howell and the PSRU on the hop and meant that the detailed blueprint for 
change was rushed, '` another reason why the Tory reformers did not experience a 
smooth implementation of their plans. Howell, however, under Heath's patronage, 
was able to add his own technocratic phrases to the foreword of the Party's manifesto, 
131 Letter from Lord Croham, 8 October 2003. 
132 Joe Haines, The Politics Of Power (Jonathan Cape, 1977), p. 26. 
133 PimlOtt, Harold Wilson, pp. 553-4. 
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`The Analytical Capability and the Use of Businessmen', 2 December 1970. 
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A Better Tomorrow, 135 which included the sentence `There has been too much 
government: there will be less. '136 
The surprise Conservative victory gave Heath a majority of thirty seats, leaving 
him in a solid position to plan for a full term, and for the Civil Service to be able to do 
the same. The Prime Minister followed Wilson's example with Marcia Williams in 
1964 and appointed a party member and the former head of his private office in 
opposition, 137 Douglas Hurd, as his Political Secretary. Heath was very adroit in 
keeping the worlds of politics and officialdom apart in No. 10.138 We saw in chapter 2 
just how disruptive an influence Williams had been. Hurd was under no illusions that 
the tone he must set needed to be almost entirely the reverse of his predecessor, 
relatively easy for someone who knew the ways of Whitehall as a former civil 
servant, and an ex-diplomat at that, between 1952 and 1966.139 (It is noteworthy how 
many reformers of Whitehall have experienced Whitehall from the inside. ) `I 
understood only', wrote Hurd, `that I was expected to make peace where Mrs 
Williams had made war. '140 And where Williams was almost Wilson's political 
wife, 14' Hurd's relationship with Heath was more like that of a civil servant to a 
Minister. '42 
Hurd was also, as opposed to Williams's ongoing struggle, happy to work with 
and through Heath's official private secretaries. 143 This was helped immeasurably as 
135 Lain Dale (ed. ), Conservative Party Manifestos 1900-1997 (Politico's, 2000), pp. 175-98; 
Conversation with Lord Howell of Guildford, 5 November 2003; Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 341; 
Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 270. 
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137 Hurd, Memoirs, p. 170. 
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141 Haines, The Politics Of Power, p. 159. 
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Hurd and Robert Armstrong, Heath's second Principal Private Secretary, were old 
school friends. ' Hurd was later to claim that Williams's demands had established the 
job of Political Secretary as one to be taken seriously, especially as she had 
successfully commandeered an office adjacent to the Cabinet Room which Hurd 
inherited -a nice allusion to the geography of power. 
" 
Heath decided to abandon Wilson's practice of having a politically appointed 
Press Secretary in No. 10. He had thought about this deeply. ' The job was given to 
Sir Donald Maitland who became his first Chief Press Secretary. 147 Maitland had been 
Head of the Foreign Office's News Department, Principal Private Secretary to two 
Labour Foreign Secretaries and, at the time of his appointment to Downing Street, 
Ambassador to Libya. Heath and Maitland had worked together during the EEC 
application negotiations in 1961-63148 and his Foreign Office background `reflected in 
part the priority Heath intended his Government to give to Europe'. 149He served from 
1970 until 1973 when his `fixed-term three-year civil service posting' came to an 
end. uo Maitland was highly respected by officialdom and by much of the media as 
`meticulous' and `civilised. lsl He even tried unsuccessfully to have lobby briefings 
9 'SZ on the record'. Douglas Hurd later wrote that Heath 
felt that Mr Harold Wilson had made a great mistake in turning the Press Office 
into a political fief. A Prime Minister needs to be sure that his Chief Press 
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146 Ibid., p. 73. 
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Officer is loyally expounding his views, but the press also needs to feel that it is 
getting a fair statement of the Government's problems and intentions. It is very 
difficult to reconcile these two requirements. I doubt if it can be done by a 
political partisan. But there is a strong case for appointing someone from outside 
the narrow caste of Government information officers ... It is an exposed 
position, and there will always be grumbles. But he came as near as anyone 
could to reconciling the different demands of an almost impossible job. 153 
All ran smoothly until Maitland's departure. He was succeeded by Robin Haydon, 
another former Head of the News Department at the Foreign Office, who was forced 
to leave a job he loved, as High Commissioner in Malawi (1971-73), for a role in 
which `he had little natural aptitude. He was not cynical, or wily, enough to face the 
press corps successfully. ' 154 Peter Hennessy thought this judgment harsh His real 
misfortune was to have to explain the crises which engulfed the Heath Administration 
in its final phase. "' 
Somewhat surprisingly, Heath did not refashion No. 10 as a whole. All 
continued as before, even to the extent that he allowed Barbara Hosking, who had 
joined Harold Wilson's Press Office from the Labour Party's headquarters', to remain 
in Downing Street; they got on very well. 15' Being a bachelor meant that No. 10 and 
Chequers were run very differently from the way they had functioned under almost all 
prime Ministers before and since. Heath expected his top officials to work with him 
and keep him company through long hours and weekends. 
157 A flat at Chequers for his 
private Secretaries, to make weekend work less onerous was being considered when 
153 Hurd, An End to Promises, pp. 73-74. 
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he left office. '58 It was as if Churchill's wartime practices had returned (though Heath 
did not work through the small hours or conduct business from his bed in the 
morning). 
The newly-returned Conservatives found the Civil Service in thoughtful mood 
in June 1970. After the thirteen years of Conservative rule, the Service was very 
happy to welcome a new set of Ministers and new ideas in 1964. But the never-ending 
economic difficulties that Labour faced, self-induced in some instances, and the short- 
term measures which were frequently the result (piecemeal cuts alongside the 
abandonment of once heralded innovations such as the DEA and the National Plan), 
led to a degree of cynicism within official circles. Some senior civil servants were 
also disenchanted with Wilson's tactical style of government. Almost all found Heath 
admirable with, as Hurd saw it, his `Substance first, then tactics and communication' 
approach"' 
Even the Fulton Report, which senior civil servants had called for, as we have 
seen, turned into a near administrative civil war of attrition during the late Labour 
years over its partial implementation. The Fulton personnel reforms were not deemed 
to conflict with what the Conservatives had in mind. John Chilcot, in 1970 Assistant 
Secretary in the Civil Service Department, thought `that while the Fulton Report was 
concerned with the Civil Service itself, that is the resources of skilled manpower 
available to government, improvements in the structure and machinery of government 
organisation were equally necessary. The changes [Heath required] are directed to the 
structure and are complementary to the Fulton reforms'. 160 David Howell, in A New 
157 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p. 341. 
158 Ibid., p. 341. 
159 Hurd, Memoirs, p. 193. 
160 NA, PRO, PREM 15/402, Chilcot to Caulcott, `Reorganisation of Central Government - Additional 
Supplementary Notes', 15 October 1970. 
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Style of Government, agreed: `The Fulton Report, so excellent in parts, gave the 
dominant weight of its attention to personnel. Most of the energies being applied by 
the Civil Service in implementing Fulton are directed to problems of staff 
reorganisation. This pamphlet in no way contradicts that approach. It merely argues 
that neither excellent men nor efficient machinery are much good without each 
other., "' The Conservative Party reformers and the Civil Service were in complete 
agreement on this. 
The on-going Fulton reforms have already been mentioned. But the key 
contentious issue arising from the Fulton Report, whether or not to implement single 
unified grading (SUG), continued to prove problematic. On 18 November 1971, 
Robert Armstrong wrote to Brian Gilmore, Private Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal 
Lord Jellicoe (Cabinet Minister for the CSD), informing him of the doubts that the 
National Whitley Council were expressing over extending SUG beyond under- 
secretary: `The Official Side took the view that the objectives which had led the 
Fulton Committee to recommend unified grading could be met and were being met by 
other means, including a conscious attempt to reduce the number of classes and 
grades in the Civil Service and to promote mobility between them. '162 The bitter 
dispute over SUG was coming to a quiet end. The attention of the Civil Service turned 
to quelling any possible embarrassment Hunt and possibly Fulton could cause over 
the abandonment of their cherished reform 163 26 November 1971 saw the final 
`shelving' of SUG. '64 
161 Howell, A New Style Of Government, p. 5. 
162 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1341, 'Fulton report: reshaping of civil service; unified grading', Robert 
Armstrong to B. Gilmour, 18 November 1971. 
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Heath's commitment to long-term administrative planning and his pledge to put 
the country before political considerations ('a cheap and trivial style of 
government"6) caught the Civil Service's imagination. `Mr Heath's reformers were, ' 
as Peter Hennessy has rightly pointed out, `preaching to the converted'. " Contrary to 
Lord Croham's belief that the reason why machinery of government issues were not 
included in the Fulton Committee's remit was because no Prime Minister would ever 
give away authority over such an important power, '67 Heath immediately handed the 
responsibility over to William Armstrong. Heath wanted his reform of Whitehall to be 
apolitical. There was also the fact that incoming Conservative Ministers were, on the 
whole, trustful of the Civil Service (though Keith Joseph had his doubts"'), a rare 
occurrence in British post-war administrative history. 
William Waldegrave, a member of the think tank in 1971-73 and then Political 
Secretary in No. 10 in 1973-74, thought that Heath `was perhaps the last Prime 
Minister ... who truly respected the 
British administrative and academic 
establishment'. 169 The Head of the Home Civil Service was asked to plan for the 
fundamental change that Heath required. The Civil Service Department used the 
summer recess - and the lengthy absence of Conservative Ministers - to go back to 
basics regarding the fundamental organisation of government for the first and last 
time since the Haldane Committee in 1918.170 ('One of the best presents which Labour 
left behind at No. 10 for Mr Heath, ' wrote a slightly caustic Marcia Williams, `was 
165 From the Conservative 1970 manifesto `A Better Tomorrow' reproduced in F. W. S. Craig, `British 
General Election Manifestos, 1959-1987', (Dartmouth, 1990), p. 113. 
166 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 221. 
167 Lord Croham quoted in quoted in `Fallton: 20 Years On', Contemporary Record, Vol. 2, No. 2, 
Summer 1988, p. 44. 
168 Theakston in The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 81. 
169 William Waldegrave, `Three Prime Ministers', Twentieth Century British History seminar, Institute 
of Historical Research, 9 March 1994. 
170 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 220. 
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the best present any Prime Minister can be given - time. The new Prime Minister 
inherited a situation in which he could plan his tactics, consult with his friends and 
sail his yacht in the weeks immediately following the Election. '171) 
In 1986, Lord Trend (as Sir Burke had become on retirement) opined that `A 
comprehensive job on the Haldane model badly needs to be done'. 172 He had become 
an fan of Haldane in 1970 when he began to think closely about Heath's machinery of 
government reforms. 13 (Geoffrey Rippon, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
1970-72, had called for a Haldane-style inquiry in 1968.14) Indeed, 1970 has proved 
to be the closest Britain has come to a `new Haldane'. There was one crucial 
difference between 1918 and 1970, however. The investigation that took place at the 
end of the First World War was peopled by a broad swathe of some of the forest 
thinkers from many of the professions central to the conduct of the Great War 
(including politicians and trade unionists). 175 In 1970, only senior members of the 
Civil Service took part. After the disjointed changes to the central machinery during 
the Wilson years - something Heath thought gimmicky176 - the Civil Service was 
raring to have a chance to produce a much more coherent series of improvements, 
reforms which this time would take hold and last a generation as opposed to a few 
years. 
171 Marcia Williams, Inside No. 10 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp. 18-19. 
172 Lord Trend, `Machinery under pressure, ' Times Literary Supplement, 26 September 1986, p. 1076. 
173 Lord Trend in conversation with Peter Hennessy, 1 October 1986, and quoted in Hennessy, 
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175 Along with Haldane, the Committee members were: Beatrice Webb; Sir Robert Morant, former 
Permanent Secretary at the Board of Education; the Labour MP Jimmy Thomas; Colonel Sir Alan 
Dykes, a Conservative MP; Edwin Montagu for the Liberals (he left quickly after being appointed 
Secretary of State for India); Sir George Murray, Permanent Secretary to the Post Office; Sir Claud 
Schuster, Permanent Secretary to the Lord Chancellor's Department; and Michael Heseltine, the 
Committee secretary. 
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On 19 June, just days after the new government had taken office, Colin 
Gilbraith, Sir William Armstrong's Private Secretary, sent the Prime Minister's 
Principal Private Secretary, Alexander `Sandy' Isserlis, 178 a minute on the 
`background philosophy on the organisation of the Executive'. 179 Isserlis did not last 
long at Number Ten being identified, like Halls before him, as personally close to 
Harold Wilson. This alone would not have endeared him to Heath, but his fate was 
sealed when, on the first night of the Conservative Administration, Isserlis only 
reluctantly produced beer and pork pies"' for Heath and William Whitelaw, shouting 
`Grub's up! ' to his new Prime Minister. "' Whitelaw, especially, was `shocked': 
`Much, he felt, had gone amiss with the standards of public life since Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home had left office six years earlier. ' 182 
Upon Isserlis's departure, Harold Wilson launched a short-lived press campaign 
on Heath's victimisation of Wilson-appointed officials and thus his politicisation of 
the Civil Service-183 Like all British Civil Service postings, none traditionally change 
with a new government and Isserlis, according to The Times, was apparently `given 
no reason to believe that he would not have the customary three-year term'. 
'" The 
next day The Times carried a full-blooded rebuttal of the story: 
At the level of private secretary it is said to be fully accepted that when there is a 
change of Government, Ministers -because of the personal relationship involved 
178 Isserlis had taken over the job on 23 April 1970 after Michael Halls's death a month earlier. 
179 NA, PRO, PREM 15/70, 'Review of departmental responsibilities including defence, technology, 
construction, trade, environment, social services (Seebohm), industry, posts, Wales and number and 
designation of ministers', Colin Gilbraith to Sandy Isserlis, 'Machinery of Government 1970', 19 
June 1970. 
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- are free either to keep or change the men whom they `inherit' from the 
previous Administration ... in Government quarters yesterday it was stated 
categorically that when Sir William Armstrong ... saw Mr. Isserlis before the 
appointment it was made clear that it was not certain that his appointment would 
outlast the Parliament if there was a change of Government ... 
185 
The article came complete with a statement from Isserlis, fully supporting his removal 
and expressing `satisfaction at the choice of an excellent successor'. 186 Robert 
Armstrong was Isserlis's replacement, much to the satisfaction of Heath who 
described him as `an unfailing source of good advice'. 187 Armstrong had been selected 
by Burke Trend and William Armstrong due to his being the conductor of the 
Treasury singers, something they rightly believed would help the new Principal 
Private Secretary to forge a close relationship with the introverted yet music-loving 
Heath. 18. Indeed, Robert Armstrong's father, Sir Thomas Armstrong, had been 
Heath's musical mentor at Oxford. 189 
In the lengthy memorandum given to Isserlis, which demonstrated that it had 
been underway before Heath's victory at the polls, Gilbraith'9o pointed out that there 
would be another clear distinction between the two reviews, in what amounted to a 
formal response to the PSRU: 
185 George Clark, `Civil Sei-Ace purge is denied', The Times, 11 July 1970. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 311. 
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It does not start de novo, as Haldane did, by laying down broad principles from 
which particular conclusions could be drawn: useful though this approach might 
be if there were a thorough-going enquiry into the machinery of government. 
Instead it seeks to offer a pragmatic basis from which to assess particular 
proposals for changes in the machinery of government. 
To this end, and in the same vein as the Fulton Committee, `Ministerial accountability 
should be preserved; policy must remain the prerogative of Ministers. ' 191 Haldane 
would have been very disappointed with this as the starting block. 
There was, however, a keenness to go as deep as the project allowed. For 
example, Gilbraith went on to explain that `the central truth about the basis of the 
machinery of government [is] that it expresses the distribution of political authority in 
the state, both within the central government, and between central government and 
other public authorities' 192 and that `politics is people, and so is the machinery of 
government. ' 193 
The CSD's administrative theorising went further. Taking on board the ideas 
put forward by the Tory planners for 'hiving-off, along with the CSD's somewhat 
half-hearted reviews into this possibility under Labour during 1969-70 (as detailed in 
Chapter 3), Gilbraith explained how the CSD was taking it rather more seriously this 
time, treating it as a potential step-change in contrast to the thinking during the last 
phase of the Wilson Government. He described hiving-off, or how `the over- 
concentration of power within the Executive might be remedied', as a process towards 
191 NA, PRO, PREM 15/70, Gilbraith to Isserlis, `Machinery of Government 1970 - The Cabinet', 19 
June 1970. 
192 Ibid., `Machinery of Government 1970 - Organisation of Government Functions', 19 June 1970. 
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`non-Ministerial boards and agencies. The practice is an old one and is one that has 
undergone marked fluctuations over the period since 1832. '194 
The concept of hiving-off across the board clearly exercised the CSD. Gilbraith 
expounded its thinking by telling No. 10-`There is no easy solution to the problems of 
government through hiving-off. If it can help, it is likely to be in limited fields of 
commercial activity and often here with a retention of some ministerial responsibility 
and therefore control. ' 115 He then went on to explain the difficulties the CSD saw in 
widespread hiving-off. There are `dangers', he wrote, `in terms of manageability, of 
finding the men to manage such departments, and of giving the staff a sense of 
identity and recognition. They can reduce the degree of central collective Ministerial 
discussion of issues, because more policy work and conflicts are intemalised. '196 Jan 
Bancroft, by now Director General of Organisation and Establishments in the newly 
created Department of the Environment, saw other difficulties including Ministerial 
status, nomenclature and pay. " It is not surprising, therefore, that the first candidate 
for hiving-off, the supplies function of the Ministry of Public Building and Works, 
was deemed inappropriate. 198 
The creation of hived-off agencies was inseparably linked with the 
establishment of super-departments - less work done better, with scope for a 
considerable reduction in Civil Service numbers. 19' This was not new, for the process 
194 NA, PRO, PREM 15/70, Gilbraith to Isserlis, `Machinery of Government 1970 - Organisation of 
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had largely begun under the previous government and was anyway very much in tune 
with the prevailing management theory which preached that big was best with 
corresponding benefits of economies of scale and internal cohesion. 200 But it was now 
being contemplated with far greater forethought and as part of a larger reform 
framework. Problems were seen here too especially, as the CSD believed, in the 
context of collective Cabinet government: 
The need for an efficient committee system cannot be reduced by the creation of 
super-Ministers or very large departments save to the extent that one is prepared 
to recognise that the indispensable processes of reconciling conflicting aims and 
co-ordinating divergent policies will merely be transferred to within the large 
departments themselves at the risk of eroding the collective responsibility 
between Ministers who are equal members of a government and accept equal 
responsibility for the sum of its policies. 
20' 
There were several targets for possible combination into super-ministries. First, the 
Board of Trade and the Ministry of Technology, which were, naturally, at the 
forefront of the drive to rejuvenate the British economy and arrest its perceived 
relative decline. Under Wilson, Mintech became a monster, eventually subsuming 
much of industry-sponsorship, too. All this was brought under one umbrella 
organisation, the Department of Trade and Industry with `a real captain of industry', 
John Davies, the former Managing Director of Shell-Mex and BP and Director- 
General of the Confederation of British Industry, brought in from outside Parliament 
200 The key works which underpinned this theory were: Alfred Chandler, Strategy and 
Structure (MI. T. Press, 1962); and Alfred Sloan, My Years With General Motors (Sidgwick 
and Jackson, 1965). My thanks to Ian Beesley for this information. 
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as its first Secretary of State. 202 It was clear where the new Department's heart was to 
lie when Sir Antony Part, from the traditionally laissez-faire Board of Trade, 203 was 
made Permanent Secretary over Otto Clarke (who, admittedly, was much nearer 
retirement age than Part) from the interventionist Mintech. 204 (Clarke's subsequent 
move to the Civil Service Department on a `special duties' basis for only a few pre- 
retirement months205 allowed the great `Ottoman Empire-builder' to dream up 
unilateral plans, akin to Baroness Sharp's prior to the Election, to split the Treasury, 
to merge the public expenditure side with the CSD and, surmised Sir Samuel 
Goldman, to install Otto as its head. 207) 
The on-going planning from the previous government ensured that the fusion of 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Ministry of Public Buildings 
and Works was made concrete with the creation of the Department of the 
Environment. The detail of the merger was, of course, handled in-house by the Civil 
Service. The man in charge of it was the head of machinery of government issues. in 
the Civil Service Department, Ian Bancroft. Mark Schreiber (later Lord Marlesford) 
thought Bancroft very helpful and keen to make this part of reform agenda a success. 
He also thought him `a wonderful, typical, typical civil servant'. Marlesford has 
recounted a meeting in which many of the issues thrown up by the merger were 
thrashed out. `Somebody said, more or less at the end, "Well, what are we going to 
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Radcliffe, The Reorganisation of British Central Government, p. 73. 
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call this new department? " and Ian Bancroft said, "Ah! Now there's something the 
Ministers can decide ! "208 
Lastly, the Conservatives' down-playing of the role of overseas aid compared to 
the emphasis Labour had placed upon it meant that the Minister of Overseas 
Development was no longer given a Cabinet seat. The department was merged into 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ' not without some difficulty over whether 
the Foreign Secretary would answer relevant questions - or would they go directly to 
the Minister for Overseas Development Administration. "' Other changes mooted by 
Armstrong and the Civil Service Department but not acted upon included establishing 
a Ministry of Construction, Social Services being given to the Home Office or the 
Children's Department of the Home Office being given to the Department of Health 
and Social Security211 and a merger between the Lord Chancellor's Department and 
the Home Office (something favoured by the ubiquitous Haldane). 212 
As we saw, the Tory planners and Heath were persuaded that a smaller, more 
strategically-minded Cabinet would be essential. 
213 The practical pursuit of a smaller 
Cabinet foundered on the experience of Sir Burke Trend. He informed Heath that the 
evolution of the Cabinet committee system necessitated a small number of senior 
208 Marlesford had a couple more choice Bancroft-isms: `For a problem he would say "I think we'll 
have to draft around that one. "' Another was provoked by Schreiber having two filing cabinets, one 
for official work and one for party documents. In the Cabinet Office, all files must be locked away 
every night and if security staff discover they are not, one is hauled up before a departmental 
manager. Schreiber had left unlocked the party political one. He was summoned by Bancroft who, 
once the facts had been established, said sardonically, `They bowled you out but it was a no-ball! ' 
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ministers in sinecure offices - such as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Lord 
President of the Council - to chair committees as honest brokers with, as Sir Burke 
put it, `no particular axe to grind'. 214 The Cabinet was reduced to 18 (from Wilson's 
21) but was back up to 21 by 1973. The Government's total number of ministers was 
cut from 88 to 71215 (the First Parliamentary Counsel told the new Prime Minister that, 
-under existing legislation, there could have been a total of 110 paid Ministerial 
offices216). Trend was not entirely comfortable with the theory of super-departments 
either. In a letter to Heath, he thought that `it would be a pity if the result were to 
disinterest other Ministers in the work of some of their colleagues; and it could be 
damaging if questions which are either important on merits or politically sensitive did 
not emerge for collective inspection until it was almost too late to affect the 
outcome'. 217 (One of the key reasons for splitting the Treasury in 1964 was that the 
Treasury was effectively handling very political dilemmas in-house, as it were, and 
not bringing the controversies to Cabinet. ) 
Another possibility for reform was the pursuit of federal departments, which 
was what the PSRU had in mind with fewer departments encompassing wider spheres 
of activity. This would be made possible by mass hiving-off, 218 super-departments 
squeezing the number of Secretaries of State and correspondingly increasing the 
significance of junior ministers by delegating to them specific areas of 
214 NA, PRO, PREM 15/402, Trend to Heath, `White Paper on the Reorganisation of Central 
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responsibility. 219 It would also make `departmental empires ... 
less clearly delineated' 
and so help to join-up Whitehall. 22° The actuality diverged from the PSRU's ideas 
when the widespread hiving-off did not take place, yet what was left was the same 
mass of functions simply merged into bigger blocks, as witnessed by the Department 
of Trade and Industry and the Department of the Environment. 
This was followed by a brief explanation on how the `functional' approach to 
government, that is big departmental silos devoted to health, education, defence, etc., 
was more practical than one which was customer-driven or based on small territories, 
as evidenced by the overwhelming reliance upon this approach in the UK and 
abroad. " Moreover, a return to Churchill's discredited overlord system was discussed 
and dismissed. m The weighty document culminated with Gilbraith quoting JS Mill's 
Representative Government: 
As a general rule, any executive function, whether superior or subordinate, 
should be the appointed duty of some given individual. It should be apparent to 
the world who did everything, and through whose fault anything was left 
undone. Responsibility is null when nobody knows who is responsible. Nor, 
even when real, can it be divided without being weakened. ' 
This proved to be the last time the Civil Service was to have anywhere near the self- 
confidence to attempt such an exercise. 
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The sidelining of the Conservative planners 
It may have been thought that after the immense legwork that organisations 
such as the PSRU and the former-permanent secretaries' groups had undertaken, their 
efforts would be considered and, maybe, that they would be consulted. This would be 
a reasonable presumption as the two main figures in the PSRU, David Howell and 
Mark Schreiber, were given posts in the new administration as Parliamentary 
Secretary in - the Civil Service Department and as `Special Adviser to the 
Government', ('a sort of gadfly' as William Armstrong described Schreiber's role), 
first based in the Treasury then the Old Admiralty Building. '4 (The PSRU ceased to 
function after the Election. ) Not a bit of it. Trend and Armstrong believed and 
behaved as if the machinery of government was their charge, and theirs alone. As 
Lord Rothschild, who was to become the `central capability's' first Director remarked 
after meeting the two knights for the first time, `Until this week I never realised the 
country was run by two men whom I'd never heard of P2" Howell saw this as almost 
sinister: 
William Armstrong and Burke Trend moved in round the Prime Minister early 
on ... 
Armstrong and Trend moved in on me - lunch at the Athenaeum on the 
second day of the government. They said these were interesting ideas and they 
had also prepared a number of papers on how Whitehall could be run more 
effectively. And, hey presto, it was all in their hands, not mine. And Ted ceased 
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to have any time to keep the momentum moving ... Momentum was lost as early 
as the first few weeks. I was a disappointed young man. 227 
The Tory reformers' work was essentially sidelined. The first permanent secretary of 
the new Department of Trade and Industry, Sir Antony Part, explained his ignorance 
of their work: `I believe that a certain amount of study had been carried out by the 
Tories in opposition, and I know that they were advised by at least one former 
Permanent Secretary. But none of the detail of that'came to our knowledge at the time 
when it was announced that the DTI was to be created. 218 It is unclear to what extent 
Heath was an accomplice to giving William Armstrong almost complete control over 
the `new style of government'. 22 But from the files deposited at Kew, it is quite plain 
that all roads led to Armstrong during the summer of 1970. They certainly did not 
lead to the Prime Minister, who spent August sailing for a week at Cowes and the rest 
at Chequers. ° Joe Haines pointedly remarked that `Edward Heath had decided not to 
do anything in his first hundred days'. 23' Heath, in an early attempt to avoid prime 
ministerial overload, thought August `the proper time for politicians to cut down on 
their work in preparation for the coming parliamentary year. 232 One of Heath's 
Ministerial colleagues went as far as to describe Armstrong as one of Plato's fabled 
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69. 
228 Quoted in Radcliffe, The Reorganisation of British Central Government, p. 129. 
229 lain Dale (ed. ), Conservative Party Manifestos 1900-1997 (Politico's, 2000), p. 183. 
230 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 321. 
231 Haines, The Politics Of Power, p. 176. 
232 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 321. 
203 
`philosopher kings'. 3 It was certainly true that one of the most powerful civil 
servants of the twentieth century was approaching the zenith of his influence. 
It seems likely that Heath asked him, after being impressed by the work of 
Howell and Schreiber et al, to plan for the practical deployment of the new style. John 
Campbell was right to write that `policies determined inflexibly in opposition ... may 
lack realism when they come to be implemented in ofhce'. 24 Taking the power away 
from the pre-election planners frustrated them enormously. Just as was joyously 
depicted in the near-documentary first episode of Yes, Minister, the special adviser 
(Schreiber) was separated from his Prime Minister almost immediately and the 
minister (Howell) was loaded with files which made his in-tray into a sky-scraper"' (I 
can still remember the late Sir Frank Cooper chuckling to himself when he admitted 
he was one of those officials overloading the naive HoweUB ). 
Howell was also given the monumental task of collating the responses to the 
Prime Minister's call in August 1970, prompted by the Lord Privy Seal, for `a review 
from first principles of all [government] functions and activities'. 237 As Lord Jellicoe 
wrote 
It was a major plank of our election platform that in our return to government we 
would reduce public expenditure and eliminate unnecessary activities ... It 
is 
therefore essential and urgent that we examine the whole range of government 
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policies and the activities that flow from them which underlie the pattern of 
public expenditure which we inherited. 
238 
Asking Departments to analyse themselves and then to suggest and deliver savings 
was, in light of Sir Humphrey Appleby's later shenanigans, naivety on a colossal 
scale. But David Howell had to continue to push it along and produce periodic 
reviews of a government activity which, it became increasingly clear, had no chance 
of fruition. He was still greatly frustrated by this some thirty-three years later. " 
Another ambitious attempt to permanently change the structure of the central 
machinery was the study in September 1970 to disperse government activity around 
the country (looked at again in the mid-1970s and also in 2003-04 by the Blair 
Government). '40 This project was ordered stepped up by the Prime Minister in 
December 1971'4' By the autumn of 1973 there had been much research done but 
little actual dispersal partly, as Robert Armstrong wrote, `because they themselves 
[civil servants] were very reluctant to be dispersed'. 242 A `comprehensive statement', 
due for December 1973, was postponed as `quite a lot of work [was] still to be 
done'. 213 
23, NA, PRO, PREM 15/78, `Review of functions and activities of government departments: 
rationalisation of government activity', Jellicoe to Heath, 27 August 1970. 
239 Interview with Lord Howell of Guildford, 8 October 2003. 
240 NA, PRO, PREM 15/777, `Location of government: dispersal of government work from London; 
Lord Privy Seal invited to lead review, interim reports of Sir Henry Hardman, Review Co- 
ordinator', Jellicoe to Heath, `The Location of Government', 23 September 1970. 
241 Ibid., Sir William Armstrong to Robert Armstrong, 'Regional Policy and Dispersal', 31 December 
1971. 
242 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1317, 'Robert Armstrong's talk with Sir Michael Swann, Chairman of Board 
of Governors, about dispersal of part of BBC', Robert Armstrong, 'Note for the Record', 16 October 
1973. 
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Immediately upon winning the June 1970 Election, the businessmen's team was 
formed and injected into the government machine. They were to `report directly to 
Ministers' but `should retain their identity as a group under the leading businessmen 
and the Civil Service Department Ministers under the Prime Minister'. The 
businessmen's team was expressly steered away from the Treasury by the Lord Privy 
Seal ('though the Treasury will have an important contribution to make'). " It was 
headed by Richard Meyjes of Shell and comprised five other seconded for terms of 
around two years on salaries pegged at two-thirds of their current private sector pay - 
their companies generously paid the rest (some may think that this was not especially 
philanthropic but wise and relatively inexpensive investment). 
The businessmen were thought by the PSRU to be a necessary addition to 
Whitehall, needed to bring fresh and thrusting business eyes to the lumbering and 
risk-averse bureaucracy. (Howell had to defend the concept, at a meeting of the forum 
of the National Staff Side of the Whitley Council, from charges of the businessmen 
being `hatchet-men'. 246) The men recruited, along with Meyjes, were A Fogg of PA 
Management Consultants, R East of Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds, KF Lane of Rio- 
Tinto Zinc Corp, HR Hutton of Hambros Bank and Derek Rayner of Marks and 
Spencer. 247 The team was in place by the lt August, 1970.248 The Management 
Projects Committee (MPC) with Heath in the Chair, Whitelaw (Lord President of the 
Council), Maurice Macmillan (Chief Secretary to the Treasury), Lord Jellicoe (Lord 
244 NA, PRO, PREM 15/79, Gilbraith to Isserlis, `Businessmen in Government', 30 November 1970. 
245 Ibid., Jellicoe to Heath, `The Analytical Capability and the Use of Businessmen', 2 December 1970. 
246 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1346, `Prime Minister's meetings with members of Staff Side: Civil Service 
National Whitley Council ', 'Note of a Meeting with Representatives of National Staff Side', 10 
July 1970. 
247 NA, PRO, PREM 15/79, Jellicoe to Heath, `Setting Up The Business Team', 29 December 1970. 
Their first names have proved elusive. 
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Privy Seal), Howell and Richard Meyjes met for the first time on 15 September 1970 
to oversee the work of the businessmen. 219 
Jellicoe told the Prime Minister that `Initially the businessmen would be 
concerned with analysing current procedures and making recommendations for 
improvements; later they may well be involved in implementation. '25° Howell was 
more specific and thought that computer utilisation, the nationalised industries, 
manpower, training, government-owned land and buildings and government 
construction were all worthy of the MPC's attention. u' 
The Civil Service was understandably suspicious of the businessmen. After all, 
was not the bringing in of these men on temporary contracts, to shed light on tasks 
and problems which officials had been struggling with all their working lives, a slur 
on their ability? (The same would be said of the Central Policy Review Staff, of 
which, more later. ) William Armstrong, however, understood the limited impact these 
men could in fact make. In a letter to Robert Armstrong, he stated that `There is no 
suggestion of the business team usurping the role of either Ministers or Departments. 
The main objective is to improve the performance of Departments by bringing extra 
expert resources to bear on certain problems which require analysis with the object of 
improving management. 9252 
The creation of `central capability' and `analytical capability', so crucial to the 
PSRU prior to the election, came to the fore around the end of September. The timing 
was due to Heath's wish to get the machinery in place as soon as possible; an October 
249 NA, PRO, CAB 134/3008. 
250 NA, PRO, PREM 15/79, Jellicoe to Heath, `The Analytical Capability and the Use of 
Businessmen', 2 December 1970. 
ul NA, PRO, PREM 15/406, "Central capability": setting up of Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) 
in Cabinet office; appointment of Lord Rothschild as head', Howell, `Management Projects 
Committee: Project Proposals', 3 September 1970. 
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finish was wanted. It was thought that the central capability would direct the work of 
the analytical capability. Thus the priority was the central capability. Whereas the 
creation of the super-departments was largely down to William Armstrong and his 
team, the question of central capability fell to Trend, who, along with Armstrong, had 
come to believe that some form of bolstering was needed for the centre to handle its 
role more effectively. But, while he did indeed want it to work effectively, he had in 
mind a different kind of central capability. As Robin Butler, early member of the 
think tank and subsequent Cabinet Secretary to three Prime Ministers, puts it, `I 
should think he did want it to work, within the limits of how he wanted it to work. 9153 
('I think Burke Trend, if he was the author of this, must have regretted it afterwards, ' 
observed Lord Hurd of WestwelL2M) 
We have seen how the PSRU envisaged a unit answering directly to the Prime 
Minister, but this was anathema to Trend, being one of the last of a powerful breed, 
the praetorian guards of the British Constitution. With so much of the Constitution 
based on convention, the man at the apex of officialdom is the highest form of 
authority as to what may and may not be done. Trend took this responsibility very 
seriously. It meant that Howell and Schreiber's wish for the Prime Minister to have 
sole control of the central capabilityu5 was simply never going to happen. It would 
mean that Trend had agreed to the Prime Minister becoming very definitely more than 
Primus inter pares. This he could not countenance. Thus the new unit would be a 
resource for the whole Cabinet. This, though, this did not stop it from acting on 
252 NA, PRO, PREM 15/79, Sir William Armstrong to Robert Armstrong, `Analysis and the Decision 
taking process - The Role of the Business Team', 15 December 1970. 
253 Interview with Lord Butler of Brockwell, 3 November 2003. 
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secretive Prime Ministerial missions on areas such as Northern Irelandu6 and Lord 
Jellicoe was later to describe its collective brief as `a gloss' - for him it was `primarily 
a device for strengthening the Prime Minister'. 257 
Trend fidgeted with what the PSRU and the Prime Minister wanted to call the 
central capability. Heath wanted it to be known simply and provocatively as the 
`Think Tank'. " This made Trend nervous. Something so clearly different, with so 
eye-catching a title could have given the unit too much independence. Independence 
from Trend and, therefore, from what he judged to be legitimate Civil Service control. 
Trend later explained that 
It became known as the Think Tank, but they weren't quite the words you could 
see on the front of a White Paper ... And then it seemed to me that if you took 
the words which we finally did adopt, they came as near as I could come to being 
accurate about it. It was central, it was concerned with policy; and it was 
concerned with reviewing policy centrally and it consisted of a staff, not a 
political unit. V' 
Trend got his way and it was christened the Central Policy Review Staff, safely 
anchored in the Cabinet Office. 
The Tory planners were losing the fight at every turn, but perhaps the biggest 
issue was who was going to head the think tank. Mark Schreiber had long planned for 
256 See chapter 5. 
257 Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine, p. 91. 
258 Edward Heath, `The First Keeling Memorial Lecture', Royal Institute of Public Administration, 7 
May 1980. 
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3's Routine Punctuated By Orgies. 
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a think tank at the centre and was also very clear as to the type of person who was 
required to head it. `The leader of the Central Capability will have to be, ' Schreiber 
wrote to Lord Jellicoe, 
1. Intensely political in his motivation - that is to say passionately keen that the 
new Government succeeds, i. e. that the party is re-elected after five years ... 
Although he will of course have to have his own views of the national good he 
must be prepared to accept the ultimate bias of the Cabinet as his arbiter. 
2. Able to think speculatively and intuitively. 
3. Able to recognise when a piece of analysis which is presented is complete and 
technically sound. 
4. Competent to decide which particular skills need to be applied for an 
interdisciplinary approach to any issue. 
5. Able to organise and enthuse staff from varying professional backgrounds 
particularly getting the best from both career civil servants and from academics 
without infringing on the political impartiality and intellectual integrity of either. 
6. Able to talk directly with Ministers and senior departmental officers without 
being patronised, feared or distrusted. 
It is clear that to fulfil these conditions, the Director of the Central Capability 
will have to be a committed Conservative. 
Schreiber went on to recommend Peter Goldman, the Conservative candidate in the 
1962 by-election at Orpington and former leading member of the Conservative 
Research Department, but also thought that either Charles Schultz or Thomas Paine, 
about to finish being Administrator of NASA and return to GEC - both US citizens - 
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`would, I believe, be a short cut to much of the experimentation'. 260 When asked about 
his wish for an overtly political appointee Schreiber (now Lord Marlesford) confessed 
that it was really a cri de coeur for the head of the think tank to be anything but a civil 
servant. " In any event, a political Director was ruled out on 4th September 1970.262 
A day earlier, the Lord Privy Seal informed the Prime Minister of the shortlist 
for the head of the Central Capability. The favoured top three were: Professor CR 
`Dick' Ross (working for the OECD in Paris, lecturer in economics at the University 
of East Anglia and former Treasury mane` ); Ralph Turvey, Joint Deputy Chairman of 
the National Board of Prices and Incomes; and Robert Marshall, Deputy Secretary of 
the Central Economic Group within Mintech (soon to be the Department of Trade and 
Industry). The next four on the list were: Professor Hugh Ford, lecturer in 
engineering, Imperial College; Professor Alan Peacock, a free-market economist from 
York University; Christopher `Kit' McMahon of the Bank of England; and Ian Fraser, 
working with the City Takeover Panel. Z64McMahon was the first to be offered the 
Directorship. He turned it down peremptorily - `it had not proved possible to 
persuade' him, Lord Jellicoe reported to Heath In the same meeting on 18th 
September, the Prime Minister, the Lord Privy Seal, Trend, William Armstrong and 
Robert Armstrong, tried to thrash it out: `The Prime Minister said that there would be 
an advantage in not moving Mr Marshall if it could be avoided ... the choice, 
therefore, lay between Professor Ford, who might not have quite enough breadth of 
experience, and Professor Ross who might not have enough cutting edge. ' 265 They 
plumped for energy over experience when, on the 29`' September, Professor Ford was 
260 NA, PRO, PREM 15/406, Schreiber to Jellicoe, 14 August 1970. 
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chosen to head the new unit with Professor Ross to be offered the post of deputy. ' 
David Howell made a late attempt to persuade the Prime Minister that the head of the 
businessmen's team, Richard Meyjes, would be the perfect candidate, owing to his 
sterling work since the Election. Heath said that this was precisely why he did not 
wish to move him at this time. 267 
Ford was invited to Downing Street on 5 October and accepted the invitation to 
become the first Director of the Central Capability Unit, in the process asking the 
Prime Minister if he could write a couple of personal letters getting him out of 
commercial commitments. This Heath agreed to do 268 And then, suddenly, a week 
later, Ford sent a handwritten letter to Heath explaining that due to these 
commitments he would not now, upon reflection, be able to take up the post. 269 This 
left precious little time for another candidate to be considered, agreed upon, consulted 
and accepted. As William Plowden, one of the first appointees to the CPRS, has 
explained, `They were in a rush because Ford had turned it down very late in the day 
and the thing needed to get off the ground. They were probably in a panic. 'n0 
Just then, one of those happy coincidences of life occurred. Victor Rothschild 
was visiting Downing Street as part of a review he was conducting into government 
research and development. R and D was part of the think tank's remit and Trend 
seized upon this overlap. 
271 Rothschild had become known to the Cabinet Secretary 
when he had been a part of the Kings Norton Committee looking at the future of the 
265 NA, PRO, PREM 15/12, Robert Armstrong, 'Note For The Record', 18 September 1970. 
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Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston in 1967-68.272 This was a 
bold move by Trend. For Rothschild was larger than life. A third Baron of the English 
branch of the great banking dynasty, he had eschewed a life in the boardroom for one 
in the laboratory which eventually led him to the ranks of the Royal Society and the 
top of Royal-Dutch Shell's research team (taking in wartime service with M15 and 
friendship with Anthony Blunt and Guy Burgess, two of the major British traitors of 
the twentieth century273). He had also joined the Labour Party some twenty years 
earlier, though his affiliation was never strong and, `by the 1960s he had shed almost 
all his Labour beliefs'. 274 It was his enforced retirement from Shell at the age of 60 
which left Rothschild with little to do and gave Trend with his opening. The Prime 
Minister jumped at the chance and Rothschild's appointment was announced on 29 
October 1970.275 
The rush for appointments, appraisals and creations was driven by the Prime 
Minister's keenness to present a white paper to the House of Commons as soon as 
possible. This fitted in with Heath's conviction that the machinery of government 
was, as Peter Hennessy describes, a `first-order' question. 276 Heath wanted the tools to 
be correct and in place before the real work of policy could begin. The 
Reorganisation of Central Government, `a monument to reason in Whitehall', 27 was 
unveiled on 15 October 1970. Heath was keen for the White Paper and the reforms 
contained within to be `presented primarily as a considered reorganisation to meet the 
requirements of good management and thus something that can be regarded as lasting, 
272 Peter Hennessy, The Secret State (Penguin, 2002), p. 74.. 
273 Kenneth Rose, Elusive Rothschild (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003), pp. 64-93. 
274 Ibid., pp. 113-5,165. 
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not merely as a political move'. m It can therefore be seen as a thoroughly Fabian 
document - perhaps the last. 
279 This made Douglas Hurd very nervous. 
As the Prime Minister's Political Secretary, Hurd was in a difficult position, 
forever trying to balance Heath's wish to govern in a statesmanlike way with the basic 
political need for re-election. In a letter to Michael Wolff, special adviser and speech 
writer (shared with William Whitelaw28), Hurd pleaded that it was `important that the 
ancestry of tomorrow's White Paper should be traced back to the work which the 
Party and in particular the Prime Minister, did on this subject in Opposition. ' Hurd 
was troubled by the news that Harold Wilson, still leader of the Labour Party, was 
going to claim `that this is all stuff which he himself had prepared in his last months 
of Office and that there is no originality about it. There is a tendency in the Civil 
Service to take a similar view. "281 Hurd pointed to Boyle's 1965 review, the PSRU, 
Lady Sharp's group, the Sundridge conference and the subsequent planning by the 
Shadow Cabinet. 282 
Even this document caused friction between the Civil Service and Howell. For 
Howell had been writing Heath's speeches on machinery of government for over five 
years and he had even provided the first drafts of the 1966 Conservative manifesto 
283 
He had been led to believe it was to be he who would write the White Paper. 2" But 
now, in government, this access to power had been disrupted. Howell's writing was to 
278 NA, PRO, PREM 15/72, Robert Armstrong to Donald Maitland, `Reorganisation of Structure of the 
Government', 28 September 1970. 
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28'4 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 345. 
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form the first draft with Trend handling `revision and editing'. 285 In fact, the task of 
blending all the manifold changes was given to John Mayne, a member of the Cabinet 
Office on secondment from the Ministry of Defence (who joined the CPRS on its 
creation). 286 
To such deeply-committed advocates as Howell, The Reorganisation of Central 
287 Government White Paper was a disappointment. What in retrospect now looks like 
a last minute addition of philosophy on top of a technocratic blueprint (akin to the 
genesis of the Modernising Government White Paper of 1999 which literally had a 
last-minute politically-written foreword foisted on it by a disappointed No. 10288), it 
opens with a sentiment the PSRU would have been proud of. `This Administration 
has pledged itself to introduce a new style of government. More is involved than 
bringing forward new policies and programmes: it means resolving the issue of the 
proper sphere of government in a free society; and improving the efficiency of the 
machinery intended to achieve the aims it sets itself within that sphere. ' The 
introduction was completed by similar thoughts: 
It [the months-long review] has been concerned not merely with departmental 
boundaries but with the central mechanism by which public policy is made and 
carried out. The results will therefore be longer lasting and will remove the need 
for continual changes for a considerable period in the future. The product of this 
review will be less government, and better government, carried out by fewer 
people. Less government, because, its activities will be related to a long-term 
strategy aimed at liberating private initiative and placing more responsibility on 
285 Howell, The Edge Of Now, p. 349. 
286 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, p. 10. 
287 Interview with Lord Howell of Guildford, 8 October 2003. 
288 Private information; Modernising Government, Cmnd. 4310 (HMSO, 1999). 
215 
the individual and less on the State. It will be better government, because the 
tasks to be done will be better defined and fewer in number, requiring fewer 
Ministers and fewer civil servants to carry them out. 
This statement of intent was undermined a few pages later. In a classic manoeuvre, 
the White Paper began to blend political wishes with customary Civil Service caution: 
There will be a sustained effort to ensure that among those functions which 
remain a necessary part of central government, executive blocks of work will be 
delegated to accountable units of management, thus lessening the load on the 
departmental top management. These are, however, major changes and will take 
some time to bring about [emphasis added]. 
The White Paper degenerated into a dry list of machinery of government changes 
bereft of the philosophy which had given birth to them. There was even space for a 
lament about the lot of the contemporary public servant: `The Civil Service itself, as it 
is given clearer objectives and more sharply defined responsibilities, will find that the 
work of public administration will again become more satisfying and that relations 
with the public it serves will improve. ' The sentence was not penned by Howell. 
Two sentences did, however, hint at what really informed the Civil Service- 
authored White Paper: `The fulfilment of these aims will improve the efficiency of 
government. This does not mean an increase in State power, nor any. sacrifice of 
humanity and compassion in public administration. ' This, in effect, is where Howell 
lost Heath to the ever consensual-seeking Civil Service. For Howell's ideas were 
unconcerned with `compassion' but radically focused on making Britain an efficient 
nation once again. Howell's time was still to come; his beliefs were to be at the very 
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centre of the neo-liberalism of the 1980s. Heath had supported, encouraged and 
listened to his young tyro. In his head, he knew he was right, but his heart contained 
too much of the `compassion' for an iron adherence to market forces. 28' 
The period from June to November 1970 witnessed one of the great showdowns 
between a still powerful `permanent government' and the temporary occupiers of the 
UK's governing echelon. Two opposing views of how the state should operate, and in 
what fields, vied for the beliefs of a tom Prime Minister. In the event, he essentially 
opted for preserving the status quo. The Reorganisation of Central Government 
changes, alongside those that came as a consequence of the Fulton Report, meant that 
some new systems had been constructed and a few new people had been recruited to 
work alongside a tough old system run by tough old professionals. The Civil Service 
did not look very different in November 1970 compared to what it had done before 
the decade-long rush of reforms. But Heath had spent six precious months putting it 
all in place. Now it was time to face the questions of policy that Heath thought 
demanded new and reformed machinery. The question was, had the changes equipped 
the Civil Service for the challenges of the 1970s? 
289 Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p. 356. 
217 
Chapter 5- Pressure 
The Heath Government & its new machinery 
1971-74 
The Central Policy Review Staff 
For Edward Heath, the publication of The Reorganisation of Central Government, 
according to his Principal Private Secretary Robert Armstrong, meant that his interest 
effectively turned away from administrative matters towards policy. 
' How the new and 
reformed machinery fared will provide the bulk of this chapter. Yet, though the White 
Paper brought an end to the somewhat frenetic machinery-work of the Summer and 
Autumn of 1970, it did not signal a complete end to Heath's interest in Whitehall. The 
dark cloud of suspicion which had hung over the Treasury increasingly since the early 
1960s became significant once again. And again, it was a Prime Minister who led the 
way, much as Macmillan and Wilson had done. 
`Heath was known to be hostile to the Treasury' thought his second Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, 
2 a man who did not want the Treasury. 3 This was 
I Lord Armstrong of Ilminster briefing the `Hidden Wiring' MA option course, Queen Mary and Westfield 
College, University of London, February 2001. 
2 Conversation with Professor John Ramsden, 28 August 2003. 
3 Edmund Dell, The Chancellors (HarperCollins, 1997), p. 375 and confirmed by Professor John Ramsden 
who said `it is entirely consistent with what 
he told me when I interviewed him - he after all saw himself 
much as the press saw 
him, as an inadequate replacement for Macleod, and as a man who would be 
regarded as Heath's stooge 
(he told me that too)', e-mail from Professor Ramsden, 7 December 2005. 
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another belief he owed in some part to Macmillan. Heath felt it had been lukewarm about 
the EEC negotiations in the early 1960s4 and that its officials were habitually gloomy 
about the prospects for the British economy. 5 `It is always the Prime Ministers who have 
not served in the Treasury who are the most suspicious of it' thought Robin Butler. 
6 
While Samuel Brittan (the country's leading Treasury-watcher of the day) thought Heath 
disliked the Treasury `in a silly, mindless way. You must realise that I'm not very 
enamoured of Heath. It's like wanting to whip the messenger that brings bad news. '? The 
Treasury had begun a rearguard action in order to defend itself against any potential 
reduction in its power within days of Heath's victory at the polls, similar to that which 
saw it retain control of public expenditure when under pressure from the DEA. 
8 The issue 
of curtailing the Treasury's reach had been brought up during the extensive planning for 
government by the Public Sector Research Unit, and by David Howell in particular. He 
did not drop his ideas once in government. On the contrary, for the first year in office, he 
kept the issue alive. His departmental boss, Lord Jellicoe, seemed to be captured by his 
permanent Secretary, Sir William Armstrong, when in December 1970 he told the Prime 
Minister that 
One suggestion in the `Black Book' was that there should be a Ministry of 
Programmes responsible for expenditure programmes. The Ministry would be 
4 John Ramsden in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds. ), The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal 
(Longman, 1996), p. 34. 
s Kevin Theakston in Seldon and Ball (eds. ), The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 84. 
6 Interview with Lord Butler of Brockwell, 3 November 2003. Though James Callaghan, a Prime Minister 
who spent three years at the Treasury, remained suspicious of it. 
7 Interview with Sir Samuel Brittan, 22 April 2004. 
$ National Archives (NA), Public Record Office (PRO), PREM 15/70, 'Review of departmental 
responsibilities including defence, technology, construction, trade, environment, social services 
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produced by splitting the Treasury into two Departments either from the start or 
within two years. Our view is that such a split is neither desirable nor practicable 
now. Some strong arguments have been put forward against it at any time. ' 
Brian Reading, the Government's politically-appointed economic adviser based in the 
Cabinet Office and an `intellectually unconventional' figure, 1° was also very-, much 
against Lord Jellicoe's thinking. He believed that the Treasury's monopoly on advice 
simply had to be broken in a manner that went beyond the 1960s attempts. 
Reading was fearful that even these modest attempts to break the Treasury's 
stranglehold were being reversed. `From the Treasury's standpoint, Neddy [at this time 
the subject of a possible review"] is a rival which has been satisfactorily disarmed and 
which they now intend should be stripped of any last pretence of influence over economic 
policy formulation ... I strongly challenge the 
Treasury's monopoly of policy 
formulation in the economic field because of - A. its disastrous record; B. its necessarily 
narrow and departmental approach. ' 
12 Robert Armstrong, formerly a Treasury man, tried 
to head Reading off: 
I am very much a believer in having properly thought out strategies, and for in-depth 
study of alternative strategies ... But I would myself stop short of your "second 
force" solution, which assumes a separate source of authoritative advice to the 
(Seebohm), industry, posts, Wales and number and designation of ministers `, `Machinery of government 
Central Departments', 19 June 1970. 
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Government advising in public, because I think that conflicting streams of public 
official advice would make it more difficult rather than easier for the Government to 
arrive at a sensible and coherent strategy. 13 
One might think that there are three `I's too many for an impartial civil servant in that 
statement, and this leads us onto another key aspect of the Heath years. Though the 
William Armstrong-Trend axis was key to understanding who was giving the final 
advice that reached Heath's ears in the Administration's first months, and Trend 
remained prominent until his retirement in 1973, the duet of Armstrong and Armstrong 
was increasingly influential. An early and powerful example of this was how Robert 
Armstrong finally put paid to pressure to split the Treasury in 1970-7 1. 
David Howell proved to be the most consistent agitator for two central economics 
departments. He later regretted that the PSRU did not have a clear strategy for splitting 
the Treasury and also carne to realise that it was wrong-headed to think that it could be 
done effectively at all. 14 What proved to be his final attempt was a letter sent to the Prime 
Minister in February 1971: 
The Treasury for many years now has had two roles - on the one hand the control of 
expenditure, on the other responsibility for economic, financial and fiscal policies, 
etc. In the kind of structure envisaged in the Prime Minister's plans for the reform in 
government decision-making, these two functions are likely to become increasingly 
divergent and distinct from each other in character. Whether this points to the 
12 NA, PRO, PREM 15/317, Brian Reading to Robert Armstrong, 29 January 1971. 
13 NA, PRO, PREM 15/84, `Papers by Brian Reading on government structure for formulation of economic 
policy, Robert Armstrong to 
Brian Reading, `The Formation of Economic Policy', 15 December 1970. 
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emergence of a separate Ministry of Programmes remains an open question. But the 
more that the expenditure side of the Treasury is developed under the influence of 
PAR [Programme Analysis and Review] into a capability for the analysis of 
departmental programmes, the more anomalous it will be to lump this part of the 
central government mechanism in with the rest of the Treasury's work. 15 
This prompted a response from Robert Armstrong to Heath which demonstrated the 
extent of Armstrong's personal involvement in policy advice: 
Sir William Armstrong sees no future in splitting the Treasury and having a 
`Ministry of Finance' and a `Ministry of Programmes'. Mr. Macleod was against it; 
so is Mr. Barber. The split, or serious discussion of it, would be thought to 
undermine the Chancellor's position. 
16 
I would add to those points that when the reform of government was 
announced last October you made a good deal of the point that, once it had been 
carried through, there should be a period of stability without future major changes. 
Dividing the Treasury would be inconsistent with that. 
The suggestion here is that, if you agree, it should be made clear to Mr. 
Howell that this is not an idea with which you propose to proceed, at any rate during 
the present Parliament. 
14 Interview with Lord Howell of Guildford, 8 October 2003. 
is NA, PRO, PREM 15/404, `Review of functions and activities of government departments: part 2', David 
Howell to Edward Heath, 12 February 1971. 
16 Sir Samuel Goldman said that neither Macleod, Barber nor Maurice Macmillan, Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury 1970-72, ever spoke to him about a potential cleavage in the Treasury, though this does not 
mean that others were not talking about it; interview with Sir Samuel Goldman, 3 November 2003. 
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Heath simply scrawled `Agreed' in the margin. 17 
It would be wrong to think that Macleod was totally against reform. In the few 
weeks of government before his death, he was drawing up a significant set of major 
public expenditure cuts. 18 He also called Howell in to listen to his ideas, suggesting that 
the PSRU's wish to see less but better government was also in Macleod's mind. 19 ('Tony 
Barber was not a strong Chancellor, Macleod would have been 20 was Lord Hurd's 
appraisal though Brittan thought `There would have been little or no change if Macleod 
had not died - he once told Douglas Allen "you do the economics and I'll do the 
politics". '21) 
Armstrong wrote to Howell two days later and, with an inescapable tone of glee, 
told him that due to the stability issue `and other reasons' a split had been ruled out 
during the present Parliament-22 `Now you know what we were up against' was Howell's 
response to being presented with this document 32 years later (he was to `give a wry 
grin' in early 2005 at the Conservative Party's plans to cut Whitehall bureaucracy by £35 
billions24). Whether Heath agreed to rule out a Treasury split on principled or on 
pragmatic grounds is unclear, but in 1977 would advocate a cleavage in ministerial 
economic responsibility. Speaking to the House of Commons' Expenditure Committee 
hearings on `The Civil Service', Heath explained that regarding `the question of what 
should be done about the Treasury, the CSD and public expenditure, my views have 
17 NA, PRO, PREM 15/405, `Review of functions and activities of government departments: part 3', Robert 
Armstrong to Edward Heath, `Review of Functions', 28 April 1971. 
1S Interview with Sir Samuel Goldman. 
19 Interview with Lord Howell of Guildford. 
20 Interview with Lord Hurd of Westwell, 27 April 2004. 
21 Interview with Sir Samuel Brittan, 22 April 2004. 
22 NA, PRO, PREM 15/405, Robert Armstrong to David Howell, 30 April 1971. 
23 Interview with Lord Howell of Guildford. 
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developed, I think, since that time [the publication of The Reorganisation of Central 
Government]. I think that today it is impossible for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to 
carry the burdens covering the whole of the field and to do so effectively ... it would be 
possible to have one Minister who was dealing with the question of expenditure ... 
[and 
another] with the question of taxation, overseas policy and so on. 
25 
Yet it would be wrong to think that Robert Armstrong was running away with his 
own ideas. He was simply embracing wholeheartedly his perceived role as gatekeeper 
and bureaucratic bodyguard to his Prime Minister, carrying out Heath's will as he 
understood it. His experiences here put him on the path to being one of the outstanding 
civil servants of the post-war period. Heath welcomed Armstrong's behaviour 
unreservedly, going as far to describe Robert Armstrong as one of the most intelligent 
and companionable officials he had ever worked with. 
26 
The question of Treasury influence in the Heath era is fascinating. While Wilson's 
1964 creation of the DEA has caught the historical imagination, the decline of the 
Treasury's authority during 1970-74 has slipped by largely unnoticed. For the Treasury 
was at its lowest level of influence during these years than at any time since 1945. The 
combination of a relatively weak Chancellor, a suspicious Prime Minister persuaded of 
the damage that uncontrolled, unsophisticated Treasury power had wrought, and an 
empowered DTI (though headed by the 
ineffective John Davies until the more dynamic 
Peter Walker left Environment and replaced him as Secretary of State in November 1972) 
2` Lord Howell of Guildford at the book launch for Sir Samuel Brittan's Against the Flow (Atlantic, 2005), 
17 January 2005. 
Eleventh Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1976-77, `The Civil Service', Vol. II, Part 11, 
p. 760. 
26 Edward Heath, The Course Of My Life (Hodder and Stoughton, 1998), p. 311. 
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led to it being sidelined. 27 Its advice was increasingly marginalised. 28 Lord Croham, then 
Sir Douglas Allen, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury in this unenviable position, 
went as far to say that `when the pound went soft [moving in May 1972 to the European 
exchange rate system and then eventually floating freely just six weeks later in June 
197229], Heath thought the Treasury was trying to pull the wool over his eyes'. 30 
The creation of the Central Policy Review Staff was part of the shift away from 
monopoly Treasury advice. Its establishment, as we have seen, was delayed over who 
was to head it. In the event, Victor Rothschild was appointed but added to the wait when 
he told a `displeased' Prime Minister that he must have three months' holiday at his 
house in Barbados. 31 This was on the advice of Rothschild's friend, John Louden, Chief 
Executive of the Royal Dutch-Shell Group, who told him that he wouldn't know how 
exhausted his job with Shell had made him until he fmished. 32 But it appears that 
Rothschild either did not want a total rest or interpreted his friend's advice very wisely. 
For he used the time between his appointment at the end of October 1970 and the official 
starting date of the CPRS on 1 February 1971 to do a milk-round of Ministers asking 
them the question `You now have a new machine; is there anything it can do for you? '33 
Rothschild's initial appreciation of the CPRS's function was based on the Executive 
Office of the (US) President and so he also used his holiday to visit Henry Kissinger, 
National Security Adviser, and Charles Schultz, former Director of the Bureau of the 
27 Dell, The Chancellors, pp. 376-7. 
28 John Campbell, Edward Heath (Jonathan Cape, 1993), p. 303. 
29 Dell, The Chancellors, pp. 389-90. 
30 Lord Croham briefing the `Hidden Wiring' MA option course, Queen Mary, University of London, 9 
February 2005. 
31 Kenneth Rose, Elusive Rothschild (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003), p. 175. 
32 Lord Rothschild, Random Variables (Collins, 1984), p. 69. 
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Budget. 34 Rothschild quickly realised how different the competing visions of what the 
CPRS should be were. 35 John Mayne, effectively the draftsman of The Reorganisation of 
Central Government White Paper, flew out to Rothschild and spent five days arguing 
over the correct interpretation of his own words (though, it will be remembered, Trend's 
thoughts) as regards the CPRS's role and functions. 36 
As we saw in Chapter 4, there were many parents involved in the creation of a 
`central capability' or think tank. Various elements in the Conservative Party and the 
Civil Service all saw a need to fill `the hole in the centre' (as Lord Hunt of Tanworth, 
Cabinet Secretary 1973-79, described it in 1983). 37 But the detail involved in building the 
new unit proved controversial. These differing perspectives continued the debate of 
September-October 1970 over who should head the unit. Howell saw it as a force to bring 
greater economic coherence, especially with reference to the long-term, to the whole 
business of government 38 For Mark Schreiber, the key was to consider government 
strategy in relation to reality - since previous governments' failure to do this `explains 
many of the mistakes only revealed by time'. He also believed that facilitating the 
reduction of government activity, on which the PSRU had been so keen, should be a 
major factor. 
39 The Prime Minister thought that the think tank should focus on the 
33 NA, PRO, PREM 15/406, "`Central capability': setting up of Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) in 
Cabinet office; appointment of Lord Rothschild as head', Sir Burke Trend to Edward Heath, 'Central 
Policy Review Staff, 25 November 1970; Rothschild, Random Variables, pp. 73-4. 
34 Rothschild, Random Variables, p. 69. 
35 Ibid., p. 69. 
36 Tessa Blackstone and William Plowden, Inside The Think Tank (Heinemann, 1988), pp. 25-6. 
37 Lord Hunt of Tanworth, 'Cabinet strategy and management', CIPFA/RIPA Conference, Eastbourne, 9 
June 1983. 
38 NA, PRO, PREM 15/406, David Howell's paper `The Central Capability' contained in Lord Jellicoe to 
Edward Heath, 'Central Capability', 28 July 1970. 
39 Ibid., Mark Schreiber to Lord Jellicoe, 14 August 1970. 
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allocation of resources4° and that his experience of Cabinet government showed there to 
be far too much short-term fire-fighting 4' 
For his part, the Cabinet Secretary was his usual `congenital snag hunting' self (to 
borrow the glorious snipe of Hugh Dalton's at the mandarinate42). Trend had already in 
August 1970 assumed responsibility for the practical construction of the CPRS, as head 
of the Cabinet Office in which it was to be housed. 43 In December 1970, Trend asked for, 
and received, authorisation `to consider in more detail how the capability should be 
organised, staffed, related to the rest of the Cabinet Office, etc' as his concerns over how 
the think tank was to emerge, remained. 44 His unease continued past the CPRS's creation. 
For example, he sought from the Prime Minister in March 1971 `a very clear ruling [on] 
... where the 
CPRS is definitely to take charge and to be able to require the departments 
concerned to provide full information and co-operation. Initially this may be a rather 
painful process, and a few tears may be shed in the course of it. Nevertheless, it is 
essential if the CPRS are to know where they are going, what their powers and duties 
are. '45 The somewhat dry official terms of reference which were presented to Cabinet on 
3 February 1971, just as the CPRS got underway, were as follows: 
1. To examine and analyse selected major policy issues referred to the C. P. R. S. by 
the Ministerial Committee on the Central Capability. 
2. To help Ministers develop a collective strategy to achieve their major objectives. 
40 NA, PRO, PREM 15/406, Peter Gregson, 'Record of a Discussion', 3 December 1970. 
41 Edward Heath, My Style Of Government (Evening Standard Publications, 1972), p. 5. 
42 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (Secker and Warburg, 1989), p. 124. 
43 NA, PRO, PREM 15/406, Sir Burke Trend to Edward Heath, `Management Projects and the Central 
Capability', 8 August 1970. 
44 NA, PRO, PREM 15/79, Sir Burke Trend to Edward Heath, `Management Projects Committee', 30 
December 1970. 
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3. To assess the compatibility of government action, proposed action or non-action 
with this strategy. 
4. To identify, and to brief the Cabinet and Ministerial Committees on, those 
selected policy issues about which decisions are necessary to achieve the 
Government's major objectives. 
5. To help to select PAR programmes and to analyse the results ' 
Added to this list was the issue of government-sponsored science. To give all science 
work at the heart of government to what was to become the CPRS was mooted by Trend 
in July 1970.47 It would have meant that the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government, 
1964-71, Sir Solly Zuckerman, an old friend and rival of Rothschild's, would have been 
subservient to him though potentially with right of direct access to the Prime Minister, as 
Heath suggested . 
48 (Kenneth Rose describes the two as pursuing `each other with 
malignant fidelity', though they proved they could work together during the deliberations 
of the Kings Norton Committee in 1968, a group of outsiders, of which Rothschild was a 
member but Zuckerman was not, being the Government's Chief Scientist. 49) The issue 
returned to the fore in February 1971 when the Prime Minister suggested it might be 
better not to merge all central scientific advice within the CPRS. S° But eventually this 
45 NA, PRO, PREM 15/406, Sir Burke Trend to Edward Heath, `Work of the CPRS', 2 March 1971. 
46 NA, PRO, CAB 129/155, CP(71) 17,3 February 1971. 
47 NA, PRO, PREM 15/269, 'Replacement of Sir Solly Zuckerman as Chief Scientific Adviser: relationship 
between post of CSA and Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS); appointment of Sir Alan Cottrell', Sir 
Burke Trend to Edward Heath, 1 July 1970. 
48 Ibid., Robert Armstrong, 'Note for the Record', 3 March 1971. 
49 Rose, Elusive Rothschild, p. 183. 
so NA, PRO, PREM 15/269, Robert Armstrong, 'Note for the Record', 10 February 1971. 
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was done in March 1971, when Sir Alan Cottrell accepted the post of Chief Scientific 
Adviser, within the think tank. sl 
Rothschild immediately acquired a stature the magnitude of which was only 
previously enjoyed by the Secretary of the Cabinet or Head of the Home Civil Service. 
`Lord Rothschild roamed like a condottiere through Whitehall, ' Douglas Hurd wrote, 
laying an ambush here, there breaching some crumbling fortress which had outlived 
its usefulness. He wrote in short sharp sentences; he made jokes; he respected 
persons occasionally but rarely policies. He had the independence of position and 
personality which was needed to make the CPRS a success from the start. 52 
Another way in which the CPRS differed from most of post-war Whitehall - certainly 
since the inter-war years which saw the entrenchment of university-to-retirement 
cloistering - was in its staffing. One of the key raisons d'etre for the CPRS was in the 
perceived need to bring in fresh talent from outside the Civil Service and to establish 
links outside the bureaucracy. The criticism that the bureaucracy had become far too 
insular had been a particular refrain of critics for many years, certainly since Balogh's 
Apotheosis of the Dilettante and the Fabians' The Administrators. The CPRS was to have 
an exciting blend of high-flying young insiders and outsiders drawn from different walks 
of academia, commerce and industry. 
53 The iconoclasm, however, did not extend to 
S' NA, PRO, PREM 15/269, Robert Armstrong, `Note for the Record - Scientific Advice at the Centre', 3 
March 1971. 
52 Douglas Hurd, An End to Promises (Collins, 1979), p. 38. 
53 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 226. 
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educational background - all of the first members of the CPRS were from Oxbridge. 54 
Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky (visiting American scholars with excellent Whitehall 
access) noted that 
The Janus-like nature of CPRS personnel reflects the desire to plug into sources of 
information both inside the system, so as not to be surprised, and outside the 
governmental apparatus, so as to be better able to take the initiative. The mixture of 
insiders and outsiders epitomises the dual need to use the existing machine and to 
contribute something novel. 55 
Rothschild was instrumental in many of the appointments, more so for those outside 
Whitehall. 56 `From the start, ' Rothschild later wrote, `it seemed to me that our job was to 
analyse problems and proposals and for that we needed excellent analytical brains: so that 
was what I tried to get. 07 
William Waldegrave, freshly back from Harvard, was one of the first given a post, 
after his father asked Lord Jellicoe, Lord Privy Seal, if he needed a `messenger-cum-tea 
boy'. 58 Waldegrave was clearly identifiable as a Conservative after being politically 
active as a student, but he had to leave this aside as he became a `proper civil servant, 
temporarily established' and was not even allowed to go to the Party Conference. The 
politically-neutral tone of the CPRS was also set by Rothschild who was by now `very 
54 NA, PRO, PREM 15/407, `Review of government strategy. CPRS; Cabinet meeting, Chequers, 8 Oct', 
undated (possibly 21 June 1971) and untitled list of CPRS members, their previous jobs and education. 
s5 Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government Of Public Money (Macmillan, 1981), p. 
307. 
56 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 227. 
57 Rothschild, Random Variables, p. 81. 
S$ Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 228. 
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apolitical'. 59 Lord Waldegrave was recruited by first meeting Rothschild and, once the 
Director was satisfied, seeing Trend (along with someone from the Cabinet Office's 
personnel office). 60 This was, according to Waldegrave, so that it could be said that the 
Secretary to the Cabinet had personal oversight of all personnel issues within his 
fiefdom. 61 But the truth was that the CPRS was beyond Trend's jurisdiction - as it had to 
be. For it to function irreverently, it had to be free of the `suffocating layer-cake of 
successive administrative generations filtering every initiative to purest innocuity', as 
Peter Jay described Civil Service grading and management. 62 For Hurd, `Because Ted 
believed in the efficacy of government, getting its organisation right, getting links with 
the private sector, getting people in who were not just civil servants by temperament but 
quite troublesome, ingenious, irritating people, getting them into government and getting 
the grit in the oyster was part of what he thought it was all about. '63 
The CPRS was in but not of the Cabinet Office. 64 Yet Trend was not a man to be 
beaten easily. He made sure that one of his chief lieutenants, John Mayne, was part of the 
CPRS from the start. 65 `There were tensions right from the beginning, ' observed Lord 
Butler, `there were those who wanted to be iconoclastic and original and those who very 
much wanted to fit us into the machine, and the particular apostle of that was John 
Mayne. '66 Rothschild was nothing if not subtle about the sinews of power and treated 
s9 Interview with Lord Waldegrave of North Hill, 29 October 2003. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 191. 
63 interview with Lord Hurd of Westwell. 
64 Heclo and Wildavsky, The Private Government Of Public Money, p. 310. 
6$ Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, p. 26. 
66 Interview with Lord Butler of Brockwell. 
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Mayne (and Professor Ross) with suspicion from the very beginning. 67 Mayne was 
widely thought to be 'Burke's Spy' in the enterprise. 68 
The. number employed in the Think Tank varied between 12 and 18 - never more 
than the physical limit that could be accommodated around Rothschild's table on a 
Monday morning for the CPRS's strategy meeting, 69 straight after Rothschild and 
Trend's regular weekly `prayer meeting'. 7° This excluded secretarial and other support 
staff. 7' Above this, so Rothschild thought, benefits would only be achieved with an 
organisation of around 200 to 300.72 Rothschild recognised the limits to remaining 
miniature: `so small an organisation made it essential to have outside consultants, so we 
built up a network of these, none of them paid'. 73 This kept the cost of the CPRS to a 
very modest £1 million a year (Rothschild's picking up much of the hospitality tab - the 
official expenses limit was just £100 - helped tremendously). 74 The Prime Minister told 
Rothschild to keep the Elm figure to himself. 75 
The Rothschild-Trend relationship, highly important, never really achieved great 
warmth Mark Schreiber, joint-author of a CPRS Report into Concorde (Rothschild was 
forever co-opting non-CPRS members to work for him through his unparalleled 
network76), believed that Trend could not accept an outsider, even one as eminent and 
personally-picked as Rothschild, as an equal. Rothschild perhaps anticipated this, for he 
67 Rose, Elusive Rothschild, pp. 177-8. 
68 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 224. 
69 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, p. 33. 
70 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 226. 
71 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, p. 26. 
72 Ibid., p. 27. 
73 Rothschild, Random Variables, p. 82. 
74 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 226. 
'S NA, PRO, PREM 15/926, `Review of government strategy by CPRS: meetings of ministers to discuss 
strategy in economic and foreign affairs; part 2', Robert Armstrong to Lord Rothschild, 2 May 1972. 
76 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 228. 
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negotiated a salary commensurate with the Prime Minister and only £1,000 less than 
Trend. 77 Such are the power-rankings of Whitehall explained - and Rothschild clearly 
understood it from the outset. Hurd remembered another minor friction: 
Once Victor got himself set up he spent a lot of time making fun of Burke Trend and 
teasing him and having quite a lot of quarrels with him. I don't say it was serious but 
Victor was a great tease, a very entertaining, witty man and Burke Trend was a 
rather solid fellow, very, very nice, very straight and not gifted with a huge sense of 
humour outside his particular area. Victor and his young men spent a lot of time 
teasing Burke. 78 
The CPRS had a `very informal atmosphere'. 79 The average age of those in the 
early Think Tank was 35,80 very young compared to other units of comparable seniority 
in the Whitehall hierarchy. It was heady stuff, thought Waldegrave, to be so young while 
addressing bureaucratic titans on equal terms, to their `astonishment and alarm' - 
something largely unheard of. 
81 For William Plowden, it was 
An extraordinary feeling to have in central Whitehall, this one of great flexibility and 
the possibility that with a sufficiently determined push one could get the machine to 
go in any of several possible directions. What worries me mainly is not having clear 
enough ideas about exactly where I'd like it to go ... 
82 
77 Rose, Elusive Rothschild, p. 175. 
78 Interview with Lord Hurd of Westwell. 
79 Interview with Lord Waldegrave of North Hill. 
so Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, p. 28. 
81 Interview with Lord Waldegrave of North Hill. 
82 The diary of Dr William Plowden. Entry for 19 April 1971. 
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Along with what Ted Heath retrospectively saw as its mission statement - `if not 
think the unthinkable, then at least to express the uncomfortable' 83 - its young, dynamic 
membership and its fabulously wealthy Director, the CPRS was undoubtedly the place to 
be. 84 Plowden thought it `The most enjoyable and exciting two years of my life. 85 But 
apart from the glitzy appearance, in its first years, it was certainly a unit with intellectual 
thrust. After the debate about how it would operate, the CPRS settled down to fulfilling 
three functions: early warning, keeper of government strategy and scrutineer of selective 
policy. 
CPRS and the early warning system 
The CPRS's early warning system (EWS) was not its most successful role. There 
were three EWS exercises, in August 1971, February 1972 and July 1972. The impetus 
for them came from two sources. Willie Whitelaw (Lord President of the Council 1970 
and from March 1972 transferred to Northern Ireland) provided a political impetus by 
saying that `he did not want to read about V& G86 in the newspapers in his bath'. 
87 
Rothschild was more precise in his wish for an EWS: 
13 Heath, The Course Of My Life, p. 315. 
84 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 228. 
85 interview with William Plowden, 10 October 2003. 
86 A senior official in the insurance division of the DTI was accused of negligence over the collapse in 1972 
of Vehicle and General, a cut-price insurance firm. See Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 504. 
67 NA, PRO, PREM 15/927, `Review of government strategy by CPRS: meetings of ministers to discuss 
strategy in economic and foreign affairs; part 3', Lord Rothschild to Edward Heath, 18 July 1972. 
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Worthwhile analysis of major issues could not be done in a short time. The CPRS 
therefore needed adequate early warning of impending major issues on which 
Ministers would be required to take collective decisions affecting the achievement of 
the Government's major objectives. Early warning of future problem areas could in 
certain cases be secured by analytical methods. But they [the CPRS] did not expect 
that such techniques could provide all the answers. It was more important that 
information about possible future problems should flow freely between departments 
and the CPRS ... 
88 
In effect, Whitelaw wanted advance notice of political pitfalls and Rothschild practical 
help on what the CPRS was to focus upon. Rothschild suggested to Permanent 
Secretaries that the information he required would be `[e]vents or developments within a 
department's responsibility which, if they occurred, could either affect the collective 
strategy of the Government or be a source of major embarrassment to the Government 
and which would require urgent collective decisions at Cabinet level. 
89 A project like 
this could have ended up being huge. Rothschild avoided this by observing that `[t]he 
object must, I think, be to achieve the maximum effect with minimum labour'. 
90 The first 
attempt at looking into the future, worked at over the summer of 1971, was disappointing. 
Responsibility fell to Robin Butler (with Plowden and Waldegrave also involved). 91 
While most departments shared information well, some did not. The Department of 
S$ NA, PRO, PREM 15/1602, `Problem areas for government: introduction of early warning system', Lord 
Rothschild to Permanent Secretaries, `Early Warning System', 27 April 1971. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ruth Cousens, `The Central Policy Review Staff Early Warning System, 1971-1972', unpublished MA 
thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2003. 
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Education and Science (with Margaret Thatcher at the helm) was uncooperative92 as was, 
much more significantly, the Treasury. 
The Treasury was very concerned, with Douglas Allen informing Rothschild in 
May 1971 that `Your proposed machinery is not suitable for certain kinds of highly 
sensitive problem which ... the Treasury may be concerned with from time to time. '93 
Allen was worried that a leaked warning over economic crisis - devaluation was again on 
the horizon - may become a self-fulfilling prophecy due to the financial markets 
overriding fixation with confidence. Rothschild was convinced that to produce an early 
warning document without any economic or financial information at all was plain silly. In 
his diary, Plowden was musing over exactly this: 
can we really stand back and let it possibly happen [devaluation] without any 
attempt to make considered decisions abt what shd be done if it does? Shd we not 
insist that this kind of failure to look realities in the face is what we're paid to 
prevent? But if we do insist, it may so incense the Tsy against our activities that 
they'll turn against us and thus threaten our existence, or certainly our 
effectiveness. 94 
The Prime Minister wrote to Rothschild on 26 July 1971 saying that he did not wish to 
see sensitive Treasury information in what was to be a paper circulated to the whole 
92 William Plowden cited in ibid. 
93 NA, PRO, CAB 184/22, `Arrangements for an "Early Warning System" designed to keep a watch on 
emerging issues that may become major topical news', Sir Douglas Allen to Lord Rothschild, 14 May 
1971. 
94 Dr William Plowden's diary. Entry for 10 May 1971. 
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Cabinet. 95 Heath mused further over `whether this memorandum should be restricted to 
use by himself and others at the centre, rather than be circulated to the Cabinet'. 96 This 
idea was not followed up and the document was distributed to his Cabinet colleagues, 
though with the Prime Minister's warning that `handling of this requires very strict 
control'. 9' 
The absence of economic information from the Treasury was not the only problem. 
How much material to include was another test. From the beginning, Plowden was 
uneasy over the EWS. In a letter to Butler, he wondered 
whether you are right so much to emphasise in this procedure the need to give 
Ministers the chance to think about problems before they become problems ... In an 
imperfect world crises will happen weekly, and one should reluctantly be prepared 
for the fact that a Cabinet may not want to spend long discussing ... a list of issues 
some of which may never happen. In this situation what is important is ... the 
thought given to it by the CPRS against the day when despite our EWS it has 
become a crisis and the Cabinet have to deal with it at 48 hours notice. 98 
The first EWS report was divided into sections covering public expenditure; foreign 
affairs and defence; prices, industrial relations; pay claims; industrial policy; the 
machinery of government; home affairs and other items. 
99 In a covering note for 
ministers to the first EWS paper, the think tank noted that `[t]he problem has, of course, 
95 NA, PRO, CAB 184/23, Robert Armstrong to Lord Rothschild, `Arrangements for an "Early Warning 
System' designed to keep a watch on emerging issues that may become topical news', 26 July 1971. 
96 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1602, CWR (? ) to Mr Norbury (Cabinet Office), 17 July 1971. 
97 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1602, comment by Edward Heath, 3 August 1971. 
98 NA, PRO, CAB 184/22, William Plowden to Robin Butler, 5 April 1971. 
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been to devise a net which will catch only fish of the right size. The CPRS does not 
expect, at this first attempt, to have got the size of the mesh exactly right. It will no doubt 
need altering in the light of experience. ' 
100 
The CPRS themselves were disappointed by their efforts: `It was agreed that the 
first early warning schedule had, in retrospect, been the least successful of the CPRS 
papers to-date and that the exercise would only serve a useful purpose if it encouraged 
Ministers to think ahead and set in hand contingency planning against possible 
developments. " 01 That contingency planning for future events had not been a key, 
practical, initial aim of the EWS was a failure. 
102 The lack of economic information, 
speculation on too many topics which may never cause a problem and little or no advice 
as to future action made the first exercise near to useless. 
The Treasury, Allen in particular, were adamant that they would not share their 
sensitive information in any future exercise, `unless there 
is an explicit instruction from 
the prime Minister and the Chancellor that business is to be conducted in future in an 
entirely different way' than the usual Treasury-Chancellor-Prime Minister one-way bad 
news systemlo3 The unimpressive 
first stab at the EWS led to renewed efforts to make it 
more valuable. In November 
1971 a deal between Butler and Peter Carey (prior to joining 
the CPRS, an Under Secretary in the Ministry of Technology and then the Department of 
Trade and Industry) with Allen of the Treasury allowed for some information to be 
provided by the Treasury on the proviso that 
future draft EWS memoranda would be 
99 NA, PRO, CAB 129/158, Cabinet Papers: 76-100 Annex A to CP(71)96, `Note by the Central Policy 
Review staff, 2 August 1971. 
100 Ibid., CP(71)96, `Note by the Central Policy Review Staff, 2 August 1971. 
lol NA, PRO, CAB 184/34, CPRS Weekly Meeting, 20 December 1971. 
toz Cousens, `The Central Policy Review Staff Early Warning System, 1971-1972'. 
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given to the Treasury for vetting before distribution. '04 The second EWS memorandum 
was more focused than the first, with no `purely speculative items'. '°5 It was approved `in 
principle' by the Cabinet in a discussion even shorter than that which greeted the first 
one. "' But it still offered no solutions. 
Rothschild demanded that for the third attempt `the CPRS must be quite clear about 
the action which it wished to result from the exercise. There might be an advantage in 
linking it more coherently with the Strategy exercise [the CPRS exercise in plotting the 
Government's course for the future, which we will come to later]'. 107 Certainly, the 
CPRS knew that the EWS had to become far more practical. As Hurd has said, `Early 
warning systems are no good if the doctrine is you don't take any action. ' 108 Progress 
reports from the departments were uncomplimentary and inside the Treasury its very 
continuance was denigrated. 109 
The third EWS paper proved to be its last. Upon completion, it was sent to Trend in 
draft form Trend was uncomfortable with its `confidential' classification, thinking 
`secret' more appropriate. The CPRS thought its circulation was too restricted already 
and that this would limit it further. At this time, Heath returned to his thought a year 
earlier, that perhaps the EWS should be just for him and selected other Ministers - 
Douglas-Home (Foreign Secretary), Barber, Whitelaw, Carrington (Defence) and Carr 
103 NA, PRO, T 342/244, 'Departmental programmes: early warning of major policy issues; Treasury 
contributions', Sir Douglas Allen to Treasury colleagues, Departmental programmes: early warning of 
major policy issues; Treasury contributions', 8 September 1971. 
104 NA, PRO, CAB 184/24, Robin Butler, Note for the record, 24 November 1971; Cousens, 'The Central 
Policy Review Staff Early Warning System, 1971-1972'. 
105 Cousens, 'The Central Policy Review Staff Early Warning System, 1971-1972'. 
106 NA, PRO, CAB 128/50/21, CP(72)21,13 April 1972. 
107 NA, PRO, CAB 184/34, points arising from the CPRS weekly meeting, 12 June 1972. 
pos interview with Lord Hurd of Westwell. 
109 Cousens, 'The Central Policy Review Staff Early Warning System, 1971-1972'. 
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(Lord President). This was agreed on the 19 July 1972.110 A restricted readership meant 
that to collate the EWS would involve officials from departments whose Ministers could 
not see it -a constitutionally unsound practice. Rothschild and the CPRS were 
`dismayed' by this turn of events. " They thought it undermined the whole point of the 
EWS which was originally constructed as a collective tool for the whole Cabinet. 
Rothschild thought that if the EWS was to be discontinued, `the bi-annual strategic 
reviews would provide continuing opportunities for looking ahead at contingencies and 
identifying major strategic issues'. 112 Heath agreed and ordered that the July 1972 
memorandum be the last. 113 
Fascinatingly, this was not the end of the story. One of the key critics in the 
unbelieving Treasury was John Hunt. By the autumn of 1973 he was Cabinet Secretary. 
On the 26 October 1973, he wrote to Schreiber, who had suggested the reactivation of the 
EWS, 
I have heard nothing to suggest any change in the balance of argument which led to 
the Prime Minister's decision to allow the early warning system to lapse in its 
original form. I am however quite clear that we here (both Secretariat and CPRS 
together) need systematically to look further ahead at regular intervals and, after any 
necessary consultation with departments, to play a more dynamic role in bringing 
issues to Ministers at the right time taking account of both political and practical 
timescales and considerations. In other words we want a document which will be 
110 NA, PRO, CAB 164/1157, `Setting up of an early warning system for Ministers', Robert Armstrong to 
Sir Burke Trend, 19 July 1972. 
111 Ibid., Lord Rothschild to Edward Heath, 24 July 1972. 
112 NA, pRO, PREM 15/1602, Robert Armstrong to Lord Rothschild, 'Early Warning System', 29 
September 1972. 
113 Ibid., Armstrong to Rothschild, 7 September 1972. 
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more a tool of management at the centre than something for the general edification 
(but non-use) of Ministers generally. 114 
The gamekeeper had turned poacher. It was agreed that `a forward look exercise' should 
take place every Parliamentary recess, but Heath felt that one was required before then, in 
January 1974.115 On 7 November, Robert Armstrong suggested to the Prime Minister that 
it would be `difficult to undertake a forward look at this moment, when the machine is 
under considerable pressure'. 116 A `forward look exercise' was, however, begun in 
December 1973 and January 1974; `The intervention of the Election, ' wrote Hunt, `meant 
that this particular exercise never reached fruition, but it was generally agreed that what 
had been done had been useful and should be repeated. ' 117 One was duly completed for 
Wilson in May 1974.118 
CPRS and the strategy sessions 
The strategy aspect of the CPRS's remit was altogether more successful - at least 
until Macmillan's `events, dear boy, events' hit Heath hard. The CPRS took the 
Conservative manifesto, looked at what departments were actually doing, assessed the 
political and economic climate in which the government was operating and prepared 
ila NA, PRO, PREM 15/1602, Sir John Hunt to Mark Schreiber, 26 October 1972. 
115 Ibid., B. M. Webster, `Meeting of Departmental Secretaries', 5 November 1973. 
116 NA, PRO, PREM 15/2014, `Appointment of John Hunt to succeed Sir Burke Trend as Cabinet 
Secretary, review of the Cabinet Committee structure', Robert Armstrong to Edward Heath, 7 November 
1973. 
117 NA, PRO, PREM 16/106, `Cabinet Secretariat 'Forward Look' exercise: business coming forward to 
Cabinet and Cabinet Committees', Sir John Hunt, `Forward Look Exercise', 3 April 1974. 
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high-level presentations for the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, smaller ones for junior 
Ministers. According to Plowden's diary, this was 
Very interesting politically, as what we're doing is in fact to reinforce the party- 
old itical content of the govt's activities, as against the creeping paralysis imposed by 
the pressures of necessity and the permanent civil service. i. e. we reinforce the Cons. 
Central Office as against the departments, something which e. g. American 
commentators have always thought badly needed doing ... 
1'9 
He returned to this question several times throughout the year: 
A lot of talk about strategy, a lot of speculation about the attitudes towards ourselves 
of key ministers and officials. We are already in that way at least far more political 
than any normal department, as well as in the sense of their own priorities we're 
forced to develop quite strong values of our own. How far should we take account of 
the realities of existing departmental policy? of public or group opinion? of 
constitutional (? Political) theory, in not letting ourselves become the agents of the 
PM who is not to be thought of as more than the chairman of a collective cabinet. 120 
Just by doing their job, the CPRS was in danger of appearing `more ideological than the 
ideologues'. 121 
its NA, PRO, PREM 16/106, Sir John Hunt to Harold Wilson, 3 May 1974. 
119 'The diary of Dr William Plowden. Entry for 19 April 1971. 
120 Ibid. Entry for 25 April 1971. 
121 Ibid. Entry for 6 November 1971. 
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When it came to the actual strategy sessions, Trend, ever the guardian of propriety, 
was very concerned that if Rothschild joined the sessions, along with some of his staff, 
and various others including Schreiber, they must not therefore be called Cabinet 
meetings: 
Sir Burke Trend would like to preserve the principle that meetings of the Cabinet are 
attended only by members of the Cabinet and the Secretariat. He would therefore 
prefer to regard this as an ad hoc meeting of Ministers with official advisers, rather 
than as a meeting of the 122 
This was Sir Burke succeeding in keeping Rothschild out of the highest forum in the land 
which just so happened to be Trend's personal domain. The actual fact of the strategy 
sessions provoked Robert Armstrong, a small `c' conservative character to his fingertips, 
to ask `Should we really waste the time of the CPRS on this primarily political task? " 23 
As soon as a government wins an election, its manifesto transforms into the plan of 
government (perhaps uniquely among contemporary governments the Attlee 
Administrations' 1945 manifesto Let Us Face The Future does read like a legislative 
history of 1945-51 bar unforeseen events which heavily shaped the period - something 
rarely true). Armstrong's query was ignored. 
These presentations, held at Chequers, charted the Government's recent journey, 
where its current policies were taking it and where the CPRS thought the government 
122 NA, PRO, PREM 15/407, Robert Armstrong to Edward Heath, `Strategy Meeting at Chequers', 22 
September 1971. 
123 NA, PRO, PREM 15/421, 'Prime Minister asked departments for notes on main issues of their 
departmental policies requiring decisions within next few months: comparison of government 
achievements with manifesto promises', Robert Armstrong to Peter Gregson, 28 November 1970. 
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actually wanted to be. They were divided into three parts: economic, social and 
employment policy - but did not include defence or foreign affairs. 
124 (There is a 
fascinating file at the National Archives which details the very private discussion over 
what intelligence information should be shared with the CPRS. The result was that one of 
its members, Robert Wade-Gery, lu was given clearance to see JIC reports and 
Rothschild, who had been `indoctrinated' in 1961 by the Ministry of Defence, was 
reindoctrinated so that he could see signals intelligence concerning oil matters. 
'26) 
Most commentators, from contemporaries until the present day, have seen these 
strategy sessions as an excellent way of infusing into a disparate governing team a 
continuing sense of common purpose and shared experience. Jock Bruce-Gardyne, 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Scotland 1970-72, thought 
that the sessions were `not there to prevent governments being blown off course ... [but] 
to make sure that Governments do not steer themselves off course - at least without 
realising that that is what they are doing'. 
127 Heath thought the first one to be a great 
success and became interested in it being repeated every six months, for Cabinet and 
junior ministers. 128 `Rothschild, ' Plowden wrote in his diary, 
taking the independent and somewhat blundering line that is all too characteristic of 
him, effective though his non-Whitehall-establishment approach can often be, 
promptly told B. Trend that this was quite out of the question, as it wd mean grossly 
124 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, p. 39. 
lu Head of Financial Policy and Aid Department, Foreign office, 1969-70, before joining the CPRS in 
1971 as an Under Secretary. 
126 See NA, PRO, CAB 163/216, `Distribution of Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) material to Central 
policy Review Staff (CPRS)', for several documents and untitled drafts. 
121 Jock Bruce-Gardyne, Whatever happened to the Quiet Revolution? (C. Knight, 1974), p. 116. 
128 The diary of Dr William Plowden. Entry for 11 October 1971. 
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overloading the CPRS. He announced this to a general meeting of the CPRS ... and 
was greeted by universal dismay. The general feeling was that if we don't `do' 
strategy, and that at fairly regular intervals, we don't really do anything, and that our 
other activities must flow from this exercise rather than being quite independent of 
it. 
129 
The strategy sessions continued. But when economic and industrial strife, which had been 
ever-present since the electricity supply workers' action in the Autumn of 1970, closed in 
on Heath's Administration from 1973, these sessions began to look luxurious. John 
Ramsden also concluded that Ministers felt somewhat unable, with their civil servants 
also in attendance, to abandon narrow departmentalism and embrace the collective 
spirit. 130 The CPRS's strategy presentations impressed a young Douglas Hurd immensely, 
with the 
high point, in my mind, [being] the sessions at Chequers. They were amazing. The 
prime Minister made Ministers submit to lecturing by Victor, but also by Victor's 
young men, with blackboards and charts all showing that if they continued with their 
policies the results would be disastrous. You've got the Chancellor sitting there as if 
they were schoolboys. I remember thinking at the time that this was very odd. But 
this was Ted's authority, he wanted people, including himself, to be subject to this 
kind of thing.... It was a very remarkable thing. In my mind, it was the high point of 
129 The diary of Dr William Plowden. Entry for 11 October 1971. 
130 john Ramsden, The Winds Of Change (Longman, 1996), p. 329. 
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the CPRS. They were actually asked to, and carried out, with great aplomb and 
elegance, that pedagogic role for Ministers. 131 
When asked how the Cabinet took it, Hurd said, `I expect that they resented it a bit. I 
think there was occasional muttering. But they did it and they had to do it. ' Hurd was 
right that some ministers were unimpressed. Peter Walker and Jellicoe thought they 
added very little value. 132 Only three exercises were eventually held in the Heath era: in 
August 1971, May 1972 and June 1973. A fourth, pencilled-in for November 1973 was 
postponed till December, which was in turn put back to January 1974 because of 
negotiations on the Northern Irish crisis on 6 and 7 December 1973 (but not before all the 
preparatory work by the CPRS had been completed). 133 The gathering storm which led to 
the February general election then put paid to that, too. 134 
Such a bright start followed by a falling-by-the-wayside was, in effect, the fate of 
so many of Heath's machinery reforms, as we shall see. Howell was a lone voice in being 
highly critical of the strategy sessions, especially the last one. During this, the CPRS 
scared the Ministers present with spine-chilling tales of economic collapse coupled with 
unemployment only dropping gradually if policies continued on their present course 
along with unfavourable comparisons with Japan, Germany and France. 135 . gis 
`emotionally upset' 136 Heath who considered the purpose of the June 1973 strategy 
131 Interview with Lord Hurd of Westwell. 
132 Christopher Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine (George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 101. 
133 NA, PRO, PREM 15/2099, 'Central capability. Lord Rothschild's appointment as Head of Central 
Policy Review Staff (CPRS); Prime Minister's discussions with Lord Rothschild on projects undertaken 
by CPRS; part 2', Robert Armstrong to Lord Rothschild, 26 November 1973. 
174 Ibid., Lord Rothschild, 14 December 1973. 
135 NA, PRO, CAB 130/536, `Government Strategy: Meetings 1-3 (1971); Meetings 1-6 (1972); Meetings 
1-3 (1973)', GEN 61 (73), 'Government Strategy', 15 June 1973. 
136 Campbell, Edward heath, p. 408. 
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session `was to discuss economic expansion, counter-inflation and the concept of "One 
Nation"'. 137 Howell put this down to Rothschild having a none too developed grasp of 
economics and, more damningly, an insufficient sympathy for the burgeoning appeal of 
monetarism: `He led everybody astray with his half-baked macro-economics, but he was 
only one of a tribe'. 13' Hurd contradicted Howell a little when he explained, 
What I was thinking of was when I got so angry with the `coal war' and what it 
seemed to me was the mishandling the NUM [National Union of Mineworkers] and I 
was in favour of a tougher line. Whereas the young men, and I think Victor himself, 
were looking ahead really to what became much more orthodox*in the Thatcher time 
of freeing the nationalised industries so that they could do more of their own thing 
prior to privatisation, to free them from the Treasury constraints and so on, and I was 
kind of horrified by that as they were opposite to my feelings at the time. 139 
Hurd wrote earlier that `They were at once abolished by Mr Wilson'. '40 This is not true. 
There was a last CPRS Chequers strategy session under Harold Wilson in November 
1974. Again, this scared the attending Ministers, unsurprisingly as the CPRS presentation 
began with the sentence `The situation confronting Ministers is dangerously 
precarious. ' 
141 Wilson, a man who was reluctant to hear bad news unless absolutely 
necessary, was `quite pleased with it, but did not arrange another. 
142 It must be noted 
that, according to Bernard Donoughue, Wilson was persuaded to keep the CPRS after it 
137 NA, PRO, CAB 130/536, GEN 61 (73), `Government Strategy', 15 June 1973. 
138 Interview with Lord Howell of Guildford. 
139 interview with Lord Hurd of Westwell. 
140 Hurd, An End to Promises, p. 39. 
141 NA, CAB 129/179/20, C(74) 110, `Strategy and Priorities', 14 October 1974; Barbara Castle, The Castle 
Diaries 1974-76 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), pp. 219-24. 
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was rumoured in the Evening Standard's `Londoner's Diary' column on 11 March 1974 
that he might abolish such a Heathite creation. 143 Rothschild, however, claimed that 
Wilson had personally assured him in Autumn 1973 that `I do not intend to make any 
institutional changes at the centre'. 144 In any event, the CPRS's first report to Wilson on 
public expenditure in June 1974 was heartily praised by the returning Prime Minister who 
thought it `first-class stuff . 145 
CPRS and the review of policy 
The other big CPRS function was the review of policy. This owed more to 
common sense and applied economics than to sophisticated policy analysis. l46 Rothschild 
understood very early on that there was a huge danger in all intractable problems being 
heaped on the CPRS's tiny membership, turning it into a repository for poisoned 
chalices. 147 He rightly had no intention of letting this happen, and largely picked the areas 
the think tank was to be involved in. The topics that the CPRS studied in Rothschild's era 
varied widely, from the future of Northern Ireland to Concorde; it had been previously 
written by Rothschild that Trend wished to steer the CPRS away from the supersonic 
142 Lord Wilson of Rievaulx quoted in Peter Hennessy, Cabinet (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), p. 86. 
143 A note in Bernard Donoughue's diary says `Wilson seemed inclined to abolish it in March 1974, but B. 
Donoughue argued strongly for its value and retention', Bernard Donoughue, Downing Street Diary: 
With Ilarold Wilson in No-10 (Jonathan Cape, 2005), p. 61, entry for 6 March 1974. 
144 Rothschild, Random Variables, pp. 73-9. 
145 NA, PRO, PREM 16/39, `Public expenditure programme: programme analysis and review (PAR); parts 
1,2 and 3', lord Rothschild to Harold Wilson, 26 June 1974. 
146 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, p. 49. 
147 Ibid., p. 43. 
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sump148 but, in fact, the Cabinet Secretary thought that the Central Capability will have 
to direct its attention to the major issues of policy (e. g. Concorde... )'. 149 The complete 
list of `CPRS specific in-house projects, 1972' was: `Government Strategy; PAR; Early 
Warning; United Kingdom Population; Unemployment and inflation; Energy and Raw 
Materials; Resource allocation; Growth and declining industries; The Great and the 
Good; Foreign control of industries; Various carry-overs from 1971'. 150 Rothschild later 
wrote to Heath saying that he had omitted `Wade-Gery's report on Northern Ireland and 
my report to the Lord President ... on the National Newspaper Industry'. 
151 The list for 
1973 was: six-monthly strategy reviews; ministerial strategy groups' on the nationalised 
industries and social affairs; collective briefs; counter-inflation; technique of presenting 
information to ministers; public expenditure; energy; PARs; coordination and 
development of long term planning (10-15 years); job satisfaction; `Great and Good'; and 
race relations. 
152 (The only published work of the CPRS during the Heath years was 
Rothschild's own Framework for Government Research and Development in 1971.153) 
How the CPRS fared in its endeavours was not universally admired. Sir Frank 
Cooper, Permanent Secretary to the Northern Ireland Office 1973-76, felt that there was 
only a limited amount of fresh thinking an outside organisation could give a question, 
especially those heavily bound up in secrecy and day-to-day experience. 
154 This ignored a 
key CPRS skill in winkling-out ideas from civil servants below the top echelon of a 
laß Rothschild, Random Variables, pp. 75-6. 
149 NA, PRO, PREM 15/79, Sir Burke Trend to Edward Heath, `Management Projects Committee', 30 
December 1970. 
lso NA, PRO, PREM 15/2099, Lord Rothschild to Edward Heath, Annex B, 21 January 1972. 
151 Ibid., Lord Rothschild to Robert Armstrong, 31 January 1972. 
152 Ibid., Lord Rothschild to Robert Armstrong, 6 March 1973. 
153 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, Appendix 1, p. 221. 
154 Sir Frank Cooper quoted in Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 232. 
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department, ideas which had not permeated that department's official line. 155 (The CPRS 
review of Northern Ireland policy conducted by Wade-Gery was only possible after 
Heath by-passed the obstructions of Trend. 156) Intelligence and foreign affairs were 
prohibited areas for the CPRS. 
157 Rothschild strongly disagreed with Cooper's line. `No 
particular class of investigation, such as those concerned with foreign affairs, defence, the 
Budget or the exchange rates, should be barred. ' 158 One area he was definitely excluded 
from, and wished he was not, was William Armstrong's bailiwick - the machinery of 
government. 159 
Most Cabinet Ministers supported Margaret Thatcher's decision in 1983 to abolish 
the tank as it was rightly seen to be a tool for strengthening the Prime Minister's power 
vis-ä-vis them16o A few, however, did lament the CPRS's passing, amongst them 
Douglas Hurd who, in May 1993 when Foreign Secretary in John Major's Government, 
recommended the rebirth of the think tank. 
161 A form of think tank did reappear in the 
New Labour Governments of 1997-2006, with groups such as the Social Exclusion Unit 
and the Centre for Management and Policy Studies, the Performance and Innovation 
Unit and the Forward Strategy Unit possessing some CPRS-like functions, before all 
were subsumed in 2002 into the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit. (Geoff Mulgan, head of 
155 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 230. 
156 Lord Rothschild quoted in Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 232. 
157 Rose, Elusive Rothschild, p. 187. 
158 Lord Rothschild quoted in Peter Hennessy, Susan Morrison and Richard Townsend, Routine Punctuated 
By Orgies: The Central Policy Review Staff, 1970-83, Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics 
no. 31, politics Department, Strathclyde 
University, 1985, Appendix A, pp. 104-8. 
ls' Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 233. 
160 David Willetts briefing the `Cabinet & Premiership' course, Queen May, University of London, 11 
February 2005. 
161 Hurd, Memoirs, p. 508. 
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the Strategy Unit 2002-04, explained that a detailed study had been made of the CPRS 
before the Strategy Unit had been set up. 162) 
The man tasked with the amalgamation of the CPRS's remnants with Margaret 
Thatcher's Downing Street Policy Unit was Robin Butler. As one of the first recruits into 
the think tank in 1971 (recommended by Trend and accepted by Rothschild, partly 
because of Butler and Rothschild's shared schooling, though many years apart, at 
Harrow163) and as one of its undertakers, his view of the CPRS is of special interest: 
I came to think that it couldn't operate advising the Cabinet as a whole. In a 
Whitehall sense it was too public and you were vulnerable to what happened which 
was that a minister or a department which didn't like the advice the CPRS was 
giving ... could 
leak it ... 
It was much better for such advice to be given privately to 
the Prime Minister rather than to the Cabinet as a whole. 164 
Trend's unshakeable conviction that the CPRS had to be an asset for the Cabinet as a 
whole, against the wishes of Howell and Schreiber who wanted it to be solely a prime 
ministerial resource, proved to be faulty. There was another perceived design flaw in the 
minds of the 1980s' executioners. David Willetts, a member of Margaret Thatcher's 
Downing Street Policy Unit in 1984-86, thought that the grandiose strategies of the CPRS 
paid no attention whatever to the tactical nitty-gritty. 
165 Willetts's point is strong in that 
162 Geoff Mulgan talking to the Mile End Group, `How Do Central Governments Think? Lessons from 
British History and Abroad', 7 June 2005. 
163 interview with Lord Butler of Brockwell. 
'64 Ibid. 
365 David Willetts briefing the `Cabinet & Premiership' course, Queen Mary, University of London, 11 
February 2005. 
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the think tank can be seen as an institutionalisation of Edward Heath's way of doing 
things. 
The CPRS did, however, bring value to the Cabinet as a whole. Within its policy 
function was a commitment to making as clear as possible the various policy choices, 
both those contained within an issue and between departments. The CPRS also strove to 
create a level playing field for anything to do with numbers: statistics, the costing of 
projects, and so on. Clarity of information - and brevity - underpinned an unsung side- 
effect of the CPRS. It bolstered the collectivity of the Cabinet (and thereby contributed to 
the coherence and `joined-upness' of government). Rothschild's sense of constitutional 
propriety had been sadly dented when he noticed on a Cabinet Minister's notes that the 
official collating them had written `This item is of no interest to you. "66 
Sir Kevin Tebbit, Permanent Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Defence 1998- 
2005, explained how he had witnessed the collegiality first hand: 
If you look at the numbers of Cabinet papers and meetings you'll find that there 
were almost twice as many as during the 1990s or the current Government. My 
personal recollection of this was as an assistant private secretary and one of the jobs 
I performed then was in pulling together views for the Secretary of State on items 
that were nothing to do with the Ministry. In other words, the Cabinet agenda would 
come round on social policy, education or health and it would be my job to 
telephone the other departments, particularly the ones that were in the lead, and, with 
the use of the Cabinet paper that may have been provided for the discussion, tease 
out points and provide information for the Minister so that he could participate in a 
166Rothschild, Random Variables, p. 82. 
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Cabinet debate even though it was not his subject. I think this illustrated the 
collegiate nature of the Heath Administration which, if you were to try to define the 
acme, as it were, the pinnacle of Cabinet Government, it would be during that 
period. 
Now I'm not sure if this was Heath's nature, he was by nature a consensus 
individual who believed deeply in rational argument and in hammering out the pros 
and cons of issues before taking a decision. Indeed, he used to frustrate his 
colleagues by the length of time he spent agonising over decisions, so there may be 
an element of the character of the Prime Minister there which was not necessarily 
always positive. But the fact is the process was always impeccably followed ... I 
remember briefing the Minister on educational policy. He said `You understand 
these things, I don't, I went to Eton ... tell me about these issues, ' and we had a long 
discussion. I mention this to illustrate the broad way in which Heath expected his 
Cabinet Ministers to behave and indeed the way in which he ran that systeml67 
Presenting difficult issues on one side of A4 (ä la wartime Churchill) - or, in 
Rothschild's words, `half a page of apparently innocent questions which one minister 
might put to his colleagues' 
168 - could only help to interest members of the Cabinet in 
issues outside their narrow departmental silos. (In February 1971, Heath called for all 
submissions to the Cabinet to be on one page, but Trend thought complex issues such as 
Keith Joseph's social security reforms required two. 169) Plowden, Private Secretary to 
Heath at the Board of Trade, was very clear on this point: 
167 Conversation with Sir Kevin Tebbit, 29 March 2005. 
168 Rothschild, Random Variables, p. 82. 
169 NA, PRO, PREM 15/762, `Prime Minister was concerned at length of memoranda circulated to 
members of Cabinet and Cabinet Committees: he asked that they contain only essentials', Sir Burke 
Trend to Robert Armstrong, 11 February 1971. 
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I've always felt very-strongly that there's a need to give countervailing advice. A 
body to withstand the powerful orthodoxies being expressed by all the spending 
departments and by the Treasury and pressing these views on Ministers without 
Ministers necessarily having any effective counter-briefing or any briefing which 
tries to set particular departmental points of view in its wider governmental 
context. 170 
Its greatest and best known triumph was in predicting a significant and sustained 
hike in the price of oil. In fact it was one of the CPRS's - Rothschild's in particular - 
network of outsiders who foretold the oil crisis. Sir David Barran of Shell asked to see 
the Prime Minister in September 1971 to explain his fear of a severe risk to oil in the next 
decade. 171 Barran was granted an audience and sent him a detailed report which looked at 
global energy supplies which warned that `The possibility also exists that Middle East 
countries would deliberately limit production to levels below actual world requirements. 
In this case take levels could rise above the high line ... and be sustained for perhaps 10 
years while the developed consumer countries implement crash programmes. ' 
172 
Rothschild wrote to Heath saying that if Barran's conclusions were right `as I suspect 
they are ... the 
impact on the U. K. will be as serious and all-pervasive as our going into 
Europe or the Irish crisis'. Rothschild was dumbfounded by the Treasury, which forecast 
that it was `probable that the relative price of oil would fall ... These remarks seem to me 
170 interview with Dr William Plowden. 
171 NA, PRO, PREM 15/595, `Sir David Barran of Shell gave Prime Minister exposition of study of future 
energy supply and demand: papers on international oil questions; CPRS paper on oil economics and 
supplies; DTI study on energy policy', AJCS to Robert Armstrong, 21 September 1971. 
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to have a certain dream-like quality in the light of the Shell appreciation. ' 173 Hurd is very 
complimentary towards his former Prime Minister over this: 
I was very slow, even with my foreign affairs background I was very slow to realise 
what was happening and I think that was true in Whitehall, too. I think the Prime 
Minister was well ahead of us in understanding the importance for our economy and 
our politics of the price rise ... 
I don't think I was alone in it, I didn't mesh the two 
together to the extent that I think Ted did himself. They were in separate boxes as far 
as I was concerned ... It was the sort of thing 
he was good at. 174 
Rothschild's envisaged a three-fold rise whereas it turned out to be 185% in real terms 
during 1974,175 but his prediction and encouragement of contingency planning was 
exactly what everyone thought that a think tank was for. 
176 
The CPRS was not comprehensively loved in Whitehall - it trod on toes 
everywhere it walked. Sir Douglas Wass, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury 1974-83, 
contended that, `As time went by, it concerned 
itself less and less with central issues and 
became a meddler in departmental business. ' 
177 One occasion illuminates much of the 
behind-closed-doors tensions which are always apparent in Whitehall but very rarely 
come to the boil. Rothschild wrote to the 
Prime Minister in May 1972, informing him 
that 
172 NA, PRO, PREM 15/595, Shell, `The Oil Demand and Supply Position in the Context of Future Energy 
Requirements (Old Edition)', September 1971, p. 16. 
13 Ibid., Lord Rothschild to Edward Heath, `Sir David Barran', 21 September 1971. 
174 Interview with Lord Hurd of Westwell. 
175 'Running out of puff? ', The Economist, 16 April 2005. 
176 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, p. 77; Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 231. 
177 Douglas Wass, Government and the Governed: BBC Reith Lectures 1983 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1984), p. 38. 
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Sir Burke Trend called a meeting of the permanent secretaries this morning to 
review the activities of the CPRS, of whom four were present. I am too insensitive to 
appreciate nuances but the other three members of the CPRS who were present 
respectively thought that the permanent secretaries put the boot in; that they put the 
shoe in; that our shin pads were thick enough to cope with these eventualities. Sir 
Burke, needless to say, was neutral. 
Heath minuted to Robert Armstrong at the top of Rothschild's memo `Is there any reason 
why I shouldn't ask Sir Burke Trend for a report on [this]? ' After a chat between the 
Prime Minister and his Principal Private Secretary, there was to be `No further action'. 178 
Opinions on Rothschild's tenure as Director of the think tank vary. Everyone saw 
him as a larger-than-life figure, which indeed he was both physically and intellectually. 
Lord Waldegrave thought him 'formidable'. 179 For Lord Marlesford, Rothschild brought 
to mind what he thought `an improbable quotation attributed to Lord Curzon: "No man 
should be Viceroy of India to whom that 
job is an honour. " Victor Rothschild totally 
fitted that. He had everything. He was a grandee, mega-rich, George Medal. They could 
give him nothing. '180 (Rothschild once told Peter Hennessy that `he was very 
misunderstood on this - having throughout his life a fear of failure'. ) Robin Butler has 
described his former boss as a `maverick' and `a mixture between ingenuousness and 
sharpness', but that `he had no 
idea how government worked'. 181 Not understanding how 
the bureaucracy operated could be one of the reasons he appears so successful in 
178 NA, PRO, PREM 15/926, Lord Rothschild to Edward Heath, 16 May 1972. 
179 Interview with Lord Waldegrave of North Hill. 
180 Interview with lord Marlesford, 8 October 2003. 
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retrospect, testament to the importance of not knowing better (or caring). But Plowden 
felt that this in some ways `created problems for himself and the CPRS, not being quite 
as oblique as he should have been', 
182 while his interfering nature upset some of his 
subordinates. '83 
Howell went much further. While he thought working with Rothschild was 
`thoroughly enjoyablei184 and that Rothschild was `the most stimulating and marvellous 
figure [who] produced an atmosphere of amusement, irreverence and excitement', lss 
Howell expressed deep and continuing frustration at his appointment. After attempting a 
desperate rearguard action to get somebody much more business-minded when the 
Directorship was being decided in the Autumn of 1970, he said that Rothschild 
knew absolutely nothing about programme budgeting and business planning and 
nothing about the Treasury and nothing about budget priorities, and when you think 
back to what we said before the Election about the sort of person we needed, the sort 
of capability we needed, he obviously wasn't going to deliver the goods ... He was 
supremely uninterested in the minutiae of budgetary policy. 
186 
, It wasn't, ' concluded Howell, `the mechanical, sort of almost steamroller effect that 
some of us were looking for. ' 
187 It is fascinating to see how the two powerful planners 
from the pre-Election PSRU, Schreiber and Howell, differ in their retrospective 
181 interview with Lord Butler of Brockwell. 
182 Interview with Dr William Plowden. 
183 Rose, Elusive Rothschild, p. 164. 
184 Interview with Lord Howell of Guildford. 
185 All The Prime Minister's Men, 7 May 1986. 
186 interview with Lord Howell of Guildford. 
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appreciation. The reason for the divergence is contained in the think tank's multi-role 
functionality. For Howell the central capability was first and foremost about economic 
and financial policy. It was to be an instrument for fundamentally changing the nature of 
government, empowering a dramatic push to less but better government. What it actually 
became was a very small unit of high-powered intellectuals who could turn their attention 
to anything. `The CPRS had more of the Civil Service in it than our ideas' lamented 
Howell. 188 
Programme Analysis and Review 
Rothschild had little interest in the Public Sector Research Unit's cherished 
`analytical capability'. William Plowden thinks it may have been because `it wasn't his 
baby'; 189 Lord Butler because he may well have found it `boring'. 190 The CPRS, as the 
embodiment of the PSRU's plan for a `central capability', was supposed to be the main 
drive behind the analytical capability, though, as was shown in chapter four, there was no 
clear blueprint for what PAR was meant to be (leaving it open to manipulation by 
officialdom). As Jellicoe stated in a letter to Heath, `PAR is indeed central to CPRS 
operations'. 
'91 The authoritative book on the CPRS by Tessa Blackstone and William 
plowden described their involvement thus: 
188 Interview with Lord Howell of Guildford. 
is9 interview with Dr William Plowden. 
i9o Interview with Lord Butler of Brockwell. 
191 NA, PRO, PREM 15/419, 'Programme Analysis and Review System (PAR) for public expenditure 
decisions', lord Jellicoe to Edward Heath, 'Future Arrangements for Programme Analysis and Review 
(PAR)', 25 June 1971. 
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Summarized, the formal procedure was that programmes to be reviewed were 
selected jointly by the Treasury, CPRS, and departments; choices agreed by officials 
were then ratified by Ministers. The main work on each review was done by 
departmental officials, but findings were again discussed jointly with the Treasury 
and the CPRS as they emerged. The final reports and recommendations were 
presented to Ministers for discussion. Ministers were also presented with a CPRS 
collective brief, commenting on the review and its conclusions and suggesting to 
Ministers decisions which they might want to make. 192 
The CPRS link with PAR `was a way of getting us into departments' business', explained 
Plowden. 193 But the CPRS's even-handed approach to spending - sometimes the 
justification was to go higher, other times to cut it - largely served only to aggravate the 
Treasury which always wanted reduction. 194 
Rothschild's lack of interest in the analytical capability of course disappointed 
people such as Howell who had invested so much in the planning before and after the 
Election. This contrasted noticeably with his continued interest in the Treasury's public 
expenditure function - he understood very well where power was located. Rothschild 
asked to be allowed to join a meeting of 
GEN 92, the Cabinet Committee on prices and 
incomes policy. Robert Armstrong and Trend both advised the Prime Minister that it 
would be better if he was not 
included because it would make other officials, such as the 
192 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, p. 48. 
193 Interview with Dr William Plowden. 
194 Kevin Theakston, The Civil Service Since 1945 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995), p. 110. 
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Treasury's Douglas Allen, jealous. 195 Heath concurred but warned that he might change 
his mind in the future. 196 Rothschild's interest in economic policy made Howell uneasy, 
since Rothschild was very much still wedded to Keynesianism. 197 
With less of the CPRS's driving spirit than was originally envisaged, the analytical 
capability was born. Initially described to the Cabinet as `Improved Expenditure 
Decisions by Government' before being christened Programme Analysis and Review 
(PAR), Richard Wilding thought `a rather Fabian sort of idea ... [that] deep and 
thoughtful analysis in the hands of experts will produce the right answers'. 198 
PAR suffered from some teething problems from which it never really recovered. 
First of all, it suffered what amounted to a snub the first time it was brought before 
Cabinet, in early December 1970, Ministers being apathetic at best, dismissive at worst. 
Doubts over the burden and manpower requirements of PAR meant that, despite the 
prime Minister's unambiguous support, it was not clearly backed by other Ministers. 199 It 
was presented twice further to Cabinet, on 5 January and 1 April 1971.200 This time 
Ministers were persuaded to support PAR (and the Prime Minister). 01 
It soon became apparent that there was a distinct lack of manpower for these 
studies, just as ministers had predicted in late 1970.202 There was, after all, a major 
squeeze on Civil Service numbers throughout the Wilson and Heath years, a key part of 
191 NA, PRO, PREM 15/764, `Lord Rothschild asked to be allowed to attend GEN 92 meeting on pay and 
prices policy, 21 June 1972: request was not agreed', Lord Rothschild to Edward Heath, 19 June 1972. 
196 Ibid., Robert Armstrong to Sir Burke Trend, 20 June 1972. 
197 Lewis Baston and Anthony Seldon in Seldon and Ball (eds. ), The Ileath Government 1970-74: A 
Reappraisal, p. 68. 
198 Interview with Richard Wilding, 15 August 2003. 
199 NA, PRO, CAB 128/47, CM (70), 38th Conclusions, 17 November 1970; PREM 15/419, 'Note for the 
Record', 8 December 1970. 
200 NA, PRO, CAB 128/49, CM (71), 1" Conclusions, 5 January 1971; 19'h Conclusions, 1 April 1971. 
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202 Heclo and Wildavsky, The Private Government Of Public Money, p. 286. 
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which was Sir Robert Bellinger's `Panel of Businessmen on Civil Service Manning', 
which fmally reported in December 1970 after being set up by Wilson203 (though total 
public sector numbers actually increased dramatically in the Heath years, up by 
400,000204 even with `[t]he statistical conjuring trick' of examples such as the Manpower 
Services Commission's 18,000 civil servants leaving the Service and then rejoining two 
years later20). There was an even bigger shortage of relevant skills. 
With ministers' coldness clear, Heath attempted to answer their criticisms by 
making PAR more selective than originally envisaged, and contended that `[t]he extra 
manpower involved was small, and, once introduced, the system should more than pay 
for itself . 
206 The less ambitious topics which were presented to the Cabinet on 29 March 
for study in 1971 were: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food: Lime and Fertiliser Subsidies (budget 
£45 million); 
Ministry of Defence: Service Manpower; Reinforcement Capability; 
Department of Education and Science: Higher Education (£500 million); 
Department of Employment: Employment Services (£50 million); 
Department of the Environment: Subsidies to Public Transport outside towns 
(£30 million); New Towns in Great Britain (£100 million); 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Overseas Development Administration): 
Technical Assistance (£50 million); 
Department of Health and Social Security: Health and Personal Social Services for 
the Elderly (£350 million); 
203 NA, PRO, PREM 15/274, 'Review of Civil Service manpower: report of Bellinger panel of 
businessmen; correspondence with Sir Robert Bellinger', Sir Robert Bellinger, `Final Observations of 
the Panel of Businessmen on Civil Service Manning', 14 December 1970. 
204 Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 526. 
205 peter Kellner and Lord Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants (Book Club Associates, 1980), p. 10. 
206 NA, PRO, CAB 128/49, CM (71), 13t Conclusions, 5 January 1971. 
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Home Office: Treatment of Offenders (£80 million); 
Department of Trade and Industry: Promotion of Visible Exports (£40 million). 207 
Another problem was where PAR was to be located. There were three possible 
homes: the Civil Service Department, the CPRS or the Treasury. The CSD was initially 
chosen, largely because the only other real possibility would have to be the Treasury, the 
department which PAR was intended, in part, to rival. As William Armstrong stated, 
`Although the Treasury would be closely involved, the implementation of P. A. R. should 
not be entrusted to the Treasury; and although it might in due course fall within the 
responsibility of the Central Capability, it might be desirable for the Civil Service 
Department to take the lead at least for the time being. t208 Perhaps Sir William wanted to 
closely monitor it himself. But when PAR was launched in March 1971, it was located 
within the Treasury. The Treasury had made it known that it was in favour of such a 
function, but not of the CSD `mucking about' with it. 209 Indeed, the CSD's PAR team 
was disbanded in June 1971.210 At the end of March 1971, Trend and Armstrong 
suggested that its Treasury location might only be temporary, as it could still be given to 
the CPRS. 211 But it stayed within the Treasury until its abolition in 1979. If the think tank 
had have been given PAR, the CPRS would have been far bigger and less fleet-footed 
than it was. 
207 NA, PRO, CAB 129/156, CP (71) 43, 'Selection of Topics for Programme Analysis and Review', 
Annex A: Proposed List of Programmes for Review in 1971', 29 March 1971. 
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Being given to the Treasury was nowhere near as fatal as it may seem. For the 
Treasury in the early 1970s had, along with its thinking on a central capability, diagnosed 
a gap in its financial planning. The Public Expenditure Survey system and accompanying 
Committee had proved successful (until it was modified in 1975-6 during the galloping 
inflation, of which PESC was a contributory cause, in favour of cash limits212). 
From no planning, save somewhat ad hoc blueprints for defence and the social 
services, five year plans had been created by the mid-sixties. This was a major 
improvement, and one with which the Treasury's public expenditure gurus were rightly 
pleased. But five years was the maximum. Long-term projects, of which Concorde was 
the most obvious and defence systems the most numerous, often had a life way beyond 
five years. The Treasury, therefore, saw that with PAR located within its fiefdom, it was 
now able to complete the PESC machinery. It also recognised shortcomings in big 
individual spending programmes. 213 Once it became part of the Treasury armoury, 
departments took PAR seriously. 214 (Otto Clarke wrote in 1971 that `the idea of PAR was 
always implicit in the concepts of PESC' 
215) 
After a difficult start, PAR began to take shape. Indeed, Sir Samuel Goldman was 
almost glowing in his study of public expenditure published soon after his retirement in 
1973216 Heath was certainly keen to see PAR become a central part of the public 
expenditure business when he wrote in November 1971 that he was `anxious to develop 
212 Leo Pliatzky, Getting And Spending (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982), pp. 135-47 
213 Theakston, The Civil Service Since 1945, pp. 108-9. 
214 Hecelo and Wildavsky, The Private Government Of Public Money, p. 278. 
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the PAR system in 1972 significantly further than was possible in 1971'. 217 In December 
1971, Mark Schreiber fretted that PAR needed an injection of energy and responsibility. 
According to Schreiber, the Prime Minister had recently said that 
`Ministers should become more involved at an earlier stage in their PARs; and 
consideration should be given to devolving to second-tier Ministers special 
responsibilities for PARs. ' ... I believe this to be terribly important and I don't think 
enough will happen if it is left there. I therefore suggest that the Prime Minister 
might wish the Cabinet to decide that a second-tier Minister should be nominated 
ZI$ with personal responsibility for every stage of the preparation of each PAR. 
Robert Armstrong pointed out to Schreiber that his thoughts were unconstitutional: 
The Cabinet cannot decide for individual Ministers how they are to run their 
departments; but ... at Cabinet the Prime Minister will remind his colleagues of what 
has been said and point out the advantages of a general procedure on the lines you 
have indicated. 219 
Howell found cause for pride when he informed Robert Armstrong in January 1972 of the 
prime Minister's `wish to see more informal meetings between Ministers, possibly in 
place of the traditional inter-departmental machinery': `One of the most important 
outcomes of the developing system of Programme Analysis and Review is that it will 
217 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1587, 'Programme Analysis and Review System (PAR) for public expenditure 
decisions; part 2', 'Draft Minute from the Prime Minister: Secretary of State for the Environment', 25 
November 1971. 
218 Ibid., Mark Schreiber to Robert Armstrong, 'PAR Selection of Topics for 1972', 8 December 1971. 
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encourage these meetings to take place frequently, regularly and within a well thought 
out framework ... 
I hope the Prime Minister will therefore feel that the proper policy 
planning system he seeks is now in fact emerging. '220 Heath continued to press the Civil 
Service to adopt PAR wholeheartedly and to make it a success. In January 1973, he 
agreed a three-year rolling-programme of PAR studies. 221 The studies themselves were 
placed within functional headings: resources deployed in facilitating industrial and 
technological change and for meeting the resultant human and social problems; and for 
enhancing the quality of urban and rural life; for preparation for employment and 
community life; in relief of poverty, illness and other forms of hardship; in support of law 
and order; in support of European and overseas commitments. 
222 Slippage meant that 
1974 was now to be the start date. 
223 
Some Treasury insiders indicated their displeasure with `a bloody excrescence', as 
one senior Treasury man privately called PAR. 
224 Sir John Hunt, Trend's successor, 
thought that the `system created a great deal of work but not much in the way of 
results'. 225 Trend discerned a wider dissatisfaction in late 1971 over an `initial (and in 
some cases continuing) reluctance of departments to accept the new system'. 
226 Yet PAR 
did have its supporters, with Wass calling in 1983 for a new, improved version. 227 PAR 
was, however, the object of perhaps the wittiest and certainly the most detailed satire on a 
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public expenditure process. In a letter from Robert Andrew, Private Secretary to Lord 
Carrington, to Robert Armstrong, the `glossary' of PAR was gloriously explained (these 
are only the edited highlights): 
PARturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus [the mountains are in labour, a ridiculous 
mouse will be born228] 
PARis Lord R-T-S-H-L-D 
PARnassus Office of the CPRS 
PARadigm Example of Programme Analysis and Review 
PARamour Person committed to PAR 
PARaphanalia Programme review machinery 
PARdon Academic member of review team 
PARticipate Take part in PAR 
PARsnip An in-depth study which satisfies all requirements 
PARrot An in-depth study which satisfies no requirements 
PARalysis Current state of PAR 
PARoxysm State brought on by PAR 
PARsimony Grudging attitude to PAR 
PARtisan Committed to PAR 
pARtricide Committed to getting rid of PAR 
PARable Skilled at telling the PAR tale 
PARboil Cook the books in preparation for PAR 
pARanoia A PAR bore 
228 A quotation from Horace, Epistles, Book 11,3, Ars Poetica (The Art of Poetry), line 139. 
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PARachute PAR on the grouse moors 
PARtridge Victim of a PARachute 
PARody Form of credo sung on PARnassus 
PARIez-vous? Are you up to PAR for Europe yet? 
PARfait knight Watch the birthday honours 229 
PAR was to be the tool for cutting out waste in government activities which were 
necessary and for getting the government out of ones that were not. But it was completely 
undermined by the 1972 shift to turning on the taps of public expenditure (which is dealt 
with in more detail later). 
230 As David Howell observed: 
the word came through from No. 10 and senior ministers and even from the 
Treasury, incredibly, that retrenchment was no longer the order of the day. On the 
contrary, `expansion' was the word. So those very able civil servants, who'd risen to 
prominence in departments as analysts, saying 'Look boys, for years I've thought we 
were wasting money. We could cut this out or do it different', suddenly found they 
were in the pending tray, got a rather smaller office, pushed down the corridor, 
didn't get called into the permanent secretary so often. And the whole bit of 
Whitehall that had been geared to this terrific, thrusting reform rather got put on a 
back-burner. 231 
In the short term, PAR relied on the idea of rational continuity of government 
policy which was simply not in evidence after 1972. Looking at a longer time frame, 
229 NA, PRO, PREM 15/419, R. J. Andrew to Robert Armstrong, 31 March 1971. 
230 Theakston, The Civil Service Since 1945, p. 110. 
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PAR was too cumbersome and theoretical for the day-to-day, rough-and-tumble 
practicality of Whitehall. In its original form, it was doomed the minute it left the Public 
Sector Research Unit's drawing board. In its Treasury incarnation, it could only survive 
as the far end of PESC. PAR's abolition in 1979 went unlamented. 232 
The businessmen's team 
Another aspect of the PSRU's work also delivered far less than the planners 
originally hoped. The businessmen's team had high hopes when it was established in the 
first days of the Heath Administration. They would bring business techniques and 
financial management to the job of government. But, six months later, Jellicoe was still 
trying to fix where they would be located. 
233 Just as Lords Plowden and Roberthall had 
predicted before the election, not being anchored to a specific department or programme 
meant that they had little or no scope to influence the work of the bureaucracy. The 
businessmen themselves thought that, as Jellicoe reported to Heath, `The initial period of 
adjustment to a strange environment was not easy for members of the team, though on 
balance the difficulties were less formidable than many had predicted, mainly because of 
the valuable preparatory work done before the Election. 9234 Lord Crobam later described 
231 David Howell quoted in Hennessy, Cabinet, p. 170. 
232 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 596. 
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the businessmen's team as a `failure' because they never became part of the machine, 
only wanting to talk to ministers. 235 
There was one huge exception to this story. Derek Rayner would achieve legendary 
Whitehall status in the 1980s as Margaret Thatcher's Efficiency Adviser. Yet his career 
as a reformer of the Civil Service began a decade earlier when he headed a review into 
the procurement of defence materiel, much of it of a highly technical nature and 
correspondingly massive cost. So many programmes had suffered `excessive duplication, 
cost overruns and long days' that reform of this most important area was absolutely 
essential. 236 Rayner was tasked with creating a hived-off executive agency which would 
handle defence procurement. In this he was singularly successful. The report he wrote 
was clear and authoritative. In fact, it was so impressive that Rayner was asked to extend 
his two-year secondment from Marks and Spencer to four years, specifically until April 
1974, which he agreed to do in March 1971237 (although he made it clear that he still saw 
his future in Marks and Spencer 238 and actually left, with a knighthood, in 1973 to 
become joint managing director of the conipany239). He became the first Chief Executive 
of the Defence Procurement Agency, with the rank of permanent secretary and head of 
department-240 Mark Schreiber was very satisfied with the Defence Procurement Agency 
and saw it as a model for a hived-off future: 
235 Lord Croham briefing the 'Hidden Wiring' MA course. 
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The essence of the work of the proposed Departmental Agency is that it would be of 
a dynamic and executive nature requiring entrepreneurial management rather than 
straightforward policy advice. The Defence Procurement Agency under Derek 
Rayner is a prototype on which to develop. I therefore believe that the `executive 
heads' of the new departmental agency should in general be appointed from outside 
the Civil Service and possibly from business, where entrepreneurial talents are 
mainly to be found. 24' 
But Rayner, and the Defence Procurement Agency, were largely exceptional. By 1972, 
Meyjes was downbeat: 
it has become clear that, in spite of a great deal of effort and much early euphoria, 
the areas in which the hiving-off solution can be applied are few in number and 
limited in significance ... 
In fact, in spite of strenuous efforts, so far only three 
activities have been found suitable for hiving-off, namely the nationalised pubs in 
Carlisle, the Civil Aviation Authority and the British Library. 242 
The actual list of hivings-off in the Heath Government was: 1971, the Defence 
Procurement Agency and the Civil Aviation Authority; 1972, the Employment Services 
Agency, the Central Computer Agency, the Property Services Agency, the British 
Overseas Trade Board and the Industrial Development Executive while Thomas Cook 
was sold to a consortium of the Automobile Association, Midland Bank and Trust Houses 
Forte; 1973, the Pay Board and Prices Commission and the establishment of the Director- 
241 NA, PRO, PREM 15/410, `Proposals for development of government organisation', Mark Schreiber to 
Robert Armstrong, Development of Government Organisation', 12 November 1971. 
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General of Fair Trading; and lastly, in January 1974, the Manpower Services 
Commission. Though there are some sizeable ventures here, compared to the high-hopes 
of the pre-1970 election planners and the businessmen's team, it adds up to little more 
than a damp squib. 243 (It is interesting to note Meyjes's description of the pubs which 
were sold to the private sector and the CAA and the British Library which were kept 
within the public sphere as being all hived-off. They would be explicitly recognised as 
two very different things by the 1980s with functions transferred to the private sector 
deemed, quite properly, `privatised'. The Next Steps report of 1988 would lead a renewed 
effort to hive-off which saw functions ring-fenced and turned into executive agencies, but 
rarely privatised. ) 
The businessmen's team recommended its own disbandment after its current 
projects were complete in March 197 1.244 In the final phase Meyjes was working on 
Ministry of Defence streamlining and the National Health Service; Herbert Cruickshank 
on a possible construction executive; Sainsbury on government real estate; Ronald East 
on PAR; and Hutton on the Public Trustee's Office. 
245 Its leader, Meyjes, so lauded by 
Howell when he suggested to Heath that Meyjes should be the first head of the CPRS, 
became despondent with the lack of success, actual or even potential, and left. 246 But this 
did not prevent in early 1972 a rearguard attempt by Howell and Schreiber to continue 
with a businessmen's team of sorts at the very top of government. Howell urged a three- 
242 Quoted in Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine, p. 101. 
243 See Patrick Ainley and Mark Corney, Training For The Future (Cassell, 1990); Pollitt, Manipulating the 
Machine, p. 104- 
u4 NA, PRO, PREM 15/923, `Report by the Businessmen's Team on its Initial Operations', 1 March 1971. 
z°s Ibid., Robert Armstrong to John Chilcot, 14 September 1971. Cruickshank and Sainsbury appear in the 
file but no evidence has been found concerning their recruitment nor further personal details. 
246 pollitt, Manipulating the Machine, p. 103. 
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man group comprising Meyjes, Schreiber and one other businessman. 
247 Douglas Hurd 
told the Prime Minister that `in my view he would be a rash man who advised you that 
the present machine ran so well that outside talent of this kind could be dispensed 
with'. 248 William Armstrong advised that the group be abolished. He thought an 
industrial adviser located in the Treasury might bring better results. 249 
In April 1972, Jellicoe finally sealed the fate of the businessmen's team when he 
told Heath that there was no future for them - but a `Central Business Adviser' may 
work. u° Rothschild was not convinced. `What is the probability of a firm releasing a 
really first-class man? I am not sure about the extent to which firms did this with the 
exception of M&S, in the first round. ''" But Rothschild did see that the best businessmen 
injected into government, and with clearly defined roles, could really benefit the 
bureaucracy. 252 William Armstrong backed calls for a Central Business Adviser because 
he foresaw that the `major task ahead of us is improving the performance of government 
at the interface with the individual citizen'. 
253 (The public services in the 1990s and early 
2000s were very focused on this precise issue. ) Rothschild eventually accepted the idea of 
a Central Business Adviser, but encouraged a step-change 
in quality. 254 A week later he 
re-opened the debate by recommending government adopt a 
French-style cabinet system 
for Ministers, which would include a business adviser. 
'" Mark Schreiber and a CSD 
247 NA, PRO, PREM 15/923, Douglas Hurd to Edward Heath, 'Businessmen's Team', 24 February 1972. 
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official, Tony Hart, were dispatched to France to investigate the use of cabinets in 
Britain, but nothing came of it. u6 
Redrawing the Whitehall map 
The super-departments which The Reorganisation of Central Government had 
thought so central, and were in fact already underway during the late 1960s, largely 
survived intact throughout the Heath Government. The re-creation of a Department of 
Energy in January 1974 (the Ministry of Fuel and Power had been incorporated into the 
Department of Trade and Industry, in 1970) after a `damaging delay' caused by the DTI's 
Secretary of State, Peter Walker, who was understandably reluctant to see his domain 
reduced, 257 was a step away, however, from the theory that big was beautiful. (A second 
Cabinet Minister, responsible for trade, prices and consumer affairs, was given to the DTI 
in 1972.258) As was the creation of the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) in 1972 due to the 
imposition of direct rule after four years of burgeoning violence and extensive civil 
unrest. The Northern Irish Parliament at Stormont was stripped of its devolved authority 
which returned to London, administered by the new NIO spun-off from the Home Office, 
with William Whitelaw appointed as its first Secretary of State. 
259 All these moves put an 
end to the pre-election wish to see a smaller Cabinet. 
256 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 238. 
257 Heath, The Course Of My Life, p. 505. 
25$ Theakston in The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 92. 
259 See NA, PRO, PREM 15/1043, `Exchange of messages following setting up of Northern Ireland Office'; 
Heath, The Course Of My Life, pp. 420-45. 
273 
Heath was reluctantly forced into several more machinery of government changes. 
The nature of industrial relations in Britain had seen a marked deterioration since the 
Second World War with increasing numbers of both official and unofficial strikes 
(certainly since Frank Cousins became head of the Transport and General Workers Union 
in 1958) and the early 1970s began its most destructive phase. The 1972 NUM strike 
involving substantial secondary picketing had demonstrated that the government was 
quite unprepared for a hardening of militancy in the union movement. Disputes of this 
magnitude had not been experienced since the Attlee. Governments' difficulties with 
unofficial dock strikes, perhaps not since the General Strike. 260 
Though the Conservatives had done a great amount of work on industrial relations 
in the run-up to 1970, there were no plans for meeting serious industrial disruption. 
Hurd's political antennae sensed in December 1970 after an electricity industry go-slow 
that events were changing the landscape and he urged a review. 261 The Prime Minister 
took up Hurd's recommendation when he thought that `in light of recent events, there are 
several aspects of our arrangements for dealing with industrial emergency situations 
which should be looked at as a matter of great urgency ... A team should be asked to start 
at once, and urgently, contingency planning for mitigating the effects of any future 
disputes affecting the basic services t. zbz On 30 December Heath went further: `His [the 
prime Minister] reaction is, I am afraid, that the machine, is just not good enough. He 
260 Keith Jeffery and Peter Hennessy, States Of Emergency (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 233. 
26' Hurd, An End to Promises, p. 99. 
262 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1600, `Arrangements for dealing with industrial and civil emergency situations: 
setting up of Whitehall Command post; possible use of new Cabinet Office Emergency Room', Robert 
Armstrong, `Planning for Emergencies', 15 December 1970. 
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comments that every major emergency so far he has had to take over himself. He deduces 
from that that a central project team could operate effectively, and indeed logically. '263 
Sir Philip Allen, Permanent Secretary to the Home Office, was `not really 
persuaded' that the machinery needed radical change, 
26 partly due to cost but also to 
potential information blockage. 
265 Allen persuaded Trend, William Armstrong and the 
Prime Minister that Allen's small committee which served the Home Secretary's Steering 
Committee on Pay Negotiations was doing the job already but promised to `ensur[e] that 
all the nuts and bolts were constantly tightened up'. 
266 Heath was clearly dissatisfied by 
this and `rather grudgingly accepted the proposal [though] making it clear that the 
resulting outfit will be very much on trial, and subject to ruthless revision if it falls down 
on the job'. 
267 Trend expressed his unease and subsequent support for Heath's warning in 
May 1971.268 
The first miners' strike changed the nature of the debate. On 23 February 1972, the 
prime Minister received a letter from the Cabinet Secretary urging urgent changes: 
I have now discussed the lessons of the miners' strike with the permanent secretary 
directly involved; and I have found general agreement that the emergency 
organisation, as tested by that crisis, is too large and diffuse and is staffed - in terms 
of departmental representation (both ministerial and official) at interdepartmental 
discussions - at too low a level of responsibility and competence. As a result the 
necessary information takes too long to reach the top and sometimes arrives in too 
263 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1600, Robert Armstrong to Sir Burke Trend, 30 December 1970. 
264 Ibid., Sir Philip Allen to Sir Burke Trend, `Planning for Emergencies', 18 December 1970. 
265 Ibid., Edward Heath to Sir Philip Allen, 23 February 1971. 
266 Ibid., Sir Burke Trend to Robert Armstrong, 5 January 1971. 
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diluted a form; and decisions reached at the top take too long to travel back to the 
point of executive action and run some risk of being misunderstood or distorted in 
the process. Measured against the two essential requirements of any crisis - namely, 
prompt and accurate information and swift and effective executive action - there is 
considerable room for improvement ... there 
is now, for the first time, ready 
acceptance of the need for greater centralisation of crisis management ... 
269 
The creation of a central `command post' had got underway with Heath telling Robert 
Armstrong a few months later, `I cannot over-emphasise the importance which I attach to 
this project. 9270 
The Civil Contingencies Unit (Heath called it his `Winter Emergencies 
Corlunittee 9271) was created in the Cabinet Office in order to co-ordinate the 
Government's response to the growing problems and was immensely secret. 272 The 
review was carried out by a group headed by John Hunt, Trend's deputy, and processed 
by a Ministerial committee chaired by Jellicoe. 
273 It is the only one of Heath's experiment 
with mixed committees of officials and Ministers which survives to this day274 (civil 
servants usually found it uncomfortable to disagree with their political masters and some 
also felt this approach to involve a dangerous blurring of constitutional divisions2n). The 
responsibility for this had previously rested with the Home Office since Parliament 
268 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1600, Sir Burke Trend to Robert Armstrong, 12 May 1971. 
269 Ibid., Sir Burke Trend to Edward Heath, The Emergency Organisation', 23 February 1972. 
270 Ibid., Edward Heath to Robert Armstrong, 28 April 1972. 
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passed the Emergency Powers Act 1920.76 Home Office officials were understandably 
unhappy with a shift which cast doubt upon their stewardship. It was expressed at the 
time that the true picture was not that the Home Office per se had failed to perform, but 
that Heath had lost confidence in his (in Hurd's words, 'hopeless '277) Home Secretary, 
Reginald Maudling, who 
hadn't a grip on anything, that was part of the Irish problem, too. The Home Office 
has these huge responsibilities, you had a man who was shrewd and idle - everybody 
liked him. He didn't have a grip. But he was too important to be shoved aside. After 
all he'd been within a hair's breath of being leader himself. He was a big beast. He 
had stature, political stature he no longer deserved and this was one of the personnel 
problems. 27$ 
Empire building on the part of the Cabinet Office was another rumoured reason for the 
change. 279 The creation of the CCU also led to a thoroughgoing review of the 
Government's planning for further militant industrial action. It was conducted by 
Brigadier R. J. `Dick' Bishop and identified the top sixteen key vulnerable industries, 
headed by electricity generation. 280 The CCU continued into the twenty-first century but 
due to non-use had lost some of its efficiency. This was to be remedied after the fuel 
protests of 2000 and the increased threat of fundamentalist Islamist violence after the 
16 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 236. 
21, Hurd, Memoirs, p. 194. 
Vs Interview with Lord Hurd of Westwell. 
279 Jeffery and Hennessy, States Of Emergency, p. 236. 
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terrorist attacks on America in September 2001 with what was now called the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat becoming ever-more important and powerful. 281 
Apparatus that Heath was, by contrast, very happy to establish came in the form of 
a co-ordinating body for all things European. 282 As he himself put it: 
After both the passage of the European Communities Act and the completion of the 
Paris Summit, we had to learn to live as members, not as applicants for membership. 
I sent a personal minute to all members of the Cabinet informing them of the need to 
familiarise themselves with the techniques which the Community had developed for 
doing its business. I stressed that each department had to define its objectives and 
work out how they could be met in the complex bargaining situations of the 
Community ... 
[and a] European Secretariat was established in the Cabinet Office 
283 
This was another of the few Heathite changes which has endured to the present day. 
The Heath Government's rhetoric combined new central government machinery 
with a wish to free entrepreneurial talent and so achieve less but better government 
alongside a dynamic economy. Allied to this was Heath's conviction that Britain's 
political and economic future was firmly anchored within the integrating nations of 
western Europe. In 1971 Heath managed to lift the French veto of nearly a decade and 
despite difficult Commons votes, Britain finally joined the European Economic 
Community in January 1973. Heath passionately believed that accession to the EEC 
281 See Peter Hennessy, `The British Secret State Old And New', Royal United Services Institute, June 
2005. 
282 See NA, PRO, PREM 15/884, `Organisation of European work in central government following UK 
entry into EEC. 
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would provide a tremendous fillip to the British economy through increased competition 
and access to a huge, high quality market. Once the first stage of his plan had been 
completed, he could turn his attention to the second. This was to prove far more difficult 
and problematic than sweet-talking the French President Pompidou and achieving the 
resulting parliamentary majorities. Continuing industrial relations unrest, rising 
unemployment (at the beginning of 1972 it reached 900,000) and growth of three per cent 
(compared to a target of five due to the supposed slack evidenced by the relatively high 
unemployment)284 led Heath to fear that the economy would not be in a fit state to seize 
the opportunities he perceived in the EEC. The aim of less government was to be 
abandoned to get the UK fit for Europe. 
285 The scene was set for a different tack. 
The U-turn 
There had been a modest reflation of the economy in the 1971 Budget after 
unemployment had taken an upturn, with a reduction 
in taxation of £500 million, but this 
was slight enough to occasion no accusations of a volte-face. 
286 The key year was 1972 
when Heath made what became 
known as the `U-turn'. Though many Conservatives 
were very critical of this in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was near unanimous 
support for it at the time. 
287 In February 1972, the lame-duck Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 
were bailed out (Rolls-Royce, too, was saved 
but this decision was about cash-flow and 
293 Heath, The Course of My Life, pp. 393-4. 
294 Alec Cairncross, The British Economy since 1945 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995), pp. 182,191-2. 
285 Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 412. 
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had international contractual and strategic repercussions - it was not really a lame-duck). 
Then in March, the Budget brought a clear commitment to government-led expansion 
with large cuts in income tax and purchase tax, April saw the pursuit of the Industry Bill, 
all followed by the floating of the pound in June. 
288 
An Industry Bill increased Whitehall's powers in terms of regional aid and created 
the Industrial Development Executive to facilitate the new policy by way of 
discriminated intervention in selected industries. 289 Heath thought it necessary to counter 
his growing frustration with industry's failure to invest (stability measured by years is 
often required to encourage entrepreneurial investment, certainly of the sustained 
kind). 290 This truly was a complete turnaround as it in effect reconstituted the Wilson 
Government's Industrial Reorganisation Corporation which had been gratuitously 
abolished early in the Heath Administration, partly as `a sop to the right. Perhaps the 
closest similarity was to Reggie Maudling's 1962-64 `dash for growth' which had at its 
heart the aborted `breakout' strategy - the idea that a determined push for sustained 
growth, superseding all other pressures (especially sterling and the balance of payments), 
would lead Britain out of its recent constrained economic performance. 
292 A `passion for 
growth - that's the key to understanding 
Ted, ' thinks Hurd; `[h]e believed this was the 
secret and because we'd 
failed to understand that in the years since 1945 we'd lagged 
behind. And there'd be obstacles and there'd be dangers but you had to press on and it 
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would come right. This was his belief - he failed - but it was his genuine belief about 
would should happen to this country. '293 
The Bill was drawn up behind the back of the DTI's junior ministers - free-market 
men294 and one in particular, Nicholas Ridley, `thoroughly indiscreet' according to 
Heath295 It was only presented to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, John 
Davies, the lead Minister who would see his powers significantly increased'29' after a 
secret Cabinet Office team led by William Armstrong and consisting of a few officials 
from relevant departments and the CPRS had drafted it. (This was under the code name 
'Cockaigne'297 - perhaps coined because Heath conducted the Elgar overture with the 
London Symphony Orchestra at the Festival Hall in November 1971 while the planning 
was taking place or even because subsidies were a dangerous drug. 98) Why Sir William? 
`Ted, ' mused Hurd, `having this semi-French view of the power of the state and its 
efficacy believed that William Armstrong could deliver on prices and incomes and so on, 
that there were possibilities there that William was the right person to push ahead 
with'299 Moreover, according to Peter Jay (in 1972 Economics Editor of The Times) 
'Armstrong had credibility with whoever he spoke to. ' Jay went on to pay 
To achieve the agreement, the consensus necessary for the country to face the fact 
that it was destroying itself by the conflict between labour and capital, and more 
particularly the inflationary consequences and the way it was boiling. To recognise 
293 interview with Lord Hurd of Westwell. 
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this and to draw the right conclusions. He came to believe that he was the only 
person who could achieve this agreement. And there were some reasons for 
believing that in the sense that he had extraordinary skills in that field. Our system 
doesn't really provide for officials, however senior, to come to occupy that pivotal 
role, it's supposed to be a minister. ... The Prime Minister certainly 
lacked the skills 
to take people with him. 300 
Heath may also have turned to Armstrong as he found Sir Douglas Allen difficult. Sir 
Donald MacDougall, Chief Economic Adviser, went as far as to label the ensuing 
reflation of the economy not the `Barber boom' as it has subsequently become known but 
the `Armstrong spending boom'. 
301 (Edmund Dell has Barber following meekly 
behind. 302) Patrick Jenkin, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, was to wind up the Commons 
debate on the bill and only found out about the change of direction during Davies's 
speech, so much was the Treasury distrusted. 
303 
But the final change of policy was politically the most significant. There had been a 
clear manifesto commitment in 1970 to keep government out of wage bargaining (except 
for its own employees) - `Labour's compulsory wage control was a failure and we will 
not repeat it. '304 Through the on-going 
industrial unrest, Heath became more and more 
convinced that there should be a temporary reversion to an incomes policy - something 
that to differing degrees both Macmillan and Wilson had felt compelled to pursue. Heath 
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was a leader whose ends always justified his means: 
305 `Our purpose was more pragmatic 
than people were led to believe, ' was how he put it in his memoirs. 306 Unshakeable once 
a decision had been made, he operated as if he were an exponent of John Maynard 
Keynes's famous remark `When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you 
do? '307 
The incomes policy took the form of three stages. First, in November 1972 there 
was a Counter-inflation (Temporary Provisions) Act which temporarily froze wages, and 
a White Paper, A Programme for Controlling Inflation, The First Stage. 
308 Next came the 
January 1973 Counter-inflation Act which set up the Pay Board and Prices Commission, 
in February 1973 a Green Paper, The Price and Pay Code, and then in April 1973 another 
White Paper, The Counter-inflation Programme - The Operation of Stage Two. 309 The 
third stage came in November 1973 with a new pay code and the dramatic step of a state 
of emergency. All this was at first overseen by William Armstrong, and late in 1973 - its 
most crucial phase - by William Whitelaw, the ace negotiator brought back from almost 
achieving the impossible in Northern Ireland to become Secretary of State for 
Employment. William Armstrong was the prime influence over both the Industry Bill and 
prices and incomes. He became the `hawk of hawks' over his complete dedication to 
obstruct the trade unions and their drive for high wage settlements. 
310 
Heath's pragmatic nature facilitated what was an even bigger shift in the 1970-74 
Government. From a collegiate start to the Administration, perhaps a `model of Cabinet 
305 Conversation with Professor John Ramsden. 
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government', 311 responsibility gradually shifted away from Ministers - especially as 
Heath became all-powerful on his front bench312 This was not a total shift, however, as 
Lord Hurd explained: 
I think it remained collegiate in the sense that they remained friends. I've never 
known a government where that was true to a greater extent. Ted had got them 
together, not all of them, I'm not including Margaret Thatcher, 
313 he got the sort of 
inner core into a group in opposition and they liked each other, they joked in the 
same way and they were friends to an extent which I've not seen since and that was 
quite important. But I suppose it's true that as the pressures multiplied, as life got 
harder, there was less time for that sort of socialising, enjoying being in office, and 
pressures on the Prime Minister became great, his impatience with government 
departments increased, and so, yes, that did ebb away to some extent but not totally, 
they still had that feel even in the desperate times in January 1974. ... I don't think 
he was ever an isolated figure as far as his colleagues were concerned but he 
probably did take more and more and more upon himself. But never to anything like 
the extent that we see now. 
314 
But power undeniably shifted to what was in effect a powerful coterie of senior civil 
servants around the Prime Minister, without a 
doubt the most significant example of an 
unannounced and unintended 
French-style cabinet in the post-war period, certainly 
310 Theakston, Leadership in Whitehall, p. 195. 
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before the Blair years. This powerfully influenced policy as `a government with an 
unusually large injection of Party thinking in 1970 had become a government almost 
divorced from any Party advice by 1973'. 315 
The tendency toward technocratic governance began earlier than generally 
understood. For in April 1971, Heath requested that he, Trend, William Armstrong and 
Rothschild should meet `as a group from time to time to review the whole structure of 
events and Government policy'. 316 In November 1971, the Prime Minister wanted this 
stepped up to once a fortnight (though there is no evidence that this lasted very long). 317 
I, ess a `kitchen cabinet' than a `study sideboard', it became the forum for the most 
controversial policies the Government wished to carry out. Armstrong and his officials 
31s also handled the switch to an incomes policy and the expansion of public expenditure. 
With the attempt to recreate Macmillan's tripartite era, Heath wrote of a `low-key 
initiative' he requested which saw Rothschild and William Armstrong conduct informal 
meetings with both sides of industry. 
319 Echoing Marcia Williams's frustration with 
Wilson's respect for and confidence in the Civil Service and its capacity to deliver, Hurd, 
her successor as Political Secretary, later wrote: 
Mr Heath had a high regard for the civil service. I sometimes wondered if this regard 
would have been so great if he had served longer as a backbench MP, or if he had 
not spent so much of his Ministerial apprenticeship in the Foreign Office. To some 
extent all senior Ministers are vulnerable in this way. The Private Secretaries in their 
313 Ramsden, The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 33. 
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own office and the very senior officials whom they themselves see day by day are 
usually people of the highest calibre. They talk well, listen attentively, know the 
world, and express themselves quickly and fluently on paper. This is particularly true 
of the Foreign Office. It is rather too easy to suppose that the whole public service is 
peopled with such agreeable paragons. In fact it is not. The traditional vices of 
bureaucracy are delay, excessive devotion to detail and a rigidity of thought which is 
reflected in authoritarian attitudes towards the citizen. These vices exist - usually at 
the lower level where policies are executed. The citizen is in touch with these levels, 
so is the conscientious backbench Member of Parliament, but the Minister is not. At 
the top of the civil service there is order, reason and reassurance - until the roof 
caves in. 
Because of his justified respect for his senior advisers Mr Heath tended to 
exaggerate what could be achieved by new official machinery ... a little more 
scepticism about machinery would have been wise. 320 
The unannounced chef de cabinet of Heath's shift towards prime ministerial 
government was the most powerful civil servant in the land, Sir William Armstrong. 
321 
Although he undoubtedly shared power with Trend in the 1960s and early 1970s, he had 
eclipsed Trend in the Heath years as the Secretary of the Cabinet's influence over the 
prime Minister waned. This was due to Heath wanting his senior Civil Service advisers to 
act in a more overtly political manner, again akin to the French Civil Service. 
322 This 
Trend could not and would not do, being the last of the old school Cabinet Secretaries 
319 Heath, The Course Of My Life, p. 353. 
320 Hard, An End to Promises, pp. 92-93. 
321 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 238. 
322 Ibid., p. 238. 
286 
who passionately believed in the continuation of the state and the protection of the 
Constitution, as they understood it. Part of this was never to become too closely identified 
with any particular government (to the extent that Trend never voted in General Elections 
lest it swayed his judgment323). 
Hurd has described Trend as `a character, a traditional character. We all regarded 
him as a defender of the status quo, somebody you could throw things at occasionally, I 
mean, you could treat him as a bit of a guy'. 
324 Trend was a great believer in the Socratic 
method of advising his Prime Minister, that if the right questions are asked in the right 
order at the right time, the correct answers will naturally become apparent. 
25 He also 
believed that detached advice - rather than advocacy - was the job of the mandarin. This 
led to caution, and Heath found it all too academic. 326 Trend's adherence to his concept 
of propriety frustrated Heath Yet Heath did respect Trend's unparalleled knowledge and 
experience on matters, including especially secret ones such as Anglo-American 
intelligence-pooling. 327 But he wanted unambiguously personal advice from his 
advisers328 and turned to William Armstrong as Trend refused to give it. 
329 Plowden 
noted this tension in February 1972: 
Leading Tories are known to have become incrly dissat'd with B. Trend's Cabinet 
Office, which simply isnt doing for them the purposive policy-oriented job they'd 
anticipated when working out in Opposition their elaborate plans for a central 
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capability of wh the CPRS was to have been only one part. It's being suggested that 
T- who's been in the job since 1963, far too long (`Harold Wilson burnt him out', 
330 as my father [Lord Plowden] is always saying) is about to go ... 
It was another year before John Hunt succeeded Trend. 
The stellar rise and tragic fall of Sir William Armstrong 
William Armstrong was central to Heath's gradual shift towards a much more 
prime ministerial-style of government. He had grown bored with his role as Head of the 
Home Civil Service, only responsible for staffing and machinery of government issues. 331 
On 23 August 1972, Samuel Brittan had an exclusive in the Financial Times speculating 
that William Armstrong was to become head of a new Prime Minister's Department. 332 
Armstrong moved quickly to rebut Brittan's article, unsurprisingly labelling it `silly 
season stuff . 
333 Robert Armstrong, ever hostile to the think tank, wrote to Donald 
Maitland with the suspicion that the story had `A CPRS source, I presume. '334 Maitland 
replied that `The indications are that the source is in the Party. Mark Schreiber is the 
leading candidate. '335 Despite Heath's 1969 interest (see chapter three) in more open 
government, very little happened on this subject during his Government. Lord Franks was 
330 The diary of Dr William Plowden. Entry for 27 February 1972. 
331 Theakston, Leadership in Whitehall, p. 192. 
332 Samuel Brittan, `Plan for New Department to Aid PM', Financial Times, 23 August 1972. 
333 Roy Blackman, `Silly Season Stuff, says Sir William', Daily Express, 25 August 1972. 
334 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1603, `Reorganistion of central government: organisation of three central 
departments of Treasury, Cabinet Office (with Central Policy Review Staff) and Civil Service 
Department (CSD); part 8', Robert Armstrong to Donald Maitland, 5 September 1972. 
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asked to chair an inquiry into the Official Secrets Act336 and in 1972 urged `a narrower, 
more clearly drawn secrecy law'. 337 If Heath had been re-elected in 1974, it is likely he 
would have legislated along these lines. 338 As it was, reform came only in 1989. 
It may or may not have been `silly season stuff in William Armstrong's view, but 
Heath asked him to consider doing exactly what he had publicly dismissed. 339 Armstrong 
duly responded with a meaty report. A chief of staff was considered - `one man acting as 
suzerain both of the Cabinet Office and the Civil Service Department'. There would be a 
single department approach for `overall government strategy and the allocation and 
control of resources in pursuit of that strategy'. This was quickly ruled out due to 
concentration of work, the overall burden and questions of ministerial responsibility. Sir 
William then suggested a `department of resources and management'. This would have 
seen either the CSD and the Treasury reunited, or the Treasury's public expenditure 
division merged with the CSD's staffing side and the Cabinet Office, but Armstrong was 
loth to split the Treasury any further. The last option mooted was a `cabinet and public 
services department', which would have involved the amalgamation of the Cabinet Office 
and either all or most of the CSD (staffmg might have been returned to the Treasury). 
There was a further option - to do nothing. 34° With William Armstrong offering a deep 
analysis but finally coming down hard on the side of the status quo, and Robert 
Armstrong already a known opponent of splitting the Treasury again, there was little 
chance of radical change at the centre. Heath accepted this, but clearly only reluctantly: 
335 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1603, Donald Maitland to Robert Armstrong, 7 September 1972. 
336 See NA, PRO, PREM 15/512, `Committee of Enquiry into law of defamation, contempt of court and 
official secrets: review of Official Secrets Act; Franks Report'. 
337 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 353. 
338 peter Hennessy, 'Open government, Whitehall and the press since 1945', in Hugh Stephenson (ed. ), 
Media Voices, (Politico's, 2001), p. 324. 
339 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1603, Sir William Armstrong to Robert Armstrong, 12 September 1972. 
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The Prime Minister said that another major problem was what he described as the 
`No. 10 problem'. Increasingly he had found the need to force issues to the fore and 
process them to the point of decision from the centre. The Prime Minister's Private 
Office as now constituted could not do this. Ad hoc arrangements had been made for 
dealing with European affairs and emergencies, but it might be beginning to be 
necessary to provide some more definite organisational arrangements. 341 
Lord Hurd was thoughtful on Heath's `No. 10 problem': 
That was quite constant. He wasn't himself a great original thinker, Ted, at all. He 
needed to be fed with ideas but he felt that he wasn't being fed with ideas. He was 
conscious of what he needed and he needed people around him such as he had in 
opposition on a smaller scale. He needed people around him who would have 
constant original ideas and he wasn't getting that out of the machine or out of his 
colleagues. I think that was the driver. I don't think it was him saying `I've got these 
brilliant ideas, how do we apply them, ' it was him saying `We bloody-well need 
these brilliant ideas, who is going to give them to me, then I'll drive them 
through. 342 
Heath had identified the same problem as Wilson earlier (along with Trend and William 
Armstrong), that of insufficient `strength at the centre'. 343 Perhaps due to the ever- 
340 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1603, Sir William Armstrong to Robert Armstrong, 12 September 1972. 
341 Ibid., Robert Armstrong to Sir William Armstrong, 13 September 1972. 
342 Interview with Lord Hurd of Westwell. 
343 See Kenneth Berrill, Strength At The Centre: The Case For A Prime Minister's Department, the Stamp 
Memorial Lecture delivered on 4 December 1980 (published by University of London, 1981). 
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growing complexity of government, the knotty problems governments were trying to deal 
with, or even the gradual expansion of the role of Prime Minister beyond being merely 
primus inter pares (maybe a combination of all three), the Prime Minister was now 
assuming a much more active role. Yet the Prime Minister's Office remained a very 
small institution, certainly compared to the offices of overseas' leaders. Part of the 
original thinking behind the CPRS was to facilitate the Prime Minister in leading from 
the front. The form in which the CPRS was actually created brought some support, but 
clearly not enough. When Wilson formed his third administration in March 1974, he took 
decisive action in this regard, establishing the Downing Street Policy Unit. This initially 
comprised of nine special advisers (including its founding father Bernard Donoughue)344 
who would be `advisers to the Prime Minister; and they are policy advisers, appointed as 
civil servants, not political advisers appointed and paid by a Party political organisation. 
They do not intend to operate over the whole field of Government policies. They are 
mainly interested in day-to-day advice to the Prime Minister on selected fields of 
domestic policy, which particular reference to the political implications of policy'. 345 The 
hole had been partially filled and it was the explicitly political Policy Unit which was to 
prosper, expand greatly and survive to the present day. 
But before the Policy Unit had been established, with Heath increasingly 
surrounded by supposedly impartial officials, however eminent, and with troubles which 
demanded political solutions crowding in, something had to give. What gave was the 
career of Sir William Armstrong. Promoted above his superiors to become Joint- 
344 NA, PRO, PREM 16/104, 'Special advisers: guidance on appointment of special advisers to ministers; 
political activities; role of Dr Bernard Donoughue', Bernard Thimont (CSD) to Donoughue, 'No 10: 
Policy Unit', 20 March 1974. 
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Permanent Secretary to the Treasury in 1962, he left after six momentous years to 
become the first Permanent Secretary to the Civil Service Department as well as Head of 
the Home Civil Service. But, in 1972, though still based in the CSD and retaining 
responsibility for machinery of government matters (Sir Frank Cooper thought `William 
got very bored with the whole thing '346) he was asked to plan Heath's shift towards a 
more interventionist strategy. Armstrong was involved throughout as a civil servant 
committed to making things better, `and without the civil servant's ultimate 
detachment'347 met a driven and pragmatic Prime Minister. 348 This was already treading a 
fine line when it came to impartiality, but when he was photographed sitting next to the 
prime Minister in a press conference to announce a statutory incomes policy in Lancaster 
House on 6 November 1972, rumours and reality began to converge. 349 This identified 
him with the politics of the incumbent. It also encouraged gossip over his role vis-ä-vis 
the Prime Minister. One Whitehall trade union leader, Bill Kendall of the Civil and 
Public Services Association, coined the phrase `the deputy prime minister s350 to describe 
Armstrong, something, according to Lord Croham, Armstrong liked the sound of. 351 
Press speculation, as we have seen, even suggested that Armstrong would be put in 
charge of a new Prime Minister's Department. 
352 
Sir William's involvement at the apex of government activity did not last very long, 
however. For, at the moment of acutest pressure on the Government, with the second 
346 Symposium, `The Heath Government', Contemporary Record, vol. 9, no. 1 (1995), p. 212. 
347 phillip Whitehead, The Writing On The Wall (Joseph in association with Channel 4 Television 
Company, 1985), p. 89. 
348 Baston and Seldon in The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, p. 66. 
349 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 239. 
350 ibid., p. 238. 
351 Lord Croham briefing the 'Hidden Wiring' MA option course, Queen Mary, University of London, 9 
February 2005. 
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miners' dispute underway from 12 November 1973 and the oil price doubled at 
Christmas, 353 Armstrong's mental health broke in the early weeks of 1974, just at the 
time when the decision was being reached to call an early general election on the basis of 
`Who Governs Britain? ' There are descriptions of him being quietly led from a 
committee room by Douglas Allen after weeks of strange warnings from Armstrong of 
infiltration by communists, moving the Red Army from here and the `blue' army from 
there, 354 and finally advising his fellow permanent secretaries to go home early that 
afternoon as a sign of governmental confidence in itself. 
355 
Whitehall folklore suggests that Armstrong may have had two earlier 
breakdowns. 356 Certainly, one ex-official explained how it came within his duties in the 
late-1960s to administer his on-going medication. 357 Samuel Brittan thinks that `His 
illness was always likely to break out under stress. '358 Armstrong remained Head of the 
Home Civil Service throughout his convalescence, but was allowed to retire a year early 
in April 1974 at the age of 59, to join the Board of the Midland Bank on the 
understanding that he would become Chairman in April 1975. Permission for this, it was 
claimed, was granted by Heath, and reviewed and approved by Wilson. 
359 Joe Haines 
made it plain that his leaving had avoided an embarrassing demand for his departure over 
his identification with Heath36o 
313 Cairnc toss, The British Economy Since 1945, p. 199. 
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As Churchill had written of Lord Curzon, `The morning had been golden; the 
noontide was bronze; and the evening lead': the same could be said of Sir William. 361 
Armstrong himself understood his mistake: `when honest people can use the words 
"deputy prime minister" of one, then clearly something got slightly askew ... I was 
always determined not to be seen as another Horace Wilson, but that's what 
happened. 062 It was undeniably a story of failure. Even Heath came to find fault with 
Armstrong, criticising him privately, after the Government fell, for claiming too much 
influence. 363 But it was a failure shared by Heath himself. 
As Prime Minister of a government better prepared than any other (according to 
politicians such as lain Macleod364 and academics like John Ramsden365) steered away 
from its original course, Heath's reputation never recovered. Recriminations reverberated 
for years. The right wing of the Conservative Party thought that Heath had betrayed them 
and his own `Selsdon-man' planning. The rise of Thatcher and her cult was mirrored by 
her followers' dismissal of Heath as without principle or a spine. 366 Others felt that 
Heath's reliance on senior civil servants fatally wounded him. It is clear that a coterie 
formed at the pinnacle of government, and that it was formed by the Prime Minister, his 
principal Private Secretary and the Head of the Home Civil Service. William 
Waldegrave, by 1973 Hurd's successor as Heath's Political Secretary, thought that he had 
become `wholly reliant' on Armstrong and Armstrong. Waldegrave was reputedly said to 
have seen the triumvirate walking down the stairs in No. 10 and then murmured `T7he 
361 Churchill quoted in Roy Jenkins, Churchill (Macmillan, 2001), p. 510. 
362 Interview with Desmond Wilcox for BBC2's Man Alive reproduced in The Listener, 28 March 1974. 
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Treasury have got him' (though his recollection in 2006 was of `a very clear picture of 
Ted going up the stairs to his flat [in No. 10] with Robert and William going with him 
and thinking that he had chosen to be surrounded by the civil service when he went to 
relax and talk about things. I perhaps should have said the Treasury, but ... I remember 
the point being that it was the civil servants and not ministerial colleagues or political 
advisers with whom he felt most comfortable by the end. )367 Talk of this kind was 
preposterous to Sir Samuel Goldman, public expenditure supremo in the Treasury from 
1968-73 and a close friend of Sir William `Rubbish. Absolute rubbish. Don't believe it. ' 
William Armstrong's fate was `Very sad. ' 
He was a politician really. He had the misfortune to become the friend, if you like, 
prot6g6 of Edward Heath and of course there are not many civil servants who can 
withstand that kind of thing when the Prime Minister makes you his particular 
favourite. It's a very sad story. He was a great friend of mine. His life in a sense 
ended in tragedy ... There's no civil servant, really, who would be capable of 
resisting that 
368 
It is likely that Burke Trend would have. Lord Hurd backs Goldman's thesis: `I think that 
is more true. Ted had no particular regard for the Treasury and the Treasury had to 
restrain him in the Autumn of 1973 when the danger signals were multiplying and the 
Treasury was quite right. 9369 There is, though, some truth to Goldman's contention. At 
the aforementioned press conference to announce the second phase of the incomes policy, 
367 Private information and letter to Professor Hennessy, 20 February 2006. 
368 interview with Sir Samuel Goldman. 
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three chairs were placed on the platform, one for Heath, one for Barber and the final one 
for Maurice Macmillan. When Macmillan was delayed, Heath turned to Sir William and 
said `Come on, you'd better sit there. ' `What does one do when instructed by the prime 
minister to sit next to him? ' was Armstrong's later comment. 370 Heath the bureaucratic 
politician and William Armstrong the highly political official were becoming far too 
close for propriety. 371 William Whitelaw, upon his return from Northern Ireland to 
become Employment Secretary, began to speak of the `Sir William Armstrong 
s 372 syndrome. 
Crises and culmination 
Sir William's fall came at the end of one of the most torrid periods over which a 
government has presided in peacetime. Strikes leading to civil disturbance, and an 
economy showing unprecedentedly sickly signs of what was christened `stagflation' by 
Norman Macrae of The Economist (stagnant growth coupled with rising unemployment - 
supposedly illogical), led some to describe the country as `ungovernable'. 
373 The Civil 
Service could not escape some of the fall-out from this distressing state of affairs. 
Douglas Hurd, Heath's Political Secretary until 1973 when he left to nurse a 
parliamentary constituency in Oxfordshire, has written critically of the Civil Service 
when crisis enveloped the Government. A diplomat to his fingertips and therefore not a 
370 Sunday Telegraph, 1 May 1977. 
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man usually given to hyperbole, Hurd described the bureaucracy's capitulation in the last 
months. He believed that when a government faces 
rough times, when existing policies have collapsed, a Prime Minister will find that 
the senior civil servants fall silent. I saw this happen once over Ireland and three 
times over incomes policy. They busy themselves at such times with the usual 
agendas and meetings, the corridors are full of scurrying figures, but nothing 
substantial emerges. They are, quite reasonably, waiting for the new course which 
only politicians can set. It is then that political advice becomes all-important ... No 
one who was present at any of these three meetings could believe that the civil 
service runs this country. 374 
Heath was largely uninterested in this `political advice', due to his attempt to always lead 
in the national interest and the belief that this would be, axiomatically, politically 
popular. 
During 1972-73 Hurd encouraged ministers, with Heath's approval, to recruit more 
special advisers, partly in an attempt to counter the image that politics were being ignored 
in favour of managerialism. 375 Hurd also voiced concerns in 1971 that the CPRS, `a body 
of public servants, [was] developing political strategy that was basically the prerogative 
of Ministers'. 
376 (The idea that Heath's governance was too technocratic found strong 
backing from a senior permanent secretary in 2005 who thought that democracy 
373 Sir Samuel Brittan, `Doomsters ride again: This house believes that demographics, debt and deficit spell 
imminent disaster for the G7', City Debate Speech Against, 24/01/05. 
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demanded greater political input than was evident during 1970-74.377) In the last months 
of the Administration, Hurd tried to bring the developing network of special advisers - 
more than ever before, though `the total in service does not seem to have exceeded ten; 
and none had the public profile of, for example, Balogh'378 - together to bring greater 
strategic coherence. 379 
This challenge to the authority of the state had many repercussions. It further 
damaged an already shaky economy. Differing beliefs on how the growing economic 
malaise could be mitigated was a main factor in the overshadowing of the CPRS. 
Relations between the Prime Minister and Rothschild had been strong from the first, with 
Rothschild finding Heath `to be a careful listener with, of course, a very sharp mind'. 380 
There was also for Rothschild, from the beginning, a right of audience with the Prime 
Minister. 381 Rothschild did admit, however, that, at the end of 1972, he only saw Heath 
once every five to seven weeks. 
382 This was partly due to Rothschild's almost shameless 
sycophancy - or should one call it calculated attentiveness? For example, when the Prime 
Minister mentioned that he wanted a Churchillian reduction in paper coming to the 
Cabinet383 (a running wish of Heath's, right through to 1973384), Rothschild wrote to 
Heath's Principal Private Secretary that, `You may care to mention to the Prime Minister 
that I hope he is not going to be one jump ahead of the CPRS on every occasion. The 
376 NA, PRO, CAB 184/34, `CPRS weekly meetings', `Meeting between the CPRS and the Prime 
Minister', 2 July 1971. 
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380 Rothschild, Random Variables, p. 76. 
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384 NA, PRO, PREM 15/2023, 'Prime Minister's instruction to departments on reduction in paperwork', C. 
W. Roberts (Downing Street) to N. W. Stuart (CSD), 13 September 1973. 
298 
central capability has been discussing this very matter during the last 10 days'385 
(Douglas-Home had mentioned it on Rothschild's milk-round386). `That all depends on 
the CPRS', was Heath's reply. 387 
Rothschild was to undermine this informality and closeness to Heath with an ill- 
judged `brief address' to the Letcombe Laboratory of the Agricultural Research Council, 
near Wantage, on 24 September 1973. He predicted, all too accurately as it turned out, 
just how far the British economy would slide if the country endured an economic future 
similar to its recent past: 
From the vantage point of the Cabinet Office, it seems to me that unless we take a 
very strong pull at ourselves and give up the idea that we are one of the wealthiest, 
most influential and important countries in the world ... we are likely to find 
ourselves in increasingly serious trouble. To give just one unpalatable example, in 
1985 we shall have half the economic weight of France or Germany ... It 
is the 
knowledge that our difficulties and dangers are as severe and ominous as they were 
in World War II, though, of course, of a different sort ... When you have 1 million 
unemployed, it is not easy to scrap the Concorde, even if that were a good idea, and 
put another 25,000 men out of work, quite apart from the financial penalties of 
breaking a Treaty ... [yet] 
if we don't grasp this nettle, we shall not solve those 
difficulties I mentioned earlier which, as sure as eggs are eggs, are with us now. 388 
385 NA, PRO, PREM 15/762, Lord Rothschild to Robert Armstrong, 19 February 1971. 
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William Plowden has explained the genesis of the speech: 
The Rothschild speech starts with Peter Carey and myself going to the Hudson 
Institute in New York and talking to Herman Kahn ... and bringing Kahn back to 
talk to Rothschild ... Kahn sowed 
in Rothschild's mind the seeds of what became 
the Wantage speech: `You guys are going down the tubes and you don't recognise 
it. ' So I felt slightly guilty about being the cause of that. 389 
What Plowden felt `slightly guilty' about was that Heath had decided, on the same day as 
Rothschild was sharing his downbeat thoughts, to give a speech of his own in Essex, 
lauding the economic prospects of Britain amid rising general prosperity. 390 The phone- 
lines of the No. 10 Press Office were soon `besieged' over this apparent divergence at the 
very heart of government. In the pressured world of Downing Street, where a pin-prick 
can appear as a sword-wound, officials moved into crisis mode. The Civil Service 
nightmare of a condottiere roaming around - and sometimes venturing outside accepted 
boundaries - was coming true . 
391 For Rothschild had `invited the BBC and local radio to 
be present' and `had circulated the text of his speech to the Press because he had learnt 
from experience that if you did not do so you were liable to misquotation' (though in this 
instance the ability to claim this would have helped him). 392 
The Director of the CPRS was tracked down to his flat after his return from 
Cambridge and, at the `invitation' of John Hunt, travelled to the Cabinet Office at once. 
389 Interview with William Plowden. 
390 Lord Rothschild, Meditations Of A Broomstick (Collins, 1977), pp. 89-96; Blackstone and Plowden, 
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An `interview' was conducted by Hunt and Robert Armstrong, at which Rothschild 
protested his innocence by professing `to be surprised by the interest which the Press 
were taking and claimed that he had said nothing in his speech which had not been 
published in some other forum'. Rothschild's warning had, almost verbatim, also formed 
the main part of the discussion briefing for the CPRS's November 1972 `Review of 
Government Strategy'. 393 
For the two paragons of propriety, Rothschild's speech was idiotic. They were 
not concerned so much with any question of the disclosure of official information 
[there had not been any] but with the policy implications and the embarrassment to 
Ministers. The Press seemed bound to draw the conclusion that our standard of 
living would fall dramatically in relation to our European partners unless the 
Government took decisions like cancelling the Concorde to free resources. Lord 
Rothschild said that he had never recommended cancelling the Concorde and did not 
do so in his speech; but he agreed that this passage might be open to 
misinterpretation. 394 
The mandariis were worried lest Anglo-French relations be damaged, `particularly since 
it was thought that General Bloch was currently in London for discussions with senior 
British officials about the Concorde programme'. 395 The British Embassy in Paris was 
briefed immediately. 396 (This may not have been disastrous, for Rothschild was on good 
terms with at least one French general, with whom he had swapped information of the 
393 NA, PRO, CAB 129/166, CPRS, 'Mid-Term Strategy. Is the Balance Right? ', 17 November 1972. 
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exact French cost of Concorde for several bottles of Chateau Lafite from his private 
cellar. 397) 
The next day, the Prime Minister summoned Hunt and William Armstrong to 
consider whether Rothschild `be dismissed or asked to resign'. The factors supporting his 
dismissal were `the general embarrassment', the speech being `a calculated act', and the 
fact that `other senior officials might be encouraged to think that they could similarly 
break the rules over the clearance of speeches and get away with it'. Against this, `the 
departure of Lord Rothschild at this juncture would not only be damaging to the 
development of the CPRS but might appear to give substance to the suggestion that there 
was a fundamental disagreement over policy between Ministers and himself'. 
Heath decided to keep Rothschild, 398 but the Prime Minister subjected the head of 
the think tank to, in Rothschild's words, a `rather unpleasant dressing-down'. 
399 In the 
meeting, Heath `made clear to Lord Rothschild the embarrassment created for him'. 
Rothschild again defended himself, saying that `there was nothing in his speech with 
which the Prime Minister would disagree'. Heath `did not contest this' but `regretted that 
Lord Rothschild's observations on the matter had been so half-baked'. The Prime 
Minister then warned Rothschild that his CPRS charges should `now be instructed to be 
completely discreet in their relations with journalists', this in reference to a leak to The 
Times that could only have come from within the think tank over advised public 
expenditure cuts (senior civil servants being generally uneasy over the tank's perceived 
openness). 
400 
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Rothschild later wrote that he and Heath immediately put all this behind them, 
such was the Prime Minister's nature: `in a very Heath-like way there came a moment in 
the interview when he said, "Well, now let's discuss nuclear reactors". And that was the 
end of it. The matter was never raised again and our relationships were perfectly OK 
afterwards. 001 Certainly, a fortnight later on 10 October 1973, after the Wantage speech 
had caused some discomfort for the Prime Minister at the Conservative Party Conference, 
Rothschild again wrote to Heath to `reiterate my apologies; and express my gratitude for 
the way you dealt with the entire issue'. 402 The Prime Minister responded curtly: `I said 
[to an ITN interviewer] that I regarded the incident as closed - and so I do' 
403 But things 
did not go back to the way they had been. Heath withdrew much of his earlier trust in the 
think tank. Even Rothschild had to admit that it was `never glad confident morning 
again'. 404 
William Waldegrave believes that the CPRS's eclipse went deeper: `The 
Government was becoming increasingly crisis bound, which means those who are crisis 
bound don't want to hear people talking about strategy. In particular, they don't want to 
hear people saying uncomfortable things. '405 Lord Butler thinks that the CPRS `was 
becoming more of an embarrassment than a help' and that Heath was beginning to think 
that `a lot of the CPRS's ideas were zany'. 
406 (Trailing the CPRS's last strategy session 
for the Heath Government were the words, `Many people in this country now believe 
politics to be a private game', promising that in the presentation the CPRS would `take 
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the devil's advocate role', which lend credence to Butler's analysis. 407) The CPRS's 
`brief heady moment of creative energy' was essentially coming to an end. 408 Indeed, on 
19 December John Hunt wrote to Robert Armstrong reporting `that morale in the CPRS is 
currently low, partly because a lot of their work has been knocked sideways by the 
current situation and partly because of Lord Rothschild's recent off-stage activities. '409 
This was very unfortunate, since it coincided exactly with the time Heath needed 
his creation most. For, just as his options over the economy began to narrow, with the 
OPEC-induced inflation and the miners' second bout of industrial action, the iconoclasm 
inherent in the CPRS may have got him through it. Indeed, Rothschild, who himself 
suffered a mild heart attack in December 1973,410 and on his doctor's orders spent the 
first three weeks of 1974 recuperating in Barbados, 411 suggested that global pressures 
were changing the domestic position. He argued, unsuccessfully as it turned out, that the 
oil crisis had made energy a special case; in any case he felt deeply that the miners 
deserved a doubled wage-packet due to their unpalatable working conditions. 412 
The road was therefore open to treat the miners outside the incomes policy to 
which the Government was trying to tie the country. This eminently reasonable and 
rational analysis, exactly what the CPRS had been born to do, was rejected over the 
power-play of who was in charge and the country slid into a three-day week and an even 
deeper crisis. 413 For Plowden, the whole malaise was `compounded by Victor 
Rothschild's extremely unfortunate illness, wh took him away at the moment when ... 
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411 NA, PRO, PREM 15/2099, Lord Rothschild to Edward Heath, 16 December 1973. 
412 Rose, Elusive Rothschild, p. 189. 
413 Blackstone and Plowden, Inside The Think Tank, pp. 55,93-4. 
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more than ever before it was critical to have a sharp cutting edge in the form of someone 
who was willing and able to deliver slightly unpalatable and unsolicited messages to 
people at the top' 414 
The last demonstration of Heath's personal cabinet in action was altogether ironic. 
In December 1973, the four most powerful mandarins in Whitehall sent the Prime 
Minister a blunt message that his attempt to `breakout' of the British economy's recent 
straitjacket was doomed. William Armstrong, Hunt, Allen and Robert Armstrong had a 
meeting to discuss economic contingency planning in order to counter the damage of an 
estimated £3,000 million deficit on the balance of payments for 1974. The measures 
would include public expenditure reductions, a cut in subsidies to public energy 
industries, an increase in income tax, abolition of some tax relief and a tax on land and 
property. Robert Armstrong minuted his Prime Minister very directly about the meeting: 
At some time between now and the announcement of a change of this kind, it would 
be necessary to change gear, from the sort of provisional `business as usual' line 
which we have followed so far, to more overt recognition that we face a very serious 
situation, which means (as you have said) at least reducing the growth of the 
standard of living and perhaps even a decline in living standards. It is arguable that 
confidence is no longer served by continuing as at present: if the situation is clearly 
serious and calls for action, confidence is damaged, not improved, by a continuing 
appearance of Governmental blindness (or refusal to see) and inaction. 
415 
414 The diary of Dr William Plowden. Entry for 4 February 1974. 
415 NA, PRO, PREM 15/1429, `Economic statement 17 Dec 1973 (public expenditure reductions, taxation 
and consumer credit measures)', Robert Armstrong to 
Edward Heath, 6 December 1973. 
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The only people capable of stopping Heath proved to be his closest official advisers. His 
political colleagues were simply unwilling and unable. 
Conclusion 
The Heath Government's extensive ambition was dashed so quickly and in the most 
dramatic fashion. It remains the biggest failure to carry out a programme in the post-war 
period. But that does not mean all was in vain, even worthless. For the planning in the 
run-up to government was exemplary, both in its theory and as an attempt to bring 
practicality to that theory. Some of those ideas, too, were imaginative and bold. But it 
was inevitable that political planning would be amended once in government. Quite how 
much was adapted and changed upset some of the pre-election planners, with programme 
analysis and review the key disappointment. The Central Policy Review Staff, while 
again disappointing political figures such as David Howell, was a tremendously exciting 
creation. Its moment in the midday sun did not last long, perhaps only two years. 
However those two years impressed all who came into contact with the think tank, and its 
abolition in 1983 was widely 
lamented. Repeated calls for a reconstitution eventually led 
to something akin to the CPRS gradually taking shape at the heart of government 
throughout the Blair years. 
Nevertheless, the Heath Government's fall in February 1974 was a disaster for both 
the temporary and permanent sides of government, and for the faith that institutional 
change could turn Britain's 
fortunes around. Perhaps it was the domestic equivalent of 
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the Suez Crisis, whereby humiliation was suffered by Britain from every angle and `as in 
a lightning flash' the landscape was revealed. Administrative reform having been 
extensively tried and perceived to have failed meant that the stage was set for the leftist 
attempts of Tony Benn and his followers and the right-wing actuality of Thatcherism, 
both of them aggressively political initiatives that drew their inspiration and much of 
their personnel from outside government altogether. Certainly the mid-1970s now seem a 
pivotal moment in the post-war history of Britain and the Civil Service had a central role 
mit. 
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Conclusion 
The reform of British central government during the years 1960-74 was a process 
of comparatively breathless activity. Departments came and went (and sometimes merged 
and de-merged). The twentieth-century's iron demarcation between temporary yet largely 
elected ministers and permanent, but unelected, officials began to break down and the 
gradually increasing power of the office of Prime Minister began to be recognised 
administratively. 
We have examined the reasons why the pressure for change was considerable and 
varied. These were long- and short-term, social, political, economic and, in some cases, 
personal. The feeling that no end was in sight to relative economic decline brought great 
impetus for change, especially in the management and purpose of the Treasury, which 
during the 1950s and 1960s was going through a difficult period anyway. Pent up 
antagonism towards allegedly elitist recruitment to the top ranks and the real or imagined 
ethos of the British Civil Service added a class-based critique to the debate. A consensus 
between the political parties during the tenures of Macmillan, Wilson and Heath, that 
administrative reform was necessary to turning around the country's fortunes added to the 
frequency of the changes. This decade-and-a-half of constant alteration brought with it 
another theme which was to dominate the 1970s - whether or not the Civil Service had its 
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own agenda; whether it was right for unelected officials to hold what were in effect 
political, if not party, opinions which they were powerfully placed to promote, and which 
usually steered policy towards the consensual middle ground. Some Labour and 
Conservative figures felt that the machine was a political entity in itself. 
It is worth analysing just how the individual Prime Ministers who presided over the 
Civil Service during the 1960s and early 1970s viewed the higher reaches of the state 
machine. Harold Macmillan's approach, as in so many other core areas, was complex. 
Macmillan demonstrated an arm's-length's dependence on the bureaucracy, as witness 
his unchanging belief in the Cabinet system and the corresponding trust in his Ministers, 
somewhat in the manner that a feudal landowner would respect his servants. This meant 
that he felt entirely comfortable in the way the centre was traditionally organised, with a 
small No. 10 office supplemented by a single unpaid appointee, his friend John 
Wyndham, essentially there as a chum to keep Macmillan's spirits up. 
Yet, especially as the decade turned, Macmillan began to take a keen interest in the 
running of the state and its power to steer the economy. The strong and sustained growth 
of France and other Western European neighbours caught Macmillan's eye and, along 
with a wish to recreate the unified national purpose of the war years, led to the creation of 
the National Economic Development Council. That, and the reorganisation of the 
Treasury (in the wake of the Plowden report) to give it a more growth-oriented 
momentum, with its concomitant out with old, in with the new promotion of Sir William 
Armstrong above his superiors, meant that Macmillan was subtly changing the nature of 
the prime Minister's role as it had been previously understood in peacetime. Certainly he 
never trusted the Treasury enough to allow it, or its Chancellors, free rein. As the author 
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of the mildly-statist The Middle Way, he believed in what he later described as `a little 
dirigisme' which he had already demonstrated during his time as an interventionist 
Minister for Housing in the early 1950s. It is entirely conceivable that if Macmillan's 
tenure had lasted longer, he would have harnessed the state's power in a greater and 
greater fashion. 
There are many general analyses and theories of the processes and dynamics of 
administrative reform, perhaps the most cogent being by Richard Chapman and J. R. 
Greenaway in 1980. They described the multitude of elements ranging from a premium 
on incrementalism for an old bureaucracy to the very long historic roots of many if not all 
of the reform issues, along with the short and long-term pressure of ideas from society in 
general, from academia, business and indeed from within the Civil Service itself. It is 
worth analysing which influences held the upper hand during the three main premierships 
of the period 1960-74. For Macmillan, the Thirties depression combined with the lessons 
of Keynes, the success of the wartime British state and its move towards a mixed 
economy with a comprehensive welfare state after 1945 all contributed to his mildly 
interventionist and expansionist stewardship of the state. Macmillan wanted `a better 
yesterday" - and more of it. 
His successor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, had too little time to demonstrate any 
reforms, analytically derived or not. In office for essentially a year and all the time 
fighting against the odds for re-election, Douglas-Home nevertheless undid nothing of 
Macmillan's new dirigiste approach and even suggested that, had he prevailed at the polls 
in 1964, a major review of central Civil Service machinery was very much in his mind. 
1 Ralf Dahrendorf quoted in Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister (Penguin, 2000), p. 335. 
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With Labour's victory over Douglas-Home's Conservatives, Harold Wilson was in 
position to enact his wishes. Having been previously a young Cabinet Minister at the 
Board of Trade and an even younger senior civil servant in the wartime Cabinet Office 
meant Wilson had plenty of experience on which to base his extensive opinions. First, he 
was a great believer in civil servants per se. Having been one at a senior level (and one 
who had been offered a permanent job at the Treasury when the war ended), Wilson felt 
secure in senior officials' company, not a universal feeling in political circles. Second, he 
was a statistician and shared the belief that experts throughout the Service were not given 
the credit their learning and skills deserved. Moreover, he had been Chairman of the 
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee before he became Labour Leader in 
1963, a role which provides solid information on financial matters generally and the 
Treasury's performance in particular. Add to this a belief throughout the centre and left of 
British politics at this time of the benefits of some form of state direction and you have a 
politician who believed in the state but who desired to see it changed to do more with 
greater effect. 
Unlike Macmillan who had taken several years to decide what he wanted to do vis- 
A-vis the machinery of government, Wilson began his reform of Whitehall with a flurry of 
activity within the first weeks. Five new departments were established, high level special 
advisers were ushered into senior posts both inside the Treasury and the Cabinet Office 
and a new Political Secretary was appointed. All were presented as needed changes to 
snake the Civil Service work more efficiently and in a modem fashion. All created to a 
lesser or greater degree friction and turf wars, especially that between the DEA and the 
Treasury, and between Marcia Williams and Derek Mitchell in No. 10. This demonstrates 
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a key factor in the Wilsonian model of Whitehall reform, namely that for every step 
forward, there was often one back. It was what Sir David Omand described as, admittedly 
in a different context, the machinery of government's `law of unexpected consequences'. ' 
Wilson's penchant for machinery tinkering in his first two Premierships (1964-66 and 
1966-70) was endless, as was his wish to build a worthy rival to the Treasury. In 1964 it 
was the DEA, then in 1967 the Department of Employment and Productivity, in 1968 the 
Civil Service Department, then in 1969 it was Mintech's turn to take the baton. None 
lasted very long, displacement activity in the form of constant reorganisation reigned and 
the Treasury remained much as it always had been. 
Wilson's creation of the Fulton Committee in 1966 was due as much to his belief in 
across-the-board modernisation as it was a wish to energise the state and unleash the 
potentials of the specialists therein (alongside a more mundane concern over 
recruitment). The true significance of the myriad recommendations contained within the 
Fulton Report came only with the passage of time when most of its major points were 
enacted in some form or another. In the short-term, Fulton was essentially memorable 
because of the arguments which ensued over its content and implementation. This was 
not healthy for Wilson's desired reputation as an effective Whitehall reformer. 
Yet Wilson will go down in history as a reformer of great importance. For two of 
his innovations did endure and evolve and have ever since been considered settled parts 
of the Civil Service constellation, namely special advisers and the Policy Unit. The 
importation of unelected outsiders to government in peacetime was not a new 
phenomenon, especially if one considers the time before the Great War. But for the rest 
2 Sir David Omand, `In the National Interest: Organising Government for National Security', The Demos 
Annual Security Lecture, 20 December 2006. 
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of the twentieth century this was novel, as was the fact that the major appointees were 
specialists, economists at that, who were placed at the very top of government, as 
advisers to the Prime Minister and Chancellor (and another way to dent the Treasury's 
monopoly of advice). The `thin end of the wedge' for special advisers into government 
came in 1964 and grew greatly. As did Wilson's other lasting reform, that of the 
Downing Street Policy Unit. Although this came in 1974 with Wilson's return, it was 
clearly based upon his experiences in government, notably a wish for the Prime Minister 
to be able to get involved much more deeply in what had hitherto been departmental 
business, something Macmillan had little interest in. Wilson also claimed it was 
developed on the recommendation of the Fulton Report which had included the concept 
of a `Planning Unit' headed by a `Senior Policy Adviser'. That the Policy Unit was 
staffed by politically-appointed special advisers, his other lasting innovation, provided a 
neat coherency uncharacteristic to Wilson's usual technocratic tinkerings. 
Harold Wilson's view of the state was essentially very similar to that of Macmillan. 
He, too, believed in a constant push for greater expansion. Where Wilson differed, 
however, was that his impetus had a much more consciously political heart. The left-wing 
of British politics had been, since at least the 1930s, fascinated by the wish to plan the 
economy to a lesser or greater extent. After the Attlee years whereby great changes were 
made to the state, the 1950s saw what was in essence a dilemma for the Labour Party 
over whether to push for further enlargement and much more intrusive intervention in the 
economy or to consolidate and recognise that changing Labour aims could be better 
achieved by other routes. The publication of Anthony Crosland's The Future of Socialism 
in 1956 was perhaps the key text of this debate. With Wilson becoming leader in 1963, a 
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circle needed to be squared, and he proceeded upon a path which promised greater 
intervention by government but without creating new capacity, only rearranging what 
was already in place. 'Thus the DEA and Mintech were emboldened to change the 
economy, yet with little or no direct controls and with the Treasury retaining its veto over 
government spending and strategic direction, and therefore still in the ascendant. The 
highly ambitious plans that Wilson's 1960s governments created were consequently 
disappointed. That Wilson's approach had a real ideological motivation led many within 
his government to retain deep suspicion that the Civil Service were politically 
obstructionist, despite Wilson's own confidence in individual civil servants. Moreover, 
the seemingly never-ending addiction to rearranging the higher reaches of the state led to 
a real rejection of machinery reforms in the later 1970s and 1980s, something directly 
linked to Wilson. He immersed himself in the minutiae of technocracy, embracing all the 
many influences therein, only to emerge with what almost always seemed the most 
politically advantageous at the time, ignoring the longer term needs. His reputation in this 
area has proved to be poor. 
The reason the Policy Unit thrived was clear from Edward Heath's cri de coeur in 
1972 when he spoke of the `Number 10 problem'. He felt that he was increasingly 
required to run policy from the centre as Macmillan did not, yet the machinery had not 
caught up. Furthermore, well placed protagonists sensed that a lack of political input into 
the policy making process was a definite factor in the failure of the Heath Government. A 
centrally placed unit comprised of those politically motivated pushed at an open door and 
prime ministers have not looked back since. 
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The last months of Heath's failing Administration were in stark contrast to the hope 
it embodied in its first. The unprecedented, and unrepeated, depth and breadth of research 
and planning the Conservatives conducted touched on many if not most elements of 
government all in the belief that while his mentor Macmillan was on exactly the right 
path he had not driven there with the required urgency or efficiency. Heath wanted to see 
central government retain its compassion and decency but wanted to graft onto it business 
efficiency and academic analysis. The influences on Heath came from many angles. For a 
start, he spent a short time within the Ministry for Civil Aviation after passing the Civil 
Service exams, but he found the bureaucracy on the periphery of Whitehall stifling and 
was followed by several years as a senior Minister, thus having a view on both sides of 
government. A salient point here is that while he most certainly found officialdom stuffy 
he also respected it mightily, in the traditional Tory manner. In contrast to Wilson, 
another with deep respect for the Service, Heath sought to avoid turf disputes whereas 
Wilson had in some ways encouraged them, as witness the example of Marcia Williams 
and Derek Mitchell compared to Douglas Hurd and Robert Armstrong. 
The research groups he oversaw pulled in a wide range of skills and experience, 
from senior officialdom, politics and business. It was from this melange that emerged 
what were in effect two strong themes. One was the need for a much strengthened centre. 
The other, related to the first, was a wish for government to accept that to do better it 
must do less. The driving forces behind these two impulses were in the main part younger 
Conservatives along with businessmen they were largely co-ordinating. Extensive work 
persuasively presented impressed Heath, enough so that this most adroit of leaders led his 
young tyros to support their growing beliefs. But, once in government, though most of the 
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plans were embarked upon, none were implemented to the letter. The creation of the 
Central Policy Review Staff is perhaps the key example. In effect, Heath understood 
basically what he wanted to do and change, set up political inquiries to provide him with 
options and then gave the results of these to the mandarins to enact (which resulted in 
greater power for the Civil Service than all other influences). 
Heath, though fascinated by the machinery of government, was understandably 
much more taken by events, especially as his government encountered crises of a 
magnitude not seen since the war. The intricacies of Civil Service reform were pushed to 
the side and the easiest course was charted. This was not a time to take on vested interests 
in the way that Wilson and more importantly those around him had taken on senior 
officialdom over Fulton (albeit to little effect). 
It has subsequently been understood that Heath himself was-not wedded to much of 
the push towards less government, and that his flirtation with it pre-1970 and 
abandonment when in government led to great disappointment in some of his closest 
supporters. Where Heath was content to be bureaucratically controversial was in his 
treatment of the Treasury. As with Macmillan and Wilson before him, Heath was 
suspicious of the Treasury's power and its secretive nature which often led to Treasury 
dominated solutions to crises with little Prime Ministerial let alone Cabinet input. Heath 
added to this wariness a belief that the Treasury was anti-European believing that 
acceding to the EEC would do little for the UK and generally gloomy about the nation's 
economic prospects (in other words, that entry was more of a political than an economic 
decision). The Treasury was at its lowest influence during Heath's tenure in the postwar 
period. The idea of an explicit reforging of the centre, with a Prime Minister's 
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Department one option, was toyed with in 1972 as part of Heath's inclination that the 
Premier needed greater personal power, even more than had accrued to him with the 
establishment of the CPRS. This thesis demonstrates that the Heath Government was a 
largely unrecognised experiment in extensive prime ministerialism. Though Heath 
perfectly observed the conventions of the constitution as they were understood and 
policed by those such as Trend, even encouraging robust debate around the Cabinet table, 
the naturally private and unexpansive Prime Minister increasingly drove policy through 
himself. This was partly due to his character, but also because there were few trusted 
ministers of stature that he could call upon, especially after lain Macleod's early death 
and before William Whitelaw's rise. It was furthermore driven by the immense pressure 
of events which demanded swift decisions which were facilitated by Heath leaning on his 
officials to be more akin to those found in the French system. This is where Sir William 
Armstrong stepped in to the breach, with damaging results all round. 
Heath had great expectations of what the machine could do for his policies but, in 
contrast to Wilson's actions, he believed that he had created the extra capacity required. 
Seeking what was essentially a retention of the status quo but run more efficiently, Heath 
was far more sympathetic to a technocratic, business-like approach, one opposed to 
overtly political steers. This was one of the reasons he became isolated from his political 
colleagues as he believed, rightly, that the Civil Service always responded to a strong 
ministerial lead, especially if it was in a consensual, centrist direction. The bond between 
politician and official was never greater than during the Heath years. The Civil Service 
rarely had more influence. 
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A few major themes consequently bind the administrative history of Britain during 
the 1960s and early 1970s. The first is that the spirit of the age across the broad swathe of 
the political centre-ground was resolutely anchored to the belief in vigorous 
interventionism. An acceptance that the economy was the government's undoubted 
responsibility was allied to the fact that government also had a duty to include all agents 
within the economy with a view to forging a coherent plan whilst maintaining fairness. A 
great deal of prime ministerial time, quite likely the single greatest aspect, was spent on 
this as was that of the Civil Service. 
A related theme is that of the self-confidence of the Civil Service. It truly did still 
see itself as the fourth Service of the Crown after the army, navy and air force, just as Sir 
Warren Fisher had envisaged. This strength meant that it could fend off political change it 
did not believe in, whether that of a philosophical nature with the Labour plans of 1964 or 
those borrowed from the business world, elements of which were part of the 1970 
Conservative approach Radicalism was hardly attempted in these years, but would have 
been seen off easily. The art of the senior civil servant - establishing consensus - was 
still dominant and trusted. 
Yet a growing feeling throughout the era studied here within the higher echelons of 
the state was that the machinery at the centre had to be modernised. Macmillan, Wilson, 
Heath, even Douglas-Home, all recognised in their own ways that change was needed. 
The years 1960-74 witnessed many experiments with structures and people, both elected 
and not. With the establishment of the Cabinet Office in 1916 a system was created that 
would last for half-a-century. 1960-74 set the pattern for the next 50 years. 
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In a study like this which encompasses a great deal of activity over a decade-or-so, 
it is also necessary to demonstrate what value has been added. In the case of this thesis, it 
is the archival material and the subsequent interviews which have not so much changed 
the prevailing conceptions, as fleshed some out and deepened our understanding of 
others. 
In terms of chronology, the first new evidence to be uncovered was the late-1964 
struggle over the creation of the Department of Economic Affairs, and, more specifically, 
the way functions were to be shared with the Treasury. It is a given that the Treasury- 
DEA split was a difficult one that never really worked. What is new is that drawing up 
the so-called `concordat' between the two departments was not the easy task that Wilson 
claimed, but one that caused conflict and subsequently took much more time to agree 
than has been previously thought. In fact, a second debate over the concordat began 
around the time of the 1966 election. The archival evidence presented here explains much 
of the simmering tension between the two departments. 
A new appraisal of the role played by Marcia Williams, Wilson's Personal and 
Political Secretary throughout his premierships, has perhaps cast a slightly more 
favourable light on her than has been true of previous treatments. For sure, she had. a 
temperament which brought about myriad rudenesses. But, as the interview with Sir Eric 
Roll suggested, Williams's frustrations over alleged Civil Service obstructionism (to use 
her extreme analysis) has a little truth to it. While there was no impropriety on the part of 
officials, their naturally sceptical, if not cynical, appraisal of governments which wished 
to change so much, was that a good deal of work could have taken place and then been 
undone, all within months. This was especially so regarding a government with a small 
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majority, which led to a practically unavoidable election just eighteen months after the 
last one, as in the 1964-66 Parliament. There was little wish to embark on wholesale 
change until it was clear that it would endure. 
The Fulton Committee and its subsequent Report has been looked at in 
comprehensive detail before. Indeed, most of the documentary evidence was seen by 
Geoffrey Fry long before the thirty-year rule released the files to the public. However, 
new elements have been unearthed. The most significant was the attitude of No. 10 
Downing Street. We always knew that Harold Wilson was a supporter of the Fulton 
Report. What we did not know was just how attached to as deep a reform as possible was 
his Principal Private Secretary, Michael Halls. This put Halls on a collision course with 
the Head of the Home Civil Service, Sir William Armstrong, who was far from persuaded 
by the Fulton Report's more stinging criticisms of the Service. The low-intensity warfare 
between Armstrong and a Halls-inspired No. 10 lasted until Halls's untimely death in the 
Spring of 1970. In any future study of Fulton, this intra-Service dispute will have to be 
included. 
A further aspect of the Fulton story which was not fully appreciated until the 
archive opened was the effort which went into looking at the issue of administrative 
`hiving-off' in 1969-70. Hiving-off had been mentioned as a topic for further research in 
the Fulton Report and was attempted on a minor scale by the Heath Government elected 
in 1970. But the fact that Wilson ordered work to be done on it in the last days of his 
second Administration adds a new slant even to the 1980s. For hiving-off at this time was 
not clearly separated from what was to become known as privatisation. The Wilson- 
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commissioned research was not extensive, but its existence means that we need to push 
the governmental genesis of this proto-Thatcherite development a year further back. 
The wide-ranging research undertaken by groups affiliated to the Conservative 
Party while in opposition during 1964-70 is another area to which this thesis brings added 
value. The existing literature demonstrated that much happened at this time, with Heath at 
the centre of groups such as those chaired by Dame Evelyn Sharp and Lord 
Normanbrook, advice from Lords Roberthall and Plowden, and the Public Sector 
Research Unit (PSRU) headed by Mark Schreiber and David Howell. After two lengthy 
interviews, several e-mails and a look at the virgin territory of the surviving PSRU 
papers, we now know a little more about the workings of this unit. None of the resulting 
information is ground-breaking, but contains material which is of interest. For example, 
there is the possible first use of the word `privatisation' which was to sweep much of the 
world during the 1980s and 1990s. It also adds a few illustrations and asides about the 
lack of interest on the part of some of Heath's Shadow Cabinet colleagues about 
machinery of government reform 
Our view of how the Conservative planning was presented to the Civil Service 
during the now traditional pre-election private conversations, known as the `Douglas- 
Home rules', is also amended by new evidence. As far as is known, these conversations 
have never been uncovered in the archives before. The material is not detailed but throws 
some light on the Civil Service reaction, for example, to the original thinking behind the 
Central Policy Review Staff. For the Senior Civil Service at this time was still relatively 
self-confident and its top figures were formulating their own plans for machinery of 
government reform. The clash of the two plans, and the way that figures such as Howell 
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were still smarting after more than three decades, provided a highly symbolic victory for 
officialdom. 
Being one of the first historians able to mine the Heath archive in full after the 
documents released under the thirty-year rule reached 1974 in January 2005 facilitated 
several breakthroughs. The archive is bulging with official documents from the 
Conservative victory in June 1970 through to the publication in October 1970 of The 
Reorganisation of Central Government White Paper which contained the blueprint for 
Heath's `new style of government'. For the Conservative plans were, in effect, given by 
Heath to Sir William Armstrong and Sir Burke Trend to deliver. The planning which took 
place within Whitehall was extensive. 
The creation and development of the CPRS and the appointment of Lord Rothschild 
was a story in itself. It had been long known that he was not the first choice, but only with 
the opening of the archive did we know that Rothschild was not even among the first 
eleven to be considered, or that he was the third to be offered the job. About the 
operations of the CPRS itself, much has already been written. Access to the archive has 
not changed our perception very much, but has inevitably brought extra detail, for 
example, a trail showing how Rothschild was the conduit of warnings between Royal- 
Dutch Shell and Heath concerning the threat to oil supplies and prices. 
The first couple of years of the CPRS represent its glory period. By 1973, its 
energetic iconoclasm, against a background of an ever-worsening economic picture, was 
becoming seen by the Whitehall regulars, in Lord Butler's word, as increasingly `zany'. 
This was powerfully underlined by Rothschild's Wantage speech which painted a 
downbeat portrait of the UK's economic future, unfortunately on the same day as Heath 
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gave an upbeat one. The degree to which the dressing-down that Rothschild received 
from the process-obsessed senior civil servants is fascinating. As is the newly-released 
document detailing how the four most senior officials in the land in effect confronted 
Heath and encouraged urgent measures regarding the deteriorating economic position in 
December 1973. 
A dawning realisation during research for this thesis was the relative lack of 
material regarding Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) during the period 1970-74. 
This was the apparatus urged by the PSRU and enshrined in The Reorganisation of 
Central Government, to shine a penetrating light on big expenditure projects in order to 
reduce waste in its broadest sense. The periodic letters to his colleagues that Heath sent 
from 1971 onwards, encouraging them to engage with the PAR process, suggests that 
passion for it was lacking. This lack of interest was presaged by its initial bumpy ride 
through Cabinet. PAR never really achieved that which was hoped for it. 
A final newly-uncovered element was the realisation that in 1973 Heath was far 
from happy about the central machinery over which he was presiding. Following the 
incomplete implementation of, most significantly, the PSRU's grand plans which strove 
to strengthen the Prime Minister's position through the think tank, PAR and a smaller 
Cabinet created through merging departments, Heath complained in the autumn of 1972 
of `the No. 10 problem'. The Prime Minister was increasingly finding that too many 
issues needed him to push them through `to the point of decision'. The complexity of 
modern politics and government - and the media's growing concentration on the person 
at the top - was adding to the pressure. 
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The CPRS and PAR, in their original conceptions, had been attempts to solve this 
problem, but their eventual creation did not fill the gap. Wilson had begun to feel the 
same by the end of his second administration in 1970 and his immediate creation of the 
Downing Street Policy Unit upon returning to No. 10 in 1974 at the beginning of his third 
certainly alleviated the problem, if not solving it. Indeed, it is intriguing to note that 
perhaps the two most important changes to central government in the post-war period 
have been the introduction of senior and more and more numerous politically-appointed 
special advisers and the creation of the Downing Street Policy Unit largely staffed by just 
such appointees. Both were Wilsonian reforms which, compared to Heath's much more 
researched and holistic major changes (none of which lasted very long), stood the test of 
time. 
Let us now turn to the theme of administrative reform during 1960-74 in the round. 
In 2003, Sir Samuel Goldman, the Treasury mandarin who, as head of public expenditure 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, had to grapple with seemingly endless economic 
dislocation, explained that `machinery of government reforms are, on the whole, a waste 
of time'. He was referring to the historically benign economic climate of the early 
twenty-first century which saw the longest sustained period of UK growth for two 
centuries, the lowest inflation and interest rates for forty years, and effectively full 
employment. According to Goldman, two events had made all the difference - the forced 
withdrawal from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 (after an ill-starred 
return in 1990 to a not-quite fixed foreign exchange rate which brought back all the 
pressures of the Bretton Woods era) and the granting of operational independence for 
interest rates to the Bank of England in 1997. 
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These events meant that the British Government no longer had day-to-day 
responsibility for stabilising the pound nor controlling inflation. Government could not 
therefore be blamed for problems in these areas, nor could politics interfere to the degree 
it had previously. (There were, of course, many other reasons for the UK's relative 
economic boom, amongst the most important being the labour market reforms of the 
1980s and the overall global economic climate of the mid-1990s onwards. ) But 
Goldman's point was that until the macro-economics of the nation had been placed on a 
logical and robust footing, all the interference in the world could not improve the 
economy, indeed that ceaseless reforms did harre: `You find again and again that great 
new schemes are put into effect and then within a few years they come unstuck ... If 
government and Ministers left things alone, a bit of laissez-faire as far as the machinery 
of government is concerned, I think on the whole the nation would benefit. '3 
Lord Butler of Brockwell, another very well placed observer of myriad reforms 
over three decades at the centre of British government, provided a contrasting view to 
Goldman's thinking. After a career which took in the CPRS, the Treasury, No. 10 as 
principal Private Secretary and the Cabinet Office as Cabinet Secretary, he was adamant 
that political pressure for reform and the injection of outsiders into institutions such as the 
Treasury undeniably pushed the Treasury to raise their horizons and their game. `I think 
they were beneficial, ' Butler said,, `I think they were very stimulating to government'. 4 
Sir Samuel Brittan, the former DEA special adviser and Financial Times stalwart, 
supported Butler's thinking when he said `that anything that reinforces the analytical 
abilities of No. 10 and takes it away from the hunt of the moment is a good thing ... If 
3 Interview with Sir Samuel Goldman, 3 November 2003. 
4 Interview with Lord Butler of Brockwell, 3 November 2003. 
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you believe [issues] should come out in the open, it's quite important to have in a prime 
minister's department or the Cabinet Office or somewhere an analytical unit which can 
prepare a paper on these differences and what they amount to and how you might resolve 
them' S 
On the surface, there appears a big gulf between Goldman's views on the one hand 
and Butler's and Brittan's on the other. That would be incorrect. While there is clearly a 
difference, one must try to put oneself into the shoes of Goldman, who presided over 
many changes to his public expenditure brief at a time of immense pressure. Goldman 
was talking without caveat and expressing his frustration of what he saw as fiddling with 
the machinery of government when what was actually necessary was bold action on such 
big-picture issues such as industrial relations reform and fixed-exchange rates. It is 
difficult to disagree with him when one considers the instances of institutional reform for 
largely political purposes, such as the splitting of the Treasury to create the Department 
of Economic Affairs and its subsequent `creative tension' - and all the eminently 
avoidable difficulties that entailed. 
A further factor to consider as to why so many reforms were enacted in a short 
period was the practical one of political pressure for something to be done in the face of 
problems. Although Goldman was probably right to say that `a bit of laissez-faire as far 
as the machinery of government is concerned' would have been beneficial, rather than all 
the changes the period 1960-1974 witnessed, government cannot continue indefinitely 
without adapting to the changing outside world. Political controversy will inevitably 
follow a government which does not reform functions or institutions which clearly 
demand alteration. But change for change's sake was equally wrong. This recalls Petronii 
5 Interview with Sir Samuel Brittan, 22 April 2004. 
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Arbitri Satyricon's comment from AD66, a quotation Derek Rayner used in his report on 
defence procurement in 1971: 
We trained hard - but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into 
teams we would be reorganised. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any 
new situation by reorganising, and a wonderful method it can be for creating the 
illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralisation. "' 
In terms of the economy, the irony is that it began to improve once large-scale set- 
piece machinery of government reform had largely ceased. It is difficult to believe that 
the earlier changes had anything other than a very marginal effect on the economy. On 
the other hand, a first-order question is whether changes to the central governmental 
apparatus have the ability to make a strong contribution to the economy at all, as 
suggested by the faith of politicians and officials alike during the 1960s and 1970s? 
Richard Wilding, nearly three decades after he had been Secretary to the Fulton 
Committee, mused on this issue: 
is it really plausible to suppose that if we had been a different set of people with 
different skills, the decisions that turned out good would still have been taken, while 
those which turned out bad would have been avoided? Or, to raise the stakes ä la 
Balogh, that the whole fate of our country between 1945 and 1979 would have been 
different? ... I suggest that the reform of the civil service, taken 
by itself, perhaps 
improved the record over this period by about one per cent, and that if all possible 
6 Petronii Arbitri Satyricon attributed to Gaius Petronius and quoted in Government crganisation for 
Defence Procurement and Civil Aerospace, Cmnd 4641, April 1971. 
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reform of the service had been successfully carried out to the maximum, that might 
have raised that one to about three per cent, with an absolute maximum five per cent, 
half, say, for the increase in guts and determination which the consciousness of 
successful reform might have given the service, and half for better knowledge and 
experience. That five per cent would have been well worth having, and I am far from 
wanting to knock it ... But 
it is a long way from the apocalypse! 
Wilding's analysis suggests that the reforms were only about government itself. In this 
sense, a one per cent improvement in national performance is about right. Yet, if the 
innovations to the economic machinery of government, from Neddy, the DEA, the 
National Plan, the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, and through to the 
interventionist U-turn in 1972, had succeeded then economic performance could have 
risen. Nurturing industrial winners, which in effect all of this boiled down to, only 
happened, somewhat paradoxically, once government admitted it was unable to, and left 
it largely to the market (agriculture and defence excepted). The sale of government 
shareholding in businesses like BP, the privatisations of entire enterprises such as British 
Telecom, British Airways and the utilities led in several cases to the `winners' of which 
the interventionist prime ministers dreamed. 
It would be folly, however, to suggest that the 1980s drive to remove government 
from the economy signalled the end of the era of big government. Welfare provision 
formed another huge swathe of government activity, and even more by way of spending. 
This has not been rolled back in any large way. The reform of welfare, however, falls 
7 Richard Wilding, `The Fulton Report in retrospect', Contemporary Record, Vol. 9, No. 2, Autumn 1995, 
p. 396. 
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outside the remit of this thesis as very little of it took place during the Macmillan, Wilson 
and Heath years. 
But perhaps the most revealing analysis came from Sir William Armstrong in his 
last days as Head of the Home Civil Service in 1974. During a retirement interview with 
Desmond Wilcox, Armstrong was asked `What do you go home and say at moments of 
economic crisis? ' 
`Thank God the Government's influence is so little. ' 
`Would you expand on that? ff 
'I have a very strong suspicion that governments are nothing like as important as 
they think they are, and that the ordinary work of making things and moving things 
about, of transport, manufacture, farming, mining, is so much more important than 
what the Government does, that the Government can make enormous mistakes and 
we can still survive. ' 
`As long as we have our Civil Service. ' 
`No, no. Even in spite of it. '8 
When the foremost apostle of administrative reform talked in this way (albeit during 
convalescence after his breakdown), the heady days of energetic belief by many, but not 
all, high-ranking civil servants in the great power of the Civil Service to effect change 
that no other agency of the state could, was clearly drawing to a close. In a way, these 
words are entirely resonant with the Conservative planners' ideas pre-1970. It is also 
S Interview with Desmond Wilcox for BBC2's Man Alive reproduced in The Listener, 28 March 1974. 
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possible that they pre-echo the Thatcherite drive to `roll back the frontiers of the state'. 9 
In any event, the career of Sir William Armstrong dovetails with the whole story of this 
thesis. Promoted above his superiors in the Treasury by Macmillan, to push through the 
new interventionist policy, integral to the story of the Fulton Report and finally Heath's 
right-hand man as the Prime Minister gravitated away from his Party towards a Civil 
Service embrace, Armstrong's tragic fall came just a few years before the end of 
consciously dirigiste governance and the rise of the New Right. 
While there is a state, there will always be a civil service. The period 1960-74 
represents an ultimately doomed attempt by decent men and women to improve and 
enlarge the state's instruments in order first to halt and later reverse relative economic 
decline, and, thereby improve the lot of the United Kingdom. From the vantage-point of 
the early twenty-first century it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the political zeitgeist 
encouraged successive governments to attempt too much, to take too much responsibility, 
certainly more than it could bear. It is also easy to understand why government did 
overreach, as the `big government' experiment of the twentieth century had not yet 
played itself out and the immense and successful example of the state's mobilisation 
during the Second World War was still powerfully remembered. A belief in government's 
unique ability to remedy or solve most difficulties was a mistake - but an entirely 
understandable and largely unavoidable one. 
9 'We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a 
European level', Margaret Thatcher to the College of Europe (the `Bruges' speech), 20 September 1988. 
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Appendix 
THE FULTON REPORT 
SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
1. The Home Civil Service today is still fundamentally the product of the nineteenth- 
century philosophy of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. The problems it faces are 
those of the second half of the twentieth century. In spite of its many strengths, it is 
inadequate in six main respects for the most efficient discharge of the present and 
prospective responsibilities of government: - 
a) It is still to much based on the philosophy of the amateur (or the 
"generalist" or "all-rounder"). This is most evident in the 
Administrative Class, which holds the dominant position in the 
Service. 
b) The present system of classes in the Service (there are over 1400, each 
for the most part with its own separate pay and career structure) 
seriously impedes its work. 
c) Scientists, engineers and members of other specialist classes are 
frequently given neither the full responsibilities and opportunities nor 
the corresponding authority they ought to have. 
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d) Too few civil servants are skilled managers. 
e) There is not enough contact between the Service and the community it 
is there to serve. 
f) Personnel management and career planning are inadequate. 
For these and other defects the central management of the Service, the Treasury, must 
accept its share of responsibility. 
2. We propose a simple guiding principle for the future. The Service must 
continuously review the tasks it is called on to perform; it should then think out 
what new skills and kinds of men are needed and how these men can be found, 
trained and deployed. 
3. A new Civil Service Department should be set up with wider functions than those 
now performed by the "Pay and Management" group of the Treasury, which it 
should take over. The new department should also absorb the Civil Service 
Commission. 
4. The new department should be under the control of the Prime Minister. We hope 
that he will retain direct responsibility for senior appointments, machinery of 
government and questions of security. Outside this area, we suggest that the Prime 
Minister should delegate day-to-day responsibility to a non-departmental Minister 
of appropriate seniority who is also a member of the Cabinet. 
5. The Permanent Secretary of the Civil Service Department should be designated 
Head of the Home Civil Service. 
I 
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6. All classes should be abolished and replaced by a single, unified grading structure 
covering all civil servants from top to bottom in the non-industrial part of the 
Service. The correct grading of each post should be determined by job evaluation. 
7. The Service should develop greater professionalism both among specialists (e. g. 
scientists and engineers) and administrators (i. e. the new counterparts of the 
present Administrative and Executive Classes). For the former this means more 
training in management, and opportunities for greater responsibility and wider 
careers. For the latter it means enabling them to specialise in particular areas of 
government. We identify two such areas and accordingly recommend the 
development of a group of economic and financial administrators, and a second 
group of social administrators. 
8. Employing departments should have a larger role in recruitment and there should 
be a speeding up of procedures. A majority of us consider that in the recruitment 
of graduates for one or other of the groups of administrators more account should 
be taken of the relevance of their university courses to the job they are being 
recruited to do. 
9. A Civil Service College should be set up. It should provide major training courses 
in administration and management and a wide range of shorter courses. It should 
also have important research functions. The courses provided by the College 
should not be restricted to civil servants; a proportion of places should be set aside 
for men and women from private industrial and commercial firms, local 
government and public corporations. 
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10. More resources should be devoted to the career management of all civil servants. 
All must have the opportunity to progress as far and as fast as their talents and 
appropriate training can take them This involves major changes in promotion 
procedures. 
11. While the Civil Service should remain predominantly a career Service, there 
should be greater mobility between it and other employments. We, therefore, 
recommend an expanded late entry, temporary appointments for fixed periods, 
short-term interchanges of staff and freer movement out of the Service. These 
proposals involve substantial changes in the pension scheme and the replacement 
of "established" status by new terms of employment. 
12. In the interests of efficiency, the principles of accountable management should be 
applied to the organisation of the work of departments. This means the clear 
allocation of responsibilities and authority to accountable units with defined 
objectives. It also means a corresponding addition to the system of government 
accounting. 
13. Management service units with highly qualified and experienced staff should be 
set up in all major departments. 
14. Departments should establish Planning Units. 
15. In addition to the Permanent Secretary, there should also be in most departments a 
Senior Policy Adviser to assist the Minister. The Senior Policy Adviser would 
normally be head of the Planning Unit. His prime job would be to look to and 
prepare for the future and to ensure that present policy decisions are taken with as 
full a recognition as possible of likely future developments. 
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16. In some of the big technical departments, there may be a need for a further senior 
post: a chief scientist, engineer or other specialist. 
17. We do not propose that the Senior Policy Adviser and chief specialist, together 
with the Permanent Secretary, should constitute ä formal board. The working 
arrangements should be informal and variable from department to department and 
from time to time; different Ministers' individual ways of working will do much 
to determine the pattern. 
18. There should be one man who has overall responsibility under the Minister for all 
the affairs of the Department and he should continue to be the Permanent 
Secretary. 
19. A Minister at the head of a department should be able to employ on a temporary 
basis such small numbers of experts as he personally considers he needs to help 
hii 
20. We have suggested a number of further inquiries. Their subjects among others, 
should be: - 
a) The desirability of "hiving off' activities to non-departmental 
organisations; 
b) Ways and means of getting rid of unnecessary secrecy both in policy- 
making and administration; 
c) The new pattern of joint consultation that will be appropriate for the Civil 
Service in the light of the Government's decisions on our report. This 
inquiry should be conducted jointly by the Civil Service Department and 
the staff associations; 
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d) Methods of making recruitment procedures as speedy and objective as 
possible. 
21. If our proposals are accepted, we hope that the Government will take steps to see 
that the progress made in their implementation is reviewed. This could be by an 
annual report to Parliament during the next five years. A small committee might 
be set up at the end of that period if needed. 
22. We have seen that the Service has men and women with the ability, vision and 
enthusiasm needed to carry our proposals through to success. A Civil Service 
reconstructed on the basis of these proposals will, we believe, make possible the 
progressive and efficient conduct of our affairs. 
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Chronology 
1957 
January Macmillan becomes Prime Minister 
1958 
July House of Commons' Select Committee on Estimates reported on Treasury 
Control of Expenditure 
1959 
July Appointment of Plowden Committee on public expenditure 
October Conservatives win general election 
The Apotheosis of the Dilettante published 
1960 
July Derick Heathcote Amory replaced by Selwyn Lloyd as Chancellor 
1961 
July Plowden Report delivered to Lloyd 
July Sterling crisis: emergency economic measures 
August 1st EEC application launched 
October Henry Brooke appointed as newly revived Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
1962 
March First meeting of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) 
June Reginald Maudling replaces Lloyd as Chancellor 
July Treasury reorganisation begins 
October Sir William Armstrong and Sir Laurence Helsby succeed Sir Frank Lee 
and 
Sir Norman Brook as Joint Permanent Secretaries to the Treasury 
1963 
January Sir Burke Trend succeeds Sir Norman Brook as Cabinet Secretary 
January 1st EEC application vetoed 
February NEDC approves 4% growth target 
May Centre for Administrative Studies announced 
October Macmillan resigns, Sir Alec Douglas-Home becomes Prime Minister 
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1964 
Douglas-Home rules on Civil Service-Opposition pre-election private 
consultation inaugurated 
The Fabians' The Administrators published 
October Labour wins general election with overall majority of 5, Harold Wilson 
becomes Prime Minister 
October James Callaghan appointed Chancellor - Department of Economic Affairs 
(DEA) created, George Brown becomes Minister for Economic Affairs 
October Mintech, Welsh Office, Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, Ministry 
of Overseas Development (ODM) created 
October Special advisers appointed to key positions 
November Sterling crisis: emergency Budget 
Conservative Opposition begins wide-ranging policy review 
1965 
July Sterling crisis: public expenditure cuts and other financial measures 
August Edward Heath replaces Douglas-Home as Conservative leader - policy 
review continues 
September National Plan published 
1966 
January Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office merged to form 
the Commonwealth Office 
February Fulton Committee convened 
March Labour wins 1966 general election with majority of 97 
May 2nd EEC application launched 
July Sterling crisis: emergency economic measures 
August George Brown leaves DEA to become Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart 
to DEA 
1967 
March Heath establishes the Marples Unit or, as it became known, the Public 
Sector Research Unit 
August Stewart leaves DEA, replaced by Peter Shore as Secretary of Economic 
Affairs under direct supervision from Wilson 
November Devaluation of the £ from $2.80 to $2.40 accompanied by emergency 
economic measures 
November 2nd EEC application vetoed 
November Callaghan resigns as Chancellor, replaced by Roy Jenkins 
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1968 
January Sir William * Armstrong appointed Head of Home Civil Service, Sir 
Douglas Allen succeeds him on Financial and Economic side of Treasury 
January Major public expenditure cuts announced 
March Gold-dollar-sterling crisis resulted in 'Operation Brutus' contingency 
planning, George Brown resigns 
March Major tax-raising Budget 
April Barbara Castle appointed to enlarged Department for Employment and 
Productivity; Parliamentary Committee (inner cabinet) convened 
April Wilson relinquishes of overall responsibility for DEA 
June Fulton Report published 
November Civil Service Department (CSD) created (Sir William Armstrong leaves 
Treasury to head it), Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Department of 
Health & Social Security formed 
JIC reformed 
1969 
June Open Government White Paper 
October DEA abolished 
October Major enlargement of Mintech and also Local Government and Regional 
Planning 
Parliamentary Committee becomes Management Committee 
1970 
April Civil Service College opened 
June Conservatives win general election with majority of 31, Heath becomes 
Prime Minister 
June Businessmen's team created in CSD 
August Comprehensive review of government functions launched 
October The Reform of Central Government White Paper 
October Department of the Environment created 
October Ministry of Fuel and Power incorporated into the merged Department of 
Trade and Industry 
October ODM merged into FCO 
October Rothschild selected to be head of CPRS after several others offered job 
December Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) first presented to Cabinet 
unsuccessfully 
1971 
January PAR again presented to Cabinet unsuccessfully 
February Central Policy Review Staff begins work 
April PAR eventually agreed by Cabinet 
August 1st CPRS early warning exercise 
August 1 st CPRS forward strategy exercise 
September Sir David Barran of Shell - through Rothschild - warned Heath of possible 
oil crisis 
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1972 
January 1st Miners' strike 
February U-turn' - Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and Rolls-Royce bailed out 
February 2nd CPRS early warning exercise 
March U-turn - Budget 
March Northern Ireland Office created 
April U-turn' - Industry Bill, overseen by secret Cabinet Office team led by Sir 
William Armstrong 
April Defence Procurement Agency hived-off 
May 2nd CPRS forward strategy exercise 
June U-turn - floating of the pound 
June Civil Contingencies Unit created in the Cabinet Office 
July 3rd CPRS early warning exercise 
1973 
January European Secretariat established in the Cabinet Office 
January Counter-Inflation Act which set up the Pay Board and Prices Commission 
January 3 year PAR programme agreed (slipped to January 1974) 
June 3rd CPRS forward strategy exercise 
September Sir John Hunt succeeds Sir Burke Trend as Cabinet Secretary 
September Rothschild's Wantage speech 
November 2nd Miners' strike 
December 4th CPRS early warning exercise begun but completed in May 1974 (after 
Wilson returned as PM) 
December Sir William Armstrong, Sir John Hunt, Sir Douglas Allen and Robert 
Armstrong warn Heath of economic danger ahead 
December Rothschild suffers mild heart attack 
December OPEC cuts supply of oil 
1974 
January Sir William Armstrong suffers mental breakdown 
January Department of Energy spun-off DTI 
February Heath loses election 
March Downing Street Policy Unit created 
April Sir William Armstrong leaves Whitehall 
November 4th (and last) CPRS forward strategy exercise held (after Wilson returned 
as PM) 
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